L’effet est la résolution de la cause et, comme teile, l’être actuel de la cause. La relation causa!e acquiert ainsi le caractère d’une identité dynamique, qui résout l'apparente dualité initiale des termes; le conséquent n’est plus un résultat conditionné par l'antécédent, dont il est plutôt la resolution. — Conséquence : identité de la liberté et de la nécessité. Cette identité se retrouve dans les rapports entre rhomme et ce que l'оп appelle les choses en soi, entendues du point de vue (...) causal: la prétendue chose en soi, lorsqu’on la donne comme saisie, est déjà résolue dans l’activité de l’homme qui, ainsi, affirme sa liberté. (shrink)

Cet article étudie la doctrine aristotélicienne du moteur immobile, cause de tout mouvement et de tout savoir, cause efficiente et cause finale, que l'A. assimile à Dieu.

Riassunto: Applicando il metodo fenomenologico e ricostruendo alcune tematiche della ricerca neuroscientifica, verranno nel testo discriminate le strutture trascendentali dell’esperienza, attraverso le quali il mondo circostante acquisisce significato, e le computazioni inconsce indagate nel dominio psico-fisiologico. L’emozionalità umana coinvolge meccanismi neurali-istintivi che precedono l’attività cosciente, ed essi possono essere esclusivamente investigati ricorrendo a metodi causali-quantitativi. La motivazione, che può essere descritta attraverso il metodo fenomenologico, esprime una forma di causalità più complessa, che ci consente di riflettere sulla nostra emozionalità (...) all’interno del flusso temporale della coscienza. La distinzione tra emozione e sentimento offre un importante indizio per comprendere la dimensione causale della prima rispetto alle caratteristiche motivazionali della seconda: in questo modo, potremo meglio approfondire il ruolo del sentimento in fenomenologia, coinvolgendo esso processi temporali-costitutivi. Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Neuroscienza; Causalità; Emozione; Motivazione. -/- Emotional Experience between Causality and Motivation: Phenomenology and Neuroscience on the Human Capacity for Reflection: Applying the phenomenological method and drawing on neuroscientific research, I discriminate between the transcendental structures of experience, through which the surrounding world acquires meaning, and unconscious computations made in the psycho-physiological domain. Human emotionality involves neuronal-instinctive mechanisms that precede subjective conscious activity, and these can only be investigated using causal-quantitative methods. Motivation, which can be described using the phenomenological method, speaks to a more complex causality, that allows us to reflect on our emotionality within the temporal flux of consciousness. The distinction between emotion and feeling offers an important clue to understanding the causal dimension of the former and the motivational characteristics of the latter: in this way, we can better understand the role that feeling, which involves constitutive-temporal processes, plays in phenomenology. Keywords: Phenomenology; Neuroscience; Causality; Emotion; Motivation. (shrink)

1 Qualche considerazione preliminare È opportuno cominciare citando per intero la sezione 5.1362 del Tractatus, attorno alla quale ruoterà gran parte di ciò che andrò sostenendo: Il libero arbitrio consiste nell’impossibilità di conoscere ora azioni future. Noi le potremmo conoscere solo se la causalità fosse una necessità interiore, come quella della conclusione logica. — La connessione di conoscere e conosciuto è quella della necessità logica. (“A sa che p" è priva di senso, se p è una taut...

The main purpose of the article is to show that the assumption of a power or force which connects cause and effect is an essential characteristic of our concept of cause. The article is divided in two parts. In the first one I present the criteria of the Agency Theory of Causality which I appreciate as correct. I show why, according to my point of view, this theory assumes the idea of force connecting cause and effect, and I propose that (...) the idea originates in the experience of “being compelled or induced” to undertake an action. In the second part of my article, I analyse an argument in favour of the opinion of Backwards Causation presented by Michael Dummett. Dummett’s argument demonstrates that just as the fatalist does not have arguments against those who believe in causality, so those who do not believe in backwards causation do not have arguments against those who do believe in it. I show that it is also the other way round: people who believe in causality cannot convince the fatalist, and people who believe in backwards causation cannot convince people not already convinced. So the two different opinions (the belief in causality and the belief in the absence of causality in its different forms) are both compatible with the empirical experience. The difference is to be looked for in an unverifiable assumption, and my proposal is that the difference lies in the opposite assumptions regarding the force connecting the events in consideration. At the end, I investigate the apparent implausibility of backwards causation. I believe that the reason it is regarded as implausible has to do with the experience that localize force as the factor that links cause and effect. (shrink)