Resumen: El presente artículo se propone establecer un dialogo entre las nociones de desarrollo y de reconocimiento. La fundamentación epistémica de esta discusión se enmarca en la consideración de Ricoeur que apuesta a la condición del individuo como un hombre capaz o “un yo puedo”, con el poder de hablar, actuar e imputarse acciones, condiciones básicas para enfrentar el camino hacia el reconocimiento de sí mismo. Ahora bien, dichas capacidades individuales de obrar, en el plano colectivo se extienden hacia prácticas (...) sociales de reconocimiento mutuo sustentadas bajo un principio ético, desde el cual, es posible identificar tres imperativos dialogantes con la noción de desarrollo: tender hacia la vida buena, en y con el otro y con instituciones justas. Se concluye afirmando que la crisis respecto de la noción de desarrollo propia de la modernidad ha dado a la misma la posibilidad de resignificar los enfoques que exaltan las capacidades humanas en la búsqueda de un bienestar subjetivo que se orienten hacia el camino del reconocimiento mutuo.: This article aims to establish a dialogue between notions of development and recognition. The epistemic foundation of this discussion is framed in Ricoeur consideration that bets on the individual's condition as a capable man or "I can", with the power to speak, act and impute actions, basic conditions to face the path to recognition of himself. However, these individual capacities to act, on the collective level, extend to social practices of mutual recognition based on an ethical principle, from which, it is possible to identify three imperatives dialoguing with the notion of development: to tend towards the good life, in and with others, and with just institutions. It concludes by affirming that the crisis regarding the notion of development proper to modernity has given it the possibility of resignifying the approaches that exalt human capacities in the search for subjective well-being that are oriented towards the path of mutual recognition. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

Resumen: Esta exposición intenta comprender las formas culturales de comunicación y fijación mnémica en una narración específica que Davi Kopenawa, chamán Yanomami, expone al antropólogo Bruce Albert, en virtud de los modos de existencia amazónicos, refiriéndose en particular a la intensidad de los espíritus selváticos y a la experiencia chamánica con los mundos espirituales. En el contexto de una extensión vegetal dispersa y sobresaliente, afirmamos una sociabilidad cotidiana en el marco de una “ética respetuosa o amorosa” entre todas las formas (...) de vida, expresada estéticamente en formas significantes y transportadoras de emociones desarrolladas por la cosmología amazónica. Para ello utilizamos las nociones que Aby Warburg emplea en su estudio de la cultura de las imágenes, en tanto curso por el que estas pueden entenderse como organismos vivientes susceptibles a transformación, preservando su propia biología en la trasmisión codificada de la memoria.: This exhibition tries to understand the cultural forms of communication and mnemic fixation in a specific narrative that Davi Kopenawa, Yanomami shaman, exposes to the anthropologist Bruce Albert, by virtue of Amazonian modes of existence, especially referring to the intensity of jungle spirits and experience Shamanic with spiritual worlds. In the context of a dispersed and outstanding plant extension, we affirm a daily sociability within the framework of a “respectful or loving ethic” among all life forms, aesthetically expressed in significant and transporting forms of emotions developed by Amazonian cosmology. For this we use the notions that Aby Warburg uses in his study of the culture of images, as a course by which they can be understood as living organisms susceptible to transformation, preserving their own biology in the coded transmission of memory. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

En esta investigación se realiza un análisis sobre el estudio de la sociedad propuesto por Wilhelm Dilthey, con la finalidad de recalcar su postura frente a la comprensión de la humanidad. Presentar cómo ésta a través de la historia va estableciendo relaciones y formando agrupaciones. Un mundo socio-histórico lleno de vivencias que no necesariamente son experimentadas de manera individual, sino que también poseen una exterioridad que se visibiliza en la sociedad. Por esto, el objetivo es analizar cómo el ser histórico (...) se comprende y se relaciona con otros. Cómo puede sentir pertenencia en la cultura, poesía e historia en la que se desenvuelve. Además, demostrar cómo esta sociedad histórica no puede darse sin una relación de por medio, debido a que sin ‘socios’ la comunidad histórica no puede ser factible. (shrink)

La sociedad que está presente hoy en día es cambiante y para nada monótona. Por esto es líquida, según Zygmunt Bauman, pues en ella todo fluye sin detenerse y sin poseer límites. Es una sociedad en la que constantemente se modifican las tendencias según lo más actual. Todo está relacionado a un consumo que posibilita mantener o asimilar un estatus social que permite ser parte del mundo consumista. El parámetro de esta sociedad es consumir para después desechar, y aquí es, (...) donde los individuos deben estar preparados para el cambio. No pueden quedar fuera de las últimas tendencias o son marginados; por tanto, no pueden dejar de consumir. Así es como el trabajo constante y el valor del dinero se han convertido en estas ‘estrategias’ que le permiten a la sociedad prepararse para todos los posibles cambios que puedan surgir. Aspirando a un estatus social que por fin les permita terminar con el miedo que ha instaurado la liquidez consumidora. Debido a todas estas características de la comunidad, el objetivo de este escrito es analizar cómo las agrupaciones que no poseen los recursos necesarios para mantenerse a la par de las tendencias, quedan marginadas y deshumanizadas por no poder consumir y depender del resto; Convirtiéndose en el peor miedo de la sociedad líquida. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Resumen: Spinoza afirma que las decisiones, elecciones y acciones de un agente son necesarias porque están determinadas causalmente. ¿Acaso los seres humanos no son agentes morales? ¿son sólo eslabones de una cadena de causas cuyo curso no pueden controlar y que los exime de las consecuencias de sus actos, así como de premios y castigos? ¿ser un individuo libre significa aceptar pasivamente lo que ocurre y abandonar la pretensión de modificarlo? Este artículo responde a estas preguntas mediante la distinción en (...) la obra spinoziana de dos conceptos de libertad, la verdadera libertad y el libre albedrío, así como con la distinción entre la responsabilidad civil fundada en el concepto de potestas humana -y no en la verdadera libertad, aunque la posibilita-.: Spinoza sustains that the agents' decisions are necessary because they are causally determined. But then, are humans really moral agents? Is it possible that they are only passengers in a train of causes, whose course they cannot control and exempts them from the consequences of their acts, of reward or punishment? Is accepting whatever happens and quitting the aspiration of changing things the hallmark of the free man? This paper answers these questions by distinguishing two concepts of freedom, real freedom and free will, as well as two concepts of responsibility. Civil responsibility is grounded in free will, whereas moral responsibility is not grounded in true freedom, but in human power. (shrink)

Some scholars have understood that Spinoza’s extreme rationalism, nominalism, conventionalism, and rejection of a semantic theory of truth make his philosophy incapable to use language for philosophical and scientific purposes; insofar he considered language a source of inadequate knowledge, falsity, and error. Thus Spinoza finds contradiction in his inevitable use of language to express his philosophy. This paper has four aims: first, propose an explanation on why language is inadequate knowledge for Spinoza; second, present differences between inadequacy, falsity, and error (...) in language; third, argue on the Spinozian use of the geometrical method as a solution for the adequate use of language in philosophical and scientific work; finally, show the problems and limits of this solution for metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

For Spinoza’s epistemology, an image is an idea that represents an external body as actually existent. This kind of knowledge is the only source of inadequate knowledge, falsity, and error. On the contrary, reason is adequate knowledge because it comprehends common notions, i.e, properties of different things. Intuition is also adequate knowledge because it conceives formal essences of singular things. The main example is the genetic definition of a sphere, an adequate knowledge form by the power of thinking of the (...) mind, without regard to existing extramental spheres. From these differences, some scholars conclude that imagination is always negative and should not deal with reason and intuition. But this conclusion will ban Spinoza’s epistemology from having adequate knowledge of existing individuals, such as Moses and the Hebrew State. In front of this view, this paper defends three theses: firstly, that the difference between the three kinds of knowledge is of genus, not of degree. Secondly, that adequate knowledge for Spinoza is a generic knowledge, i.e., insofar as S knows P insofar S deduces the effects, consequences, or properties of P. Thirdly, that adequate knowledge can include imagination through the proper use of the geometric method. In this case, imagination offers data to reason and intuition for having adequate knowledge of singular things that actually existed. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

Starting from the notions of q-entailment and p-entailment, a two-dimensional notion of entailment is developed with respect to certain generalized q-matrices referred to as B-matrices. After showing that every purely monotonic singleconclusion consequence relation is characterized by a class of B-matrices with respect to q-entailment as well as with respect to p-entailment, it is observed that, as a result, every such consequence relation has an inferentially four-valued characterization. Next, the canonical form of B-entailment, a two-dimensional multiple-conclusion notion of entailment based (...) on B-matrices, is introduced, providing a uniform framework for studying several different notions of entailment based on designation, antidesignation, and their complements. Moreover, the two-dimensional concept of a B-consequence relation is defined, and an abstract characterization of such relations by classes of B-matrices is obtained. Finally, a contribution to the study of inferential many-valuedness is made by generalizing Suszko’s Thesis and the corresponding reduction to show that any B-consequence relation is, in general, inferentially four-valued. (shrink)

important source for the work has been the testimony of those closest to Wittgenstein. Literary executors, friends and students have all become essential tools for discovering more about Wittgenstein's personality and thoughts. That is the reason why many of their writings have been used to give a more accurate description of how the philosopher understood matters concerning the meaning of life.

Over the last few years, in part due to the political impact of terrorist activities, the debate on the moral significance of torture as a useful means of obtaining information from enemy combatants has arisen with an urgency not seen in many years. Stressing the importance of exceptional cases, the defenders of torture attempt to justify its acceptance by and back its use in the judicial system of Western democracies. Yet what is at stake here are the basic moral principles—especially (...) that of human dignity-on which our political convictions rest. Admitting of exceptions would change the value of these principles: what once werefixed guidelines for acceptable action now become alterable according to specific political demands, thus making torture into a morally neutral act. The current defence of torture in the West may be a symptom of the progressive absolutization of the State. (shrink)

RESUMENLa estructura desdoblada que adopta habitualmente la escritura de Chantal Maillard tiene un sentido intenso en el poemario Hilos. Este libro, que en parte surge como segregación del diario Husos, despliega una lógica estética contraria a toda interpretación metafísica. Para ello, los poemas crecen como ecos unos de otros y como reflejos de fragmentos de otros libros de la autora. En Hilos, la escritura teje una malla o red cuyos vórtices dibujan el mapa de un Texto en que obras de (...) otras manifestaciones artísticas (Gego), filosóficas (Derrida) o mitológicas (Kālī) vienen a explicar su urdimbre.PALABRAS CLAVECHANTAL MAILLARD, ESTÉTICA, GEGO, DERRIDA, KĀLĪABSTRACTThe split structure in which Chantal Maillard’s writing are regularly framed, has an intense sense in the poems in Hilos. This book, which comes as a segregation of the diary Husos, displays an aesthetic logic opposed to metaphysics. The poems are written as echoes and as reflections of other fragments of other Maillard’s books. In Hilos, the writing is a mesh or a network whose vortices draw the map of a Text explained by other artistic works (Gego), philosophical works (Derrida) or mythological expressions (Kālī).KEY WORDSCHANTAL MAILLARD, AESTHETICS, GEGO, DERRIDA, KĀLĪ. (shrink)

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Little has been studied on the relationship between affect and school problems related with attendance. This study aims to identify different affective profiles and to determine whether these profiles differ from each other based on the four functional conditions of school refusal behavior. Participants comprised 1,816 Spanish adolescents aged 15–18 years. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule for Children-Short Form and the School Refusal Assessment Scale-Revised for Children were administered. Latent profile analysis revealed five affective profiles: low affective profile, self-fulfilling (...) profile, low positive affect profile, self-destructive profile, and high affective profile. The self-destructive profile revealed the highest average scores in the first three factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the high affective profile reached the highest average score in the fourth factor. On the contrary, the self-fulfilling profile obtained the lowest average scores in the first two factors of the SRAS-R-C, whereas the low affective profile revealed the lowest average scores in the last two factors. Findings suggest the relevance of developing more adaptative affective profiles, such as the self-fulfilling profile, which would contribute to diminishing school attendance problems. (shrink)

El uso del espacio virtual invita a una reflexión ética sobre su impacto moral. Sociólogos, psicólogos y filósofos son incapaces acordar sus implicaciones éticas. El presente artículo examina el espacio virtual a través de la teoría de La Construcción Social de la Realidad de Peter L. Berger y Thomas Luckmann, que sostiene que el otro significante conforma el carácter del individuo. Se argumenta que el ciberespacio produce un progreso moral. Por un lado, la multiplicidad de otros significantes representa un obstáculo (...) en la socialización del individuo. Por otro y más importante, los otros significantes constituyen nuevas verdades que favorecen un nuevo orden moral. Este resultado se explica mediante el concepto de otro generalizado originario del filósofo George H. Mead. En conclusión, se propone que el espacio virtual conforma el carácter moral del individuo de forma positiva. (shrink)

Many destructive business leaders drive their companies into bankruptcy and dissolution, never to be heard from again in the business press. However, it is useful to study these organizations to prevent the same, or similar destructive business from taking on, and destroying, additional businesses. In this article, we describe one type of organization that follows the model of religious cults, which we call secular business cults. Building on Padilla et al., we describe an SBC toxic triangle of (1) Padilla et (...) al.'s societal factors, (2) additional business factors, and (3) antisocial actors that set the stage for the SBC's emergence. We then describe the characteristics of the SBC's operations, such as an ultrastrong culture, formalized manipulation, manipulative hierarchical relationships, competition, and operations efficiency tools, and the frequent overcommunication of deceptive messages. It is our hope that this unique perspective on organizations will inspire research into an overlooked area of unethical behavior in businesses today. In our Part II paper on the topic, we intend to extend the idea of SBCs to manipulative businesses, which are essentially reorganized, well‐established and legally‐complying revisions of SBCs, and then to manipulative industries and societies. (shrink)

Some classical studies in social psychology suggest that we are more sensitive to situational factors, and less responsive to reasons, than we normally recognize we are. In recent years, moral responsibility theorists have examined the question whether those studies represent a serious threat to our moral responsibility. A common response to the “situationist threat” has been to defend the reasons-responsiveness of ordinary human agents by appeal to a theory of reasons-responsiveness that appeals to patterns of counterfactual scenarios or possible worlds. (...) In this paper I identify a problem with that response and I offer a better solution. (shrink)

In this article I examine the relation between causation and moral responsibility. I distinguish four possible views about that relation. One is the standard view: the view that an agent's moral responsibility for an outcome requires, and is grounded in, the agent's causal responsibility for it. I discuss several challenges to the standard view, which motivate the three remaining views. The final view – the view I argue for – is that causation is the vehicle of transmission of moral responsibility. (...) According to this view, although moral responsibility does not require causation, causation still grounds moral responsibility. (shrink)

There is an initial presumption against disjunctive causes. First of all, for some people causation is a relation between events. But, arguably, there are no disjunctive events, since events are particulars and thus they have spatiotemporal locations, while it is unclear what the spatiotemporal location of a disjunctive event could be.1 More importantly, even if one believes that entities like facts can enter in causal relations, and even if there are disjunctive facts, it is still hard to see how disjunctive (...) facts could be causes. Imagine, for instance, the following scenario. I have a gun filled with red paint and another gun filled with blue paint, and I fire both guns at my neighbor’s white wall. A moment later, there is a graffiti on the wall and my neighbor notifies the police. He would have done so regardless of the graffiti’s color, since all he cares about is the existence of a graffiti on his wall. Is it plausible to claim that a disjunctive fact is a cause of his notifying the police? In particular, is it plausible to claim that he notified the police because I fired the red-paint gun or the blue-paint gun (the thought being that my firing paint of either color would have sufficed)? It seems not. The police was notified because of the actual graffiti on the wall, and the actual graffiti on the wall is made of a certain pattern of colored patches. Imagine, that, as it turns out, there are patches of both colors on the wall. Then it seems that both my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun were causes of my neighbor’s notifying the police. In other words, my firing the red-paint gun and my firing the blue-paint gun jointly caused the outcome: each of them was a contributory cause of the outcome’s occurrence. On the other hand, imagine that there are only patches of one color on the wall. Then it seems that my firing only one of the guns was a cause. Either way, the disjunction fails to be a cause: either my firing the red-paint gun was a cause, or my firing the blue-paint gun was a cause, or they were both causes, but their disjunction was not.. (shrink)

The standard notion of formal theory, in logic, is in general biased exclusively towards assertion: it commonly refers only to collections of assertions that any agent who accepts the generating axioms of the theory should also be committed to accept. In reviewing the main abstract approaches to the study of logical consequence, we point out why this notion of theory is unsatisfactory at multiple levels, and introduce a novel notion of theory that attacks the shortcomings of the received notion by (...) allowing one to take both assertions and denials on a par. This novel notion of theory is based on a bilateralist approach to consequence operators, which we hereby introduce, and whose main properties we investigate in the present paper. (shrink)

A modo de preámbulo, consideramos importante mencionar que el presente ensayo pretende entrelazar los conceptos mirada y seducción desde distintas ópticas. Se plantean someramente algunas ideas desde la filosofía hasta el psicoanálisis. Se inicia con una “mirada” a las construcciones literarias de creadores de gran importancia, tales como Jean Braudrillard y Georges Bataille, en quienes se estudia la idea del ojo perverso, de la mirada y el deseo, subjetividad que nos atrapa. Se ambiciona articular con teorizaciones psicoanalíticas de lo inconsciente, (...) abundando en investigaciones freudianas y de otros teóricos del psicoanálisis para analizar e interpretar sus “seductoras” aportaciones.By way of preamble, we consider important to mention that this essay intends to link the concepts of look and seduction from different angles. Some ideas are raised from philosophy to psychoanalysis. The article starts with a “look” to the creators of literary constructions of great importance such as Jean Braudrillard and Georges Bataille, in order to study the idea of the evil eye, the gaze and desire, the subjectivity that catch us. The article aspires to articulate psychoanalytic theories of the unconscious, abounding in Freudian investigations and other theorists of psychoanalysis to analyze and interpret “seductive” contributions. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

Jorgensen’s dilemma has been analysed from various theoretical angles. However, it is not the aim of this essay to “theorize” but to “experiment” on the above mentioned dilemma; particularly to carry out attempts of deontic reproduction of a logical paradox substituting the value “truth” for the value “validity”. The relevance of the obtained results will be appraised from the point of view of Conte’s paradigm“syntactic validity” vs. “dianoetic validity”.

La importancia de Montserrat como santuario se puede medir no sólo por la extensión de su culto, sino también como centro irradiador de modelos narrativos. La leyenda de Garí fue elaborada en el medievo por los benedictinos y proviene de dos fuentes conocidas: el eremita tentado y la historia del hombre salvaje. En ella se aúnan legados de origen oriental y europeo. El hallazgo de la imagen se suma más tarde a esta narración, lo que pone de manifiesto cómo se (...) van hilvanando las leyendas, su proceso de elaboración: 1º una leyenda de fundación del monasterio santuario como la de Garí. En 2º lugar una leyenda de origen de culto a una imagen. La leyenda mariana de Montserrat forma parte de la cultura devocional dedicada a ciertos santos y a san Miguel, así como también al culto a las imágenes. (shrink)

Drug trafficking in Mexico has been inspired by corridos, novels, telenovelas, films, new religious images, in general of a change of imaginary that is not only reflected in the number of dead, but in a lack of Values coming from policausal factors and that is leading vertiginosa to insensibility. The study is aimed at drug trafficking literature. The first part defines the background, the theorys fundamentals ; The second is dedicated to the methodology indicating the corpus to be treated and (...) the analysis of the literary discourse. The third to the results obtained and finally offer some reflections as proposals. (shrink)

The prolific discussion about consciousness has resulted a multiplicity in the uses for the term. The -curious- little clarity regarding the use of the notion, can lead to confusion to who tries to enter the contemporary discussion of the philosophy of mind. The purpose of this article is to serve as a starting point for those who seek to enter the contemporary discussion of consciousness, presenting: i) the central concept of the consciousness that is used, and ii) give an account (...) of the state of the discussion, that is, the central problem of consciousness. (shrink)