Que Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels aient à la fin des années 1860 uni la destinée de leur projet de révolution prolétarienne universelle à l’Irlande, est généralement méconnu. Principal obstacle à l’avènement en Angleterre d’un parti ouvrier révolutionnaire, auquel les deux théoriciens avaient assigné le rôle dirigeant de leur stratégie politique, la question irlandaise se devait donc d’être réglée, selon eux, à la faveur de l’indépendance nationale de l’Irlande. Or le fait que jamais ces desseins n’aboutissent, apporte la preuve pour (...) d’aucuns que Marx et Engels s’étaient trompés quant à la nature du problème posé. Qu’en fut-il au juste? L’examen critique dont les deux révolutionnaires allemands font l’objet ne tend-il pas à négliger certains paramètres, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une relecture de l’analyse marxienne vis-à-vis de la question irlandaise? (shrink)

This article is based on the premise that the social and political foundations of the geopolitical entity known as the Irish Free State was of a conservative nature, unique in Western Europe. Of course, conservative forces also featured prominently in the early twentieth-century in other European countries. However, they were counterbalanced by forces of opposition sufficiently powerful to generate a social and political balance that was practically nonexistent within the Irish Free State. When exploring the root cause of Ireland's conservative (...) politics, I identify an ideological connection between the lack of radical forces in the Irish Free State and the revolution through which it was established. In other words, the 1916?23 Irish Revolution indisputably laid the foundations of the ideas that were to become the dominant ideology in southern Ireland during the 1920s and 1930s. (shrink)

We present a theoretical framework bearing on the evolution of written communication. We analyze writing as a special kind of graphic code. Like languages, graphic codes consist of stable, conventional mappings between symbols and meanings, but (unlike spoken or signed languages) their symbols consist of enduring images. This gives them the unique capacity to transmit information in one go across time and space. Yet this capacity usually remains quite unexploited, because most graphic codes are insufficiently informative. They may only be (...) used for mnemonic purposes or as props for oral communication in real-time encounters. Writing systems, unlike other graphic codes, work by encoding a natural language. This allows them to support asynchronous communication in a more powerful and versatile way than any other graphic code. Yet, writing systems will not automatically unlock the capacity to communicate asynchronously. We argue that this capacity is a rarity in non-literate societies, and not so frequent even in literate ones. Asynchronous communication is intrinsically inefficient because asynchrony constrains the amount of information that the interlocutors share and limits possibilities for repair. This would explain why synchronous, face-to-face communication always fosters the development of sophisticated codes (natural languages), but similar codes for asynchronous communication evolve with more difficulties. It also implies that writing cannot have evolved, at first, for supporting asynchronous communication. (shrink)

Cultural forms are constrained by cognitive biases, and writing is thought to have evolved to fit basic visual preferences, but little is known about the history and mechanisms of that evolution. Cognitive constraints have been documented for the topology of script features, but not for their orientation. Orientation anisotropy in human vision, as revealed by the oblique effect, suggests that cardinal orientations, being easier to process, should be overrepresented in letters. As this study of 116 scripts shows, the orientation of (...) strokes inside written characters massively favors cardinal directions, and it is organized in such a way as to make letter recognition easier: Cardinal and oblique strokes tend not to mix, and mirror symmetry is anisotropic, favoring vertical over horizontal symmetry. Phylogenetic analyses and recently invented scripts show that cultural evolution over the last three millennia cannot be the sole cause of these effects. (shrink)

Cognitive gadgets puts forward an ambitious claim: language, mindreading, and imitation evolved by cultural group selection. Defending this claim requires more than Heyes' spirited and effective critique of nativist claims. The latest human “cognitive gadgets,” such as literacy, did not spread through cultural group selection. Why should social cognition be different? The book leaves this question pending. It also makes strong assumptions regarding cultural evolution: it is moved by selection rather than transformation; it relies on high‐fidelity imitation; it requires specific (...) cognitive adaptations to cultural learning. Each of these assumptions raises crucial yet unaddressed difficulties. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. At (...) the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

An ideography is a general-purpose code made of pictures that do not encode language, which can be used autonomously – not just as a mnemonic prop – to encode information on a broad range of topics. Why are viable ideographies so hard to find? I contend that self-sufficient graphic codes need to be narrowly specialized. Writing systems are only an apparent exception: At their core, they are notations of a spoken language. Even if they also encode nonlinguistic information, they are (...) useless to someone who lacks linguistic competence in the encoded language or a related one. The versatility of writing is thus vicarious: Writing borrows it from spoken language. Why is it so difficult to build a fully generalist graphic code? The most widespread answer points to a learnability problem. We possess specialized cognitive resources for learning spoken language, but lack them for graphic codes. I argue in favor of a different account: What is difficult about graphic codes is not so much learning or teaching them as getting every user to learn and teach the same code. This standardization problem does not affect spoken or signed languages as much. Those are based on cheap and transient signals, allowing for easy online repairing of miscommunication, and require face-to-face interactions where the advantages of common ground are maximized. Graphic codes lack these advantages, which makes them smaller in size and more specialized. (shrink)

This paper describes and defends the “virtues of ingenuity”: detachment, lucidity, thoroughness. Philosophers traditionally praise these virtues for their role in the practice of using reasoning to solve problems and gather information. Yet, reasoning has other, no less important uses. Conviction is one of them. A recent revival of rhetoric and argumentative approaches to reasoning (in psychology, philosophy and science studies) has highlighted the virtues of persuasiveness and cast a new light on some of its apparent vices—bad faith, deluded confidence, (...) confirmation and myside biases. Those traits, it is often argued, will no longer look so detrimental once we grasp their proper function: arguing in order to persuade, rather than thinking in order to solve problems. Some of these biases may even have a positive impact on intellectual life. Seen in this light, the virtues of ingenuity may well seem redundant. Defending them, I argue that the vices of conviction are not innocuous. If generalized, they would destabilize argumentative practices. Argumentation is a common good that is threatened when every arguer pursues conviction at the expense of ingenuity. Bad faith, myside biases and delusions of all sorts are neither called for nor explained by argumentative practices. To avoid a collapse of argumentation, mere civil virtues (respect, humility or honesty) do not suffice: we need virtues that specifically attach to the practice of making conscious inferences. (shrink)

Cet article examine le traitement donné par Descartes et certains de ses successeurs d’une question classique, quoique peu étudiée, celle de savoir si l’on peut penser plusieurs choses à la fois. Le thème d’une saisie simultanée est central dans la théorie cartésienne de la connaissance, en particulier dans les Regulæ, où il s’appuie sur le recours à une attention divisée. Restreignant ce pouvoir à la seule imagination, Clauberg voit dans le corps vivant le paradigme de la simultanéité. Spinoza offre quant (...) à lui un point de vue synthétique : la simultanéité dans le corps et l’esprit sont des expressions de la puissance individuelle et de son progrès. L’attention n’est plus comme chez Descartes une condition de la simultanéité intellectuelle, mais un obstacle qu’il s’agit de surmonter pour comprendre plus et mieux. (shrink)

Research on the influence of industry on chemical regulation has mostly been conducted within the framework of the production of ignorance. This special issue extends this research by looking at how industry asserts its interests––not just in the scientific sphere but also at other stages of policy-making and regulatory process––with a specific focus on the types of tools or instruments industry has used. Bringing together sociologists and historians specialized in Science and Technology Studies, the articles of the special issue study (...) the arenas in which instruments and practical guidelines for public policy are negotiated or used. The aim is to observe the devices in the making or in action, from the selection of actors to the production of thresholds, criteria, and other technical regulations. The introduction highlights how industry influence on expertise and regulation is undoubtedly far more pervasive and multifarious than has been conceptualized to date by social scientists. Putting this issue back at the heart of both the STS and social sciences research agendas is increasingly urgent and could lead to new inquiries able to highlight these logics even more widely, using fresh empirical examples. (shrink)

This book builds on recent scholarship highlighted in the edited collections, Philosophie, histoire, biologie: mélanges offerts à Jean Gayon (Merlin & Huneman, 2018) and Knowledge of Life Today (Gayon & Petit 2018/2019). While honoring the career and the thought of Jean Gayon (1949-2018), this book showcases the continued relevance of Gayon’s interdisciplinary work and illustrates his central place in the community of historians and philosophers of the life sciences. Chapters in this book address Jean Gayon’s intellectual trajectory from historical epistemology (...) to the philosophy of biology, the nature and scope of his philosophical approach to the history of science, and his unique contributions to the history and epistemology of biological concepts and theories. Drawing on published and unpublished sources, the book explores some of Gayon’s most significant contributions to the philosophy, history, and social studies of biology. (shrink)

Suspicion of “physics envy” surrounds the standard statistical toolbox used in the empirical sciences, from biology to psychology. Mainstream methods in these fields, various lines of criticism point out, often fall short of the basic requirements of measurement. Quantitative scales are applied to variables that can hardly be treated as measurable magnitudes, like preferences or happiness; hypotheses are tested by comparing data with conventional significance thresholds that hardly mention effect sizes. This article discusses what I call “shmeasurement.” To “shmeasure” is (...) to fail to apply quantitative tools to quantitative questions. We “shmeasure” when we try to measure what cannot be measured, or, conversely, when we ask binary questions of continuous measurements. Following the critics of standard statistical tools, it is argued that our statistical toolbox is indeed less concerned with the measurement of magnitudes than we take it to be. This article adds, however, that measurement is not all there is to scientific activity. Most techniques of proof do not resemble measurement as much as voting—a practice that makes frequent use of numbers, figures, or measurements, yet is not chiefly concerned with assessing quantities. Measurement is only one among three functions of the scientific toolbox, the other two being collating observations and deciding which hypotheses to relinquish. I thus make a plea for “shmeasurement”: the mismeasure of things starts to make more sense once we take into account the nonquantitative side of scientific practice. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to give a critical discussion of Sartre’s concept of sexual desire and its relation to self-identity and freedom. Why Sartre? Sartre is one of very few philosophers who offers a systematic account of sexual desire. He has influenced eminent philosophical concepts of sexual desire held by, for instance, de Beauvoir, Lacan, Foucault, Levinas, Irigaray and Butler, but not much is written about his own notion of sexual desire. This alone is reason to explore Sartre’s (...) view. What makes his view of sexual desire particularly interesting is that it is framed by his theory of freedom. Sartre offers the original, radical notion that freedom is absolute. Because consciousness is never self-identical, he argues, human identity is not fixed. Instead, we are consequently nothing else but what we keep desiring to make of ourselves. He concludes that we are always free to choose our drives and desires, even what seem to be our most enslaving, natural sexual instincts. The question raised in this article, however, concerns what the nature of sexual desire is and how free we really are to choose our sexual desires. I first contextualise Sartre’s view of sexual desire within his notion of desire in general and its relation to instinct, drive, consciousness, freedom and identity. Then, I give a detailed discussion of his analysis of sexual desire, its relation to freedom, and, what Sartre calls its failures. Finally, I discuss a critique of, and alternative to, Sartre’s theory of sexual desire from the perspective of my own notion of heteronomous and autonomous desire and freedom. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à rendre compte de la signification du concept d'habitus que nous retrouvons chez Michel Henry en tentant de le situer par rapport aux principaux concepts qui sont au fondement de la phénoménologie matérielle.

Cet article veut démontrer l’importance de la temporalité dans le champ des études queer. Notre objectif premier est de souligner que le concept de queer se révèle être fondamentalement un concept temporel qui se déploie de manière dynamique et transitoire. Par l’entremise du concept de résistance foucaldienne, nous insistons pour montrer qu’au cœur de la temporalité queer s’expose aussi bien une négativité — une critique de la temporalité hétéronormative — qu’une positivité — la création de nouvelles manières de vivre temporellement.

Dans les Cours d'Esthétique, qu'il prononce à Berlin entre 1820 et 1829, Hegel propose une théorie de la musique et analyse le rapport de celle-ci avec les autres arts dans l'ensemble du système philosophique. Mais comment le philosophe, qui n'est pas connaisseur, peut-il penser la musique de son temps? Sur quelle base se construit la réflexion? Et comment la reconstituer scientifiquement à partir des différentes sources? Le présent ouvrage apporte une réponse à ces questions en replaçant le discours hégélien dans (...) l'arrière-plan socio-historique de la vie musicale contemporaine, et en reconstituant, pour la première fois, la théorie de Hegel à partir des manuscrits inédits des différents cours. La spéculation apparaît alors dans toute son originalité, comme le prolongement des multiples expériences faites au théâtre et au concert. La conception de la musique comme manifestation de l'esprit absolu se vérifie alors dans l'expérience la plus concrète. (shrink)

To be optimistic, it is standardly assumed, is to have positive expectations. I here argue that this definition is correct but captures only one variety of optimism – here called factual optimism. It leaves out two other important varieties of optimism. The first – focal optimism – corresponds to the idea of seeing the glass half full. The second – axiological optimism – consists in the view that good is stronger than bad. Those three varieties of optimism are irreducible to (...) each other and do not belong to a common kind. I define each of these, characterize their respective correctness conditions, and contrast hope with optimism. (shrink)

Can one refute Berkeleyan phenomenalism by arguing that sensory objects seem mind-independent, and that, according to Berkeley, experience is to be taken at face value? Relying on Mackie’s recent discussion of the issue, I argue, first, that phenomenalism cannot be straightforwardly refuted by relying on perceptual or bodily experience of mind-independence together with the truthfulness of experience. However, I maintain, second that phenomenalism can be indirectly refuted by appealing to the bodily experience of resistance. Such experience presents us with the (...) causal activity of the resisting physical object. If experience is truthful, as the phenomenalist has it, physical objects are causally active. But then their effects no longer depend on our perceiving them, on pain of overdetermination. (shrink)

Phenomenology is an emerging field within the broader domain of African and Africana philosophy. The phenomenological method, with its various approaches to studying the meaning of lived experience, is at the core of the thought of African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, Dismas A. Masolo, Achille Mbembe, Mabogo More, Tsenay Serequeberhan, Noel Chabani Manganyi, and proponents of Africana Philosophy such as WEB Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Lucius Outlaw, Lewis Gordon, George Yancy, and Linda Martin Alcoff. Technically, the term “African phenomenology” (...) is not used as widely, or introduced as systematically, as Africana phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to introduce some of the central issues and theorists of the field of African phenomenology. As the subtitle of this chapter indicates, its scope is limited to what one may call introductory perspectives in African phenomenology. The idea is to outline for further investigation some thematically related contributions to African phenomenology with specific reference to the grounding work of Paulin Hountondji as related to works of Kwasi Wiredu and Dismas A. Masolo. Hountondji’s critical adoption of Husserl’s classic phenomenological approach offers a broad, foundational scope, which makes it particularly suitable for a basic introduction to African phenomenology. (shrink)

In African Philosophy and Enactivist Cognition: The Space of Thought (2023), Bruce B. Janz introduces what he calls an enactivist African philosophy. The book makes a significant contribution to African philosophy as no other work has yet made the connection between African philosophy and enactivism. This article’s aim is to give a critical response to the book. It starts with some background by connecting Enactivist Cognition with Janz’s earlier Philosophy in an African Place (2009). This is followed by a brief (...) discussion of his introduction to enactivist African philosophy and its connection to texts in African philosophy. The article closes with a discussion of some issues that Enactivist Cognition raises. (shrink)

This chapter has three sections. The first introduces Brentano’s view of sensations by presenting the intentional features of sensations irreducible to features of the sensory objects. The second presents Brentano’s view of sensory objects —which include sensory qualities— and the features of sensations that such objects allow to explain, such as their intensity. The third section presents Brentano’s approach to sensory pleasures and pains, which combines both appeal to specific modes of reference and to specific sensory qualities.

Urban agriculture is an important source of food and income throughout Africa. The majority of cultivators on the continent are women who use urban agriculture to provide for their family. Much research on urban agriculture in Africa focuses on the material benefits of urban agriculture for women, but a smaller body of literature considers its social and psychological empowering effects. The present study seeks to contribute to this debate by looking at the ways in which urban agriculture empowers women on (...) the Cape Flats, a region of Cape Town where urban agriculture is supported by nongovernmental organisations. Based on interviews with cultivators, the findings show that NGO-run urban agriculture projects not only aid food security, but also help women to develop supportive networks that unlock benefits across the personal, social and economic spectrum. (shrink)

Hans KELSEN, le plus célèbre philosophe du droit issu du rang des juristes, est surtout connu pour avoir fondé une école juridique (l'Ecole de Vienne) qui radicalise la doctrine du positivisme juridique. Il a défendu, sa vie durant, une conception normativiste du droit et la thèse d'une stricte séparation entre le droit et la science du droit. Si l'on connaît bien en France son ouvrage programmatique sur la Théorie pure du droit, dans sa deuxième édition traduite par Charles Eisenmann, on (...) sait au moins que cette seconde édition, publiée en 1960, n'est pas l'expression définitive de sa pensée. La traduction de la Théorie générale des normes, qui est un ouvrage posthume et inachevé, donne au lecteur français l'occasion de découvrir cette pensée dans ses derniers développements qui rompent en partie avec ceux de l'œuvre précédente. Le Maître viennois y poursuit l'analyse de la norme juridique, entamée dans la Théorie pure du droit, mais il l'approfondit sur certains points et l'infléchit sur d'autres. Il introduit ainsi de nouvelles réflexions sur la signification de la norme et sur ses fonctions, sur l'application et l'interprétation de la norme et également sur le rapport entre la norme et le langage, insistant notamment sur la distinction entre la norme et l'énoncé sur la norme. Par ailleurs, il considère la religion et le droit comme deux ordres normatifs similaires, ce qui le conduit à proposer une théorie vraiment " générale " des normes et non pas seulement une théorie juridique des normes. Il avance une nouvelle interprétation de la norme fondamentale en recourant à l'idée de fiction juridique. Enfin, dans la dernière partie du livre, Kelsen donne le dernier état de sa pensée sur le problème majeur de l'application de la logique au droit. Rompant avec son logicisme antérieur, il nie l'existence d'une logique spécifique au droit et conteste l'application de la logique syllogistique au processus d'application du droit, renouant ainsi avec un volontarisme juridique qu'il avait rejeté au début de son œuvre. Dans cet ouvrage, sous couvert de bâtir une théorie générale des normes, Kelsen construit une théorie de l'interprétation des normes. Il propose donc une herméneutique juridique originale qui intéressera tous ceux qui étudient les sciences normatives (juristes, mais aussi théologiens et spécialistes de l'éthique). Il engage un dialogue avec les représentants anglo-américains de la philosophie du droit, de l'éthique ou de la logique, et il renoue le dialogue avec les auteurs influents à Vienne au début du siècle. (shrink)

In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome (...) a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo pretende mostrar que a teoria das ideias de Hume náo apresenta apropriadamente uma soluçáo cética para o problema da justificaçáo das crenças, mas, sobretudo, uma soluçáo naturalista. Uma investigaçáo empirista como a de Hume prioriza as impressões sensíveis no processo cognitivo da natureza humana ao mesmo tempo em que reconhece as dificuldades em se extrair ideias diretamente de impressões, o que pode ocasionar a dúvida e a suspensáo das crenças. Como mitigaçáo ao ceticismo, Hume propõe uma intervençáo (...) terapêutica, visando uma descriçáo das crenças naturais mais do que a sua suspensáo devido à ausência de fundamentaçáo racional. Palavras-chave: Ceticismo. Crenças naturais. Hume. Naturalismo. (shrink)

Le Dictionnaire de la pensée politique présente, sous une forme simple et accessible, les principaux courants d'idées, les grands débats philosophiques et les auteurs majeurs de la pensée politique occidentale. Il couvre toutes les périodes de l'histoire depuis l'Antiquité et aborde une très grande diversité de thèmes : la philosophie des Anciens, les doctrines du Moyen Age, l'humanisme de la Renaissance, les grands projets des lumières, mais aussi les réflexions sur le pouvoir, la justice, l'État, la nation, la démocratie, le (...) socialisme, le libéralisme, le totalitarisme ou le communautarisme. Guidé par un souci de rigueur, de concision et de clarté, il présente les idées politiques dans leur rapport avec les évolutions sociales, politiques et culturelles de l'Europe et du monde. Certaines notices sont consacrées à un auteur et à son œuvre. D'autres traitent un concept ou une idée philosophique centrale ayant nourri la réflexion sur le pouvoir et la société. D'autres enfin, privilégiant un angle historique, analysent l'évolution d'une sensibilité doctrinale ou intellectuelle. Le dictionnaire s'adresse aux étudiants des cursus de philosophie, de droit, d'histoire et de science politique. Il sera particulièrement utile aux étudiants de Sciences-Po et aux élèves des classes préparatoires. Il offre à chacun les moyens d'approfondir ses connaissances sur les grands débats qui ont influencé le cours de l'histoire. (shrink)

The role of foundation with respect to transitive closure in the Zermelo system Z has been investigated by Boffa; our aim is to explore the role of antifoundation. We start by showing the consistency of "Z antifoundation transitive closure" relative to Z (by a technique well known for ZF). Further, we introduce a "weak replacement principle" (deductible from antifoundation and transitive closure) and study the relations among these three statements in Z via interpretations. Finally, we give some adaptations for ZF (...) without infinity. (shrink)

Epistemologists have generally accepted that competently deduced, known conclusions must issue from known premises, as the principle of Counter-Closure demands; however, some have recently challenged the notion, arguing that knowledge may be inferred from non-knowledge. In this paper, I focus on the yet unexamined topic of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief with regard to Greco's virtue-epistemic framework, which he refers to as ‘agent reliabilism’. I argue that agent reliabilism allows for instances of Counter-Closure violation. In presenting my argument, I construct (...) and provide an analysis of a case that challenges Counter-Closure, and defend the case against various possible objections, including some that feature in mainstream Counter-Closure literature. I contend that, if my analysis is accepted, Greco is left with two options: either he rejects Counter-Closure, or he must substantially revise his view in such a way as to preserve Counter-Closure in light of cases of inferential knowledge from Gettiered belief. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is mainly to give a model of paraconsistent logic satisfying the "Frege comprehension scheme" in which we can develop standard set theory (and even much more as we shall see). This is the continuation of the work of Hinnion and Libert.