One important role of belief systems is to allow us to represent information about a certain domain of inquiry. This paper presents a formal framework to accommodate such information representation. Three cognitive models to represent information are discussed: conceptual spaces, state-spaces, and the problem spaces familiar from artificial intelligence. After indicating their weakness to deal with partial information, it is argued that an alternative, formulated in terms of partial structures, can be provided which not only captures the positive (...) features of these models, but also accommodates the partiality of information ubiquitous in science and mathematics. (shrink)

Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of (...) rational belief functions. (shrink)

My purpose is to offer an assessment of the scientific legacy of Converse's “Belief Systems” by reviewing five productive lines of research stimulated by his authoritative analysis and unsettling conclusions. First I recount the later life history of Converse's notion of “nonattitudes,” and suggest that as important as nonattitudes are, we should be paying at least as much attention to their opposite: attitudes held with conviction. Second, I argue that the problem of insufficient information that resides at the (...) center of Converse's analysis has not gone away, and that newly fashioned models of information processing offer only partial remedies. Third, I suggest that the concept of the “average voter” is a malicious fiction, as it blinds us to the enormous variation in political attention, interest, and knowledge that characterizes mass publics, in Converse's time as in our own. Fourth, I develop an affirmative aspect of Converse's analysis that has mostly been overlooked: namely, that if ideological reasoning is beyond most citizens’ capacity and interest, they might fall back on a simple and reasonable alternative, which I will call “group‐centrism.” And fifth, I consider the possibility that while the majority of individual citizens falls short of democratic standards, the public as a whole might do rather well. (shrink)

Many philosophers have used the concept of belief system or some related notion as a basic tool of epistemological discussion and analysis. A belief system is a set of propositions or statements which represents a person’s doxastic state or credal state in a certain situation; it consists of the propositions which the person either explicitly or implicitly accepts in the situation. One of the many concerns of epistemologists is to attempt to formulate general “conditions of rationality” for (...) class='Hi'>belief systems. I want to suggest in the present paper that in this endeavour philosophers usually treat belief systems as if they were artifacts or tools made for various epistemic purposes: for providing satisfactory answers to interesting questions, for helping to find answers to new questions, and for providing resources for argumentation and research. Insofar as epistemology and philosophy of science can legitimately be viewed in this way, they may be regarded as “sciences of the artificial” in Herbert Simon’s sense, and not as sciences of the “natural world” or parts of natural science, as some proponents of “naturalised epistemology” have recently suggested. (shrink)

This book focuses on the social psychology of belief systems and how they influence perceptions of reality. These belief systems, from politics to religion to science, shape one¿s thoughts and views, but also can be the cause of conflict and disagreement over values, particularly when they are enacted in political policies. ¿ In¿Belief Systems and the Perceptions of Reality, editors Bastiaan Rutjens and Mark Brandt examine the social psychological effects at the heart of the (...) conflict, by bringing together contributions under five themes: Motivated Reasoning; Inequality; Threat; Scientists Interpreting Science; and People Interpreting Science. This book aims to create a more integrated understanding of reality perception and its connection with belief systems, viewed through the lens of social psychology. ¿ The synthesis of expert contributors as well as the literature around social psychology and belief systems makes this a unique resource for students, researchers and academics in behavioural and social sciences, as well as activists and journalists working in this political field. (shrink)

The paper presents the most general aspects of scientific modeling and shows that social systems naturally include different belief systems. Belief systems differ in a variety of respects, most notably in the selection of suitable qualities to encode and the internal structure of the observables. The following results emerge from the analysis: conflict is explained by showing that different models encode different qualities, which implies that they model different realities; explicitly connecting models to the realities (...) that they encode makes it possible to clarify the relations among models; by understanding that social systems are complex one knows that there is no chance of developing a maximal model of the system; the distinction among different levels of depth implicitly includes a strategy for inducing change; identity-preserving models are among the most difficult to modify; since models do not customarily generate internal signals of error, strategies with which to determine when models are out of synch with their situations are especially valuable; changing the form of power from a zero sum game to a positive sum game helps transform the nature of conflicts. (shrink)

Paradigm transitions come with tremendous risk, as societies can come undone when people stop believing in the imaginary constructs that unite us. The Black Plague’s devastation resulted not only f...

In beliefs we live, we move and we are [...] the beliefs constitute the base of our life, the land on which we live [...] All our conduct, including the intellectual life, depends on the system of our authentic beliefs. In them [...] lies latent, as implications of whatever specifically we do or we think [...] the man, at heart, is believing or, which is equal, the deepest stratum of our life, the spirit that maintains and carries all the others, (...) is formed by beliefs...We know that the human being is a social animal. This is a common fact. Moreover, the human being is defined as a rational being. It is clear and nobody can deny that human creations include logic, mathematics, philosophy, science, and jurisprudence. These are all products of rationality or abstract thought. Nevertheless, human sociability goes further that the sociability of an animal herd. Societies were founded, cohere, develop, degenerate and die based on their belief systems. Reason cannot prove the .. (shrink)

This paper offers an epistemological discussion of self-validating belief systems and the recurrence of ?epistemic defense mechanisms? and ?immunizing strategies? across widely different domains of knowledge. We challenge the idea that typical ?weird? belief systems are inherently fragile, and we argue that, instead, they exhibit a surprising degree of resilience in the face of adverse evidence and criticism. Borrowing from the psychological research on belief perseverance, rationalization and motivated reasoning, we argue that the human mind (...) is particularly susceptible to belief systems that are structurally self-validating. On this cognitive-psychological basis, we construct an epidemiology of beliefs, arguing that the apparent convenience of escape clauses and other defensive ?tactics? used by believers may well derive not from conscious deliberation on their part, but from more subtle mechanisms of cultural selection. (shrink)

This study explores the way that belief systems, interactions with social or experimental environments, and skills at the “control” level in decision‐making shape people's behavior as they solve problems. It is argued that problem‐solvers' beliefs (not necessarily consciously held) about what is useful in mathematics may determine the set of “cognitive resources” at their disposal as they do mathematics. Such beliefs may, for example, render inaccessible to them large bodies of information that are stored in long‐term memory and (...) that are easily retrieved in other circumstances. In other cases, individuals' reactions to an experimental setting (fear of failure, or the desire to “look mathematical” while being videotaped) may induce behavior that is almost pathological—and at the same time, so consistent that it can be modeled. In general, such “environmental” factors establish the context within which individuals access and utilize the information potentially at their disposal.Protocols illustrating these points are presented and discussed. A model based on an axiomatization of students' beliefs about plane geometry is outlined, and is shown to correspond closely to their problem‐solving performance. A framework is offered for analyzing problem‐solving performance at three qualitatively different levels: access to cognitive resources stored in LTM, executive or control decision‐making, and belief systems. (shrink)

Belief in evolved belief systems stems from using a population-genetic model of evolution that misconstrues the developmental relationship between genes and behaviour, confuses notions of “adapted” and “adaptive,” and ignores the fundamental role of language in the development of human beliefs. We suggest that theories about the evolution of belief would be better grounded in a developmental model of evolution.

Everyone would like to have it, many fight for it, some seem to have it, but until now it has not been clear what it actually is: the power of interpretation. In this work, the authors seek to define and conceptualize - in the form of case studies - this term which is frequently used in communicative practice but whose precise meaning often remains obscure. How does the power of interpretation emerge, function and disintegrate, for example in the context of (...) religion and belief systems? Under normal conditions, the power of interpretation is generally recognized and unquestionably adhered to (Torah, Jesus, Scripture). However its emergence and acceptance have still not been adequately studied. The social relevance of the project consists of formulating a differentiated understanding of what happens during cultural conflicts related to the power of interpretation and of how social and mythical forces and representations contribute to the emergence, hegemony and decline of religious content. (shrink)

The paper first proposes a new definition of religion which features a novel four-layered element and which does not involve any circularity ; thereby, it allows to clearly distinguish the phenomenon of religion from certain other worldviews, in particular from certain political ideologies. Relying on the findings, the paper develops two structural conceptual models which serve to describe religious and non-religious belief systems. Further, the definition and the conceptual models allow to establish a clear criterion to distinguish pivotal (...) structural differences between religious and non-religious belief systems. The criterion is based on the concept of two kinds of rationality: first-level and second-level rationalities. These will demonstrate to what degree religion can be a rational enterprise, and what role logic can play in it. The result is a clear-cut line in the structures of religious and certain consistent non-religious belief systems. (shrink)

In On Certainty, Wittgenstein argues both that certain propositions belong to our “frame of reference” and are “exempt from doubt,” and that this “river-bed of thoughts” can change. Exploring this seeming contradiction, I argue that such changes can take place as the result of rational argumentation, although of a highly indirect nature, and suggest that something like this can hold for argumentation between cultures.

This paper describes a belief understanding system which, taking an interview-text as its input, builds a conceptual representation of a respondent's belief system concerning a given object. Central to the understanding process is the identification of the connections between the object and the believer's goals. A general scheme governing the inference-processes with respect to these object-goal relationships is presented. It is suggested that the implementation of BUS could proceed from Schank's et al Integrated Partial Parsing program. The system's (...) behavior is illustrated by examining the processing of a fragment of an interview-text. Some implications for the study of belief systems are discussed. (shrink)

In philosophical literature the issue of beliefs has been identified historically with David Hume and common sense. Beliefs are dynamic systems and its resignification is constant. Charles Sanders Pierce would interpret the fixation of beliefs, as those ones which are fixed by means of art, being this a method well-tuned with science. Truths established in beliefs are always probable and dependent on the degree of utility they have. The degree of utility is complemented with comprehension, explanations have multiple causes. (...) En la literatura filosófica el tema de las creencias se puede identificar históricamente con David Hume y el sentido común. Las creencias son sistemas dinámicos y su resignificación es constante. Charles Sanders Peirce interpretaría la fijación de las creencias en Hume, como aquella que se fija a través del arte, siendo ésta un método que se acomoda bien con el de la ciencia. Las verdades establecidas en las creencias son siempre probables y dependen del grado de utilidad que ellas presten. El grado de utilidad se complementa con la comprensión, las explicaciones son multicausales. (shrink)

Some belief systems postulate intelligent agents that are deliberately evading detection and thus sabotaging any possible investigation into their existence. These belief systems have the remarkable feature that they predict an absence of evidence in their favor, and even the discovery of counterevidence. Such ‘epistemic black holes’, as I call them, crop up in different guises and in different domains: history, psychology, religion. Because of their radical underdetermination by evidence and their extreme resilience to counterevidence, they (...) develop and evolve in certain predictable ways. Shedding light on how epistemic black holes function can protect us against their allure. (shrink)

In order to establish patterns of materialization of the beliefs we are going to consider that these have defined mathematical structures. It will allow us to understand better processes of the textual, architectonic, normative, educative, etc., materialization of an ideology. The materialization is the conversion by means of certain mathematical correspondences, of an abstract set whose elements are beliefs or ideas, in an impure set whose elements are material or energetic. Text is a materialization of ideology and it is any (...) representation of the Reality represented by symbolic means. In all text T we can observe diverse topological structures: Metric Textual Space, Textual Topology and a Textual Lattice. (shrink)

Beliefs about fair prices for betting arrangements can obviously vary depending upon how the contingencies are described, even though each of the different descriptions is correct. This sort of variation in beliefs on the part of an agent has been Iinked by Ramsey and Skyrms with the agent’s susceptibility to a dutch book situation involving some combination of bets on which there is a mathematically-guaranteed net loss as the overall outcome. Clarifying the nature of that Iinkage is the purpose of (...) this paper. After a framework for analysis has been developed, it is shown precisely how several important conditions for having correct beliefs are interrelated. (shrink)

Beliefs about fair prices for betting arrangements can obviously vary depending upon how the contingencies are described, even though each of the different descriptions is correct. This sort of variation in beliefs on the part of an agent has been Iinked by Ramsey and Skyrms with the agent’s susceptibility to a dutch book situation involving some combination of bets on which there is a mathematically-guaranteed net loss as the overall outcome. Clarifying the nature of that Iinkage is the purpose of (...) this paper. After a framework for analysis has been developed, it is shown precisely how several important conditions for having correct beliefs are interrelated. (shrink)

Converse contended that the ideological disorganization, attitudi‐nal inconsistency, and limited information of American voters make them a politically disengaged mass, not a responsible electorate. I illustrate the shortcomings of Converse's line of reasoning by showing that he misread his two most prominent examples of the electoral consequences of his theory: voting on the Vietnam War in the 1968 New Hampshire primary, and public opinion about the 1948 Taft‐Hartley Act. In both cases, voters were better able to sort candidates and policies (...) than Converse reported, despite their lack of ideological sophistication or their knowledge of specific legislation. Converse's interpretive errors here stem from mistaken assumptions about information processing and recall, and from questionable normative standards about what constitute meaningful and competent political orientation. His criteria underestimate the public's ability to make responsible choices, and the effect of campaigns on the choosing process. (shrink)

“The Nature of Belief Systems” sets forth a Hobson's choice between rule by the politically ignorant masses and rule by the ideologically constrained—which is to say, the doctrinaire—elites. On the one hand, lacking comprehensive cognitive structures, such as ideological “belief systems,” with which to understand politics, most people learn distressingly little about it. On the other hand, a spiral of conviction seems to make it difficult for the highly informed few to see any aspects of politics (...) but those that confirm the cognitive structures that organize their political perceptions. This is a troubling situation for any consequentialist democratic political theory, according to which what is crucial is the electorate's (and subsidiary decision makers') ability to make informed policy judgments, not their possession of willful but uninformed political “attitudes.” Any political theorist who does not take democracy to be an end in itself (regardless of its consequences) should be concerned about Converse's findings. (shrink)

People experiencing similar conditions may make different decisions, and their belief systems provide insight about these differences. An example of high‐stakes decision‐making within a complex social context is the Arab Spring, in which large numbers of people decided to protest and even larger numbers decided to stay at home. This study uses qualitative analyses of interview narratives and social media addressing individual decisions to develop a computational model tracing the cognitive decision‐making process. The model builds on work by (...) Abelson and Carroll (1965), Schank and Abelson (1977), and Axelrod (1976) to systematically trace the inferences connecting beliefs to decisions. The findings show that protest decisions were often based on positive emotions such as pride, hope, courage, and solidarity, triggered by beliefs about successful protest and self‐sacrifice. By contrast, decisions to stay at home were triggered by beliefs about safety, state approval, and living conditions. As one participant said, “When I heard about the revolution in Tunisia, my heart was filled with solidarity for the people.” In the words of a non‐participant: “When people are killed, we must be careful. There are more important things than protest: safety and stability.” This study of individual explanations about events identifies the role of emotions in high‐stakes decision‐making within complex social environments. (shrink)

This paper presents an approach to the belief system based on a computational framework in three levels: first, the logic level with the definition of binary local rules, second, the arithmetic level with the definition of recursive functions and finally the behavioural level with the definition of a recursive construction pattern. Social communication is achieved when different beliefs are expressed, modified, propagated and shared through social nets. This approach is useful to mimic the belief system because the defined (...) functions provide different ways to process the same incoming information as well as a means to propagate it. Our model also provides a means to cross different beliefs so, any incoming information can be processed many times by the same or different functions as it occurs is social nets. (shrink)

In Hausa worldview, Peaceful living is conceived as the chief goal of life. Zaman Lafiya is that which determines goodness or badness of actions and practices. Everything, including morality, life, death and the afterlife is construed as being good or bad with reference to Zaman Lafiya. So, for instance, no matter the gravity of one’s wrongful conducts, it is not justified to punish him, except when punishing him does contribute to the consolidation/realization/attainment of Zaman Lafiya. This paper investigates the Hausa (...) culture and belief system, especially the aspect of punishment alongside the actions that are thought of as being grave to warrant evil punishment such as the death penalty. With the aid of some Hausa proverbs and the African notion of relationality, it would demonstrate how a conversation of metaphysical nature is sparked among such realities/constructs as morality, life, evil, death and the afterlife. It will also show how living an ethical life entails acting in a manner that consolidates communal or relational existence as framework for Zaman Lafiya. (shrink)

This study uses accounting professionals from an international setting to test the individualism and power distance cultural dimensions developed by Hofstede [Culture's Consequences 1980]. Six countries, which appropriately represented high and low values on the Hofstede dimensions, were chosen for the survey of ethical beliefs. Respondents from the six countries were requested to supply their agreement/disagreement with eight questionable behaviors associated with the work environment. Each of these behaviors contained an individualism and/or power distance cultural component for the responding accountants (...) to consider. The results of the cultural analysis indicated significance on five of the eight survey items. Results lend support for the presence of the individualism cultural element in the ethical responses of the accountants surveyed. (shrink)