Cost, expected benefits, and risks are paramount in grant agencies' decisions to fund scientific research. In _Cognitive Economy,_ Nicholas Rescher outlines a general theory for the cost-effective use of intellectual resources, amplifying the theories of Charles Sanders Pierce, who stressed an “economy of research.” Rescher discusses the requirements of cooperation, communication, cognitive importance, cognitive economy, as well as the economic factors bearing on induction and simplicity. He then applies his model to several case studies and (...) to clarifying the limits imposed on science by economic considerations. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in (...) its objective qualities, but the world as perceived. In order to make these claims operational we can rely on the ecological concept of coping with the sonic world and the cybernetic concepts of artificial and adaptive devices. Listeners, on this view, are able to change their semantic relations with the sonic world through functional adaptations at the level of sensing, acting and coordinating between action and perception. This allows us to understand music in functional terms of what it affords to us and not merely in terms of its acoustic qualities. There are, however, degrees of freedom and constraints which shape the semiotization of the sonic world. As such we must consider the role of event perception and cognitive economy: listeners do not perceive the acoustical environment in terms of phenomenological descriptions but as ecological events. (shrink)

In the human cognitive economy there are four grades of epistemic involvement. Knowledge partitions into distinct sorts, each in turn subject to gradations. This gives a fourwise partition on ignorance, which exhibits somewhat different coinstantiation possibilities. The elements of these partitions interact with one another in complex and sometimes cognitively fruitful ways. The first grade of knowledge I call “anselmian” to echo the famous declaration credo ut intelligam, that is, “I believe in order that I may come to (...) know”. As construed here, one knows in this anselmian way that E = mc2 just in case one knows that sentence expresses a true statement, but without having to understand the proposition it expresses. Most epistemologists ignore the significance of this grade of epistemic involvement. In a second grade of epistemic involvement, knowing that E = mc2 is knowing what that sentence means and understanding the proposition it express. This is knowledge in the propositional or semantic sense, and is the dominant target of epistemological investigation. Tacit and implicit knowledge occupies another tier. A typical example would be something that someone has “known all along” but, until now, hasn’t had occasion to put her mind to it or formulate in words. TI-knowledge remains a minority interest in today’s epistemology. Operating at a fourth grade of epistemic involvement is what I call “impact”-knowledge, which is the knowledge of a matter at its deepest and most widespread. An example, to be discussed below, is the knowledge that was generated by the Wiles proof of Fermat’s last theorem. Its true importance lies not only, or even mainly, in its verification of a commonly accepted fact about numbers, but rather in its enrichment of the mathematics of elliptical curves and the promise it holds for greater advancement into the mathematical unknown. Knowledge of this fourth grade has yet to find a seat in the parliaments of epistemology. Knowledge of the anselmian sort is independent of the other three. Tacit and implicit knowledge is incompatible with anselmian and semantic knowledge but coinstantiable with impact-knowledge. Semantic knowledge is incompatible with tacit and implicit knowledge but coinstantiable with the others. Impact-knowledge is pairwise coinstantiable with the others. Below I will bring the ignorance partitions into such alignment as they have with these ones. In doing so, I’ll propose a naturalized causal response epistemology designed to give these interactive distinctions the theoretical air they need to breathe. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whether we can conceive of music cognition in ecosemiotic terms. It claims that music knowledge must be generated as a tool for adaptation to the sonic world and calls forth a shift from a structural description of music as an artifact to a process-like approach to dealing with music. As listeners, we are observers who construct and organize our knowledge and bring with us our observational tools. What matters is not merely the sonic world in (...) its objective qualities, but the world as perceived. In order to make these claims operational we can rely on the ecological concept of coping with the sonic world and the cybernetic concepts of artificial and adaptive devices. Listeners, on this view, are able to change their semantic relations with the sonic world through functional adaptations at the level of sensing, acting and coordinating between action and perception. This allows us to understand music in functional terms of what it affords to us and not merely in terms of its acoustic qualities. There are, however, degrees of freedom and constraints which shape the semiotization of the sonic world. As such we must consider the role of event perception and cognitive economy: listeners do not perceive the acoustical environment in terms of phenomenological descriptions but as ecological events. (shrink)

In “Context and Communication” Stephen Neale argues that the referential use of descriptions differs from the attributive use only in the pragmatics, making referential descriptions applicable to Russellian analysis. Marga Reimer disagrees with Neale’s view and argues that the difference is in the semantics, making referential descriptions semantically ambiguous. In this paper, I argue that Neale’s Modified Occam’s Razor overlooks the behavioral data of how we actually use language. I attempt to accommodate the strength of both Neale’s and Reimer’s explanations, (...) putting them in a framework governed by the principle of cognitive economy. (shrink)

In this letter, we argue that an economic perspective on the mind has played—and should continue to play—a central role in the development of cognitive science. Viewing cognition as the productive application of mental resources puts cognitive science and economics on a common conceptual footing, paving the way for closer collaboration between the two disciplines. This will enable cognitive scientists to more readily repurpose economic concepts and analytical tools for the study of mental phenomena, while at the (...) same time, enriching our understanding of the modern economy, which is increasingly driven by mental, rather than physical, production. (shrink)

Digital Cognitive Technologies is an interdisciplinary book which assesses the socio-technical stakes of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), which are at the core of the Knowledge Society. This book addresses eight major issues, analyzed by authors writing from a Human and Social Science and a Science and Technology perspective. The contributions seek to explore whether and how ICTs are changing our perception of time, space, social structures and networks, document writing and dissemination, sense-making and interpretation, cooperation, politics, and the (...) dynamics of collective activity (socio-informatics). (shrink)

Digital Cognitive Technologies is an interdisciplinary book which assesses the socio-technical stakes of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), which are at the core of the Knowledge Society. This book addresses eight major issues, analyzed by authors writing from a Human and Social Science and a Science and Technology perspective. The contributions seek to explore whether and how ICTs are changing our perception of time, space, social structures and networks, document writing and dissemination, sense-making and interpretation, cooperation, politics, and the (...) dynamics of collective activity (socio-informatics). (shrink)

One of the most impressive changes in economics and decision sciences is the emergence and fast growth of so-called “behavioral” economics and neuroeconomics. These fields raise several methodological issues, some of them being currently intensively discussed. Amongst those issues, the following is prominent : what is the epistemic relevance of non-behavioral or “cognitive” data, i.e. data which bear on cognitive processes and states involved in decision making ? F. Gul and W. Pesendorfer (2005/2008) have vigorously criticized the idea (...) that these data could be relevant for economics and decision sciences. Their criticisms became the focal point of a very active methodological literature. In this paper, we reconstruct and discuss Gul and Pesendorfer’s views and arguments. Although we are not convinced by some of them, we believe the authors hint a genuine issue : the “missing links” issue. (shrink)

Develops a critique of the concept of the attention economy from the perspectives of labour, time, and power.

Develops a critique of the concept of the attention economy from the perspectives of labour, time, and power.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cognitive Error and Contemplative Practices:The Cultivation of Discernment in Mind and HeartWesley J. WildmanBrains are amazing organs in all creatures with central nervous systems and especially in human beings. But they are not perfect. Without forgetting the larger success story of cognitive evolution, I want to explore the way that cognitive biases sometimes produce errors in both religious and secular social settings and how such errors (...) can be diagnosed and corrected when they occur. This will involve noticing that error diagnosis and correction is a process that certain social groups have a vested interest in resisting or neglecting, in some respects, while the very same social groups may furnish resources that support the detection of cognitive errors, in other respects.This presents a moral quandary for both secular and religious groups. Should we educate children to be fully aware of their cognitive vulnerability to advertising, thereby learning how to resist and eventually become immune to one of the fundamental power sources of modern market economies? Should religious groups explain to young people their cognitive tendencies to posit the action of supernatural beings whether or not any such action exists, even though this may disrupt the power of religious groups to forge bracing social togetherness that supports psychologically useful coping skills? While I do not seek to answer such complex moral questions in this paper, I do argue that knowledge of cognitive biases and the resulting tendencies to cognitive error, self-defeating behaviors, and self-deception should be made available to those individuals and groups who are interested in promoting a high degree of critical self-awareness in the analysis of beliefs and behaviors in both secular and religious contexts.The term "error" is a potentially problematic one in that it misleadingly suggests that there might be a uniquely correct way in which cognition should work. I do not wish to suggest such a binary opposition. After all, biases exist in the human cognitive system either because they have been selected in the evolutionary process for their survival benefits or because they are side effects of other traits selected for their usefulness. My concern is with the wondrous human discovery that we can analyze [End Page 61] our behaviors and beliefs with such precision that we can sometimes detect when our cognitive biases produce mistaken beliefs and self-defeating behaviors. This forms the basis for my contention that cognition can often work better than it does—more accurately, less self-destructively—when tendencies to cognitive error are diagnosed, corrected, and perhaps even systematically resisted.The profound irony here is that the very same social groups (secular and religious) with an obvious vested interest in resisting such enlightenment in some respects can also promote processes of discernment and insight in other respects. Existing literature in the cognitive psychology of religion rarely bothers with such subtleties. It is common to assume that simply to notice the operation of cognitive biases in religion—say, in supporting belief in supernatural entities who providentially interact in human affairs, or in establishing and reinforcing people's willingness to defer to certain kinds of religious authority—is at the same time to establish the presence of rampant cognitive error, massive resistance to diagnosing and correcting it, and thus the infliction of pernicious cruelties on young children who have no way of escaping the resulting irrational indoctrination.This moral reflex to condemn religious groups because of their characteristic reluctance to acknowledge the role of cognitive biases in their beliefs and practices is understandable given the irrationality, ignorance, or denial that such reluctance suggests. I frankly acknowledge that I share this moral concern. But the actual complexities of religious practice demonstrate that the situation demands a subtler evaluation. Resistance to awareness of cognitive biases exists both inside and outside religious groups; economic and political practices in all eras and of all types have every bit as much to gain from neglecting to enlighten people about their cognitive operations as religious groups do—just consider the techniques employed in commercial advertising and political campaigns. Moreover, religious groups also promote methods of discernment and self-awareness that have historically been, and continue to be, the dominant method by which... (shrink)

The article examines the role of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's critique of classical political economy. I argue that Hegel's distinction of finite cognition between analytic and synthetic in the Science of Logic constitutes the methodological framework through which Marx delineates the different stages of the development of political economy. Focusing on the Grundrisse, I reveal the Hegelian influence behind Marx's statements on previous political economists’ methods. Thus, Marx's immanent critique of the classical political economy (...) is construed as undertaken from the level of the systematic dialectical method of Capital, and is modelled on Hegel's immanent critique of analytic and synthetic cognition from the perspective of absolute cognition. In this context, and focusing on Marx's critique of Ricardo's method, I argue that the latter's limitations are associated with the deficiencies of synthetic cognition as presented by Hegel. Therefore, the article sheds light on an important yet underexplored topic of the Hegel-Marx relationship. By indicating the centrality of Hegel's theory of finite cognition in Marx's methodological underpinnings, the article provides a new perspective on Hegel-Marx scholarship. (shrink)

Circular economy thinking has become the subject of academic enquiry across several disciplines recently. Yet whilst its technical and business angles are more widely discussed, its philosophical underpinnings and socio-economic implications are insufficiently investigated. In this article, we aim to contribute to their understanding by uncovering the circular economy role in shaping a new vision, highlighting the social and economic dimensions of future imaginaries and the mechanisms that can enable them to bring about change in the social context. (...) We believe that defining the vision that the circular economy is contributing to shape is key to explain its conceptual framework and activities. Drawing on the concept of fictional expectations, we uncover one of the plausible social dimensions inherent to the circular economy thinking thereby opening up a new perspective on the current debate in the circular economy literature wherein authors, by contrast, are emphasising the lack of an explicit social dimension. Fictional expectations are introduced to refer to those imaginaries of the future that can catalyse social action in the present and counteract societal addictions, in which modern society seems to be trapped. We show how a circular economy inspired vision can be instrumental to the emergence of a fictional expectation that can provide therapies to the current societal addiction of wasteful production and consumption systems. This philosophical background allows us to provide, in conclusion, a new conceptualisation of the circular economy as a cognitive framework instrumental to the emergence of a future imaginary. (shrink)

In his “Common knowledge” (2016) and _The Transmission of Knowledge_ (2021), John Greco proposes a novel account of hinge propositions. Central to it is the idea that they are items of common knowledge – that is, of knowledge that is already present in the system, freely available to anyone, without having to figure it out by oneself or having to be taught it by others. As such, they are not subject to any quality control at all. Furthermore, they figure in (...) a subject’s cognitive economy as items of procedural, mostly tacit knowledge, which is operative in the execution of actions and various cognitive tasks. After introducing the basics of Greco’s account, I consider it from a systematic and historical perspective and argue that, while instructive, it is wanting in several respects. Whereas some, among the myriad hinges Wittgenstein considers in _On Certainty_ (1969), may be known, there is no need to make them the content of a different kind of knowledge. Furthermore, we cannot have (evidential) justification and, _a fortiori_, knowledge of at least some other propositions that Wittgenstein considered as hinges. In passing, I also show that Greco’s account aligns much more with G. E. Moore’s ideas about the epistemic status of his truisms in “A defence of common sense” (1925) and the premises of his celebrated “Proof of an external world” (1939), than with Wittgenstein’s account of hinges and their epistemic significance in _On Certainty_. (shrink)

In the dissertation I examine the split between cognition and eros in Kant's notion of objectivity, which has become paradigmatic for modern theories about knowledge. I argue that the split between cognition, on the one hand, and feelings and desires, on the other, does not capture the necessary conditions of knowledge, as Kant claims, but involves a suppression of erotic factors of existence. ;The split between pure knowledge and sensual existence in Kant's thought reflects an ascetic tradition inherited from both (...) Greek and Christian sources, which views the body, sexuality, and in particular women's sexuality as a source of pollution. According to this tradition, since thought must be divested of the pollution of sensuous existence, women's sexuality precludes them from rational activity. Consequently, the philosophical commitment to purity has justified the exclusion of women from the practice of knowledge. ;The particular form of asceticism which is evident in Kant's treatment of sensibility of objective knowledge, of morality, and of aesthetic judgement, reflects the reified nature of relations in an emerging capitalist economy. The suppression of the immediate, sensual qualities in both the subject and object of knowledge, in Kant's system, corresponds to the suppression of the immediate, qualitative features of the subject and object in the process of commodity production. Both persons and things become reduced to a formal abstract equivalence. Kant's notion of objectivity makes normative this objectification of relations between persons and things. ;Thus, the paradigm of objective knowledge is not only damaging to the thinker, who must detach himself from the emotional and sensual facets of existence. It serves as an ideology which has justified the exclusion of women from the pursuit of knowledge, and which more generally legitimates the distorted human relations generated by the world of commodity production. ;By considering Kant's commitment to pure knowledge in the context of the genealogy of the concept of purity, the themes of asceticism and fetishism emerged as mutually illuminating. Implicit in the ascetic denial of sensuality is a dialectic which leads to an objectification of persons and things. Moreover, the fetishism of commodities involves a detachment of erotic interests from persons which results in an obsessive interest in objects. (shrink)

Economy and Theology: Cusanus' Theory of Value, a study from the field of the history of philosophy, responds to the present-day interest in what is referred to as economic theology. This study aims to show that value (valor), one of the fundamental concepts of contemporary philosophy and economics, has its genealogy in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa. Starting from the economic context (the concept of price/pretium), Cusanus proposes the theory of value that, on the one hand, is objectively (...) rooted in the Divine act of creation (God as the Minter) and, on the other hand, requires reading by human beings (human mind as a banker). While this theory appears in Cusanus' late work The Bowling-Game, it is underpinned by his theory of knowledge, theory of human beings and human cognition against the background of his vision of the universe. Thus, the aim of the book is to try to answer the question about the role and tasks of human being as a principal player in economic and social game. This description of human position emerges from the creative tension between human philosophical and theological reflection and certain economic solutions. (shrink)

More recent advancements in digital technologies have significantly alleviated the dissemination of new scientific ideas as well as the storing, searching and retrieval of large amounts of published research findings. While not denying the benefits of this novel ‘economy of memory,’ this paper endeavors to shed light on the ways in which the use of digital technologies may be linked to a distortion of the system of formal publications that facilitates the effective dissemination and collaborative building of scientific knowledge. (...) Through combining three different strands of discussion that are often left separate – those pertaining to the cognitive effects of new technological memory systems, those pertaining to citation and publishing practices, and those regarding the effects of formalizing modes of research governance – it is also shown that this distortion is not merely a consequence of technological developments alone. Rather, such a distortion is inseparable from and potentially aggravated by the spreading of increasingly dysfunctional, formalizing research governance mechanisms. It is argued that these mechanisms run the risk of fostering the proliferation of knowledge practices that are characterized by an increasing degree of superficiality as well as the strategic publication of research that is of a decreasing degree of originality. If left unaddressed, this may pose a serious threat to the efficiency and effectiveness of the formal record of scientific knowledge as a tool for the dissemination of original research. By extension, this may in the long run seriously undermine the capacity of the publicly funded research system more generally. (shrink)

Aujourd'hui nous vivons un nouveau stade de la longue histoire de l'évolution technique de l'humanité : le stade du capitalisme hyperindustriel. Depuis le XXe siècle, l'homme n'a cessé de vivre les bouleversements des conditions de la temporalité, c'est-à-dire aussi bien de son individuation. Ce nouveau stade induit déjà une profonde transformation de nos existences. Loin de disparaître, l'industrialisation se poursuit et se renforce, elle investit de nouveaux champs, invisibles, qui vont des nanostructures jusqu'aux fondements neurologiques de l'insconscient, en passant par (...) les biotechnologies : les champs de l'hypermatériel, où la matière est toujours déjà une forme, où la forme est toujours déjà une information et où l'" immatériel " apparaît pour ce qu'il est : une fable qui enfume les esprits. Bernard Stiegler formule à nouveaux frais les enjeux des technologies culturelles et cognitives, mais aussi des biotechnologies et des nanotechnologies. Elles ne vont pas sans péril pour l'humanité, pour le " devenir non inhumain " de l'espèce humaine, comme il l'écrit. Demain, l'homme sera-t-il désemparé de lui-même, de sa conscience et de sa libido, ou saura-t-il exister avec les technologies de l'hypermatériel? S'il se laisse subsumer, s'il laisse son désir être capté par les puissantes machines et réseaux qui cherchent déjà à instaurer un psychopouvoir, l'une des conséquences pourrait bien être l'auto-destruction du capitalisme, déjà bien engagé sur cette pente. Bernard Stiegler n'est pas un technophobe. Il n'en est que plus autorisé à nous alerter. (shrink)

How should we conceptualise the turn to attention as a means of producing surplus value? Claudio Celis Bueno answers this question through a consideration of the attention economy in the context of a rethinking of Marxist political economy. Bueno accounts for the development of the economisation of attention through the concepts of value, labour and time, but also investigates how the shift to attention requires us to rethink the basis of these terms. Using the attention economy as (...) an example, he develops a method of immanent critique which rejects a-historical understandings of labour, in order to show how the core concepts of Marxist political economy transform across different economic systems. Despite the clarity of this argument, Bueno opens an interesting but unanswered question as to how one transitions from this insight to a positive political project that may not be compatible with immanent critique. (shrink)

In this interview with Yann Moulier Boutang and Carlo Vercellone, André Gorz elaborates on three crucial points of his analysis of the significance of the mutation inherent in the concept of cognitive capitalism: first, the redefinition of the mechanisms of exploitation and the processes of emancipation, since when labor is no longer measurable in units of time, and when self-exploitation takes on a central function in the process of valorization, the production of subjectivity becomes a central site of conflicts; (...) second the importance of snaking a precise distinction between the notion of knowledge, which is objective and formalizable by essence, and the notion of « know-how » or intellectual capability, which is by essence something alive and experienced; third the subjective and objective reasons why cognitive capitalism appears as a crisis of capitalism, containing the seed of another model of society. (shrink)

“Noverim me, noverim te.” – Saint Augustine, Confessions, 10.1.1. (397-400 AD). -/- What would and will an urban commons look like that is slowly and incrementally being re-socialized? How would that affect urban planning “now” and in times of crisis? How do we prepare for the likelihood of rolling similar crises with an eye on returning the urban commons to citizens? -/- There is the old adage that under capitalism, risk is always socialized and profit is always privatized. We are (...) seeing it now, under the COVID-19 crisis. The huge bailouts launched by governments are symptomatic of the crisis in political economy, just as they were post-2008. “Too big to fail” has sponsored monsters that refuse to back off without threatening the collapse of the entire system. Francisco Goya’s “The sleep of Reason produces monsters …” comes to mind. -/- Physical and immaterial culture, in our current Western civilisation, are intimately linked. Yet the focus for urban design is generally on the material or physical side, with the immaterial left to its own devices. Increasingly, urban design measures are merely ameliorative and aesthetic, with the larger share shaped by a political economy dictated by market ideology or “politicalology.” What transpires, nonetheless, is an immaterial commons that constitutes a public or private intellectual commons – often a mix of the two; but, in the case of domination by market ideology, the privatization of “general intellect” proceeds by abject appropriation. In such a technocratically driven model, subjective states become increasingly important. As Indian architect Balkrishna Vithaldas Doshi once said, “Smart cities are smart people.” -/- How might these two otherwise contiguous and synchronous systems be brought back into a properly civic-minded rapport with or without crisis-driven change? Are there alternate models for the urban commons? What measures might be put in place in advance, or as provisional intercessions? (shrink)

We demonstrate “economies of experience” in eye-movement patterns—that is, optimization of eye-movement patterns aimed at more efficient and less costly visual processing, similar to the priming-induced formation of sparser cortical representations or reduced reaction times. Participants looked at Mooney-type, degraded stimuli that were difficult to recognize without prior experience, but easily recognizable after exposure to their undegraded versions. As predicted, eye-movement dispersion, velocity, and the number of fixations decreased with each stimulus presentation. Further analyses showed that this effect was contingent (...) on recognition, and the selection of information from the stimulus could be informed by the identity of the presented object. Finally, our study demonstrates that after exposure to the undegraded version of the stimulus, eye-movement patterns associated with its degraded and undegraded versions become more similar. This suggests that eye-movement patterns can evolve to facilitate the optimal processing of a given stimulus via experience-driven perceptual learning. (shrink)

The acceptability of sentences in natural language is constrained not only grammaticality, but also by the relationship between what is being conveyed and such factors as context and the beliefs of interlocutors. In many languages the critical element in a sentence (its focus) must be given grammatical prominence. There are different accounts of the nature of focus marking. Some researchers treat it as the grammatical realization of a potentially arbitrary feature of universal grammar and do not provide an explicit account (...) of its origins; others have argued, however, that focus marking is a (grammaticalized) functional solution to the problem of efficiently transmitting information via a noisy channel. By adding redundancy to highlight critical elements in particular, focus protects key parts of the message from noise. If this information‐theoretic account is true, then we should expect focus‐like behavior to emerge even in non‐linguistic communication systems given sufficient noise and pressures for efficiency. We tested this in an experiment in which participants played a simple communication game in which they had to click cells on a grid to communicate one of two line figures drawn across the grid. We manipulated the noise, available time, and required effort, and measured patterns of redundancy. Because the lines in many cases overlapped, meaning that only some parts of each line could be used to distinguish it from the other, we were able to compare the extent to which effort was expended on adding redundancy to critical (non‐overlapping) and non‐critical (overlapping) parts of the message. The results supported the information‐theoretic account of focus and shed light on the emergence of information structure in language. (shrink)

Par leur grande diversité, les industries de contenus marquent, avec Internet, la mobilisation de communautés et réseaux socionumériques au service de nouveaux paradigmes économiques. Ce phénomène central opère simultanément sur plusieurs registres. Il modifie les modes de conception et de développement des biens et services, il transforme la place et les pratiques des utilisateurs, il redéfinit les modèles d'affaires, les formes de commercialisation, les organisations comme les marchés sous-jacents. Les industries culturelles apparaissent ainsi comme le laboratoire d'expérimentation de nouvelles formes (...) d'organisation, de travail et de marché. L'article qui suit s'appuie sur les traits dominants de ce secteur pour pointer les dynamiques économiques de ces réseaux et les bases sur lesquelles s'organisent leurs modèles d'affaire. Dans une première partie, l'auteur explicite les principaux types de structuration des réseaux sociaux. Leur multiplicité et leur évolutivité masquent en effet souvent leurs différences de nature. L'article distingue trois grands types de réseaux socionumériques : architectures et espaces partagés de collaboration, communautés de production ou d'action collective, réseaux sociaux et communautés de prescription. Dans sa seconde partie, l'article spécifie les principales conséquences économiques de chaque type de réseau (centralité des hybridations entre modèles marchands et non-marchands, déstructuration des industries traditionnelles par l'instauration de filières courtes de production et de diffusion, rôle grandissant des fonctions de prescription dans une économie d'abondance) ; en effet, les différentes formes de réseau ne se démarquent pas simplement par leur organisation, leur mode de structuration ou la gouvernance associée, elles renvoient également à des modalités différentes de gestion et de valorisation du savoir, marquées par la coexistence et l'imbrication de formes d'économies et d'échanges sociaux marchands et non marchands, par des manières nouvelles de stimuler et composer avec une abondance renouvelée des contenus et des informations L'émergence des réseaux socionumériques a donc généré l'apparition de modèles économiques originaux qui ne doivent pas être envisagés comme les simples décalques ou adaptations de configuration existantes, pas plus que comme l' opérationnalisation commerciale des communautés de pratiques. Ils font intervenir de nouveaux intervenants ainsi que des rapports inédits entre opérateurs et constructeurs de matériel, fournisseurs de programmes et de contenus, diffuseurs et fournisseurs d'accès, consommateurs et utilisateurs finaux. (shrink)

Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive (...) system? Second, can a group acting as a distributed cognitive system be ‘rational’ and ‘track the truth’ in the outputs it produces? I argue that a group’s performance as a distributed cognitive system depends on its ‘aggregation procedure’ – its mechanism for aggregating the group members’ inputs into collective outputs – and I investigate the properties of an aggregation procedure that matter. (shrink)

L'usage du monde numérique, et plus particulièrement de l'Internet, crée des traces qui constituent la source de services que les utilisateurs contribuent à personnaliser eux-mêmes. En échangeant leurs favoris, leurs photos, leurs informations de toutes sortes, les utilisateurs révèlent leurs préférences et renforcent l'utilité du service qu'ils sont en train d'utiliser. Une première génération de services s'appuie sur les mécanismes d'une rationalité exploratoire, tirant bénéfice du savoir collectif . Une seconde génération de services va plus loin en utilisant les préférences (...) déclarées pour connecter des individus « qui se ressemblent » . Ces évolutions suggèrent le passage d'une économie de stock à une économie de flux où le bien rare est moins l'information que l'attention nécessaire pour la traiter. Elles ont des conséquences sur la gestion de l'identité numérique des individus et rend de moins opérant la notion juridique de la privacy.Using the digital world, and especially the Internet, generates traces that become the basis for services which are customised by the contributions of users themselves. As they share their favourites, photos and information of all kinds, users not only disclose their preferences but also strengthen the utility of the service they are using. Some first-generation services rely on mechanisms based on exploratory rationality and drawing on collective knowledge . A second type of service goes a step further by using displayed preferences to connect people who are "alike" . These trends suggest a switch from a stock-based economy to a flow-based economy, where the most valuable asset is not information as such but the attention it attracts. These developments are creating issues relating to the management of individual digital identities, and bringing the relevance of the legal notion of privacy into question. (shrink)

In recent years the understanding of the cognitive foundations of economic behavior has become increasingly important. This volume contains contributions from such leading scholars as Adam Brandenburger, Michael Bacharach and Patrick Suppes. It will be of great interest to academics and researchers involved in the field of economics and psychology as well as those interested in political economy more generally.

It has become commonplace within feminist theory to claim that women’s lives are constructed by multiple, intersecting systems of oppression. In this thesis, I challenge the consensus that oppression is aptly captured by the theoretical model of “intersectionality.” While intersectionality originates in Black feminist thought as a purposive intervention into US antidiscrimination law, it has been detached from that context and harnessed to different representational aims. For instance, it is often asserted that intersectionality enables a representational politics that overcomes legacies (...) of exclusion within hegemonic Anglo-American feminism. I argue that intersectionality reinscribes the political exclusion of racialized women as a feature of their embodied identities. That is, it locates the failure of political representation in the “complex” identities of “intersectional” subjects, who are constructed as unrepresentable in terms of “race” or “gender” alone. Further, I argue that intersectionality fails to supplant race- and class-privileged women as the normative subjects of feminist theory and politics. In Chapter One, I demonstrate that intersectionality illicitly imports unitary concepts of “race,” “gender,” and “class.” In Chapter Two, I argue that intersectionality lacks a theory of hierarchy: it is a “flat geography” which cannot capture vertical and horizontal lines of power. In Chapter Three, I explore the role of analogical reasoning in rendering racialized women invisible both as gendered and as racialized subjects in twentieth-century social movements. To concretize this argument, I turn to Simone de Beauvoir’s use of race-sex analogies to describe (white, bourgeois) “women’s” situation in The Second Sex. In Chapter Four, I advance a programmatic unified account of oppression. I suggest that the possibility of a unified theory (as opposed to an intersectional one) is intimated in the concrete articulation of race, class, and gender. My point of departure is a phenomenology of capitalism, which reveals that these are all fundamentally modes of exploitation and appropriation. In Chapter Five, I theorize how they are made visible (and invisible) on the body. I extend Frantz Fanon’s account of “epidermalization,” drawing upon the marxian concepts of “fetishism” and “mode of appearance” to elaborate four structures of gendered racialized perception: first, the “miscegenation taboo” structures perceptions of the “purity” of whiteness and the “polluting” effects of blackness. Whiteness, theorised as a “possessive investment” and as “property” is defined by the right to exclude. Second, the “episteme of tellable differences” produces the conviction that we can automatically “tell the difference” between a body placed in one “racial” or gender category, and another—while bodies that temporarily confound classification cause fear and consternation. Third, the “race/reproduction bind” names the axiomatic assumption that “race” is reproduced through (heterosexual) procreation and that “race” is, therefore, biologically inheritable. Finally, the “fear/criminalisation reflex” refers to the bidirectional equation of particular racialised-gendered bodies with crime, and of crime with those bodies; this a function of the discursive use of ‘crime’ as an alibi for “race’” the systemic racialisation of punitive carceral institutions, and the historical origins of “race” in transatlantic chattel slavery, which shaped perceptual-cognitive associations of freedom with whiteness and captivity with blackness. (shrink)

It is now a common belief that the truths of our lives are hidden in the databases streamed from our interactions in smart environments. In this current hype of big data, the Internet of Things has been suggested as the idea to embed small sensors and actuators everywhere to unfold the truths beneath the surfaces of everything. However, remaining the technology that promises more than it can provide thus far, more important for the IoT’s actual expansion to various social domains (...) than the actual discovery of hidden truths has been people’s speculations about the unknown problems, such as hidden security issues or lifestyle concerns, beyond the narrow human knowability but assumed to leave their traces in the IoT-collected big data. This paper discuss this speculation as the concealed cognitive labor of IoT users that projects some fictitious values to the big data IoT companies accumulate. By the term pan-kinetics, the systemic operation of smart actuators is analyzed as the process through which fictitious values of data are converted to the real values as these actuators draw some profitable correlations from physical domains of the IoT. Analyzing smart electroencephalogram headsets as the unique IoT devices operating on human brains, it argues how the IoT translates this speculative realism of unknown problems into its big data, which the IoT developers believe to be full of machine-learnable correlations that would lead to the smart solutions of the problems. (shrink)

This book seeks to explain long-term economic development and institutional change in terms of the cognitive features of human learning and communication processes. Martens links individual cognitive processes to macroeconomic growth theories, including economies of scale and scope, and to theories of institutional development based on asymmetric information in production processes and economies of scale in enforcement technology. With considerable flair, Bertin Martens has applied the hot new area of psychological and behavioural economics to notions of growth and (...) development and has created a unique and impressive volume. (shrink)

Prominent evolutionary psychologists have argued that our innate psychological endowment consists of numerous domainspecific cognitive resources, rather than a few domaingeneral ones. In the light of some conceptual clarification, we examine the central inprinciple arguments that evolutionary psychologists mount against domaingeneral cognition. We conclude (a) that the fundamental logic of Darwinism, as advanced within evolutionary psychology, does not entail that the innate mind consists exclusively, or even massively, of domainspecific features, and (b) that a mixed innate cognitive (...) class='Hi'>economy of domainspecific and domaingeneral resources remains a genuine conceptual possibility. However, an examination of evolutionary psychology's 'grain problem' reveals that there is no way of establishing a principled and robust distinction between domainspecific and domaingeneral features. Nevertheless, we show that evolutionary psychologists can and do live with this grain problem without their whole enterprise being undermined. (shrink)

Neuroscience opens new avenues to alleviate neurological and psychiatric disorders and presents targeted ways to control and enhance vegetative as well as mood and cognitive behaviors. It considers a general trend to obtain improved memory and comprehension capacities through “smart pills,” rewards from technical progress. The article shows that currently available drugs will not only change some quantitative aspects of neural activities, whose improvement implies no problem, but also the global internal economy of cognition. Cognitive enhancers do (...) not only change the amplitude of a given brain capacity, i.e. memory, but also the balance between emotional and rational networks. This article argues that the real risk resides in a hypertrophy of the self, losing essential feedback from the eyes of the others. These fundamental changes provide an understanding of the driving forces of “neurotechnological gourmandize”. (shrink)

‘Academic rentiership’ is an economistic way of thinking about the familiar tendency for academic knowledge to consolidate into forms of expertise that exercise authority over the entire society. The feature that ‘rentiership’ high-lights is control over what can be accepted as a plausible knowledge claim, which I call ‘modal power’. This amounts to how the flow of information is channelled in society, with academic training and peer-reviewed research being the main institutional drivers. This paper begins by contextualizing rentiership in the (...) deeper issues surrounding ‘cognitive economy ’that lie at the heart of the Western philosophical tradition. The psychological phenomenon of the ‘Gestaltshift’ is used to illustrate various ways in which the flow of information can be channelled to enable or disable certain possible ways of regarding the world. Against this background, such familiar concepts from academic practice as ‘quality control’ and ‘plagiarism’ acquire a new look. Quality control aims to maintain rentiership, whereas plagiarism aims to undermine it. The second half of the paper is largely concerned with the historical swings back and forth between rentiership and anti-rentiership in academia. Rentiership’s decline is associated with corruption of its quality control processes, which reveals academia’s reliance on equally corrupt power elites in society. In addition, the introduction of new communication media over which academia cannot exert proprietary control also serves to open up the sphere of plausible knowledge claims. The ongoing Internet revolution is likely to permanently alter the terms on which academic rentiership will be possible in the future. (shrink)

This collection of 17 articles offers an overview of the philosophical activities of a group of philosophers (who have been) working at the Groningen University. The meta-methodological assumption which unifies the research of this group, holds that there is a way to do philosophy which is a middle course between abstract normative philosophy of science and descriptive social studies of science. On the one hand it is argued with social studies of science that philosophy should take notice of what scientists (...) actually do. On the other hand, however, it is claimed that philosophy can and should aim to reveal cognitive patterns in the processes and products of scientific and common sense knowledge. Since it is thought that those patterns can function as guidelines in new research and/or in research in other disciplines, philosophy can nevertheless hold on to the normative aim which is characteristic of 'classical' philosophy of science. Compared to this common assumption, there is a diversity of subjects. Some papers deal with general problems of science, knowledge, cognition and argumentation, others with topics relating to foundational problems of particular sciences. Therefore this volume is of interest to philosophers of science, to philosophers of knowledge and argumentation in general, to philosophers of mind, as well as for scientists working in the physical and applied sciences, biology, psychology and economy who are interested in the foundations of their disciplines. After a foreword by Leszek Nowak and a general introduction by the editors, the book is divided into four parts, with special introductions. - I: Conceptual Analysis in Service of Various Research Programmes (Henk Zandvoort, Rein Vos, Rick Looijen, Gerben Stavenga, Renée Dalitz); - II: The Logic of the Evaluation of Arguments, Hypotheses, Default Rules, and Interesting Theorems (Erik Krabbe, Theo Kuipers, Alfons Keupink, Maarten Janssen/Yao-Hua Tan, Bert Hamminga); - III: Three Challenges to the Truth Approximation Programme (Sjoerd Zwart, Hinne Hettema/Theo Kuipers, Roberto Festa); - IV: Explicating Psychological Intuitions (Anne-Ruth Mackor, Jeanne Peijnenburg, Lex Guichard, Michel ter Hark). The Groningen research group was recently qualified, by an official international assessment committee, as one of the best philosophy research groups in the Netherlands. (shrink)

The present article studies the representation of economy in Wunderkammer, a collection of poetry by Finland-Swedish author Ralf Andtbacka. Going back to the historical form of cabinets of curiosities, Wunderkammer depicts acts of buying, selling, and collecting. By showing the connectivity of objects and their impact on human subjects, Andtbacka actualizes and deconstructs topics originally initiated by Karl Marx, such as value, fetish, commodifica-tion, and alienation. The portrayal of capitalism, both past and pres-ent, in the book is highly ambivalent. (...) On the one hand, collecting functions as a critical, anticapitalistic act. On the other hand, eco-nomic discourse has invaded the text and turned the author into a writing machine powered by the energy of neoliberal labor. Besides an excess of objects, the poems display an overflow of information, a characteristic feature of a postcapitalist economy. As an exam-ple of cognitive mapping, Wunderkammer allegorically portrays humans, objects, and information in the middle of a paradoxical economic transformation. (shrink)

One hundred years ago, Frederick Taylor and the pioneers of scientific management went into battle on US factory-floors. Armed with stopwatches and clipboards, they were fighting a war over measure. A century on and capitalist production has spread far beyond the factory walls and the confines of 'national economies'. Although capitalism increasingly seems to rely on 'cognitive' and 'immaterial' forms of labour and social cooperation, the war over measure continues. Armies of economists, statisticians, management-scientists, information-specialists, accountants and others are (...) engaged in a struggle to connect heterogeneous concrete human activities on the basis of equal quantities of human labour in the abstract – that is, to link work and capitalist value. In this paper, we discuss contemporary capital's attempt to impose the 'law of value' through its measuring of immaterial labour. Using the example of higher education in the UK – a 'frontline' of capitalist development – as our case-study, we explain how measuring takes places on various 'self-similar' levels of social organisation. We suggest that such processes are both diachronic and synchronic: socially-necessary labour-times of 'immaterial doings' are emerging and being driven down at the same time as heterogeneous concrete activities are being made commensurable. Alongside more overt attacks on academic freedom, it is in this way that neoliberalism appears on campus. (shrink)

One hundred years ago, Frederick Taylor and the pioneers of scientific management went into battle on US factory-floors. Armed with stopwatches and clipboards, they were fighting a war over measure. A century on and capitalist production has spread far beyond the factory walls and the confines of 'national economies'. Although capitalism increasingly seems to rely on 'cognitive' and 'immaterial' forms of labour and social cooperation, the war over measure continues. Armies of economists, statisticians, management-scientists, information-specialists, accountants and others are (...) engaged in a struggle to connect heterogeneous concrete human activities on the basis of equal quantities of human labour in the abstract – that is, to link work and capitalist value. In this paper, we discuss contemporary capital's attempt to impose the 'law of value' through its measuring of immaterial labour. Using the example of higher education in the UK – a 'frontline' of capitalist development – as our case-study, we explain how measuring takes places on various 'self-similar' levels of social organisation. We suggest that such processes are both diachronic and synchronic: socially-necessary labour-times of 'immaterial doings' are emerging and being driven down at the same time as heterogeneous concrete activities are being made commensurable. Alongside more overt attacks on academic freedom, it is in this way that neoliberalism appears on campus. (shrink)

In today's post-pandemic reality, human capital plays one of the leading roles in ensuring economic growth. The intensification of innovative processes in the context of post-pandemic social constructivism, the widespread use of information technology, intellectualization of labor, etc. In the context of post-pandemic social constructivism, transformations of the content and structure of human capital take place, make adjustments to the process of its formation, accumulation, use and change the nature of the impact of human capital on economic development. In today's (...) post-pandemic reality, there are many problems both in the field of the formation of innovatively oriented human capital and in the sphere of its use, which necessitates the search for ways to effectively manage these processes in order to ensure the balanced development of production factors in the context of the formation of an innovative economy in the country. The article analyzes the main methods and aspects of cognitive psychology that can be useful in the development of human capital. In particular, special attention was paid to the development of emotional intelligence and emotional competence. The reason for choosing precisely such elements of cognitive psychology as the level of emotional intelligence and emotional competence is that they are a prerequisite for successful self-realization of a person and, as a result, an important prerequisite for successful management of human capital in the conditions of post-pandemic social constructivism. (shrink)

This paper examines the contemporary philosophical and cognitive relevance of Charles Peirce's diagrammatic logic of existential graphs (EGs), the ‘moving pictures of thought’. The first part brings to the fore some hitherto unknown details about the reception of EGs in the early 1900s that took place amidst the emergence of modern conceptions of symbolic logic. In the second part, philosophical aspects of EGs and their contributions to contemporary logical theory are pointed out, including the relationship between iconic logic and (...) images, the problem of the meaning of logical constants, the cognitive economy of iconic logic, the failure of the Frege–Russell thesis, and the failure of the Language of Thought hypothesis. (shrink)

According to the main theories of the knowledge-based economy (KBE), the recent transformations of capitalism are the origins of a general societal change. Managerial theories consider KBE to be a series of win-win mechanisms that simultaneously favour firms, workers and consumers. The cognitive capitalism theory perceives in the development of cognitive capitalism signs of the formation of a post-capitalist economy. This article discusses the main features of these two theoretical orientations and identifies some core ambivalences in (...) KBE. The relationship between the market and society in KBE is marked by a dialectical process. The former incorporates mechanisms of potential economic valorization generated by informal social relationships. To this end, it must internalize actors, practices and cultures that are partially in conflict with it, given that it must make ever greater attempts to bring the overall process back within the ownership regime. One thus witnesses a reduction of the barriers between firms and society, that can simultaneously engender a more subtle dominance of the former over the latter, or the growth of autonomy, self-organization and peer cooperation among social actors. This second possibility relies entirely upon politics and collective action. (shrink)

This article seeks to situate pharmacological cognitive enhancement as part of a broader relationship between cultural understandings of the body-brain and the political economy. It is the body of the worker that forms the intersection of this relationship and through which it comes to be enacted and experienced. In this article, we investigate the imaginaries that both inform and are reproduced by representations of pharmacological cognitive enhancement, drawing on cultural sources such as newspaper articles and films, policy (...) documents, and pharmaceutical marketing material to illustrate our argument. Through analysis of these diverse cultural sources, we argue that the use of pharmaceuticals has come to be seen not only as a way to manage our brains, but through this as a means to manage our productive selves, and thereby to better manage the economy. We develop three analytical themes. First, we consider the cultural representations of the brain in connection with the idea of plasticity – captured most graphically in images of morphing – and the representation of enhancement as a desirable, inevitable, and almost painless process in which the mind-brain realizes its full potential and asserts its will over matter. Following this, we explore the social value accorded to productive employment and the contemporary ethos of working on or managing oneself, particularly in respect of improving one’s productive performance through cognitive enhancement. Developing this, we elaborate a third theme by looking at the moulding of the worker’s productive body-brain in relation to the demands of the economic system. (shrink)

We challenge the prevalent opinion that consumption does not seem to matter as much as production and defy the fetishism of industrial work. We explore the implications of the premise that under conditions of cognitive capitalism consumption dictates what production does, when and how. We explain that in a post-industrial global society and economy fashion, branding, instant gratification of desires, and ephemeral consumer tastes govern production and consumption. The London riots of August 2011 send us a warning that (...) consumption and cognitive capitalism are asphyxiating in the structures and norms of industrial capitalism that are still in place. (shrink)

Thomas Hobbes holds that there is an intimate connection between linguistic meaning and thought. This chapter provides a general overview of Hobbes's views on language, and argues that Hobbes holds an inchoate, but recognizable, version of an inferential role or functional role semantics. On Hobbes's theory of language use and linguistic meaning, the meaning of an expression is the functional role of that expression in cognition. The chapter describes Hobbes's account of use of names in cognition – names are marks, (...) applied to objects, for the sake of recalling thoughts of those objects. According to Hobbes, a propositional attitude is a relation between a language‐using animal and a sentence. Sentences are signs of thought because they express propositional judgments. The chapter presents Hobbes's account of linguistic understanding. It argues that the understanding of linguistic expressions characteristic of mature, fully language‐competent humans is determined by the ability of language‐competent humans to deploy names in reasoning. (shrink)