It was not long ago when the consciousness was not considered a problem for science. However, this has now changed and the problem of consciousness is considered the greatest challenge to science. In the last decade, a great number of books and articles have been published in the field, but very few have focused on the how consciousness evolves and develops, and what characterizes the transitions between different conscious states, in animals and humans. This book addresses these (...) questions. Renowned researchers from different fields of science (including neurobiology, evolutionary biology, ethology, cognitive science, computational neuroscience and philosophy) contribute with their results and theories in this book, making it a unique collection of the state-of-the-art of this young field of consciousness studies. - First book on the topic - Focus on different levels of consciousness, including: Evolutionary, developmental, and functional - Highly interdisciplinary. (shrink)

The article discusses the peculiarities and specific features of phenomenological approach developed in contemporary analytical philosophy. Despite the fact that the trust in phenomenological approaches continue to grow in analytical philosophy, it is necessary to recognize the presence of noticeable divergence between the classical transcendental phenomenology of E. Husserl and contemporary versions of phenomenology in analytical philosophy. The article examines some of these divergences. It is shown that, unlike the skepticism of transcendental phenomenology in relation to scientific methodology in the (...) research of consciousness, the analytical tradition of phenomenology is oriented toward cooperative dialogue with science. Phenomenology in analytical philosophy places great hopes on the possibility of making consciousness a subject of joint research of neuroscientists and phenomenologists. The article claims that in the course of realization of this task, phenomenology in analytical tradition often starts to be interpreted from realistic and partly from naturalistic positions, and that does not meet the project of transcendental phenomenology. As an illustration of this idea, certain approaches of analytical phenomenology are considered, in particular: phenomena are interpreted from the point of view of logical and linguistic analysis, intentionality is connected with the activity of the brain and is located in the natural world, phenomenal consciousness is interpreted as the awareness of a high order, and the phenomena have a gradual nature and are often identified only with sensual experience, which implies a correlative correspondence of the substrate data of brain physiology. In that regard, there are reasons to interpret phenomenological theories that are funded by analytical tradition as an example of a specific phenomenology of non-transcendental origin. (shrink)

What processes of the brain or the mind can explain the uniquely personal experience we have of smelling a rose, or feeling the pain of toothache, or seeing the point of a newspaper cartoon, or sensing a pang of post-modernist angst in the run up to the Millenium. The phenomenon of humanhigher-order consciousness has puzzled philosophers, naturalists, and theologians down the ages. Now, somewhat belatedly, consciousness has caught the interest of scientists, some of whom believe they are on (...) the brink of discovering its basis in neurobiological processes. This book, drawing together leading figures from the spheres of science and philosophy, is about the prospects of finding a scientific explanation of consciousness. And it is also about how our view of ourselves could be affected by such a scientific explanation. Until recently, the vast complexityof the brain had kept researchers from tackling the thorny topic of consciousness. But now, new imaging techniques are revealing many of the brain's mysteries to neuroscientists, while some researchers in the field of artificial intelligence believe they will be able to replicate consciousness withsilicon and circuitry. Meanwhile, philosophers continue to take issue with the methodology used by science to investigate this phenomenon. These are the issues that are debated in this book, in which exponenets of each view have the opportunity to argue their case, and the result is a collectionthat will both enlighten all those interested in the question of consciousness, and stimulate debate among those at the forefront of research in the many fields now investigating it. (shrink)

In recent years consciousness has become a significant area of study in the cognitive sciences. The Frontiers of Consciousness is a major interdisciplinary exploration of consciousness. The book stems from the Chichele lectures held at All Souls College in Oxford, and features contributions from a 'who's who' of authorities from both philosophy and psychology. The result is a truly interdisciplinary volume, which tackles some of the biggest and most impenetrable problems in consciousness. The book includes chapters (...) considering the apparent explanatory gap between science and consciousness, our conscious experience of emotions such as fear, and of willed actions by ourselves and others. It looks at subjective differences between two ways in which visual information guides behaviour, and scientific investigation of consciousness in non-human animals. It looks at the challenges that the mind-brain relation presents for clinical practice as well as for theories of consciousness. The book draws on leading research from philosophy, experimental psychology, functional imaging of the brain, neuropsychology, neuroscience, and clinical neurology. Distinctive in its accessibility, authority, and its depth of coverage, Frontiers of Consciousness will be a groundbreaking and influential addition to the consciousness literature. (shrink)

The catastrophe of the eye -- A new view of seeing -- Applying the new view of seeing -- The illusion of seeing everything -- Some contentious points -- Towards consciousness -- Types of consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness, raw feel, and why they're hard -- Squeeze a sponge, drive a porsche : a sensorimotor account of feel -- Consciously experiencing a feel -- The sensorimotor approach to color -- Sensory substitution -- The localization of touch -- The (...) phenomenality plot -- Consciousness. (shrink)

“This is surely the ultimate expression of the top-down approach to consciousness, written with Sommerhoff's characteristic clarity and precision. It says far more than other books four times the size of this admirably concise volume. This book is destined to become a pillar of the subject.” —Rodney Cotterill, Technical University of Denmark The problem of consciousness has been described as a mystery about which we are still in a terrible muddle and in Understanding Consciousness: Its Function and (...) Brain Processes, the author attempts to unravel this mystery by offering a clarification of the main concepts related to consciousness, and positing a comprehensive biological explanation. Consequently, this book will be ideal for a wide-range of upper level undergraduate and postgraduate courses. The author interprets consciousness as a property that can be possessed by many creatures lacking a language faculty and comprises all of the following: awareness of the surrounding world; awareness of the self as an entity; and awareness of such things as thoughts and feelings. He argues that a biological approach can achieve both the necessary conceptual clarifications and a joint explanation of these divisions of awareness in terms of just two accurately defined concepts of 'internal representation' and two empirically supported assumptions about the functional architecture of a specific set of brain processes. Despite this striking simplicity, his model covers these divisions of awareness both as objective faculties of the brain and as subjective experience. These conclusions are applied to a broad range of fundamental questions, including the biological rationale of subjective experience and where consciousness resides in the neural networks. (shrink)

In the beginning: introduction -- This I believe: preview -- This they believe: other views -- Where it begins: anatomy and environment -- Where it began: evolution -- What is it?: consciousness -- There was the word: self-consciousness and language -- See here: attention -- Perhaps to dream: sleep -- x=2y: representation -- The dance of life: movement -- They all fall down: dissolution of function -- Been there, done that: experience -- Which have eyes and see not: (...) stimulus hierarchy -- Buy one, get one free: volition -- Play it again: speculative reprise -- In the end: conclusion. (shrink)

The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells (...) of the body, which communicate via gap junctions and electrical potentials to create this unified space. We use 3D llustrations to explain how both visual and non-visual sensory information may be filled-in within this dynamic space, creating a unified seamless conscious experience. This neural sensory memory space is likely generated by baseline neural oscillatory activity from the default mode network, other salient networks, brainstem, and reticular activating system. (shrink)

Reprint, in paper covers, of the Columbia U. Press edition of 1990. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Philosophers of mind have been arguing for decades about the nature of phenomenal consciousness and the relation between brain and mind. More recently, neuroscientists and philosophers of science have entered the discussion. Which neural activities in the brain constitute phenomenal consciousness, and how could science distinguish the neural correlates of consciousness from its neural constitution? At what level of neural activity is consciousness constituted in the brain and what might be learned from well-studied phenomena like binocular (...) rivalry, attention, memory, affect, pain, dreams and coma? What should the science of consciousness want to know and what should explanation look like in this field? How should the constitution relation be applied to brain and mind and are other relations like identity, supervenience, realization, emergence and causation preferable? Building on a companion volume on the constitution of visual consciousness, this volume addresses these questions and related empirical and conceptual territory. It brings together, for the first time, scientists and philosophers to discuss this engaging interdisciplinary topic. (shrink)

The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive (systems level) neuroscience (...) informing basic questions about the structure and biological basis of conscious states. This book describes the latest advances in understanding hypnosis and similar trance states by researchers within the neuroscience of consciousness. It contains many new and exciting contributions from up and coming researchers and provides a lively debate on methodological and theoretical issues central to the development of emerging research paradigms in the neuroscience of conscious states. The book introduces and describes many of the recent new tools that have become available to researchers in this field. Academics, researchers, and clinicians wanting to develop their knowledge of the latest findings, theories and methods in the scientific study of hypnosis and related states of consciousness will find this an up to date guide to this rapidly advancing field. (shrink)

A new theory about the origins of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the evolutionary transition to basic consciousness. What marked the evolutionary transition from organisms that lacked consciousness to those with consciousness—to minimal subjective experiencing, or, as Aristotle described it, “the sensitive soul”? In this book, Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka propose a new theory about the origin of consciousness that finds learning to be the driving force in the transition (...) to basic consciousness. Using a methodology similar to that used by scientists when they identified the transition from non-life to life, Ginsburg and Jablonka suggest a set of criteria, identify a marker for the transition to minimal consciousness, and explore the far-reaching biological, psychological, and philosophical implications. After presenting the historical, neurobiological, and philosophical foundations of their analysis, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose that the evolutionary marker of basic or minimal consciousness is a complex form of associative learning, which they term unlimited associative learning (UAL). UAL enables an organism to ascribe motivational value to a novel, compound, non-reflex-inducing stimulus or action, and use it as the basis for future learning. Associative learning, Ginsburg and Jablonka argue, drove the Cambrian explosion and its massive diversification of organisms. Finally, Ginsburg and Jablonka propose symbolic language as a similar type of marker for the evolutionary transition to human rationality—to Aristotle's “rational soul.”. (shrink)

The phenomenon of hypnosis provides a rich paradigm for those seeking to understand the processes that underlie consciousness. Understanding hypnosis tells us about a basic human capacity for altered experiences that is often overlooked in contemporary western societies. Throughout the 200 year history of psychology, hypnosis has been a major topic of investigation by some of the leading experimenters and theorists of each generation. Today hypnosis is emerging again as a lively area of research within cognitive neuroscience informing basic (...) questions about the structure and biological basis of conscious states. This book describes the latest advances in understanding hypnosis and similar trance states by researchers within the neuroscience of consciousness. It contains many new and exciting contributions from up and coming researchers and provides a lively debate on methodological and theoretical issues central to the development of emerging research paradigms in the neuroscience of conscious states. The book introduces and describes many of the recent new tools that have become available to researchers in this field. Academics, researchers, and clinicians wanting to develop their knowledge of the latest findings, theories and methods in the scientific study of hypnosis and related states of consciousness will find this an up to date guide to this rapidly advancing field. (shrink)

In this volume the author tackles this problem in a rigorous analysis which begins with the general dynamics of living systems and leads the reader step-by-step ...

How making up our minds and the makeup of our minds can help us live better and die better. We live in a climate where feelings trump reason and evidence. Lies are treated as "alternative facts." At the same time, it seems our culture does not want us to treat altered or higher states of consciousness seriously. Focusing both on evidence and on such states of consciousness can reorient our attitudes. Jack Crittenden asks the reader to think about (...) life after death, about the basis of morality and the essence of spirituality, about the meaning of happiness, about the path of dying, and about the proper role of work in our lives and how education connects to that role. What if our memories, thoughts, and whole personality lived on after we died? What if morality were based on reasons and evidence and not on God and sacred texts? What if happiness lies not in what we think, how we feel, and what we long for, but in living in the present and in the dying of the self itself? Experiences of and the evidence on altered and higher states of consciousness can lead us to better lives and better deaths. (shrink)

The human brain is the first computer to which all others are compared. Yet we know painfully little about how a brain accomplishes its peculiar computations. In particular, consciousness is at once familiar and mysterious, and needs to be understood both for science and for medicine. Boldly, but gently this book introduces a reader to the neural circuitry that achieves consciousness. This amazing interconnection enables consciousness to flow like a stream, intimately relevant to the outside world; and (...) for this to happen, fundamental cues emerge from mental images to bring forth associated recalls. Alas cues can be inconsistent, causing memory failure; fortunately a subliminal cue editor encourages remembering forgotten items. Furthermore, cues generally address several memories, forcing the brain to make a selection. This necessitates another special circuit whose purpose is subliminal editing. The simplified explanations provided in this book make it clear that neurons do far more than ordinary devices, since a single neuron is capable of remarkably dense combinational and sequential logic. Beginning with their interesting and unexpected logical behavior, the reader will genuinely enjoy Dr. Burger's synthesis of a system for biological consciousness, a system that may someday result in credible artificial consciousness. (shrink)

The Problem of Consciousness This chapter will introduce you to consciousness and its most important characteristics. We will look at definitions of consciousness, and examine what it means to say that consciousness is a private experience. We will look at the idea that it is like something to be you or me. The chapter mentions ideas and themes that will be covered in more detail in the rest of the book, and explains why the topic is (...) an important one. Research on consciousness is big on questions but shorter on answers. Nevertheless these questions are central to what it means to be human, or indeed at the heart of what it's like to be anything - what it's like to be conscious. Think of yourself just now. What does it feel like you to be you right at this moment? Think of a loved one. What do you think it is like to be them? Do they know exactly what they're feeling, and do you know just what they're feeling? We might have some idea, but the answer in both cases is no, and not only "no", we can't see how we ever could know for sure. It's my consciousness and your consciousness. (shrink)

This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently (...) encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of mind, clinical psychology, and other related fields ultimately refer to a unified natural process, analysed under four general aspects. The proposed taxonomy will, it is hoped, possess sufficient clarity to serve as a sound theoretical framework for further scientific studies, and to count as a significant step in the direction of a properly formulated unified concept of consciousness. (shrink)

Contemporary culture increasingly suffers from problems of attention, over-stimulation, and stress, and a variety of personal and social discontents generated by deceptive body images. This book argues that improved body consciousness can relieve these problems and enhance one's knowledge, performance, and pleasure. The body is our basic medium of perception and action, but focused attention to its feelings and movements has long been criticised as a damaging distraction that also ethically corrupts through self-absorption. In Body Consciousness, Richard Shusterman (...) refutes such charges by engaging the most influential twentieth-century somatic philosophers and incorporating insights from both Western and Asian disciplines of body-mind awareness. Rather than rehashing intractable ontological debates on the mind-body relation, Shusterman reorients study of this crucial nexus towards a more fruitful, pragmatic direction that reinforces important but neglected connections between philosophy of mind, ethics, politics, and the pervasive aesthetic dimensions of everyday life. (shrink)

Anthropology of the Brain In this unique exploration of the mysteries of the human brain, Roger Bartra shows that consciousness is a phenomenon that occurs not only in the mind but also in an external network, a symbolic system. He argues that the symbolic systems created by humans in art, language, in cooking or in dress, are the key to understanding human consciousness.

In Sherrington's Loom, Alan McComas provides a historical account of the research that has led to recognition of key mechanisms underlying consciousness. Evidence is assembled from a rich variety of sources--neurological patients, animal behavior, laboratory studies, and especially brain stimulation and recording in humans and animals. Among the remarkable advances in the field has been the ability to identify nerve cells in the human brain that store memories of specific people, places, and objects. In addition to dealing with the (...) issue of "free will," the book assembles the information into possible working models for sensations, intentions, and actions. McComas concludes by considering the possibility of consciousness in artificially intelligent systems. (shrink)

A succinct, neurobiological explanation of the pathways that 'wake up the brain' from deep anesthesia, sleep and brain injury.

We need to clarify at least four aspects of selfhood if we are to reach a better understanding of consciousness in general, and of its alternate states. First, how did we develop our self-centred psychophysiology? Second, can the four familiar lobes of the brain alone serve, if only as preliminary landmarks of convenience, to help understand the functions of our many self-referent networks? Third, what could cause one's former sense of self to vanish from the mental field during (...) an extraordinary state of consciousness? Fourth, when a person's physical and psychic self do drop off briefly, how has conscious experience then been transformed? In particular, what happens to that subject's personal sense of time? Our many-sided self arose in widely distributed brain networks. Since infancy, these self-oriented circuits have been over-conditioned by limbic biases. Selfhood then seems to have evolved along lines suggesting at least in shorthand the operations of a kind of ‘I-Me-Mine’ complex. But what happens when this egocentric triad briefly dissolves? Novel states of consciousness emerge. Two personally-observed states are discussed: insight-wisdom ; internal absorption. How do these two states differ phenomenologically? The physiological processes briefly suggested here emphasize shifts in deeper systems, and pivotal roles for thalamo-cortical interactions in the front and back of the brain. (shrink)

Human beings seem to have been always aware of something they called consciousness and have not stopped wondering what it is, what it does, where it came from, and why we have it. This book is testimony to the continuous attempts to crack the riddle, in the 21st century no less, if not even more than before. The book expresses two major convictions. One is that consciousness has a multiplicity of aspects, which need to be considered in (...) order to deepen understanding of this phenomenon and of ourselves. These include in the very least biology, philosophy, religion, mathematics, physics, physiology, and psychology. The other is that the next phase of human evolution may well be the evolution of consciousness - its expansion, development, and enhanced ability on our part to recognise and control it, shape it and put it to our use for improving our chances of survival and enhancing our happiness. This book is aimed at contributing towards the attainment of this goal. (shrink)

In Cognitive science and philosophy of consciousness, the explanatory gap, following Joseph Levine, refers to the unintelligible link between our conscious mental life and its corresponding objective physical explanation; the gap in our understanding of how consciousness is related to a physical or a physiological substrate :354–361, 1983). David Chalmers holds the explanatory gap as the evidence for a form of metaphysical dualism between consciousness and physical reality. On the other hand, McGinn takes it as an (...) epistemic rather than an ontological gap. Considering the recent advances in neuroscience, however, the reductionist approaches have become replete, which attempt to reduce consciousness and subjectivity to neurobiological accounts. On this view, consciousness mirrors the brain mechanisms, and the self is formulated as an illusory product or construct of neuronal processes. Thomas Fuchs, who is committed to embodied and enactive approaches toward cognition, in Ecology of the Brain, espouses an enactive-ecological perspective concerning the problem of the explanatory gap. He develops an account of human’s life in its dual aspects of the living body and lived body which, on the one hand, defies the ontological dualism and, on the other hand, avoids drifting towards any form of reductionism. Often, the ontologically monistic approaches to the explanatory gap have inclined to a form of reductionism because they conceive consciousness as either identical with its physiological substrate or caused by it, where in both cases, consciousness is claimed to be explainable within the framework of physicalism. Fuchs, however, defends an ontological monism which remains irreconcilable with reductionism. In his account of dual aspects, there is no interaction or impact between the sphere of subjectivity and nature; however, these two aspects imply one another. In this essay, I will develop the philosophical justification of the above reformulation of the mind–body problem and employing the analogy of light will canvass the paradoxical relationship between dual aspects in a phenomenological framework. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of consciousness when defined in the terms mind, spirit, soul and awareness. It consists of the edited proceedings of a colloquium held in Cordoba, at which experts in physics, neuro- and psycho-physiology, analytical psychology, philosophy and religious knowledge discussed aspects of their work related to this main theme. The following areas are covered: quantum mechanics and the role of consciousness, neurophysiology and states of consciousness, the manifestation of the psyche in (...) class='Hi'>consciousness, the odyssey of consciousness, and science and consciousness. The discussions which follow give a multi-disciplinary perspective on the questions involved. (shrink)

Yoga is believed to have beneficial effects on cognition, attenuation of emotional intensity and stress reduction. Previous studies were mainly performed on eastern experienced practitioners or unhealthy subjects undergoing concomitant conventional therapies. Further investigation is needed on the effects of yoga per se, as well as its possible preventive benefits on healthy subjects. We investigated the effects of yoga on memory and psychophysiological parameters related to stress, comparing yoga practice and conventional physical exercises in healthy men . Memory tests, salivary (...) cortisol levels and stress, anxiety, and depression inventories were assessed before and after 6 months of practice. Yoga practitioners showed improvement of the memory performance, as well as improvements in psychophysiological parameters. The present results suggest that regular yoga practice can improve aspects of cognition and quality of life for healthy individuals. An indirect influence of emotional state on cognitive improvement promoted by yoga practice can be proposed. (shrink)

A biophysical and biochemical perspective of Brahmajnaana will be advanced by viewing Upanishads and related books as “Texts of Science on human mind”. A biological and cognitive science insight of Atman and Maya, the results of breathing process; constituting and responsible for human consciousness and mental functions will be developed. The Advaita and Dvaita phases of human mind, its cognitive and functional states will be discussed. These mental activities will be modeled as brain-wave modulation and demodulation processes. The energy-forms (...) and their transformations as ideas/moods/experiences/thoughts/feelings/utterances/knowing/perception/experience/mood; and a theory of human cognition and communication will be advanced. The sameness of these and processes taking place and steps involved in human language acquisition and communication processes will be highlighted taking ideas from Sabdabrahma Siddhanta and Sphota Vaada, for which the basis is Brahmajnaana only. In fine, a physiological psychological and neurological model of human consciousness and function of mind based on Indian spiritual thought will be derived and discussed using concepts from modern science and technology. The application of these derivations in the fields of physiological psychology, mind-machine modeling, natural language comprehension branch of artificial intelligence and neurology to model and imitate human mental functions will be hinted. -/- . (shrink)

Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of (...) emotions. In particular, both views face the problem of fortuitous connection, and, as a result, they fail to identify and distinguish an emotion from other mental states. Consequently, they fail to account for our first person authority over our emotions. I finally argue that only an internal, conceptual relation between the cognitive/evaluative and affective/physiological aspects of emotion can avoid such problems, and suggest that the Aristotelian distinction of form and matter can provide such internal relation. (shrink)

In this article first some general aspects of near-death experience will be discussed, followed by questions about consciousness and its relation to brain function. Details will be described from our prospective study on near-death experience in survivors of cardiac arrest in the Netherlands, which was published in the Lancet in 2001. In this study it could not be shown that physiological, psychological, or pharmacological factors caused these experiences after cardiac arrest. Neurophysiology in cardiac arrest and in a (...) normal functioning brain will be explained. Finally, implications for consciousness studies will be discussed, and how it could be possible to explain the continuity of our consciousness. Scientific study of NDE pushes us to the limits of our medical and neurophysiologic ideas about the range of human consciousness and mind-brain relation. (shrink)

On the evolution of mind Harry J. Jerison Most of us think of mind as a little person in the head, the 'knower' of reality (cf. Attneave,). ...

The neurobiological systems that mediate the basic emotions are beginning to be understood. They appear to be constituted of genetically coded, but experientially refined executive circuits situated in subcortical areas of the brain which can coordinate the behavioral, physiological and psychological processes that need to be recruited to cope with a variety of primal survival needs (i.e., they signal evolutionary fitness issues). These birthrights allow newborn organisms to begin navigating the complexities of the world and to learn about the (...) values and contingencies of the environment. Some of these systems have been identified and characterized using modern neuroscientific and psychobiological tools. The fundamental emotional systems can now be defined by the functional psychobiological characteristics of the underlying circuitries ? characteristics which help coordinate behavioral, physiological and psychological aspects of emotionality, including the valenced affective feeling states that provide fundamental values for the guidance of behavior. The various emotional circuits are coordinated by different neuropeptides, and the arousal of each system may generate distinct affective/neurodynamic states and imbalances may lead to various psychiatric disorders. The aim of this essay is to discuss the underlying conceptual issues that must be addressed for additional progress in understanding the nature of primary process affective consciousness. (shrink)

Organized by the Mind and Life Institute, this discussion addresses some of the most troublesome questions that have driven a wedge between Western science and religion. Where Buddhism Meets Neuroscience resulted from meetings of the Dalai Lama and a group of eminent neuroscientists and psychiatrists. Is the mind an ephemeral side effect of the brain's physical processes? Are there forms of consciousness so subtle that science has not yet identified them? How does consciousness happen? The Dalai Lama's incisive, (...) open-minded approach both challenges and offers inspiration to Western scientists. The book consists primarily of dialogue and intense, frank conversations between the Dalai Lama and participants. Questions of perception, dualism, categories of consciousness, memory, dreams, the nature of mental illness, and the mind during and after death are all explored. (shrink)

S. Pockett and G. Gomes discuss a possible bias in the method by which Libet's subjects estimated the time at which they became aware of their intent to move their hands. The bias, caused by sensory delay processing the clock information, would be sufficient to alter Trevena and Miller's conclusions regarding the timing of the lateralized readiness potential. I show that the flash-lag effect would compensate for that bias. In the last part of my commentary I note that the other (...) target articles do not examine the most interesting aspect of Libet's unfashionable views on free will. I point out that Libet's views are less strange than they at first appear to be. (shrink)

Since Jackendoff has shown that language facilitates abstract and complex thought by making possible subtle manipulations of the focus of attention, and since the kind of attention relevant here is attention to aspects of intentional objects in conscious awareness, it follows that the abstract and complex thinking that language facilitates owes much to the working of a conscious process. This, however, conflicts with Jackendoff's view of consciousness as something which does not play a direct part in thinking, but (...) is only a byproduct of a non-conscious computational process in the brain which does the real thinking. I argue that, since Jackendoff s phenomenology of language shows that attention plays such an important part in thinking, yet language can help us attend only to what we are conscious of consciousness does play an important part in thinking. Moreover, consciousness cannot be merely an epiphenomenal byproduct separable in principle from underlying physical mechanisms, because this would imply that consciousness itself is not physical, which would lead to dualism. But if consciousness is inseparable from its physiological substratum, then it also causes whatever effects the physiological substratum causes. (shrink)

Pain is an important focus for consciousness research because it is an avenue for exploring somatic awareness, emotion, and the genesis of subjectivity. In principle, pain is awareness of tissue trauma, but pain can occur in the absence of identifiable injury, and sometimes substantive tissue injury produces no pain. The purpose of this paper is to help bridge pain research and consciousness studies. It reviews the basic sensory neurophysiology associated with tissue injury, including transduction, transmission, modulation, and central (...) representation. In addition, it highlights the central mechanisms for the emotional aspects of pain, demonstrating the physiological link between tissue trauma and mechanisms of emotional arousal. Finally, we discuss several current issues in the field of pain research that bear on central issues in consciousness studies, such as sickness and sense of self. (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest in psychology and anthropology in the idea of altered states of consciousness. This paper begins by examining the meaning of this term and the extent to which such experiences are reported globally. The topic of shamanism is then discussed, first with respect to its social functions, and then to what is known about its psychological aspects (which is little). Far more is known about altered states of consciousness (ASCs) as they are (...) expressed in meditation, trance and possession, and channeling, and a number of studies are reviewed, both of individuals and of groups, which illustrate the full extent of ASCs. The following section then goes more deeply into the stimulus situations that are associated with ASCs. This brings the discussion into drugs, attempts at altering the sensorium (music and imagery in particular) and recent technological innovations, peculiar to our time, which deliberately alter our usual state of awareness through feedback principles. In the final section, what is known about the physiology of ASCs is reviewed and also the extent to which these phenomena, including shamanism, are regarded as pathological. As a great number of people across the world utilize the healing aspects of trance, possession and shamanic practices, this aspect is discussed, and lastly the adaptive functions of ASCs are considered, with their context in the history of psychology. (shrink)

Est-il aujourd’hui possible d’expliquer le mental à partir du cerveau? Où est le problème, diront les uns, puisque la mécanique neuronale est celle qui le crée? Comment seulement espérer, rétorqueront les autres, que la complexité de l’esprit puisse être fondée sur le seul fonctionnement cérébral? S’appuyant sur des siècles d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, et surtout sur un examen des données expérimentales récentes, Pierre Buser établit ici une sorte de bilan, dégageant plusieurs problématiques distinctes et bien actuelles : comment (...) définir la conscience, ce site supposé abriter notre vécu subjectif, à nouveau reconnu comme instance fondamentale de l’esprit chez l’homme et aussi chez l’animal? Que sait-on aujourd’hui de l’inconscient, ce domaine où se trouvent amassés tant d’acquis de notre intellect, de notre vie cognitive et affective? Et que nous apprennent, par exemple, l’hypnose ou la méditation sur le fonctionnement de notre esprit? Pierre Buser est professeur émérite de neurosciences de l’université Pierre-et-Marie-Curie de Paris. Il est membre de l’Académie des sciences. Il a notamment publié Cerveau de soi, cerveau de l’autre, L’Inconscient aux mille visages et Le Temps, instant et durée (en collaboration avec Claude Debru). (shrink)

Pain is an important focus for consciousness research because it is an avenue for exploring somatic awareness, emotion, and the genesis of subjectivity. In principle, pain is awareness of tissue trauma, but pain can occur in the absence of identifiable injury, and sometimes substantive tissue injury produces no pain. The purpose of this paper is to help bridge pain research and consciousness studies. It reviews the basic sensory neurophysiology associated with tissue injury, including transduction, transmission, modulation, and central (...) representation. In addition, it highlights the central mechanisms for the emotional aspects of pain, demonstrating the physiological link between tissue trauma and mechanisms of emotional arousal. Finally, we discuss several current issues in the field of pain research that bear on central issues in consciousness studies, such as sickness and sense of self. (shrink)

Since Jackendoff has shown that language facilitates abstract and complex thought by making possible subtle manipulations of the focus of attention, and since the kind of attention relevant here is attention to aspects of intentional objects in conscious awareness, it follows that the abstract and complex thinking that language facilitates owes much to the working of a conscious process. This, however, conflicts with Jackendoff's view of consciousness as something which does not play a direct part in thinking, but (...) is only a byproduct of a non-conscious computational process in the brain which does the real thinking. I argue that, since Jackendoff s phenomenology of language shows that attention plays such an important part in thinking, yet language can help us attend only to what we are conscious of consciousness does play an important part in thinking. Moreover, consciousness cannot be merely an epiphenomenal byproduct separable in principle from underlying physical mechanisms, because this would imply that consciousness itself is not physical, which would lead to dualism. But if consciousness is inseparable from its physiological substratum, then it also causes whatever effects the physiological substratum causes. (shrink)