The Archaeology of Semiotics and the social order of things is edited by George Nash and George Children and brings together 15 thought-provoking chapters from contributors around the world. A sequel to an earlier volume published in 1997, it tackles the problem of understanding how complex communities interact with landscape and shows how the rules concerning landscape constitute a recognised and readable grammar. The mechanisms underlying landscape grammar are both physical and mental, being based in part on the mindset (...) of the individual; the same landscape can thus evoke different meanings for different people and at different times. People's perception has greatly influenced the construction of landscapes over millennia but, until recently, the potential of this area has been largely untapped. Apart from chapters focusing solely upon human interaction with landscape, there are several which skilfully integrate artefacts and place with landscape (e.g. Gheorghiu and Sognnes). Other chapters look at the way people have marked the landscape through such mechanisms as rock-art (e.g. Clegg, Devereux, Estévez, Fossati, Kelleher and Skier). Rock-art establishes personal and communal identity in relation to landscape and it is clear that other forms of visual expression were in place which distinctively created special places within the landscape. Landscape constructs can bind cultures together; bringing the old ways of reading the landscape into contemporary life (e.g. Smiseth). Defining early and late prehistoric landscapes and segregating these into, say, mundane domestic and ritualised spaces rely on both clear and subtle archaeologies and in this volume distinct monument clustering and ritualised linearity are considered (e.g. Mason and Nash). A volume such as this cannot escape the influence of New World approaches, such as anthropology, and in many respects chapters by Bender, Muller and Merritt give context to other chapters within the book. Finally, one must consider text as a means of constructing landscape and this is considered by Heyd, who eloquently deconstructs the travel diary of a 17th century Japanese poet. This will be an important volume for archaeologists, landscape scholars and students. The many approaches used are tried and tested, forming an invaluable resource and not just another edited book. (shrink)

The United Nations' designation of 1979 as the International Year of the Child marked the first global effort undertaken to heighten awareness of the special needs of children. Activities initiated during this special year were designed to promote purposive and collaborative actions for the benefit of children throughout the world. Michigan State University's celebration of the International Year of the Child was held from Septem ber 1979 through June 1980. A variety of activities focused attention on the multiplicity (...) of factors affecting the welfare of today's children as well as the children of the future. Many people involved with the university were concerned that benefits to children continue beyond the official time allocated to the celebration. The series Child Nurturance is one response to this concern. The first five volumes of Child Nurturance reflect directly the activities held on the Michigan State University campus and consist of original contributions from guest speakers and invited contributors. Subsequent biennial volumes will present original contributions from individuals representing such fields as anthropology, biology, education, human ecology, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and medicine. We hope the material presented in these volumes will promote greater understanding of children and encourage interdisciplinary inquiry into the individual, family, societal and cultural variables which influence their welfare and development. We would. like to express both our thanks and our admiration for who not only typed the camera-ready copy for each of Margaret Burritt the volumes, but also served as general manager of the entire project. (shrink)

Having been involved in the Philosophy For Children program for several years now as a philosopher/teacher trainer, I often have had the occasion to reflect upon my experience. While conduction "Philosophy for Children" workshops, I have discovered that one of the great joys of that process has been the way in which teachers have so often responded to the material. It has come as quite a surprise to me that after some initial hesitance, the teachers become enthusiastically involved (...) in the dialogues which take place in the workshop process. Perhaps this shouldn't surprise me, but it does. I have even found it somewhat confusing because, as a philosopher, I am used to the idea of being thought esoteric, divorced from reality and not really concerned with matters of everyday importance. But here is a case in which others, too, are discovering that it is not only permissible to talk about philosophical ideas, but actually encouraged. It was a surprise to me to discover that people do want to think about philosophical ideas. (shrink)

No indictment of existing education is more serious than the charge that it fosters uncritical rather than critical dispositions. It is difficult to see how the addition of anything but epistemology - and even more importantly of philosophy in general - can remedy that deficiency. The sentiment expressed here by Professor Matthew Lipman is a profound one. I agree completely that education has, as one of its fundamental tasks, the fostering of critical dispositions. I agree, moreover, that epistemology is basic (...) to an education that takes seriously the enhancement of critical thinking. Philosophy for Children has forcefully delivered the message, to both the educational and the philosophical communities, that philosophy can and should be viewed as a central component of an adequate education. (shrink)

In this paper I trace the dialogical and narrative dimensions of the philosophical tradition and explore how they are reconfigured in the notion of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI), the mainstay of the collection of novels and discussion plans known as Philosophy for Children. After considering the ontology and epistemology of dialogue, I argue that narrative has replaced exposition in our understanding of philosophical discourse and that CPI represents a narrative context in which truth comes to represent the best (...) story, in a discursive location in which there are always multiple stories. Finally, I raise the issue of children's philosophical voice. Can children philosophize, and if they can, do they do so in a voice different from adults'? If so, what are the distinctive features of that voice? I assert that it is children's historical marginalization in the Western construction of rationality that now – as that rationality undergoes its crisis – makes of them, like women and other “natives,” privileged strangers to the tradition, who are, through CPI, enabled to enter it through dialogue and narrative. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Since the late 1960s, philosophy for children has become a global, multi-disciplinary movement involving innovations in curriculum, pedagogy, educational theory, and teacher education; in moral, social and political philosophy; and in discourse and literary theory. And it has generated the new academic field of philosophy of childhood. Gareth B. Matthews (1929-2011) traced contemporary disrespect for children to Aristotle, for whom the child is essentially a pre-intellectual and pre-moral precursor to the fully realized human adult. Matthews Matthews dubbed this (...) the “deficit conception of childhood” and wrote extensive critiques of its perpetuation in Jean Piaget’s stage model of cognitive development and in Lawrence Kholberg’s stage model of moral development. He published the first book (1994) in the field of philosophy of childhood and wrote a column of reviews of philosophically-oriented children’s books. He argued that even academic philosophers can benefit from the freshness and directness of children’s thinking. For Matthew Lipman (1923-2010) and Ann Margaret Sharp (1942-2010), the child is only potentially a philosophical agent and grows into becoming such by means of a philosophical education. Lipman invented the literary genre of children’s philosophical fiction, which systematically reconstructs key philosophical issues and positions in language accessible by children, attempts to help children recognize philosophical dimensions of their own experience, and models philosophical dialogue. Lipman and Sharp developed a protocol for a “community of philosophical inquiry,” in which people with diverse experiences, ideas and concerns dialogue together around a shared philosophical question, with the aim of forming reasonable, meaningful judgments about the matter. The early success of philosophy for children was due in part to its coincidence with the critical thinking movement in education, in which Lipman was an important figure. Its emphasis on ethics has justified its use as a program of ethics, character, and even religious education. It has also been used for civics education, because of how it instantiates democratic deliberation and power-sharing. At the same time, philosophy for children has been criticized by religious and social conservatives, developmental psychologists, and philosophers. Today, the diversity of approaches, aims, materials, and grounding theories of philosophy for children signifies different understandings of philosophy, childhood and education, which have become “essentially contested concepts” within the movement. Philosophy for children is no longer unified by an identifiable theory, purpose, pedagogy, method or curriculum, but is now used to further a number of disparate educational agendas. Shaun Gallagher’s (1992) heuristic of four schools of hermeneutics is helpful in understanding these competing agendas. Conservative hermeneutics is the attempt to devise methods of interpretation that uncover and preserve truth or original meaning without distortion or bias. This is consonant with the use of philosophy for children to help young people appropriate the fundamental questions, ideas and skills of (Western) philosophy as a resource for understanding the world and managing their own experience, and with the understanding critical thinking as a way of avoiding prejudice and approaching truth. Critical hermeneutics approaches interpretation—including teaching and learning—as a method of liberating the interpreter from the racist, sexist, homophobic, capitalist, religiously fanatical, and other kinds of ideologies that commonly distort thinking, feeling and behavior. This is consonant with those who argue that the attributes of mutual criticism, inclusion, solidarity, self-regulation, and distributed power make the community of philosophical inquiry an ideal site for recognizing and overcoming ideology. Others find philosophy for children politically ineffectual due to the limited role of students and teachers in co-constructing the curriculum and its lack of an explicit component of political critique and action. Radical hermeneutics suggests that because every text is open to a plurality of meanings, the purpose of interpretation is not to artificially constrain that plurality but to play with the signs that constitute the text in order to achieve fresh insights. A radical hermeneutical strand is identifiable in the philosophy for children literature when scholars resist the idea that the aim of philosophical dialogue is to find consensus or to narrow down on the most reasonable conclusions. Moderate hermeneutics holds that the work of interpretation is the attempt to reach meaning or shared understanding in a process modeled on dialogue between the familiar and the strange. This is consonant with those who argue that philosophical traditions can still give meaning to (young) people’s lives, but that those traditions must be continually reinterpreted (including by children) in order to survive and flourish. Fifty-odd years since its inception, philosophy for children has deepened and diversified, both theoretically and as a field of practice. Perhaps the only point of agreement among (most) everyone in the movement is that children’s philosophical thinking, variously understood, is necessary for the realization of the intellectual, moral, and political agency the movement attributes to them. (shrink)

This paper presents a rationale for doing philosophy with children. It suggests a rationale that differs from more usual arguments supporting philosophy with children—for such reasons as that it will enhance problem solving-skills or will help pupils' thinking to be more logical. These worthy objectives are not denied but only considered somewhat subordinate to the rationale proposed. This is presented in three steps. In the first step the issue of whether philosophy should be done with children is (...) considered in the context of claims that children may be too young to do philosophy or too inexperienced in the ways of academic discipline to be able to discern proper philosophy. These objections are weighty enough, especially in view of general teacher reluctance to engage with philosophy itself in any form. In the second part, I invoke the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid as a method of philosophy particularly significant for, and appropriate to, philosophy for children. Finally, I show how these aspects arising out of my understanding of Reid's philosophy can help resolve at least some of the misgivings people have about doing philosophy with children. It is hoped that these discussions will illuminate the question of how it may be appropriate for children to do philosophy in classrooms today. (shrink)

This paper presents a rationale for doing philosophy with children. It suggests a rationale that differs from more usual arguments supporting philosophy with children—for such reasons as that it will enhance problem solving-skills or will help pupils’ thinking to be more logical. These worthy objectives are not denied but only considered somewhat subordinate to the rationale proposed. This is presented in three steps. In the first step the issue of whether philosophy should be done with children is (...) considered in the context of claims that children may be too young to do philosophy or too inexperienced in the ways of academic discipline to be able to discern proper philosophy. These objections are weighty enough, especially in view of general teacher reluctance to engage with philosophy itself in any form. In the second part, I invoke the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid as a method of philosophy particularly significant for, and appropriate to, philosophy for children. Finally, I show how these aspects arising out of my understanding of Reid’s philosophy can help resolve at least some of the misgivings people have about doing philosophy with children. It is hoped that these discussions will illuminate the question of how it may be appropriate for children to do philosophy in classrooms today. (shrink)

The overall purpose of this paper is to explore three related themes: feminist philosophy and philosophy for children have much in common including pegagogy, an inclusive orientation and fallibilist but critical epistemology, both feminism and philosophy for children benefit from a close reading of Peirce, but only philosophy for children draws explicitly on Peirce, and because of this common bond feminist philosophy and philosophy for children provide place to stand against the postmodern retreat to texts.e.

The article examines the need to increase an education toward the development of complex thinking in urban areas where there is a considerable amount of social unrest. The school often fails to bridge the gap between educator/education and learner and this happens in particular when it comes to kids ‘disadvantaged’. The P4C is a pedagogical method that can heal this divide, inter alia, through its dialogic practice. The practice of philosophy can became a way to bridge the sense of fragmentation (...) that the learner feels during his school track when he is having to do with a series of parceled knowledge, because it facilitate the cognitive access to them. The risk to which the student meets with the traditional education, as Freire says, is to undermine the faculty to make aware and to problematize his learning process. To built complex thinking opens the possibility of a 360-degree access to the real and increases the development of critical, creative and caring cognitive spheres. The P4C methodology application should be widespread in many school settings possible, but not only. The article continues with a brief description of some non-formal educational services offered to minors in situations of social disadvantage in Naples, focusing in particular on the Territorial Educational Laboratories. In one of these, L’Officina dei Sogni, an organization working in the territory of the 1st Municipality of the city, I carried out from October 2010 to June 2011 a P4C laboratory with children between 8 and 12 years old, driven by the reflection that this educational methodology can improve on cognitive skills in children and adolescents who are living in situations of high social problems and difficulties at school, in order to reduce for them the risk of social exclusion. The success encountered by the laboratory has had a positive effect also on the other daily Territorial Educational Laboratories activities. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the use of this philosophical practice is not only possible but necessary in the educational fields that attend in urban areas where there is a strong presence of social problems. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to connect the Brazilian Paulo Freire’s well known educational thinking with the “philosophy for children” movement. It considers the relationship between the creator of philosophy for children, Matthew Lipman and Freire through different attempts to establish a relationship between these two educators. The paper shows that the relationship between them is not as close as many supporters of P4C have claimed, especially in Latin America. It also considers the context of Educational Policies in (...) our time and why Freire’s understanding of the politics of education makes it impossible to be Freirean and at the same time be neutral or favorable to the actual status quo. Finally, after presenting Lipman’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy, education and democracy and their connection to capitalism, it proposes ways to begin the political path of philosophizing with children inspired by Paulo Freire’s educational thinking. As a result, a more politically committed path to doing philosophy with children is offered. (shrink)

Jaspers' vision of an ideal university stipulates an institution devoted to the search for truth by virtue of communication. I argue that such an institution requires students who are willing and able to collectively pursue open and free inquiry as well as academics who uphold this value. Such a desideratum as well as an overall capacity for participation in the university's mandate needs to be cultivated in students at an early age. While a desire for truth and open-ended inquiry requires (...) that economic and instrumental considerations for education do not exhaust the students' reasons for seeking a university education, an interest in truth and learning for its own sake is best cultivated when one aims to foster children's natural curiosity about big questions, such as, for example, the beginning of the universe, personal identity, the meaning of life, or the nature of friendship. Furthermore, the capacity for participation in a community of learning and research requires that the virtues of critical thinking, intellectual empathy, and intellectual integrity are familiar to students—that their interaction with teachers and academic personnel is not based on their status as authority figures and disciplinarians, thereby following stereotypes of early schooling, but rather that they are also seen as being fellow inquirers and thinkers. These two Jaspersian goals of university education—(1) the open inquiry for truth and (2) communication as the method for such inquiry—are best supported if philosophical thinking is introduced to students at an early age. (shrink)

There is at this point no shortage of testimonials regarding the practice of philosophy for children. In addition, there have been a number of studies which give further support to the claim that philosophy for children is a valuable classroom practice. The idea that pre-college instruction in philosophy is beneficial is no longer in doubt, nor is there a significant lack of materials for use in philosophy for children programs. From Lewis Carroll to Matthew Lipman authors constructed (...) texts that go far in engaging children's philosophical inclinations. If there is any weakness in the practice of philosophy for children it is usually found in the individual classroom. (shrink)

External pressure on Higher Education Institutes in the United Kingdom has brought the question of the extrinsic value of academic philosophy into focus. One line of research into questions about the extrinsic value of philosophy comes from the Philosophy for Children (P4C) movement. There is a large body of literature about the benefits of P4C. This paper argues that the distinctive nature of the P4C pedagogy limits the claims made by the P4C literature about the extrinsic value of philosophy (...) to claims about the value of P4C. While this is not a problem within the P4C literature that recognises these limitations, the paper makes three claims about why it is sometimes inappropriate to extend claims from research into the value of P4C to claims about the value of non‐P4C philosophy. It argues that more research is needed to investigate the value of non‐P4C philosophy. (shrink)

As conceived by founders Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, Philosophy for Children is a humanistic practice with roots in the Hellenistic tradition of philosophy as a way of life given to the search for meaning, in American pragmatism with its emphasis on qualitative experience, collaborative inquiry and democratic society, and in American and Soviet social learning theory. The programme has attracted overlapping and conflicting criticism from religious and social conservatives who don’t want children to question traditional values, (...) from educational psychologists who believe certain kinds of thinking are beyond children of certain ages, from philosophers who define their discipline as theoretical and exegetical, from critical theorists who see the programme as politically compliant, and from postmodernists who see it as scientistic and imperialist. The paper is written as a dialogue in order to illustrate the complex interactions among these normative positions. Rather than respond to particular criticisms in depth, I indicate the general nature of my position regarding them and provide references to published material where they have been made and responded to over the past 40 years. (shrink)

A reply to the lead article by Matthew Lipman: "Philosophy for Children: Some Assumptions and Implications", which discxusses the relation between Jürgen Habermas' discourse ethics and Philosophy for Children.

One of the most striking features of the rhetoric of philosophy in the West has been its wide-scale employment of the dialogue form. The dialogues of Plato are normative not only in the sense Whitehead gave them, that they constitute the text of which our philosophical history is a series of footnotes. But they also provide the ideal of philosophical discourse. Philosophy ought to be public and spoken. I take it that this choice of dialogue is not some mere dramatic (...) artifice, chosen for aesthetic reasons. Rather I think the medium here is part of the message and that dialogue says something about philosophy itself. That is, once we have learned to dialogue and to think dialogically, we have taken a philosophical position, in advance of whatever the dialogue may be said to contain. But otherwise, we are Platonists once we dialogue, whatever degree of adherence we may claim to his metaphysics or to his theory of knowledge. (shrink)

The debate about children in art and the surrounding morality started with Bill Henson's photographs of naked pubescent children. It is wider now, extending in several directions. In particular, into freedom of speech , and its association with freedom in art This article explores these issues with particular regard to Hensons photographs; and the application of several of the moral theories to this issue.

Proprioception is usually used in reference to body movement and the self-perception of body movement. Proprius in Latin means “one’s own,” or “self.” It refers to the physical knowledge acquired, say, in the process of doing a particular activity, such as riding a bicycle, for instance. You can be told how to ride a bicycle, and this may be of some help. But in the end, it’s the physical knowledge and not the mere theoretical knowledge that enables you to ride (...) your bike. David Bohm, a world-renowned theoretical physicist, applied this notion of proprioception to the movement of thought, the process of thought. In On Dialogue, he contends that thinking can become aware of its own movement and aware of itself in action: -/- “Proprioception” is a technical term – you could also say “self-perception of thought,” “self-awareness of thought,” or “thought is aware of itself in action.” Whatever terms we use, I am saying: thought should be able to perceive its own movement, be aware of its own movement. In the process of thought there should be the awareness of that movement, of the intention to think, and of the result which the thinking produces. -/- This opens the door to an understanding of thinking as a process like any other physical process, such as riding a bicycle. We usually think of thinking as an abstract process – one of learning abstract knowledge and how to apply that knowledge. And this is what we are primarily taught in school. Unfortunately, some methods used in doing philosophy with children focus too much on strictly developing abstract critical thinking skills. -/- In doing philosophy with children, I am interested in focusing on the process of thinking in the process of thinking. In this way, it is also different from metacognition, which tends to focus on the ability to self-correct in response to the self-assessment toward the completion of a task. (shrink)

This rich collection of essays offers a broad array of perspectives from prominent international 'philosophy for/with children' scholars and practitioners regarding the interface between P4wC and teacher education and training curricula. The book considers the deep and varied points of contact that exist between the pedagogical and philosophical principles of the philosophical community of inquiry and teacher education and training programs. It is designed to help improve education systems worldwide as they seek to shift their attention towards the student, (...) student inter-relations, and student-other relations and foster independent high-order, critical, creative, and caring thinking within democratic, pluralistic societies. It proposes an innovative, creative way of approaching teacher education and training--a central subject in today's educational world. Offering diverse perspectives on integrating progressive educational philosophy and contemporary pedagogy, Philosophy with Children and Teacher Education is a must-read for all those studying philosophy for/with children and researching in this area. (shrink)

Illiteracy is a concrete and real problem, which involves nearly one thousand million people in the world. And, according to UNESCO statistics, this number, far from decreasing, keeps increasing in undeveloped countries as well as in the industrialized ones.

This paper explores the notion that children have a knowledge of the world of their own – an intuitive knowledge. Being fully immersed in the world as adults are, they too have a knowledge of the world. In contrast to adults, who have developed a cognitive knowledge of the world, children still depend on their intuitive knowledge. Children certainly have a strong grasp of the world they live in; it’s just not dependent on cognitive knowledge. In my (...) paper I compare and contrast Kohlberg and Lipman’s views on children’s ability to be natural philosophers. To be immersed in the world, brings to mind Martin Buber’s idea that we are born in relation, the a priori of relation, which only later develops into the essential relation as we develop the consciousness of our individual separateness. This a priori relation, then, forms the basis for children’s intuitive knowledge, and which is expressed through the language of imagination. And certainly, imagination is not devoid of any kind of reason. In focusing strictly on children’s cognitive development and ignoring their inborn relation with the world, we essentially rob them of their foothold in the world, their inner authority needed for self-regulated thinking. We create a world where children grow up dependent on authority, status, trends and fads. This can lead to what we’ve observed in the famous Milgram study. Philosophy with children encourages children to speak from their own place, in a form of parrhesia, if you will, and to discuss together with others the complexities of ideas. It honors their inborn relation with the world, their statements and aids in the process of developing their cognitive knowledge out of their intuitive grasp of the world. In respecting their inborn relation, philosophy with children allows children to grow up as full human beings, not just as smart and educated “disembodied creatures.” Children speak from the logic of experience (Foucault). Through the process of putting thinking itself into question, children become aware of themselves as thinking beings. It is what Bohm refers to as the “proprioception of thought,” the ability to “observe thought.” Philosophers, I argue, are experts in not knowing. In practicing the art of philosophy, the art of not knowing, we need each other to think together to explore deeper concepts. This binds us and allows us to explore the unknown with joy, curiosity and confidence. In an example from my own experience, I show that children not only intuitively touch on complex philosophical ideas; students are wrestling with ideas about how to understand the world, which is where philosophy began as well. How can we be surprised when children decide computer games are more interesting than life itself, if we have essentially robbed them of the desire to “get dirty,” and engage this world filled with wonder. We have created a world too boring and act surprised when children are bored. The world isn’t boring and in “doing” philosophy with children we keep the fascination with this place we call earth alive. (shrink)

During the past decade, the Philosophy for Children Program has offered teacher-training workshops throughout the United States and elsewhere. The workshops frequently supported by grants, enable teachers to work with a professional philosopher in developing the skills required for teaching critical thinking to elementary and intermediate schools.

The present investigation directs itself towards the individualization of a possible area of intersection between the Philosophy for Children curriculum and the world of Kinetic Sciences? This trajectory follows two lines of inquiry. The principal arises from an analysis of the person as a live body, as a body that expresses through movements characteristics of rationality and intentionality. A particular focus on how and on what role the body “subject” is engraved in the typical philosophy for children context. (...) Along these lines, to support such an analysis, we compare the philosophy for children curriculum with other educational contexts. The second line of research, which is only sketched here, establishes a relationship with an analysis of the body “object” of discussion in the philosophy for children curriculums. (shrink)

It is a matter of fact—and has been so for a considerable amount of time—that philosophy is taught at the pre—college level. However, to teach philosophy at that (or at any) level is one thing; to teach it well is quite another. Fortunately, it can be taught well, as a host of successful experiences and programs have shown. But in what ways can it be taught? Are there differences in the ways in which it can or should be taught at (...) the pre-college level from the ways in which it is taught in college? Are there differences in the ways in which it can or should be taught at the elementary-school level from ways in which it can or should be taught at the secondary-school level? There are other questions, of a similar nature, that the beginning college-level teacher of philosophy might ask: “I have never taught Introduction to Philosophy before; how should I go about it?” And there is a further question: Should it be taught at all? This question can, of course, be raised at any educational level, but it is especially acute at the elementary level. (shrink)

Children are routinely treated paternalistically. There are good reasons for this. Children are quite vulnerable. They are ill-equipped to meet their most basic needs, due, in part, to deficiencies in practical and theoretical reasoning and in executing their wishes. Children’s motivations and perceptions are often not congruent with their best interests. Consequently, raising children involves facilitating their best interests synchronically and diachronically. In practice, this requires caregivers to (in some sense) manage a child’s daily life. If (...) apposite, this management will focus partly on a child’s well-being. To be ably executed, an account of children’s well-being will need to be articulated. This chapter focuses on the nature of children’s well-being. It has five sections. The first section clarifies the focus. The second section examines some hurdles to articulating a view of children’s well-being. The third section evaluates some accounts of children’s well-being. The fourth section addresses the view that children possess features essential to them that make their lives on balance prudentially bad for them. The fifth section sums things up. (shrink)

In 1963 James A. Jordan Jr. claimed that "It is not difficult nowadays to run into a claim that such and such teaching method follows the principle implicit in the method of Socrates." Jordan's claim refers particularly to supporters of programmed instruction or the use of teaching machines. He argued that the use or application of such materials cannot lead to genuine immitation of Socrates. Today, although the use and application of computers in schools has increased, the claim of following (...) the Socratic Method is usually made by teachers who allow or encourage "classroom discussions." Some might even claim that this is the only appropriate or suitable method of learning. (shrink)

A Platonic dialogue, an undergraduate lecture, an enquiry in philosophy for children (P4C): Are all three activities "philosophy"? Is there a difference between doing philosophy and studying philosophy? What is the importance of philosophy in each guise, and how might the different guises relate to the aims of "teaching" philosophy? Drawing on the work of Bernard Williams, I suggest that doing philosophy involves making sense of our lives, and that this requires a wider knowledge base than traditionally taught in (...) academic philosophy. I argue that both academic philosophy and P4C both involve philosophising, and that this is more valuable than an encyclopedic knowledge of the products of this process - the canon. (shrink)

The notion of educating the ‘whole child’ invites suspicion because of the value-laden assumptions carried by such a goal. I argue that the intuitive appeal of the notion reflects the meaning of education but that the goal is also implicit in P4C in its respect for wholeness in content, rationale and practices whereby the learner is honoured and engaged. In this paper, I focus on the senior high school curriculum in which the rich resources of philosophy can speak to the (...) broad range of students’ questions and concerns: intellectual, existential and social, addressing their ‘whole’ persons with its legacy of wisdom. (shrink)

By now, I would guess that thousands of teachers and children have read chapter one of Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery by Matthew Lipman. It is the chapter in which Harry discovers, among other things, the Aristotelian notion of conversation. The students and the teahers have probably talked about truth, conversation, discovery, invention, mind, resentment, daydreaming, and perhaps even the role of Lisa as the one who supplies the counter-example to Harry's theory about language and how it works.

This article regards a particular way through which adults take children into consideration and listen their voices. Reflections have sprung from a research context, focused on existential questions that children pose during their preschool years in early education settings. The research explored the meanings of these questions for children and adults involved in their education. The questions of meaning emerged by children’s discourses are considered through the representations of childhood that subtend parents and teachers’ educational practices. (...) The article discusses one of these representations, that of philosopher child, with regard on his various internal perspectives. Lipman, Kyle, Martens and Matthews are some of the authors taken into consideration in order to examine briefly some traditional approaches of doing philosophy with children and to understand the practices that teachers operate everyday in early childhood education and care services. (shrink)

All over the Internet, many websites operate dealing with collective and personal memory. The sites relevant to collective memory deal with structuring the memory of social groups and they comprise part of “civil religion”. The sites that deal with personal memory memorialize people who have died and whose family members or friends or other members of their community have an interest in preserving their memory. This article offers an analysis of an expanded philosophical discourse that took place over a two-year (...) period with three groups of young people who had experienced loss in their families or their communities and who were partners in writing texts on memorial sites or had established websites as part of coping with the loss. This article seeks to offer a narrative analysis of the philosophical discourse and to contribute to an expansion of the discussion regarding the connection between Philosophy with Children and its methods and the social networks where entire lives involving philosophical dimensions are conducted. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on the interconnectedness between two important projects in applied philosophy: (a) Philosophy for Children (P4C), a movement for the introduction of philosophy in schools, and (b) Logic-based Therapy and Consultation (LBTC), a widely developed form of philosophical counselling. More specifically, it attempts to show how Michael Hand’s (2018) argument in favour of P4C can fruitfully be enhanced by the endorsement of fundamental theoretical assumptions of Elliot Cohen’s (2005, 2019) LBTC. Hand argues that philosophy (...) should be taught in schools as a mandatory subject by virtue of its distinctive educational value, namely its ability to contribute to justifying subscription to moral, political and religious standards. In turn, proponents of LBTC presuppose the distinctive capability of philosophy to assess and direct subscription to emotional standards, as well as to a broader category of standards, the practical ones. Given that subscribing to all those types of standards is of utmost importance for human life, an argument for mandatorily introducing philosophy in the school curricula starts taking a more concrete shape. (shrink)

I offer an account of theories useful in addressing the question of whether children are young theoreticians whose development can be regarded as the product of theory change. I argue that to regard a set of propositions as a theory is to be committed to evaluating that set in terms of its explanatory power. If theory change is the substance of cognitive development, we should see patterns of affect and arousal consonant with the emergence and resolution of explanation-seeking curiosity. (...) Affect has largely been ignored as a potential source of support or disconfirmation for the “theory theory” of development. (shrink)

Concerns about children's ability to fully comprehend and evaluate advertising messages has stimulated substantial research and heated debate among scholars, business leaders, consumer advocates, and public policy makers for more than three decades. During that time, some very fundamental questions about the fairness of marketing to children have been raised, yet many remain unresolved today. With the emergence of increasingly sophisticated advertising media, promotional offers and creative appeals in recent years, new issues have also developed. This paper provides (...) a basis for further examination of some the key questions in this area, and suggests how children's advertising research can be employed to illuminate them. (shrink)

As I was thinking about what I would say to you tonight, I remembered myself in my freshman year at a Catholic girls high school. It was Spring and the nuns had told us that we would have a five-day retreat. Speakers would come to speak to us in the mornings and the afternoons would be reserved for reflection and reading. Of course, it was to be a silent retreat. No talking for five days.

Philosophy, like the IAPC Mendham seminar itself, is a place apart. I don't mean by this that philosophy is a realm of timeless ideas, or a dream time, or a place of the ancestors where all the seminal ideas are, although it may very well be that; what I mean is that when we do philosophy, everything stops. Everything stops, I think, because if, as we are flowing along in life and language, we encounter a problem, and we don't smooth (...) it over or push it to the side and go on, we discover that it actually represents a question. And if we follow the question to ask itself, it often turns out that: 1) it seems to be a very important question about meaning; 2) it doesn't have an answer, although it may promise one; and 3) it tends to raise even other such questions. (shrink)