In recent years, Karl Rahner's theology of concupiscence as a «pre-ethical appetite» has been subjected to some negative criticism as «un-Thomistic» and as presupposing modern philosophy's dualistic understanding of being. The present essay tries to situate Rahner's interpretation within the theological context of the time when it was originally published; the major debate then was on the nature of the supernatural and the desiderium naturale videndi Deum. It then tries to reconstruct the usage Rahner himself made of Aquinas's theology (...) and Heidegger's philosophy, as presented in the latter's Sein und Zeit . In 1941, Rahner's major contribution consisted in reformulating Aquinas's theology on concupiscence in Heideggerian terminology. The Incarnation and the gift of integrity constituted two benchmarks that Rahner used to test his own understanding of concupiscence. Finally, Rahner's contribution is placed within the context of the Catholic-Lutheran Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification and the definition of concupiscence as presented in the accompanying Official Common Statement. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I will argue that Levinas’ criticisms of Hegel are insufficient. Levinas’ accusation that Hegel’s system is totalitarian ignores the centrality of love in the latter’s work, which constitutes the ethical character of the State. Second, though, I will expand Levinas’ critique to encompass love. I argue that Hegelian love is an insufficient ground for ethics because it is, ultimately, a self-love. But, Levinasian love is sufficient, since it account for societal love, while (...) nevertheless demanding an ethical responsibility for those outside of a given community. Hence, Levinasian love expresses the love of the stranger. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the conception of evil and the prescriptions for its mitigation that Michel Serres has articulated in his recent works. My explication of Serres’s argument centers on the claim, advanced in many different texts, that practices of exclusion, motivated by what he calls “the terrifying concupiscence of belonging,” are the primary sources of evil in the world. After explicating Serres’s argument, I examine three important objections, concluding that Serres overestimates somewhat the role of exclusion in (...) perpetuating evil and that his prescriptions for mitigating evil are excessively optimistic. (shrink)

Philosophical and medical excellence notwithstanding, Avicenna was far from being an otherwordly person who buried himself in his books. He had an extraordinarily adventurous life and is reported to have been fond of good food, drink, and lovemaking. This article discusses the wellknown but quite unusual view that he died of having too much sex. A detailed analysis of the sources and a common-sense approach to some of their medical claims will show that this allegation is not supported by any (...) evidence whatsoever. Quite the opposite: it will be argued that the main source on which all later reports must taken to depend has been tampered with in two places to produce the image that we know. Thus, we must assume that people hostile to Avicenna and his philosophy are behind this, their forgery most likely having been committed in the first half of the twelfth century AD. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas divides the sensory appetite into two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible. The irascible power moves creatures toward arduous goods and away from arduous evils, while the concupiscible power moves creatures toward pleasant goods and away from non-arduous evils. Despite the importance of this distinction, it remains unclear what counts as an arduous good or evil, and why arduousness is the defining feature of the division. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I argue that an arduous (...) object is one that is difficult and important for the creature. Second, given this proper understanding of arduousness, I highlight the shortcomings of the standard interpretation of Aquinas’s argument for the irascible-concupiscible distinction and suggest an alternative. I argue that Aquinas grounds the distinction in the distinction between useful and pleasant goods. I explain how these distinct goods allow arduousness to be the defining feature of the irascible-concupiscible division. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle's approach to the proper type of acquisition, use-value, want, and accumulation/storage of wealth is oriented less to excluding commercial activity, such as that of Aristotle's Athens, than to forestalling misordered concupiscence – the taking of an inherendy limited good for the unlimited, or highest, good. That is, his moral aversion to taking a means for an end lies behind his rendering of the sort of wealth that is natural. By stressing the limited nature of natural (...) wealth, Aristode distinguishes such wealth qua limited from an artificial unlimited desire for profit in order to drive home his point that wealth ought not be taken as an objective good. (shrink)

Pascal conceives the civil order as an order of conscupiscence, that is, an order produced and regulated by concupiscence. However, when exempting virtue from being the source of civil order, he does not advance the separation between politics and morals, but signals a new and problematic role to virtue in the interior of civil order - no more the role of producing it, but of judging it properly.Pascal concebe a ordem civil como uma ordem da concupiscência, isto é, uma (...) ordem produzida e regulada pela concupiscência. Ao dispensar a virtude de ser o fundamento da ordem civil, ele não promove, contudo, a separação entre a política e a moral, mas assinala um novo e problemático papel para a virtude no interior da ordem civil - não mais o de produzi-la, mas o de julgá-la de modo apropriado. (shrink)

In the spirit of Augustine’s own “Reconsiderations,” and inspired by Peter Brown’s act of “reconsidering” in the Epilogue to Augustine of Hippo (new edition), this essay offers a reconsideration of Augustine’s work On Marriage and Concupiscence. Key to the reconsideration of this text is a reconsideration of the role of the “sacrament” of marriage in Augustine’s articulation and defense of the goods of marriage and of human sexuality. For Augustine, Julian’s advocacy of concupiscence as an innocent natural desire (...) amounts to a dangerous sentimentalization of fallen human freedom. Such sentimentalization masks the investments of the fallen will in the will to power or, in Augustinian terms, the preference for power over justice. Because sexual concupiscence, as Augustine famously argued, has no natural object, but, rather, is invested only in its own gratification, it is therefore a function of the preference for power over justice without remainder. It is a mark of the Fall that the procreative increase in human community willed by God is now ineluctably linked to the will to power, as though the will to power were the true source of social solidarity. The sacramental good of marriage enables married couples to “use” concupiscence in such a way that all of the goods associated with human sexuality can be experienced as true goods instead of as realities constitutively defined by the will to power. (shrink)

In the spirit of Augustine’s own “Reconsiderations,” and inspired by Peter Brown’s act of “reconsidering” in the Epilogue to Augustine of Hippo, this essay offers a reconsideration of Augustine’s work On Marriage and Concupiscence. Key to the reconsideration of this text is a reconsideration of the role of the “sacrament” of marriage in Augustine’s articulation and defense of the goods of marriage and of human sexuality. For Augustine, Julian’s advocacy of concupiscence as an innocent natural desire amounts to (...) a dangerous sentimentalization of fallen human freedom. Such sentimentalization masks the investments of the fallen will in the will to power or, in Augustinian terms, the preference for power over justice. Because sexual concupiscence, as Augustine famously argued, has no natural object, but, rather, is invested only in its own gratification, it is therefore a function of the preference for power over justice without remainder. It is a mark of the Fall that the procreative increase in human community willed by God is now ineluctably linked to the will to power, as though the will to power were the true source of social solidarity. The sacramental good of marriage enables married couples to “use” concupiscence in such a way that all of the goods associated with human sexuality can be experienced as true goods instead of as realities constitutively defined by the will to power. (shrink)

Pascal concebe a ordem civil como uma ordem da concupiscência, isto é, uma ordem produzida e regulada pela concupiscência. Ao dispensar a virtude de ser o fundamento da ordem civil, ele não promove, contudo, a separação entre a política e a moral, mas assinala um novo e problemático papel para a virtude no interior da ordem civil - não mais o de produzi-la, mas o de julgá-la de modo apropriado. Pascal conceives the civil order as an order of conscupiscence, that (...) is, an order produced and regulated by concupiscence. However, when exempting virtue from being the source of civil order, he does not advance the separation between politics and morals, but signals a new and problematic role to virtue in the interior of civil order - no more the role of producing it, but of judging it properly. (shrink)

I argue that Aristotle's approach to the proper type of acquisition, use-value, want, and accumulation/storage of wealth is oriented less to excluding commercial activity, such as that of Aristotle's Athens, than to forestalling misordered concupiscence – the taking of an inherendy limited good for the unlimited, or highest, good. That is, his moral aversion to taking a means for an end lies behind his rendering of the sort of wealth that is natural. By stressing the limited nature of natural (...) wealth, Aristode distinguishes such wealth qua limited from an artificial unlimited desire for profit in order to drive home his point that wealth ought not be taken as an objective good (i. e., good in itself). (shrink)

Résumé Les théologiens jansénistes s’évertuent à réconcilier la thèse selon laquelle l’homme est assujetti à une nécessité générale de pécher avec le libre arbitre. Jansénius affirme que, malgré la nécessité générale, nous avons la liberté d’indifférence en ce qui concerne les actes particuliers ; mais il prétend aussi (en dépit d’Aristote) que la concupiscence, source des actes particuliers, se ramène à une forme de contrainte. Arnauld se contente d’affirmer la compatibilité de la nécessité générale de pécher avec l’indifférence, tandis (...) que Nicole s’attaque à la conception de la concupiscence comme une forme de contrainte. (shrink)

James Wetzel in his recent book argues that Augustine's statements in 'Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum' (hereafter, 'C2EP'), especially that "(t)he apostles...were free from consent to evil desire," directly contradict his long-held anti-Pelagian thesis. For in 'C2EP' and his other anti-Pelagian works, Augustine apparently defends the thesis that in this earthly life every human being consents to concupiscence daily. Thus, all need God's forgiveness daily. This is, Augustine argues, the true meaning of the Lord's Prayer. But this seems to contradict (...) Augustine's statement that the apostles "were free from consent to evil desire." By distinguishing different ways that an agent consents to concupiscence, the author argues that this seeming contradiction can be removed. Consequently, Augustine is consistent in his polemic against the Pelagians. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists argue that moral norms are natural norms that apply to human beings. A central issue for neo-Aristotelians is to determine what belongs to the good human life; the question is complicated, since we take up a diversity of different lives, many of which seem good, and it seems unclear what the human species-characteristic life really is. The Aristotelian tradition gives some guidance on this question, however, because it describes us as rational animals with intellectual and appetitive powers; (...) the perfection of those powers is what makes us good qua human. This is especially well spelled out in Thomas Aquinas; he takes moral virtues of courage and temperance to be perfections of our sense appetites, a power of going for things presented as good through our senses. These virtues thereby shape our passions, specifically the passions of fear, daring and concupiscent love, which are a result of the sense appetites pursuing what appears as good. This view provides a framework for virtue, which can then be taken as the perfections of distinct powers shared by all human beings, though actualized in a variety of ways. In this article, I will focus on the passion of fear, which I here describe, following Aquinas, as a movement of sense appetite away from evils that are difficult or impossible to avoid. My focus will be on showing that this passion is necessary, irreplaceable by our cognitive powers, and that the underlying sensitive appetites that produce fear must be perfected for any human being to count as good. (shrink)

I argue that, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, God--and not one's own happiness through union with God--is the ultimate end of the moral life strictly speaking. Although He is the source of happiness, God Himself, and not the happiness of knowing Him, is the center of the virtuous agent's life. Thus Aquinas, while incorporating all of the strengths of a virtue ethical framework, is not a eudaimonist in the normal sense, and is thus immune to any self-centeredness objections. I set (...) the stage by contrasting two of Aquinas' explicit and repeated theses. First, he maintains that happiness, strictly speaking, consists in an act of knowledge (the knowledge of God) inhering in the human intellect, rather than in any act of the will. Secondly, he maintains that loving God, an act of the will, is better than knowing Him. This indicates that loving God is better than happiness. By analyzing Aquinas' distinction between the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence, and his distinction between end in the sense of object and end in the sense of attainment, I show that he holds that loving God is better than knowing Him not because the activity of loving God is the ultimate end of the moral life, but because God Himself is the ultimate end of the moral life. Thus man's ultimate end is neither himself nor any condition that He can enter into, but rather a being separate from himself. (shrink)

Aquinas argues that love of others depends on whether the other is seen as a person like oneself or as a tool of gratification. The former grounds love-of-friendship (altruistic love), the latter love-of-concupiscence. Seeing the other as a person like oneself enables one to love the other as another self, thereby, basing altruism ultimately on self-love.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Between Deleuze and DerridaMary Beth MaderPaul Patton and John Protevi, editors. Between Deleuze and Derrida. New York: Continuum, 2003. Pp. ix + 207. Cloth, $105.00. Paper, $29.95.One of the many provisions of Gilles Deleuze's prodigious philosophical invention, Difference and Repetition, is an ontological account of how invention is actual. That book itself is an instance of that of which it offers an account. An element of this account (...) is the notion of an intensive system. The intensive system is proposed as a way in which novelty and movement come about. It requires as its basic constituents two heterogeneous organized series which are put into communication through their differences, producing a resonance internal to the system which then yields a novel forced movement. Several of the essays in Between Deleuze and Derrida so put the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida into communication as to themselves amount to intensive systems: movement and novelty emerge in our grasp of the separate oeuvres of the two philosophers.Essays by Daniel W. Smith and Leonard Lawlor tackle in detail the task of comparative explication. Since Deleuze and Derrida treat many of the same philosophical topics, often employing identical terms, these clear cases for their divergences and similarities are especially useful. Smith's historical situation of Deleuze and Derrida relative to the thought of Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche is exemplary. Dense with connections, Lawlor's decisive expositions pursue the implications of his interpretative distinctions rigorously to their ends, tracing the divergent constructions of the two thinkers to a common source in the notion of a simulacrum. Smith and Lawlor themselves part company, however, over the issue of whether Derrida and Deleuze are best characterized as philosophers of immanence or transcendence. Paul Patton crafts a sophisticated cross-reading of their shared vision of philosophy as a "utopian vocation," without homogenizing the differing voices they hear in this call or its unshared ontology.Branka Arsiæ's imaginative contribution on the topic of passive events and Melville's Bartleby is enlightening even without mention of Deleuze's notion of static ordinal genesis. The essays of John Protevi and Tamsin Lorraine are also rich in philosophical imagination. Protevi's extension of Derrida's aporias of the gift and friendship to an "aporia of love" illuminates Derrida's own evolution while refusing a version of undecidability that remains in static indecision. His discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the girl, with its isotropic implications for sexuality per se, is one of the best in print. Lorraine displays the novelty of Deleuze and Derrida's post-Heideggerian thought on the temporality of sense and the limits of representation in readings of Alice in Wonderland and Hamlet that clarify by example some of the more forbiddingly elaborate proposals in the philosophy of time that these thinkers offer.Arkady Plotnitsky's chapter addresses the crucial questions of Deleuze's and Derrida's relations to various sub-fields of mathematics and happily considers Derrida, with his deployment of a notion of undecidability, as a legatee of Gödel. It is confusing, however, that this stimulating essay treats Deleuze's and Derrida's invocations of algebra, geometry and topology by means of the "tropes" of "algebra, geometry and topology." This is especially puzzling in the case of Deleuze, whose use of mathematics in Difference and Repetition is avowedly not metaphorical. Further, although algebra is said to be the prime instrument of Plotnitsky's analysis, it turns out that "the general quasi-algebraic inscriptive structure or operation" (111; my italics) is most fundamental to that analysis. For this reason, it would be preferable to locate in both Deleuze and Derrida a post-structuralist concern with structure itself, making "algebra" another in the Derridean syntagmatic chain of names for a descendent of "structure."The book does contain some disappointing stretches. Eric Alliez's chapter does not read well despite its reliable translation. Alphonso Lingis's ruminations of a blithely bewildered Western roamer ("you" and then "me") on his "detour into exoticism" thanks to the "willing" concupiscence of an Asian female bed-mate ("she" and never "you" or "me") make one regret the era of easy... (shrink)

In discussions of early-modern notions of passion and virtue, the humanist movement has played only a minor role. However, it has its own characteristics and approaches to the problem of passion and virtue. The moral philosophy of the Neapolitan humanist Giovanni Pontano is a case in point. Pontano pronounces himself against the Stoic doctrine of the eradication of the passions. Although his moral psychology follows traditional conceptions of the passions as subjected to the rule of reason, it rather illustrates the (...) complex structures into which reason and virtue have to be implemented. The notion of arduousness is helpful to illuminate these structures. Falling back on Aquinas' distinction between a 'concupiscible' and an 'irascible' appetite, Pontano puts a special emphasis on the latter, necessary to deal with the difficulties and hardships that are typical of any process of learning. As he argues, the way to human perfection is full of hardship, and the higher the perfection aims, the greater the hardship will be. This concept implies the need for passionate responses to overcome hardship.Moreover, it suggests the picture of a ruler unimpressed by difficulties and obstacles, vehement and forceful. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"CONCUPISCIENCE" AND "MIMETIC DESIRE": A DIALOGUE BETWEEN K. RAHNER AND R. GIRARD Nikolaus Wandinger Innsbruck University Since Augustine "concupiscence" has been the theological technical expression for the consequences that remain in all human persons subject to original sin. These consequences were often described as involuntary and uncontrollable desires or passions, especially in the realm ofsexuality. In the 1940s Karl Rahner revised that concept, freeing it from its narrow (...) sexual connotations and opening it up, so that concupiscence can be construed as a force in all intentional human action. In 1954 Rahner expanded the scope ofthis revision still further, situating concupiscence in the theological framework of grace. While the mimetic theory does not use the concept of"concupiscence," "mimetic desire" is the core ofthat theory. The mimetic nature of desire accounts for involuntary and uncontrollable passions, in sexuality or otherwise. René Girard's mimetic theory goes a step further than Rahner in that it explains how this power of passion can arise. However, it does not link its results with the traditional Christian language of grace. Is there a place for grace in mimetic theory? A comparative look at Rahner's development ofconcupiscence in a framework ofgrace and Girard's theory of human desire promises richer insights into the phenomenon of involuntary and uncontrollable human desires and passionsthan each ofthe two on its own. My paper attempts to develop and explicate these insights. On the way there, differences and similarities between a more philosophical-minded theology and mimetic theory will be examined and related to each other. Nikolaus Wandinger147 1.Introduction I will try to give you a briefoutline ofRahner's theological analysis of concupiscence, already interspersed with comments from mimetic theory, as to how much the two agree or disagree. In a second step I will present to you Rahner's special emphasis on the meaning of concupiscence within a world that has already been redeemed and ask, whetherthis can be accepted by mimetic theory. It might seem strange to attempt such a dialogue with Rahner, since he is certainly one ofthe most "philosophical" theologians there are—while Girard distances himself quite clearly from philosophical thinking.5 Yet, many theologians stand in that philosophical tradition, and one obstacle for a wider acceptance of mimetic theory in theology might be its aversion against philosophical thinking. So, ifwe could contribute something to the diminishing ofthat divide on the way, it would be no small feat. 2.Rahner's "concupiscence" Commented by Girard's mimetic theory In 1941 Rahner forthe firsttime pubiished his article on the theological concept of concupiscence, which he later revised and enlarged with a chapter on grace.6 In it Rahner starts out by giving three definitions ofhow the word concupiscence is used in philosophical ortheological literature of the time. Interestingly Rahner translates the Latin concupiscentia into the German Begehren, which is desire, when he explains the meaning ofthe term. The definitions are: 1) Desire in the broadest sense is any consciousness-related reactive behavior toward any value or good, as opposed to receptive acknowledgement.7 It is characteristic for this broad concept ofconcupiscence that it pertains to voluntary as well as to involuntary acts of human reaction towards value.8 5 See Girard, 2002, 15 or Girard 1999, 16 Not contained in the English version whose foreword is much shorter. 6 Rahner 1941, 61-80. Revised version in Rahner 1954, 377-414 English version. Rahner 1961, 347-382 1 will refer here to the version contained in Rahner 1954 and moreover use my own paraphrase ofthat version in which I will bring Rahner's thoughts already into a more easily understandable English. I claim to do so without distorting Rahner's original meaning (German original given in the references). 7 Rahner 1954, 388: "Begehren im weitesten Smn istjede bewusste reaktive Stellungnahme zum Wert und Gut. im Gegensatz zu hinnehmender Kenntnisnahme " 8 Rahner 1 954, 389- "Das Charakteristische dieses weitesten Begriffes der Konkupiszenz ist dies, dass er sowohl die freien wie die unwillkürlichen Akte menschlicher Wertreaktion 148A Dialogue Between K. Rahner and R. Girard Now, here Rahner is really philosophical. What he says is that we can distinguish two types ofhuman reactive behavior towards any object in the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy by Susan JamesRichard A. WatsonSusan James. Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. vii + 318. Cloth, $35.00.Susan James shows how during the seventeenth century philosophers moved from the three souls of Aristotle and the tripartite soul of Thomas Aquinas in which passions and reasons compete for the attention of the will, (...) to a Cartesian view of man as a single soul in union with the body who wills under the influence of both passions and reasons, to a Hobbesian view that the soul is the body and that the bodily motions we call reasons and passions are desires; acts of will are merely the deciding desires in deterministic causal sequences of the material motions of the body that constitute desires. This sets up the contemporary view that, motions are caused by desires and beliefs, leaving behind the difficulties of integrating with one another Aristotelian souls, Thomistic faculties, and Cartesian mind and body. James conceives of this evolution as one of unification of mental and bodily powers, and of integration of the active and passive powers of the mind. This concourse also represents a development from theories meant to explain to theories calculated for control and finally to theories facilitating therapy. Aristotle and Thomas adapted their ontologies to perceived differences in powers and faculties, while Descartes and Hobbes worked toward an ideal of unity of science and nature. The Christian Descartes brought together all the substances and powers of nature under a single extended matter divided into parts by the single force of motion, but he excepted the human soul with its power of will to alter the course of nature. The atheist Hobbes simply dispensed with supernatural [End Page 168] mental substance and occult power of will in order to integrate the whole of nature (including sensing and reasoning) under a cause and effect sequence of moving material bodies in which the last desire in a sequence of human bodily motions is designated as an act of will.James intends her book “as a contribution to the reinstatement of the emotions within philosophy, to the… opinion that we need to take account of our emotional life if we are to understand… moral motivation and growth, the springs of action (rational and otherwise), and the nature of reasoning” (22). She agrees that the sharp division between ideas and passions or emotions is properly abolished to be replaced by the view that all ideas have an emotional component, and all passions an ideational component. This fits with the parallel development of the notion that all sensible perceptions are propositional, and the somewhat less widespread notion that all concepts have a sensible component.But did this development result in a view of passions and ideas, learning and knowing, thinking and action, that is more true to nature than Aristotelian ontology? It is very hard to answer this question, and despite her sympathies with the notion that all human thought is both conceptual and emotional, James does not try. The reason we don’t know lies under the surface of the movement from Aristotle to Hobbes (i.e., to Daniel Dennett) like a monster in the deep. The monster is the monotheistic God, the perfection and unity of which underlies the Western drive to a unitary view of nature including man. The possibility that this God could be a deceiver, and so all our sensations and ideas might not represent the real world, set up Cartesianism and modern hypothetico-deductive science. But lurking throughout James’ book is a more palpable dreadnought, a demoness, the woman Eve. The female is responsible for the Fall of Man, and thus the fear and suspicion of women that suffuses patriarchic Christianity, and is expressed openly by such philosophers as Malebranche. Bodily passions and emotions (particularly the concupiscent ones) are nasty, evil, irrational, overpowering; to wit, they are feminine. They are not to be trusted, and must be subdued. So while still driven by ideals of monotheism, Descartes and Hobbes do move beyond the dogmatic Christian association of the emotions with female treachery. Even so... (shrink)

Camus himself called The Plague his most anti-Christian text, and most theologically oriented readings of the text agree. This paper shows how the sermons of Fr. Paneloux—an Augustine scholar--as well as Dr. Rieux’s mother present an Augustinian picture of love. This love opposes the passionate concupiscence for possession of things with the divine love which wishes for the constant conscious presence of the beloved in the light of the good. Such is possible for us, as Augustine exhibits and helps (...) us practice, if one reads the world as it really is—temporal signs of the eternal goodness, wisdom and presence of God—which Augustine discovers “too late.” While the doctor describes Oran as a city “without intimations” many elements of the text intimate otherwise. In such an Augustinian sacramental reading the “problem of evil” disappears. (shrink)

Catholic theologians after Trent saw the Protestant teaching about the remnants of original sin in the justified as one of the ‘chief ’ errors of Protestant soteriology. Martin Luther, John Calvin, Martin Chemnitz, and many Protestant theologians believed that a view of concupiscence as sinful, strictly speaking, did away with any reliance on good works. This conviction also clarified the Christian’s dependence on the imputed righteousness of Christ. Catholic theologians condemned this position as detracting from the work of Christ (...) who takes away the sins of the world. The rejection of this teaching—and the affirmation of Trent’s statement that original sin is taken away and that the justified at baptism is without stain or ‘immaculate’ before God—is essential for understanding Catholic opposition to Protestant soteriology. Two Spanish Dominican Thomists, Domingo de Soto and Bartolomé de Medina, rejected the Protestant teaching on imputation in part because of its connection with the view on the remnants of original sin in the justified. Adrian and Peter van Walenburch, brothers who served as auxiliary bishops of Cologne in the second half of the seventeenth century, argued that the Protestants of their time now agreed with the Catholic Church on a number of soteriological points. They also drew upon some of their post–Tridentine predecessors to offer a Catholic account of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. Nonetheless, the issue of sin in the justified remained a point of serious controversy. (shrink)

Attraper erôs dans le filet du logos, l'Occident n'a pas attendu la psychanalyse pour s'y employer. Entre [es aphrodisia grecs et le dispositif de sexualité moderne, il ne restait plus à Foucault qu'à déposer une dernière pièce au puzzle de son Histoire de la sexualité : que s'est-il passé au temps de la concupiscence chrétienne et du péché de chair? Comment le sexe en est-il venu à polariser le rapport de soi à soi? 'Il m'a semblé, écrit Foucault, que (...) la question qui devait servir de fil directeur était celle-ci : comment, pourquoi et sous quelle forme ['activité sexuelle a-t-elle été constituée comme domaine moral?' À qui sont destinés les aveux? De quoi libèrent-ils? Quel sujet moderne l'expérience de la 'chair' dans le christianisme a-t-elle contribué à construire? Les Aveux de la chair jettent le trouble dans une 'histoire de la sexualité' qui s'avère faussement linéaire et sollicite tout autant philosophes, historiens, spécialistes de la littérature et psychanalystes. Ce volume fait écho à Bien avant la sexualité. L'expérience érotique en Grèce ancienne, publié en 2019 chez Epel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Si l’on conçoit le lien à la fois comme préexistant et nécessairement emprunté, il n’y a aucune nécessité à le valoriser socialement et politiquement selon le modèle de la fusion communautaire, où les individus ne feraient qu’un. Nous voudrions montrer à partir de cette considération, d’une part que Montaigne promeut une communauté de la différence, dans un bon usage de la conflictualité inhérente à l’ambivalence des désirs, d’autre part qu’il ne valorise pas pour autant l’organisation de la servitude dans le (...) règne de la concupiscence par la réduction des liens sociopolitiques à la sphère trompeuse des apparences, où la civilité, au fond, ne serait que haine. À la différence de Pascal, le lien est en effet pour Montaigne ce par quoi nous accédons à l’identité et l’estime de soi, dans les structures mêmes de l’aliénation : « notre condition singeresse et imitatrice » est la condition de notre humanisation dans et par la vie sociale qui repose sur le regard de l’autre et le partage de la parole. Il faudra dans ces conditions présenter les modalités de cette parole qui fait lien, parce qu’elle fait « foi », en la distinguant de notre relation à la sainte parole, comme d’un dire hypocrite qui ne tient les hommes que par « la langue ». (shrink)

La louve n’est pas seulement associée à la violence et à la terreur mais elle évoque également l’image de la mère nourricière et protectrice comme dans les légendes de Rémus et Romulus et de saint Ailbhe. Dans les deux légendes, des héros allaités par une louve grandissent pour devenir fondateurs : Rome pour Rémus et Romulus et le diocèse d’Emly pour saint Ailbhe. La louve est aussi liée à la débauche et à la luxure, et le bordel est nommé lupanar (...) en latin. The she-wolf is not only associated with violence and terror, but also evokes the image of a protective, nurturing mother as in the legends of Remus and Romulus as well as Saint Ailbhe. In the two legends referred to, namely that of the Roman heroes who became the founder of Rome, as well as that of Saint Ailbhe, founder of the diocese of Emly, both the Roman twins and Saint Ailbhe were suckled by a she-wolf. The she-wolf is also associated with debauchery and concupiscence and the whorehouse is called lupanar in Latin. (shrink)

Justification for reading Pride and Prejudice as a philosophical novel may be found in its much cited and variously interpreted opening sentence: "It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife." This universal law is the first principle of a philosophical novel, although I shall also interpret it as the statement of a scientific law of human nature, a characterization of the civility of English society, and (...) as a pronouncement on the manners of an economic class. Pride and Prejudice is a philosophical novel both in the sense of presenting a philosophy in exposition and of embodying a philosophy in action, and literary criticism exercises its proper function by expounding that philosophy and by explicating and clarifying the thought and action of the novel by means of it. The thought of Pride and Prejudice may be uncovered by interpreting it in accordance with any of a variety of philosophies, but it is peculiarly appropriate, and enlightening, to recognize its Platonizing echoes since the dialogues of Plato have gone through a history of interpretation that has evolved distinctions which are useful in interpreting Pride and Prejudice. Many interpreters of Plato's dialogues, in antiquity and later, argue that they are not statements of thoughts or opinions but are simply exhibitions of how philosophers talk; others, beginning with the Old Academy, interpret them as the expression of the truth not of the doctrines of one philosopher, but of all philosophers; some, beginning with the skepticism of the Middle or New Academy, hold that the method of Socrates was to demonstrate that all doctrines are false and therefore, by the same token, true; and some, following the Neoplatonists, sought in them the adumbration of a truth transcending human thought and expression. Neoplatonic truths are suited to tragedy and epic; skeptical Academic opinions provide a place and expectation proper to comedy. All Platonisms share hierarchical structures of being, thought, and aspiration. Plato himself describes three ladders of being, knowledge, and love in the Republic and the Symposium. The New Academic skepticism chooses a low place on those ladders, which is excellently named in the opening sentence of Pride and Prejudice: knowledge is based on self-evident truths, opinion can rise no higher than "a truth universally accepted," "possession of a good fortune" is a dubious degradation of vision of the ideal God to possession of material goods, and "want of a wife" is a transformation of charity or agape or love of the good in itself to concupiscence or eros or matrimony. Richard McKeon is the editor of The Basic Works of Aristotle and coeditor of Peter Abailard, Sic et Non: A Critical Edition. He delivered an earlier version of this paper at the 1977 Modern Language Association's session of the Division on Philosophical Approaches to Literature. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Arts of Invention and Arts of Memory: Creation and Criticism" and "Canonic Books and Prohibited Books: Orthodoxy and Heresy in Religion and Culture". (shrink)

Publiés dans le dernier quart du XVIIe siècle, les Essais de morale de Pierre Nicole (1625-1695), l'un des auteurs les plus importants de Port-Royal, constituèrent pendant plus d'un siècle une référence incontournable de la pensée morale. Fort de leur succès immédiat, les Essais furent très vite republiés et enrichis par les éditeurs de textes posthumes et de lettres jusqu'à former un ensemble de vingt-cinq tomes en 1771. Pour introduire à la lecture d'un tel massif, le présent volume offre un choix (...) de traités et lettres extraits de la série des Essais de morale, établis et annotés à partir des éditions originales. Ces textes proposent un parcours dont le fil directeur est la critique des attraits engendrés par le monde visible. Le monde des hommes est en effet envisagé par Nicole comme un spectacle chatoyant et trompeur dans lequel l'esprit, charmé par tant d'éclat, s'enfonce jusqu'à se perdre. Mais, outre le déploiement d'une anthropologie de la concupiscence fondée sur l'analyse précise des mécanismes psychiques et affectifs, la puissance théorique de ces Essais tient au fait qu'ils proposent des remèdes ordinaires et humains, et donc, praticables dès cette vie, pour neutraliser les effets de cette séduction qui s'exerce par l'entremise du regard. Pour ce faire, Nicole ne se contente pas de produire des exposés généraux et abstraits, il décrit au contraire avec une grande minutie les dangers souvent inapparaissants de ces instruments de fascination de l'âme. La plupart des essais proposés n'avaient pas été réédités depuis plus d'un siècle. Ce volume souhaite donc rendre à nouveau disponible ces textes majeurs et pourtant encore peu connus de la littérature morale du Grand siècle. (shrink)

Daemonic eros -- The work of love -- Beauty itself -- The spirit at the center of the world -- The highest one -- Demonizing the daemonic -- Saint Augustine and concupiscence of the flesh -- The eclipse of beauty -- Religion without God -- Social virtue -- The problem of evil -- Surviving death.

CHILDREN ARE INCONSISTENTLY LABELED MORAL AGENTS IN SOME HIGHLY charged situations and denied that status in others. This essay draws on the writings of Nomy Arpaly, Lisa Tessman, and legal theorists to argue that both children and adults should nearly always be considered moral agents. But agency does not imply autonomy, ability to articulate rational reasons, or legal liability for either adults or children. Rather, all agents are dependent and conditioned. This quality divides them from a strict Augustinian vision in (...) which adults and children are fully and solely responsible for their actions. The subtext of Augustine's Confessions suggests that Augustine's biography can as easily be interpreted according to the present framework as according to his own thematic of concupiscence. (shrink)

This article investigates Foucault’s account of desiring man by drawing upon History of Sexuality vol. 4, Confessions of the Flesh. In order to do so, the article focuses on Foucault’s diagnosis of the Christian elaboration of “the analytic of the subject of concupiscence” that closes Confessions of the Flesh. As the article shows, “the analytic of the subject of concupiscence” inspires Foucault’s account of desiring man. However, Foucault’s diagnosis of the Christian elaboration of “the analytic of concupiscence” (...) proves to be debatable as it relies on a problematic interplay between Cassian’s and Saint Augustine’s account of concupiscence. The article exposes the problems that such interplay supposes by addressing the contrast between Cassian’s and Augustine’s perspective on both concupiscence and the human condition. Despite this problematic aspect of Foucault’s investigation of Christianity, the article argues that the publication of Confessions of the Flesh is central to understanding Foucault’s History of Sexuality. By providing new elements of analysis, the book reopens Foucault’s genealogical diagnosis of the formation of the medical account of sexuality and allows us to problematise new avenues for developing Foucault’s investigation in depth. (shrink)

Aquinas's teachings on usury are difficult to apply directly to the modern economy given the tremendous transformations in economic institutions and sensibilities since his day. However, his treatment of the relationship between the abstraction of money and the problem of disordered concupiscent desire proves to be helpful in understanding modern financial instability. Money invites a disordered understanding of the infinite good that is the object of human desire, channeling that desire into the fruitless quest for indefinite accumulation, which is both (...) destabilizing to the economic system and ultimately frustrates the pursuit of real goods. Aquinas's thought offers clarity about the proper role of economic goods in a life well lived that is necessary for thinking about the role finance should play in a humane economy. (shrink)

This paper examines Augustine’s analysis of the possible causes of akrasia and suggests that an implicit two-phased consent process takes place in an akratic decision. This two-phased consent theory revolves around Augustine’s theory of the two wills, one carnal and the other spiritual. Without the help of grace, the fallen will dominated by the carnal will can only choose to sin. After exploration of this two-phased consent theory, the paper turns to examine the accusation made by Julian of Eclanum, a (...) fifth-century Pelagian, and J. Van Oort, a contemporary Augustinian scholar, that Augustine’s doctrine of the two wills and concupiscence led the Church into a Manichaean position. The paper concludes that this accusation fails to hold up, especially when one considers the more nuanced view on the human body and concupiscence in Augustine’s later works. (shrink)

Contrary to the fairly standard view of Aquinas on temperance according to which this virtue habituates the concupiscible appetite to move in ways that accord with reason spontaneously, that is, independently of any immediate command from reason, the author of this paper argues that temperance is a virtue which "(1) disposes the concupiscible appetite to remain more or less still in the absence of any command from reason to move, thus preventing vehement, spontaneous passions of any sort, ordinate or inordinate, (...) from arising in the concupiscible appetite prior to reason's immediate command; and (2) also disposes the concupiscible appetite to obey reason's command so that a person may incite, increase, decrease, or curb a passion as needed." The paper ends by noting a lacuna in Aquinas's teaching on temperance. (shrink)

After he was delivered from the necessity of making provision for the flesh in its concupiscence and after tendering his resignation as a professor of rhetoric, St. Augustine was, in the autumn of 386 a.d., eager to explore his newfound Christian faith and prepare for his reception into the Catholic Church. His conversion, momentous though it was, did not so much entail a repudiation of all that he had learned and studied as it did a transformation of what had (...) brought him to the threshold of religious belief. Chief among the spoils of Augustine’s early education was philosophy, which he understood primarily as an all-encompassing love of wisdom and only secondarily as a confederacy of.. (shrink)

1 MONSTER . . . evil is, not, as we thought, deeds that must be punished, but our lack of faith, our dishonest mood of denial, the concupiscence of the ...

Par rapport à la conception réflexive du retour à soi propre à la philosophie du sujet telle qu’elle se développe de Hegel à Ricœur et qui cherche à surmonter la dispersion de la vie temporelle par une formation de soi dans l’unité d’une histoire, saint Augustin nous donne à penser une autre figure de l’ipséité qui permet d’échapper aux apories de la centration égologique comme à l’antihumanisme de ses contestations. L’histoire personnelle dans sa finitude et sa facticité ne peut trouver (...) son unité et son sens qu’en dehors d’elle, dans un retour à la vérité qui illumine. Le soi, selon saint Augustin, ne se laisse pas comprendre par rapport au projet néoplatonicien de purification, car il ne s’agit pas de trouver une place dans le cosmos, mais de se libérer de toute forme venant du monde dans un combat intérieur entre le poids de la concupiscence et l’attente patiente des biens véritables. L’humilité, la patience et l’amour sont les actes du soi véritable. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 2007 Meeting of the Society for Buddhist-Christian StudiesSan Diego, California, November 16–17, 2007Peter A. HuffThe Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies sponsored two sessions in conjunction with the 2007 annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion (AAR). Each session highlighted themes related to the work of a major figure in Buddhist-Christian dialogue. The first session, addressing the topic “Homosexuality, the Church, and the Sangha,” was organized in honor of (...) Roger Corless (1938–2007), longtime member of the society, dual practitioner of Roman Catholicism and Vajrayana Buddhism, and a well-known voice for “queer sangha.” The second session, a panel discussion titled “The Thought and Legacy of Masao Abe,” focused on the career achievements of Abe (1915–2006), widely acknowledged as one of the most innovative and influential scholars in modern Zen studies, interreligious dialogue, and comparative philosophy.The first session, moderated by Harry Wells (Humboldt State University), featured three papers on issues of gender, sexual ethics, and religious identity. Robert Fastiggi, professor of systematic theology at Sacred Heart Major Seminary (Detroit), presented the paper “The Catholic Church and Homosexuality.” Arguing that the Catholic tradition avoids an “either/or” approach to homosexuality, he outlined the church’s official distinction between morally neutral homoerotic identity and what Vatican documents call “intrinsically disordered” homosexual acts. He also noted that Catholic researchers differ significantly on the question of the genetic origins of same-sex attraction. The key to Catholic moral teaching on homosexuality, he explained, is a “theology of the body” that envisions male-female complementarity as the divinely ordained pattern of creation. Fastiggi suggested that further discussion of related ideas such as celibacy, chastity, desire, and concupiscence would enhance future Buddhist-Christian dialogue on homosexuality.Ilene Stanford, a ThD candidate in religion, gender, and culture at Harvard University, presented the next paper, “In or Out? Marriage as a Social Practice.” Describing marriage in the United States as a “site of contestation,” she explored the conflicting [End Page 137] models of sexual union that currently inform public debates in political and ecclesiastical contexts. Using William Johnson’s A Time to Embrace: Same-Gender Relationships in Religion, Law, and Politics (2006) as a point of departure, she argued that many contemporary examinations of sexual relationships, even some of the most inclusive, fail to reckon with the way in which the West’s Augustinian legacy continues to make heterosexual marriage the norm for all moral reflection on sexual identity and expression. The escalating controversy in the international Anglican community, she said, exposes the weaknesses of Johnson’s “deliberative democracy” model and other theoretical models that minimize the role of political and social power in the construction of sexual ideals.José Ignacio Cabezón, who holds the XIV Dalai Lama Chair in Tibetan Buddhism at the University of California, Santa Barbara, presented the final paper: “Is Homosexual Sex ‘Sexual Misconduct’? Critical Reflections on Some Classical Indo-Tibetan Sources.” Analyzing the changing portraits of sexual immorality in the Pali canon, Indian Sanskrit texts, and Tibetan scholastic treatises, Cabezón traced the evolution of monastic commentary on lay sexuality over the course of several centuries. What originated primarily as a simple prohibition against some forms of male adulterous activity, he explained, eventually became an unprecedented attempt to regulate intricate details of sexual behavior. Identifying Ansanga (fourth century ce) as the first Buddhist writer to proscribe same-sex activity between men, Cabezón suggested that changing social mores, intra-Buddhist debates, and the fertile monastic imagination contributed to the gradual elaboration of moral teaching in ancient and classical Buddhist literature.After the paper presentations, Richard Reilly, professor of philosophy at St. Bonaventure University, responded with provocative comments. He raised critical points about the significance of the distinction between sexual acts and erotic relationships, the strategic though limited value of “deliberative democracy” in multicultural faith communities, and the need for more rigorous comparative study of homophobic legislation in Buddhist and Abrahamic religious traditions. Sparking an engaging discussion among presenters and members of the audience, Reilly’s remarks underscored the importance of ongoing interdisciplinary investigations into homosexuality, the church, and the sangha.The society’s second session at the AAR provided a venue for former... (shrink)

Augustine of Hippo is often regarded as the champion of the doctrine of weakness of the will. John M. Rist in his 1994 'Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized' draws an interesting analogy between Aristotle's 'akrasia' and Augustine's 'concupiscentia'. However, such an analogy without further qualification is defective and misleading because it implies that Augustine commits himself to the notion that since everyone is perpetually akratic and, thus, always morally blameworthy. I argue that, for Augustine, weakness of the will has equivocal meanings (...) and is manifested in four kinds of case--their scope goes far beyond Aristotle's discussion of 'akrasia' in Book Seven of the 'Nicomachean Ethics'. There are, therefore, considerable differences between Aristotle's and Augustine's account of weakness of the will. Consequently, for Augustine, moral responsibility for the moral agent also varies in each of the four cases. (shrink)

This paper investigates Thomas Aquinas’s threefold division of pleasure into delectatio, gaudium, and fruitio, and its taxonomical basis in his threefold division of knowledge into tactility, the cogitative power, and the intellect. -/- Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three ways in which the sensory and intellectual appetites rest in the good. When the will rests in the intellectually apprehended good, this act is called fruitio; when the concupiscible appetite rests in a good apprehended by the internal senses this passion is called gaudium; (...) and when the concupiscible appetite rests in a good apprehended by the external senses this passion is called delectatio. Each of these appetible goods presupposes a different kind of knowledge of a present good, namely, the knowledge of the intellect, internal senses, and external senses, respectively. The difficulty is that it is not entirely perspicuous what the difference is between the goods apprehended by the external senses and those grasped by the internal senses. How does Thomas justify the distinction between delectatio and gaudium? Can he reasonably maintain that there are three sufficiently different kinds of knowledge that specify three different kinds of pleasure? In order to address these questions this study investigates Thomas’s account of the external and internal senses, and in particular the way in which tactility and the cogitative power supply two kinds of knowledge that specify two kinds of pleasure. (shrink)

Many scientists have argued forcefully for the pointlessness of nature, something that challenges any doctrine of Creation. However, apparent design and comprehensibility are also to be found in nature; it is ambivalent. This trait is nowhere more evident than in the natural inclinations that lead to concupiscence and the “seven deadly sins” in human beings. These inclinations are dealt with as pertaining to the “pre-fallen” condition of nature and human beings. As a framework to make sense of the goodness (...) of creation in this context, Paul Tillich's notion of the “vital trends of nature” is called to the fore. Being at the intersection of a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of nature, this notion hints at the goodness of Creation in fragment and anticipation. -/- . (shrink)

In his biography on Augustine, Possidius writes: “His table was frugal and sparing, though indeed with the herbs and lentils he also had meats at times for the sake of his guests or for some of the weaker brethren”.1 Given the importance of friendship in Augustine’s life, it is not surprising that he ate meat for the sake of others and not for his own pleasures. However, Augustine spends much time in Book X of his Confessions obsessing over his delight (...) in everyday activities, including eating2. Indeed, Augustine examines the relationship between desire and the object of desire throughout the Confessions, his ultimate focus being on the nature of our concupiscent hearts. In this paper, I will explore Augustine’s seemingly unhealthy relationship with food by discussing the place of food in his eschatology, his account of concupiscence and will, and his theory of interiority as given in the Confessions. Ultimately, for Augustine, there is a beauty to eating that is found in its relationship to the sensual experience of God. (shrink)

Malebranche ne dissocie jamais la théorie et la pratique. Son Traité de morale est une œuvre métaphysique. Ceci a sa raison dans les rapports entre la foi et la raison qui sont complémentaires. Le rapport de l'âme et de l'amour, conformément à une tradition platonicienne, est un lieu où l'on peut vérifier cette connexion. L'analyse de l'âme met en évidence la modernité de Malebranche dans sa conception de la conscience ou sentiment intérieur, où se révèle l'irréductibilité du sensible. L'amour est (...) au sommet de l'âme, en ce qu'il coïncide avec la volonté du bonheur. En ce sens la théorie païenne est juste: une volonté aveugle et un amour d'instinct s'équivalent. Mais la liberté est le don du Dieu chrétien à l'homme. Avec la liberté seulement, un amour-propre déréglé est possible et pécheur. Inversement, le véritable amour, celui où l'âme se reconnaît elle-même, c'est la charité, qui est une sainte concupiscence; celle-ci est capable de nous inspirer le désir du vrai. L'amour de la vérité qui illumine l'âme est le sentiment qui reconnaît Dieu comme la souveraine Raison. (shrink)

For Pascal, how are human beings related, or how do they relate themselves, to the summum bonum in this life? In what sense do they share in it, and how do they come to share in it? These are questions that emerge in many ways in Pascal’s writing, significantly in his concept of repos. To answer these questions, especially by elucidating what repos is for human beings in this life, I would like to begin with Graeme Hunter’s “Motion and Rest (...) in the Pensées”. Hunter’s account of Pascal is important because his purpose is to specifically address how certain aspects of modernity affect how Pascal understood repos. Hunter is certainly correct when he argues that for Pascal, repos is an orderly, directed seeking of truth—what Hunter designates as “search.” However, Hunter’s account of Pascal’s repos falls short of completion, because he neglects a crucial part of Pascal’s articulation of repos: his emphasis on the role of God’s grace in searching. By neglecting Pascal’s emphasis on grace, Hunter inadvertently depicts Pascal as reducing repos to motion, rather than envisioning them together in dialectical unity. I argue that for Pascal, it is correct to say that someone who is anxiously searching has indeed “already found,” but this cannot be solely due to human efforts: rather, it because the whole enterprise is entirely infused by grace. (shrink)

Mulla Sadrā refers to ancient Greek philosophers in his writings quite often, especially when the subject matter is the soul. In this article, I will address how Mulla Sadra reiterates Avicenna’s summary and analyses of ancient theories of the soul as discussed in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of, al-Hikmat al-Mutaʿāliya fi asfār al-ʿaqliyyat al-arbaʿa. The source of these discussions, when the structure and basic contents are considered, is Aristotle’s De Anima Book I. Before defining the soul, Aristotle (...) discusses what kind of a science, a science on the soul should be, and afterwards, he evaluates previous theories on the soul as those defining the soul through movement, perception, and life. We observe that this evaluation on previous theories play a preparatory role for his own definition of the soul as perfection and actualization. In a similar manner, in Safar 4, Bab 5, and Fasl 5 of Asfār al-aqliyyat al-arbaʿa, Mulla Sadrā reinterprets and discusses Ancient theories in such a way that the discussion leads us to a theory similar to Mulla Sadrā’s. In the presentation of this chapter, we find out that the soul is immaterial and modulated (tashkīkī) reality and is represented as a unity which is in a constant movement in its substance. The soul is matter in its origin, yet turns into an immaterial reality through substantial movement. In direct disagreement with Aristotelian philosophy, for Mulla Sadrā, movement in substance is possible as well as it is essential in understanding the reality of the soul. When Mulla Sadrā evaluates the ancient discussions and the criticisms by Avicenna, he finds that the discussion focuses on the source of mobility yet the soul is supposed to be defined as the source of immobility equally. Next in the discussion on movement, he focuses on the necessity of accepting the principle of substantial movement. According to Mulla Sadrā, Avicenna (following Aristotle’s presentation and interpretation) is misleading in his evaluation and criticisms of the ancient theories on the soul mainly because he follows a literalist reading. On the contrary, sources for Ancients’ knowledge is perennial wisdom, and their words on the soul have deeper meanings than what is understood at the first reading. When read with more trustful lenses, it will be manifested that the soul is an immaterial reality for them as well. For example, when they talk about the soul as a sphere, Mulla Sadrā thinks that they want to direct attention to the perfection. When fire is mentioned, the dynamic reality of the soul is brought to light. Mulla Sadrā, adds the principle of gradation (tashkīk) to his presentation and talks about modulation of fire from material fire to the immaterial light (nūr).The lowest level of fire is related to the changes in nature of the soul, the soul responsible of irascible and concupiscent establishes the next level. Once the soul is under total control, then it completes the passage to its incorporeality and becomes light. So this chapter is important in its structure because it allows us to read into how Sadrā’s historical reiteration is influenced by his own theoretical framework on the one hand. On the other hand, thanks to the long lineage of De Anima commentary literature, we can compare Sadrā with Aristotelian readings in this chapter. The interpretative reading of Mulla Sadrā, in opposition to the literalist reading of Avicenna on the ancient theories, also leans on a history of other philosophers before him. In this regard, a lineage of historiography might be traced back to Āmirī, Qādi Saʿīd, and Shahristāni. What the article comes to conclude is that a particular presentation found in Aristotles’ De Anima- Book I is molded in Mulla Sadrā’s hands with a more interpretative version of pre-Socratic theories to such an extent to support Mulla Sadra’s own theories on the soul. (shrink)

In the introduction to this important study Bowlin draws attention to the fact that contemporary students of ethics often resort to Aristotle, but overlook Aquinas, one of the more able interpreters of the Aristotelian moral tradition. He intends to correct this situation by concentrating on a particular point of Thomas’s moral theory: the contingencies of various kinds which we must confront. Bowlin argues that Thomas’s treatment of the moral virtues is largely functional: they help to cope with contingencies, although he (...) leaves the connection between the virtues and these contingencies largely undeveloped. Chapter 1 deals with the difficulties caused by the different passions such as concupiscence, fear, and others. The next chapter takes us into the heart of the problem, the contingency of the human good. In Bowlin’s view this contingency results from the fact that circumstances can modify the morality of our actions. Given this variability, prudence and justice must help us to decide what is right to do. Bowlin’s treatment of justice is surprising: this virtue is viewed in the light of contingency, whereas for Aquinas it proceeds basically in an objective way. (shrink)

In a sermon on the words of St Paul, «And they that are Christ's, have crucified their flesh, with the vices and concupiscences», Robert Grosseteste expressed that interior spirituality of the cross which he shared, notably, with the Franciscans. The sermon is located in his sermon-collection but it has not been edited or studied hitherto. Brief though it is, it merits publication and translation, for it instantiates its author's biblical and practical approach both to theology and to the interior life (...) of the believer. (shrink)