This article examines how Žižek’s analysis of “subjective” violence can be used to explore the ways in which media coverage of a terrorist attack is contoured and shaped by less noticeable forms of “objective” (symbolic and systemic) violence. Drawing upon newspaper coverage of the 2017 London Bridge attack, it is noted how examples of “subjective” violence were grounded in the externalization of a clearly identifiable “other”, which symbolically framed the terrorists and the attack as tied to and representative of the (...) UK Muslim community. Examples of “systematic” violence were most notable in the ideological edifice that underpinned this framing but also in the ways in which newspaper reports served to draw upon British values in the aftermath of the attack. This directed attention away from the contradictions within the UK, towards narratives that sought to “fix” these contradictions through eradicating the problem of “the other” and/or by violently protecting the British values “they” seek to undermine. As a consequence, newspaper coverage worked to uphold the illusion that “peace” could be achieved by eradicating terrorism through further forms of objective violence, including, internment without trial; the “ripping up” of human rights; and, closer surveillance of Muslim communities. Indeed, it was this unacknowledged violence that worked to maintain British values in the press’ coverage. (shrink)

What exactly do we mean when we talk about fundamental British values? Further, what defines Britishness and has this remained a static concept over time? How have recent changes to legislation and policy repositioned the way teachers engage with British values and how has it affected their status in the private and public spheres of their lives? This illuminating book sets out to address these questions, providing a historical account of how national identity in Britain has (...) developed over time and an overview of the status that teachers currently hold. As the book focuses on British education, it will be most relevant for professionals working in the UK context, however international readers will undoubtedly be interested in how national identity can develop and how the role of the educator progresses to reflect these changes. (shrink)

Societies concerned with preventing acts of violent extremism often target the ideas that are thought to motivate such acts. The state's use of educational institutions is one mechanism by which those ideas are subjected to challenge. Teaching liberal democratic values to students is one method. Here, David Stevens argues that this model is misguided. First, commitment to violent methods is not primarily driven by the attractiveness of radical ideas themselves, but by material facts and circumstances. Second, an education that (...) ignores the teaching of various socioeconomic values, such as a commitment to a certain degree of material equality and welfare provision, is inadequate as a conception of citizenship. These criticisms are related. Citizens are owed certain resources and commitments as citizens, and grounds for dissatisfaction and violence are reduced when citizens receive the holdings to which they are entitled, and when their fellow citizens recognize and endorse this. Consequently, it is the role of education to teach directively toward the adoption of such socioeconomic values and commitments. (shrink)

I analyse the 2014 policy to promote 'British values' in schools from the perspective of the two main positions in contemporary liberal theory, comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism. I highlight in what ways comprehensive and political liberal defences of the policy are unsatisfactory, before briefly sketching a possible alternative position – ‘thin comprehensive liberalism’ – and discussing its potential for justifying a substantive education in liberal values. In light of this theoretical perspective, I suggest some ways that (...) the existing British values policy might be amended in practice so as to bring it more in line with the liberal ideal. (shrink)

This article explores the rhetoric, and mass mediation, of the national Holocaust Memorial Day commemoration ceremony, as broadcast on British television. I argue that the televised national ceremonies should be approached as an example of multi-genre epideictic rhetoric, working up meanings through a hybrid combination of genres, author/animators and modes. Epideictic rhetoric has often been depreciated as simply ceremonial ‘praise or blame’ speeches. However, given that the topics of praise/blame assume the existence of social norms, epideictic also acts to (...) presuppose and evoke common values, in general, and a collective recognition of shared social responsibilities, in particular. My methodology draws on the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis, given, first, its central prominence in analysing argumentative strategies in discourse and, second, the ways it facilitates a reflexive ‘shuttling’ between text-discursive features, intertextual relations and wider contexts of society and history. Here, I examine how a catastrophic past is invoked in speech and evoked through image and music, in response to the demands that uncertainty of the future ‘places upon one’s conscience’. (shrink)

This paper examines the work ethic characteristics of particular practising Protestant, Catholic and Muslim managers in Britain, Ireland and Turkey. Max Weber, argued that Protestant societies had a particular work ethic which was quite distinct from non-Protestant societies. The Protestant work ethics (PWE) thesis of Weber was reviewed. Previous empirical and analytical research results showed that the number of research results which support Weberian ideas were more than those which did not support. Methodological issues were also discussed. Results revealed that (...) there was a considerable difference between Muslim and other groups in terms of PWE characteristics. The Muslim group showed the highest PWE level, while the Protestant group was placed second and the Catholic group third. The Protestant group showed a slightly higher of PWE level than the Catholic group. The possible reasons for the higher level of the PWE values of Muslim managers are discussed in the light of historical, political, social and economic developments in Turkey. (shrink)

A contribution to the liberalism-republicanism debate from a political historian's point of view, this essay focuses on Britain in the mid-Victorian period—arguably the golden age of modern liberalism. The first part argues that the writings and political ideas of the leading liberal thinkers were imbued with ‘neo-roman’ values, including participatory citizenship, civic virtue and concern for the common good. The second part discusses the dissemination of ‘neo-roman’ ideas among the rank and file of the Liberal party, focusing on popular (...) celebrations of the right to bear arms. The essay concludes that, despite the methodological claims of some scholars, the liberalism-republicanism debate has tended to ignore the context within which ideas and traditions were developed by their leading interpreters. Moreover, it argues that if we really are interested in the context of political thought we must go beyond traditional concerns with the ‘canonical’ texts and look at its social environment. (shrink)

The subject of gratitude has gained traction in recent years in academic and popular circles. However, limited attention has been devoted to understanding what laypeople understand by the concept of gratitude; the meaning of which tends to have been assumed in the literature. Furthermore, while intrapersonal and interpersonal benefits of gratitude have been extolled in this growing body of research, there has been little assessment of the value laypeople place on gratitude themselves, or whether and how they think it might (...) be fostered. Since September 2012, our Attitude for Gratitude research project has been engaged in examining precisely how gratitude is conceptualised by the British public, what British people are grateful for, the value they place on gratitude, what kinds of people tend to be grateful, and whether and how they think gratitude might be promoted in British society. The project has incorporated a variety of methods to examine these questions, conceptually and empirically, canvassing the opinions of over 10,000 people in the UK. A key issue for our research has been to represent the views of British people across a range of ages, ethnicities and backgrounds that are representative of Britain today. We are strongly committed to the view that researchers should engage with laypeople to avoid superimposing a meaning and value on gratitude that does not reflect the views of the people the research purports to study. To this end, and to throw light on what British laypeople understand by the concept of gratitude, we carried out a series of empirical studies that complement the definitions of philosophers and psychologists with more everyday definitions of laypeople5. To examine the perceived value of gratitude we surveyed British people directly, making no prior assumptions about where gratitude might be evaluated in relation to other values and virtues. Finally, we sought to elicit suggestions from the British public themselves about how gratitude might be fostered in British society. Much recent research on gratitude has originated in the USA and therefore a further aim of the project was to assess the degree to which the understanding and evaluation of gratitude may differ between the USA and the UK. We sought to target the British public with these questions. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.

In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even (...) when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that advocates of that proposal assume a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science. (shrink)

The paper uses two historical examples, public health (1840-1880) and town planning (1945-1975) in Britain, to analyse the challenges faced by goal-driven research, an increasingly important trend in science policy, as exemplified by the prominence of calls for addressing Grand Challenges. Two key points are argued. (1) Given that the aim of research addressing social or global problems is to contribute to improving things, this research should include all the steps necessary to bring science and technology to fruition. This need (...) is captured by the idea of practical integration, which brings this type of research under the umbrella of collective practical reason rather than under the aegis of science. Achieving practical integration is difficult for many reasons: the complexity of social needs, the plurality of values at stake, the limitation of our knowledge, the elusive nature of the skills needed to deal with uncertainty, incomplete information and asymmetries of power. Nevertheless, drawing from the lessons of the case studies, it is argued that (2) practical integration needs a proper balance between values, institutions and knowledge: i.e. a combination of mutual support and mutual limitation. Pursuing such a balance provides a flexible strategy for approximating practical integration. (shrink)

Originally published in 1954, on behalf of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, this book presents a general review of British economic statistics in relation to the uses made of them for policy purposes. The text begins with an examination, in general terms, of the ways in which statistics can help in guiding or assessing policy, covering housing, coal, the development areas, agricultural price-fixing, the balance of external payments and the balance of the economy. The problems of (...) statistical application are then separately discussed under the headings of quality, presentation and availability, and organization. A full bibliography and reference table of principal British economic statistics are also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in British economic history and statistics. (shrink)

Global citizenship education (GCE) within schools in England is increasingly being reoriented to address a statutory duty to promote fundamental British values (FBV). This multi-method study investigates the influence of critical GCE within initial teacher education in reshaping awareness, understanding and disposition towards FBV amongst beginning teachers. Findings highlight a tension between growing confidence and understanding of how to implement the FBV agenda and the development of autonomous dispositions of the kind demanded for the practice of critical GCE. (...) Four teacher orientations towards FBV are developed and explored, demonstrating the role of practice-based learning for the cultivation of critical dispositions. (shrink)

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that epistemic (...) rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

India today is facing value crisis. Drift started during the British era and since then it has been witnessing continuous erosion of values. At that time the man who came to India’s rescue was Mahatma Gandhi, man of principles and values who never compromised with his values. He along with his powerful values of truth and non-violence helped India regain its strength. Almost after 64 years of freedom there is a heartfelt need to go back (...) to these values for effective management and survival. This article is an endeavour for reviving these time-tested values and to draw insights for management of organization. The values like truth, non-violence, renunciation, humility, equanimity, etc., at the organization’s roots may provide it a firm footing in this turbulent scenario. (shrink)

It would be, at this hour of the day, supererogatory to argue the pre-eminence of Locke's influence on eighteenth-century thought. But though this claim has been made often enough, 1 and has often enough been shown to be true, it has not been shown for aesthetics. I believe it to be true of aesthetics as well, but that the fact has gone unremarked, because the line of influence here is not so overt as in the case of, say, political theory (...) or epistemology. It is, rather, oblique and devious; that the influence is there at all is, even, paradoxical. (shrink)

It would be, at this hour of the day, supererogatory to argue the pre-eminence of Locke's influence on eighteenth-century thought. But though this claim has been made often enough, 1 and has often enough been shown to be true, it has not been shown for aesthetics. I believe it to be true of aesthetics as well, but that the fact has gone unremarked, because the line of influence here is not so overt as in the case of, say, political theory (...) or epistemology. It is, rather, oblique and devious; that the influence is there at all is, even, paradoxical. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus among philosophers of science that core parts of the scientific process involve non-epistemic values. This undermines the traditional foundation for public trust in science. In this article I consider two proposals for justifying public trust in value-laden science. According to the first, scientists can promote trust by being transparent about their value choices. On the second, trust requires that the values of a scientist align with the values of an individual member of (...) the public. I argue that neither of these proposals work and suggest an alternative that does better. When scientists must appeal to values in the course of their research, they should appeal to democratic values: the values of the public or its representatives. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This thesis considers the place of values in comparative political inquiry. After a review of the debate in the philosophy of social science between the positivist and hermeneutic approaches , the argument is divided into two parts. The first part looks at the origins, and consequences, of the attempt to establish a positivistic value-free comparative political science. The second part considers the basis, and the potential nature, (...) of a self-consciously normative discipline of comparative politics. ;The idea of value-freedom is criticised; it is argued: that the failure to take into account the values of the comparative theorist results in the imposition of a non-neutral framework on the phenomena under investigation; and that the failure to take into account the values of the agents under investigation makes it impossible to properly describe or explain political phenomena. ;Examples are used to illustrate these points but also to show how, and why, the rhetoric of neutrality is sustained in practice. It is suggested that mainstream comparative political science conflates a positivist epistemology and a quantitative research methodology. This mixture results in a variety of confusions but is seen to protect comparative politics from "the problem of relativism", which is treated as the principal weakness of the hermeneutic approach. ;Two possible foundations for a normative comparative politics are considered. Firstly, the idea that it is possible to found comparative politics on a non-relative moral theory is reviewed and rejected. It is argued that the best candidates for such a theory, utilitarianism and "thin" theories of the good, cannot be established a priori. Secondly, the assumption that the existence of a plurality of cultures, moral beliefs, and theoretical perspectives leads to relativism is rejected. Instead it is argued that the existence of diversity and disagreement itself provides the basis for a coherent and self-critical discipline, and enhances the scope of comparative politics. (shrink)

A central aspiration of the ‘Britishness’ agenda in UK politics is to promote community through the teaching of British values in schools. The agenda’s justification depends in part on the suppositions that harmony arising from agreement on certain values is a necessary condition of social health and that conflict arising from pluralism connotes a form of dysfunction in social life. These perceptions of harmony and conflict are traceable to the ancient Greeks. Plato used the device of the (...) soul-city analogy to provide a form of independent justification for his favoured model of community according to which harmony was essential. However, the soul-city analogy involves an intellectual sleight-of-hand. The idea that conflict connotes a defect in social life, which continues to haunt contemporary debates about community and values education, is the vestige of an ancient aristocratic ideology and we must learn to see it as such. There is no more reason to accept the Platonist portrayal of the place of conflict in social life than there is to accept a diametrically opposed Heraclitean account, which interprets harmony as the central threat to social flourishing. The implications of this ancient dispute for modern education are considerable: there is nothing natural or inevitable about the association of conflict with social dysfunction that partly supports the Britishness agenda; it is a political prejudice. Coming to see it as such will reveal new pathways to belonging and new ways of understanding the role of education in fostering the good society. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This contribution examines the implementation of the ‘British’ values agenda within Early Childhood Care and Education settings in England, as introduced by the Prevent Duty. It begins by tracing the rise of the ECEC setting as the primary place of education of the young child, as this has shifted from the home environment. It examines the place of values education, culminating in the Government directive on the promotion of ‘British’ values, and how these (...) class='Hi'>values must be seen as integral to effective ECEC provision. Using a case study of two focus groups and subsequent in-depth semi-structured interviews, the implications of the introduction of this strategy are identified, focusing in particular on the relationships between the ECEC leaders and parents. This presents clear evidence of the potential for a negative impact on interpersonal professional relationships. (shrink)

Aesthetics is a normative domain. We evaluate artworks as better or worse, good or bad, great or grim. I will refer to a positive appraisal of an artwork as an aesthetic appreciation of that work, and I refer to a negative appraisal as aesthetic depreciation. (I will often drop the word “aesthetic.”) There has been considerable amount of work on what makes an artwork worthy of appreciation, and less, it seems, on the nature of appreciation itself. These two topics are (...) related, of course, because they nature of appreciation may bear on what things are worthy of that response, or at least on what things are likely to elicit it. So I will have some things to say about the latter. But I want to focus in this discussion on appreciation itself. When we praise a work of art, when we say it has aesthetic value, what does our praise consist in? This is a question about aesthetic psychology. I am interested in what kind of mental state appreciation is. What kind of state are we expressing when we say a work of art is “good”? This question has parallels in other areas of value theory. In ethics, most notably, there has been much attention lavished on the question of what people express when they refer to an action as “morally good.” One popular class of theories, associated with the British moralists and their followers, posits a link between moral valuation and emotion. To call an act morally good is to express an emotion toward that act. I think this approach to morality is right on target (Prinz, 2007). Here I want to argue that an emotional account of aesthetic valuation is equally promising. There are important differences between the two domains, but both have an affective foundation. I suspect that valuing of all kinds involves the emotions. Here I will inquire into the role of emotions in aesthetic valuing. I will not claim that artworks express emotions or even that they necessarily evoke emotions.. (shrink)

Marilyn Strathern’s arguments against the possibility of feminist research bringing about a paradigm shift in social anthropology have led to a number of responses. Regarding one argument she presents, her own writings suggest a response: the argument that feminist research cannot bring about such a shift, because it is only concerned with part of society. A foray into the history of British social anthropology is of value for appreciating this argument and the response.

This Paper identifies seven positive elements of an _ethics system_, or framework, for public officials - namely, (1) the culture and values prevailing in a country; (2) codes and laws and their enforcement; (3) new institutions to uphold ethics in public life; (4) audit, public accountability and openness; (5) guiding principles and motivation to encourage good conduct; (6) external and internal education and training for public life; and (7) the views of the public in regard to their call for (...) greater trust, honesty, and integrity in public life. The Paper next discusses in detail each of these seven elements of an _ethics system_ in the context of British Central Government. However, these seven elements are deemed appropriate for the Public Service of any country seeking to strengthen its standards of conduct and uphold its ethical responsibilities. Finally, this Paper concludes with a reference to business companies and the relevance to them of an _ethics system_. For example, there is a defence in the new UK Bribery Act of 2010 (to be implemented on 1st July 2011 and applicable also to foreign corporations doing business in the UK) that, if a business company has procedures in place to prevent corruption (that is, an _ethics system_), it will be treated more leniently. (shrink)

In truth-functional analysis we need not worry about the purported ambiguity of the English ‘or,’ for we can assign different symbols and define each by means of a truth table. However, at least in classes in elementary logic, we often try to indicate that there is some rationale to the assignation of truth values by marshaling English disjunctive sentences which will clearly render an inclusive or an exclusive reading, without the explicit addition of one of the qualifying phrases, “or (...) both” or “but not both.” At this point one discovers people writing on logic saying quite different things about the English ‘or.’ In his Methods of Logic Quine takes the inclusive sense to be the more naturally intended and claims that “indisputable instances of the exclusive use” are rare. Yet in The Principles of Logic Bradley says that no one ever really intends to use ‘or’ in any other than an exclusive sense; and Bosanquet followed him in this. In this paper I am interested in attempting to discover why the British Idealists held that ‘or’ is always exclusive, especially in the face of various examples which, prima facie, establish both uses in English. Why would Bradley feel compelled to deny “any possible instance in which alternatives are not exclusive”? As it turns out, the position held by Bradley and Bosanquet is stronger and more interesting than one initially expects. (shrink)

The investigation aims at analysing the two general notions of mankind and people in two lexicographic reference works on trade and commerce published in London in the 1750s: Rolt’s A New Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (1756) and Postlethwayt’s The Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (1757). An overview of the same notions in universal dictionaries of arts and sciences (cfr. References, Primary Sources), issued before and after ND and UD, will also be of help to define a more general (...) background. Starting from the key words mankind and people, their frequency and relevance in the two dictionaries, the investigation is widened to include related terms (e.g. multiword expressions and language patterns in which mankind and people occur) and semantic categories (e.g. specific contexts of use: social condition, social values, demography, identity and citizenship, etc.). The many entries, cross-references, and the various lexical clusters reveal a complex lexicographic and lexicological network. This network, beyond providing information and contents on specific topics, ultimately emphasises the hierarchical organising principle at the basis of Late Modern British society: in particular, people unfolds into a myriad of ‘entities’. Dictionaries of trade and commerce are plentiful sources of knowledge, from general concepts and notions to more specific contents, but also powerful ideological tools. (shrink)

This paper considers the role of the British Educational Research Association (BERA) in promoting the improvement of UK research over the past 27 years. The views of some BERA representatives, as expressed at Conferences, in occasional publications and particularly in the pages of Research Intelligence, suggest a certain complacency. These representatives have devoted considerable effort to defending the existing quality of research, arguing for greater funding, and explaining how it is that educational research is so much more difficult than (...) in any other field of endeavour. Some effort has been devoted to making more people aware of the value of existing research, but relatively little attention appears to be devoted to rallying the field to improve. This paper suggests that this relative emphasis should be adjusted, and presents a few examples of ways in which the BERA of the future, if it is to survive in strength, as it should, might address these deficiencies. In my opinion, BERA as the sole professional organization of UK educational researchers should be leading our way rather more on this, and not merely acting as our apologist. (shrink)

Ethics, Value, and Reality is a collection of essays written after Kolnai settled in England in 1955. These essays from Kolnai's mature years sit atop a remarkable gestation of moral and political thinking. At the heart of his thought is the special role of privilege in a good social order. Kolnai relies heavily on the work of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century value theorists such as Alexius Meinong, Nicolai Hartmann, and Max Scheler. He blends this continental tradition of ethics with (...) British intuitionism and Scottish Enlightenment articulations. For Kolnai, ethical life cannot be adequately understood except by reference to moral emphasis, and thus, Kolnai can be thought of as a liberal conservative. He acknowledges myriad values, moral and non-moral, and accepts that all can have some claim upon us. Low values as much as high values have a legitimate claim. His is a tolerant conservatism though not for a moment does he forgo the necessity of judgment: a readily graspable hierarchy keeps the respective demands of values in proportion. Kolnai welcomes the call to seriousness, which is the hallmark of existentialism. The ground of Kolnai's thought is the idea of emotion as cognitive. He saw the typical analytical philosopher's fascination with simplicity of explanation not only thoroughly refuted by the gains in understanding wrought by phenomenological method, with its deference to the richness of phenomena, but sensed in the monistic inclination he dreaded a harbinger of totalitarianism. Never denying his emotionalism, he nonetheless made his points well enough by adopting an analytical approach to philosophy and ethics. This is a major work crossing moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Professionalism is initially understood as a historical process, through which certain commercial services sought to improve their social status by separating themselves from mere crafts or trades. This process may be traced clearly with the aspiration of British portrait painters, in the eighteenth century, to acquire a social status akin to that of already established professionals, such as clerics and doctors. This may be understood, to a significant degree, as a process of gentrification. The values of the professional (...) thereby lie as much in the etiquette and other social skills with which they deal with their clients, than with any distinctive form of skill or value. Professionalisation as gentrification seemingly says little about the nature of modern professionalism. However, if this process is also construed as one in which the goals and achievements of the profession come to be subject to radical reflection, then something significant about professional values emerges. On this account, the profession is distinguished from craft or trade on the grounds that the goals of the profession, and the effectiveness of any attempt to realise them, are not transparent to the client. While a lay person will typically have the competence necessary to judge whether or not a craft worker has achieved their goal, that person will not necessarily be able to recognise the values that determine the success of a medical operation. It will be concluded that the values of a profession are articulated intrinsically to the profession, in terms of the contested understanding that the professionals themselves have of the meaning of the profession and the narratives within which its history is to be told. (shrink)

© British Society of Aesthetics 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the British Society of Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] adaptation of literary works into films has been almost completely neglected as a philosophical topic. I discuss two questions about this phenomenon:What do we mean when we say that a film is faithful to its source?Is being faithful to its source a merit in a film adaptation?In response to, I set out (...) two distinct senses of fidelity: story fidelity and thematic fidelity. I then argue, in response to, that thematic fidelity, but not story fidelity, is an aesthetic merit in a film adaptation. The key steps in this argument involve showing that merely preserving the story from one medium to another does not typically involve an aesthetically... (shrink)

In the diverse but related essays collected in Values and Evaluations, Julius Kovesi's central concerns are the nature of ideological thinking and the rational core of morality. «It is characteristic of ideological beliefs that their truth is upheld independent of the arguments for them,» he contends. He examines ideological tendencies in the Marxist tradition, in attempts to demythologize Christianity, and in modern British ethical theory. In ethics, he continues the attack on the fact/value dichotomy he began in Moral (...) Notions, a dichotomy he thinks has ideological sources. In theology, he argues that demythologizing is really a form of «remythologizing.» A long study of Moses Hess's essay On the Essence of Money is used to illuminate the early thought of Marx. (shrink)

Three proposals are made regarding values acquisition in schools. It is believed that: (a) optimal conditions for the integration of values into school-students' lives will include students' voluntary commitments; (b) values learning must lead to personally transformed relationships between students and topics considered worthwhile; (c) since values learning is, arguably, the core of formal education, there has to be some consistency between what is learned and the wider socio-political scene. It is argued that these conditions are (...) hard to fulfil via the prescribed, performance-oriented curricula currently on offer in English school classrooms. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Critical Research on Religion, Mary Jo Neitz presents a four-cell Locations Matrix created by the two dimensions of the status of the religion studied, as dominant and marginal, and position of the researchers vis-à-vis that religion, as insiders or outsiders. Her subsequent arguments about the influence of researcher standpoint perhaps work in the US setting where religion remains popular. This paper points out difficulties in applying the Matrix in the UK setting where religion is unpopular (...) and uses the patently disinterested nature of much of the research conducted by professional sociologists of religion to retrieve the possibility of objective and value-neutral research. (shrink)

Does the ethical value of a work of art ever contribute to its aesthetic value? I argue that when conventionally interpreted as a request for a conceptual analysis the answer to this question is indeterminate. I then propose a different interpretation of the question on which it is understood as a substantial and normative question internal to the practice of aesthetic criticism.

Professionalism is initially understood as a historical process, through which certain commercial services sought to improve their social status by separating themselves from mere crafts or trades. This process may be traced clearly with the aspiration of British portrait painters, in the eighteenth century, to acquire a social status akin to that of already established professionals, such as clerics and doctors. This may be understood, to a significant degree, as a process of gentrification. The values of the professional (...) thereby lie as much in the etiquette and other social skills with which they deal with their clients, than with any distinctive form of skill or value. Professionalisation as gentrification seemingly says little about the nature of modern professionalism. However, if this process is also construed as one in which the goals and achievements of the profession come to be subject to radical reflection, then something significant about professional values emerges. On this account, the profession is distinguished from craft or trade on the grounds that the goals of the profession, and the effectiveness of any attempt to realise them, are not transparent to the client. While a lay person will typically have the competence necessary to judge whether or not a craft worker has achieved their goal, that person will not necessarily be able to recognise the values that determine the success of a medical operation. It will be concluded that the values of a profession are articulated intrinsically to the profession, in terms of the contested understanding that the professionals themselves have of the meaning of the profession and the narratives within which its history is to be told. (shrink)

This paper argues that young people are unlikely to integrate themselves positively into adult life - to adopt its values, responsibilities and opportunities - unless that life is made more morally acceptable in their terms. Central to this process of community building and reconciliation with the young is the condition of solidarity which both results from and results in common values and a shared conception of the good life.

When the history of American philosophy in the nineteenth century can be written in great detail than hitherto, the important place of Charles S. Peirce as a pathfinder in every one of the many fields that his work touched will have to receive fuller recognition than has as yet been accorded to it. This quotation is from “Charles Peirce’s Pragmatism,” a paper by John Henry Muirhead that was published in The Philosophical Review in 1930s. It is evidence that the value (...) of Peirce’s work was reco... (shrink)

Some critics argue that the types of psychiatric diagnosis found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and International Classification of Disease are superfluous and should be abandoned. These are known as categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses. To receive a categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnosis an individual need only exhibit some, rather than all, of the symptoms on the diagnostic criteria. Consequently, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses only associate an individual with a range of symptoms rather than specify which symptoms they (...) have. Drawing on Giere’s account of scientific models, I portray categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses as abstract models that guide the building of less abstract models. These models can specify which symptoms a particular individual has. Additionally, categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses can guide investigation of symptoms towards difficult to spot symptoms, guide investigation towards changing symptoms, and guide investigation towards how symptoms manifest. These important roles mean categorical polythetic psychiatric diagnoses should not be abandoned. (shrink)

Why should a Bayesian bother performing an experiment, one the result of which might well upset his own favored credence function? The Ramsey-Good theorem provides a decision theoretic answer. Provided you base your decision on expected utility, and the the experiment is cost-free, performing the experiment and then choosing has at least as much expected utility as choosing without further ado. Furthermore, doing the experiment is strictly preferable just in case at least one possible outcome of the experiment could alter (...) your choice of options. That is, you should pursue the information just in case it could make a difference to what you do. The problem remains, however, why one should do an experiment when nothing of much practical consequence hangs in the balance. One possibility here is to invoke the pure cognitive utility of states. It is shown that one constraint on cognitive value (what I call cogency) guarantees the value of learning: from a cognitive point of view you are justified in performing an experiment if the outcome of the experiment could make a different to what you think. A bonus of the basic framework is that it provides a new decision theoretic argument for the rationality of conditionalization. (shrink)

The paper documents the post-war retrenchment and failure of the post-war British Consumer Co-operative Movement. In contrast to the general failure one CEO, Terry Thomas stands out both for his success in co-operative rebranding and returning to profitability the UK Co-operative Bank and because he alone amongst the top echelons of the Co-operative Groups Management based his strategies on a clearly articulated philosophy based on his understanding of the values and purpose of the co-operative movement rooted in its (...) historical traditions grounded in the writings and achievements of Robert Owen, The paper goes on to provide a case study of the bank’s process of transformation from loss-making subsidiary to the first positive co-operative national brand in the post-war period of its history. The author argues that lack of appropriate vision based on the founding values and purposes of the Co-operative Movement is the principal reason for the management’s and governance failures that have beset the UK Co-operative Group. Instead of using the past to help in understanding the present and planning for the future, the UK Co-operative Group Leadership ignored it or worse used the past successes to congratulate itself and disguise its manifest failures. In this, they were supported by an uncritical Co-operative Union. Davis argues large co-operatives cannot be managed by a civil service responsible to an elected board. Co-operatives need a servant-leadership model of professional management dedicated to the transformational goals set by the founders of the co-operative movement. This needs a radical rethink and promotion of co-operative management education and a dedicated executive recruitment that seeks out value-based professionals whose attitudes and values are compatible with Co-operative values, ownership and purpose. (shrink)