I shall be dealing, throughout this book, with a set of related problems: the relationship between morality and reasoning in general, the way in which moral reasoning is properly to be carried on, and why morality is not arbitrary. The solutions to these problems come out of the same train of argument. Morality is not arbitrary, I shall argue, because the acceptance of certain qualities of character as virtues and the rejection of others as vices is forced on us by (...) the co-operative basis of human life. The co-operation in human life is unavoidable; the alternative is a literal Hobbesian state of nature, and that is impossible. It is not that co-operation between people is a good thing or even a very good thing; it is simply unavoidable in human life, and it is impossible unless the qualities of character counted as virtues are encouraged and are at least fairly common. The possibility of human life presupposes a theory of human nature, and working out that theory of human nature is the main job of moral philosophy. These virtues or qualities of character or attitudes lead us towards a theory of reasons. A person with a sense of justice is a person inclined to accept certain sorts of facts as reasons for acting, and if the virtues are presupposed by human life then the acceptance of those sorts of facts as reasons for acting is presupposed by human life. A condition of the life of reasoning beings (a more accurate term here than 'human beings') is that moral reasons are reasons for acting and are at the very basis of reasoning. And from this it follows that properly conducted moral reasoning is ultimately guided by the virtues rather than ultimately guided by a set of rules. (shrink)

Niels H. Gregersen seeks to illuminate the nature of continuing divine action in the world and to show that the classical theistic doctrine of continuous creation is consonant with some recent scientific theories of self‐productive (“autopoietic”) systems. Central to these theories is the concept of co‐operation; central to Gregersen's theological appropriation of these theories is also the notion of structuring causality developed by philosopher Fred Dretske. While supportive of Gregersen's overall aims and emphases, we find significant disanalogies between co‐ (...) class='Hi'>operation as a theological construct and as an evolutionary strategy. We also doubt the utility of Dretske's notion for his project. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the fair trade network in the North through a comparative assessment of two distinctly different fair trade certified roasters: Planet Bean, a worker-owned co-operative in Guelph, Ontario; and Starbucks Coffee Company, the world's largest specialty roaster. The two organizations are assessed on the basis of their distinct visions of the fair trade mission and their understandings of "consumer sovereignty". It is concluded that the objectives of Planet Bean are more compatible with the moral mission (...) of fair trade, even while the network has become increasingly dependent on the market-reach of corporations like Starbucks, raising difficult prospects for the future of fair trade. (shrink)

We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse (...) these ways of co–operating in game–theoretic terms and submit that the co–operative strategy of games that involve shared representations of future goals may provide new equilibrium solutions. (shrink)

For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. (...) But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from. (shrink)

The economic theory of contract is being reshaped in ways which resonate with the findings of socio-legal contract scholars and of industrial economists and sociologists in the Marshallian tradition, who emphasise the 'embeddedness' of organizations within their social and cultural environment. Contractual co-operation is seen as depending on institutional factors which serve to enhance 'trust', and arrangements which in the past were criticized as the product of collusion are being reassessed as potentially efficient responses to market failure. An active (...) debate has begun on how instruments of public policy can best be deployed to arrive at an effective balance between co-operation and competition. This affects both the competitiveness of private sector organizations and the success of deregulatory reforms in the public sphere. These issues are explored within four main areas: developments in private-sector contracting; contract and organization in the public sector; the economics of contract law; and competitiveness and competition policy. (shrink)

The author identifies and defines the features of traditional utilitarian theories which account for their appeal, demonstrates that no theory which is exclusively act-oriented can have all the properties that ultilitarians have attempted to build into their theories, and develops a new theory co-operative utilitarianism.

Political interaction among citizens who hold opposing moral views commonly requires reaching beyond toleration, toward actual co‐operation with policies one opposes. On the more personal level, however, regarding (e.g.) interactions between healthcare providers and patients, several authors emphasise the importance of preserving integrity. But those who oppose any ‘complicity in evil’ often wrongly conflate instances in which the other's position is (and should be) totally rejected with instances of legitimate, although deep, disagreement. Starting with a striking example from the (...) context of a particular tradition, I argue generally that in the latter sort of disagreements, talk of ‘complicity’ should be largely replaced with a more co‐operative moral stance, grounded in a pluralistic framework. Co‐operation Despite Disagreement (CDD) should be sought either for institutional reasons – akin to the political – or for relational reasons. CDD involves sharing another's perspective and sometimes calls for adopting another's moral judgements in preference to one's own. I seek to identify some of the conditions and circumstances that would justify such a shift, particularly in scenarios involving assistance, such as physician‐assisted suicide (PAS) or the role of an anaesthesiologist in abortion. This discussion is meant to provide examples of the kind of second‐order reasons appropriate for determining the terms for CDD – in distinction from first‐order considerations (e.g., the much‐contested ‘active/passive’ distinction) which are likely to be the subject of the initial disagreement and hence cannot serve to resolve it. (shrink)

This chapter further develops the perfectionist case for distributive equality by arguing that different people's perfections do not compete but often cooperate, so one person's achieving perfection encourages or requires others to do so. This cooperativeness is the core of Marx's argument for distributive equality and strengthens the case from natural abilities and diminishing marginal utility given in Ch. 12. The chapter then considers perfectionist arguments of Green and Bosanquet for private property and the free market, arguing that while these (...) have some merit they do not overturn the general perfectionist case for equality; its arguments here echo those of Hobhouse. (shrink)

Concludes the discussion of theoretical and practical perfection by connecting formal measures of extent and hierarchical organization to further specific values in political action, cooperation, and mutual love. It concludes by answering objections to the account and connecting it to historical perfectionists such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Nietzsche, and Bradley.

Coffee producers in many parts of the world have the option of either becoming a member of and selling their coffee to a Fairtrade and organic co-operative, or selling it to a “coyote”, the Central American nickname for intermediary purchaser. This study investigates why different producers make different choices, looking at both material and immaterial costs and benefits of the two choices. A qualitative study from Chiapas finds that a main reason for not choosing the co-operatives is the production requirements (...) that follow organic certification. A survey on production costs confirms that members of an organic co-operative have more work hours than non-members in the same area. A probit analysis indicates that both coffee plot size and number of working household members influence the producers’ decision on sales channel. However, the study also finds that aspects not related to the organic production requirements can affect the choice, such as the level of trust in co-operative leadership, and the co-operatives’ payment systems. (shrink)

In this chapter, we turn to cooperation as the remedy for market failure, and to justice as the rational disposition to cooperative behaviour. Instead of each person choosing her own strategy, in cooperation persons agree on a single joint strategy choice leading to an optimal outcome. We argue that such a choice results from an ideal bargain among all persons, and offer an account of bargaining, in terms of the initial bargaining position, the claims rational persons would make from that (...) position, and the concessions they would then offer to achieve agreement on a joint strategy, yielding a fundamental principle labelled ‘minimax relative concession’. We then show that this principle is equivalent to ‘maximin relative benefit’, in which the smallest gain anyone receives, measured as a proportion of the gain he would receive from being granted his claim, is as great as possible. The principle of maximin relative benefit, we claim, captures the idea of impartiality in the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, and so is a principle of fairness or justice. Thus, rational bargaining and justice coincide. But we note that the question of determining the initial bargaining position remains to be resolved, both rationally and morally; this question is in fact the same as that of determining initial factor endowments, which we raised and deferred in the previous chapter. (shrink)

Automation does not always replace human labour altogether: there is an intermediate stage of human co-existence with machines, including robots, in a production process. Cobots are robots designed to participate at close quarters with humans in such a process. I shall discuss the possible role of cobots in facilitating the eventual total elimination of human operators from production in which co-bots are initially involved. This issue is complicated by another: cobots are often introduced to workplaces with the message (from managers) (...) that they will not replace human operators but will rather assist human operators and make their jobs more interesting and responsible. If, in the process of learning to assist human operators, robots acquire the skills of human operators, then the promise of avoiding replacement can turn out to be false, and if a human operator loses his job, he has been harmed twice over: once by unemployment and once by deception. I shall suggest that this moral risk attends some cobots more than others. (shrink)

The author identifies and defines the features of traditional utilitarian theories which account for their appeal, demonstrates that no theory which is "exclusively act-oriented" can have all the properties that ultilitarians have attempted to build into their theories, and develops a new theory "co-operative utilitarianism", which is radically different than traditional theories.

In this chapter I defend a novel view of the relationships among intention for the future, self-control, and co-operation. I argue that when an agent forms an intention for the future she comes to regard herself as criticizable if she does not act in accordance with her intention and as praiseworthy if she does. In forming intentions, then, agents acquire dispositions to have reflexive evaluative attitudes. In contexts where the agent has inclinations that run contrary to her unrescinded intention, (...) these evaluative attitudes help her to resist these inclinations. Intentions have, in other words, a built-in mechanism for self-control. I go on to argue that this mechanism can also function as a mechanism for co-operative behaviour. Sometimes a common species of co-operation just is the exercise of self-controlled behaviour in a social context. If this is on the right track, agents like us are not just equipped to formulate and abide by plans for the future, we are also thereby equipped for exercising self-control and participating in co-operative ventures. (shrink)

The focus in this study is the relationships between one tertiary music academy and four amateur orchestras. In this study the kinds of cooperation that exist, how students benefit from participati...

The focus in this study is the relationships between one tertiary music academy and four amateur orchestras. In this study the kinds of cooperation that exist, how students benefit from participati...

Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, Ahead of Print. The focus in this study is the relationships between one tertiary music academy and four amateur orchestras. In this study the kinds of cooperation that exist, how students benefit from participating in amateur orchestras, and how cooperation can be further developed is identified. Four administrators from the academy and four conductors were interviewed. The study shows that the bases for cooperation are informal arrangements and personal contacts between individuals. What the interviewees (...) considered as the main benefit for students was that participating in amateur orchestras provided opportunities for orchestral playing that were lacking within their formal education. Policy decisions were based on the interviewees ideas about students’ benefits, which could be social, musical and professional. The interviewees also respected the students’, and teachers’, autonomy in choosing their own musical and professional paths. Both the academy administrators and the amateur orchestra conductors value the cooperative relationships between academy and amateur orchestras. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Nordic co-operation is renowned throughout the world and perceived as the collaboration of a group of countries which are similar in their views and activities. The main pillars of the Nordic model of co-operation are the tradition of constitutional principles, activity of public movements and organisations, freedom of speech, equality, solidarity, and respect for the natural environment. In connection with labour and entrepreneurship, these elements are the features of a society which favours efficiency, a sense of security and (...) balance between an individual and a group. Currently, the collaboration is a complex process, including many national, governmental and institutional connections which form the “Nordic family”. (shrink)