ArgumentThis essay considers the metaphors of projection in Hugo Münsterberg's theory of cinema spectatorship. Münsterberg (1863–1916), a German born and educated professor of psychology at Harvard University, turned his attention to cinema only a few years before his untimely death at the age of fifty-three. But he brought to the new medium certain lasting preoccupations. This account begins with the contention that Münsterberg's intervention in the cinema discussion pursued his well-established strategy of pitting a laboratory model against a clinical one, (...) in this case the “master-trope” of early cinema a spectatorship drawn from hysteria, hypnosis, and related phenomena like double-consciousness. Münsterberg's laboratory-oriented account also flowed from his account of cinema technology as an outgrowth of the apparatus of his own discipline of experimental psycho-physiology, which entailed a model of cinema spectatorship continuous with the epistemological setting of laboratory relations. I argue that inThe Photoplayand related writings projection functioned in three registers: material, psychological, and philosophical. Münsterberg's primary concern was with psychological projection, where he drew upon his own work in experimental aesthetics to articulate an account of how the basic automatisms of cinema produce a state of oscillation between immersion and distraction. I show how Münsterberg's experimental aesthetics drew upon German doctrines of aesthetic empathy, orEinfühlung, which Münsterberg sought to modify in accordance with the dynamic and temporal characteristics of psycho-physiological experiment. Finally, I argue that Münsterberg's cinema theory was enfolded in his action or double-standpoint theory, in which the transcendental self posits the material, objective conditions of laboratory experience as a means to know itself. This philosophical projection explained cinema's uncanny ability to suspend ordinary perceptions of space, time, and causality. It also made cinema uniquely suited for the philosophical emancipation of a popular mass audience. (shrink)

If we are looking for an Ur-explanation for the persistence of the Ur-myth, or any other myth, in our literature, could we not more directly find it in the structure of a mind which does not have to remember in order to imitate? The occasion of both myth and literature is the social life of the species which, in Starobinski's sense, is a history of continual eviction; but as regards the apparatus of thought by which this social life is reflected (...) in art it is more a history of assimilation and repetition. "The work of the brain," to cite a recent article in Scientific American, "is to create a model of a possible world rather than to record and transmit to the mind a world that is metaphysically true…Different worlds are presumably constructed by similar species."1 And, presumably, similar worlds are constructed by similar species. Weisinger hints briefly at something like this in his essay "The Mythic Origins of the Creative Process," but one has the clear impression, as his title suggests, that he would like to have the [myth/ritual] cart before the creative horse.2 However much this may satisfy our longing to crown our literature, if not creativity itself, with a mythic genealogy, it seems a wistful hypothesis. One might just as well look upon the remains of early man's shelters, marvel that they too had roofs, just like ours, and conclude that therefore our roofs have their origin in theirs.· 1. Harry J. Jerison, "Paleoneurology and the Evolution of Mind," Scientific American, January 1976, p. 99.· 2. Herbert Weisinger, The Agony and the Triumph: Papers on the Use and Abuse of Myth , p. 250.Bert O. States, professor of dramatic arts at the University of California at Santa Barbara, is the author of Irony and Drama: A Poetics and The Shape of Paradox: An Essay on "Waiting for Godot.". (shrink)

Three issues related to Feldman and Levin's treatment of biological variability are discussed. We question the usefulness of the indirect component of δλ. We suggest that trade-offs between speed and accuracy in aimed movements support identification of δλ, rather than λ, as a control variable. We take issue with the authors' proposal for resolving redundancy in multi-joint movements, given recent data.

This article examines the emerging possibility of “brain-state transitioning,” in which one brain state is prompted through manipulating the dynamics of the active brain. The technique, still in its infancy, is intended to provide the basis for novel treatments for brain-based disorders. Although a detailed literature exists covering topics around brain-machine interfaces, where targets of brain-based activity include artificial limbs, hardware, and software, there is less concentration on the brain itself as a target (...) for instrumental intervention. This article examines some of the science behind brain-state transitioning, before extending beyond current possibilities in order to explore philosophical and ethical questions about how transitions could be seen to impact on assessment of responsibility and personal identity. It concludes with some thoughts on how best to pursue this nascent approach while accounting for the philosophical and ethical issues. (shrink)

Research in cognitive neuroscience now considers the state of the brain prior to the task an important aspect of performance. Hypnosis seems to alter the brain state in a way which allows external input to dominate over internal goals. We examine how normal development may illuminate the hypnotic state.

If conscious observers are to be included in the quantum mechanical universe, we need to find the rules that engage observers with quantum mechanical systems. The author has proposed five rules that are discovered by insisting on empirical completeness; that is, by requiring the rules to draw empirical information from Schrödinger's solutions that is more complete than is currently possible with the (Born) probability interpretation. I discard Born's interpretation, introducing probability solely through probability “current.” These rules tell us something about (...) brains. They require the existence of observer brain states that are neither conscious nor unconscious. I call them “ready” brain states because they are on stand-by, ready to become conscious the moment they are stochastically chosen. Two of the rules are selection rules involving ready brain states. The place of these rules in a wider theoretical context is discussed. (shrink)

Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making (...) some other argument with the result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain. (shrink)

Every step forward, in life and in thought, is a return to a beginning in that it empties that much more the plan by which the journey is directed. The journey that began this work was with the recondite lore of aphasia. This early work led to a psychology of language, perception, action, and feeling based on the principle of microgenesis. This psychology and its corre sponding brain process are detailed in my book, Life of the Mind, a vade (...) mecum for the ideas that are developed further in this work. Now this psychology, a single thought exposed at progressively deeper levels, is extended to the problems of time awareness, consciousness and the nature of the self. It is astonishing, is it not, that an aphasic error, a slip of the tongue, can be a peephole on some of the ultimate mysteries of life? Over the last few years I have had the occasion to present portions of this work at various conferences and to different audiences, and have found, to my dismay, that the theory is often difficult for many to grasp. (shrink)

During the past couple of decades, philosophy of mind--with its siblings, philosophy of psychology and cognitive science--has been one of the most exciting areas of philosophy. Yet, in that time, I have come to think that there is a deep flaw in the basic conception of its object of study--a deep flaw in its conception of the so-called propositional attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention. Taking belief as the fundamental propositional attitude, scientifically-minded philosophers hold that beliefs, if there are any, (...) are brain states. I call this conception of belief. (shrink)

Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that (...) some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental. (shrink)

Although the brain enables us to perceive the external world and our body, it remains unknown whether brain processes themselves can be perceived. Brain tissue does not have receptors for its own activity. However, the ability of humans to acquire self-control of brain processes indicates that the perception of these processes may also be achieved by learning. In this study patients learned to control low-frequency components of their EEG: the so-called slow cortical potentials (SCPs). In particular (...) ''probe'' sessions, the patients estimated the quality of the SCP shift they had produced in the preceding trial. The correspondence between the recorded SCP amplitudes and the subjective estimates increased with training. The ability to perceive the SCPs was related to the ability to control them; this perception was not mediated by peripheral variables such as changes in muscle tonus and cannot be reduced to simple vigilance monitoring. These data provide evidence that humans can learn to perceive the neural activity of their brain. Alternative interpretations are discussed. (shrink)

With neurons emergence, life alters itself in a remarkable way. This embodied neurons become carriers of signals, and processing devices: it begins an inexorable progression of functional complexity, from increasingly drawn behaviors to the mind and eventually to consciousness [Damasio, 2010]. In which moment has awareness arisen in the history of life? The emergence of human consciousness is associated with evolutionary developments in brain, behavior and mind, which ultimately lead to the creation of culture, a radical novelty in natural (...) history. It is in this context of biological evolution of conscious brains that we raise the question: how conscious brains connect with each other? In order to answer it, I will explore how brain states and conscious states each participate in dynamic interactive processes involving the whole organism. I will argue that a possible way to overcome the hard problem of consciousness might be based on the notion of embodiment as a process of embedding the mental in the living organism relating dynamically with the environment through the sensorymotor experience. In order to do so, I will provide an assembly between an anthropologic perspective of consciousness with contemporary Philosophy of Mind, Interaction Theory [Gallagher 2001, 2008; Zahavi 2001, 2008; Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009]. (shrink)

The way the central nervous system (CNS) responds to diverse stimuli is contingent upon the specific brain state of the individual, including sleep and wakefulness. Despite the wealth of readout parameters and data delineating the brain states, the primary mechanisms are yet to be identified. Here we highlight the role of astrocytes, with a specific emphasis on chloride (Cl−) homeostasis as a modulator of brain states. Neuronal activity is regulated by the concentration of ions that (...) determine excitability. Astrocytes, as the CNS homeostatic cells, are recognised for their proficiency in maintaining dynamic homeostasis of ions, known as ionostasis. Nevertheless, the contribution of astrocyte‐driven ionostasis to the genesis of brain states or their response to sleep‐inducing pharmacological agents has been overlooked. Our objective is to underscore the significance of astrocytic Cl− homeostasis, elucidating how it may underlie the modulation of brain states. We endeavour to contribute to a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between astrocytes and brain states. (shrink)

Transcranial magnetic stimulation can cause measurable effects on neural activity and behavioral performance in healthy volunteers. In addition, TMS is increasingly used in clinical practice for treating various neuropsychiatric disorders. Unfortunately, TMS-induced effects show large intra- and inter-subject variability, hindering its reliability, and efficacy. One possible source of this variability may be the spontaneous fluctuations of neuronal oscillations. We present recent studies using multimodal TMS including TMS-EMG, TMS-tACS, and concurrent TMS-EEG-fMRI, to evaluate how individual oscillatory brain state affects TMS (...) signal propagation within targeted networks. We demonstrate how the spontaneous oscillatory state at the time of TMS influences both immediate and longer-lasting TMS effects. These findings indicate that at least part of the variability in TMS efficacy may be attributable to the current practice of ignoring oscillatory fluctuations during TMS. Ignoring this state-dependent spread of activity may cause great individual variability which so far is poorly understood and has proven impossible to control. We therefore also compare two technical solutions to directly account for oscillatory state during TMS, namely, to use tACS to externally control these oscillatory states and then apply TMS at the optimal brain state, or oscillatory state-triggered TMS. The described multimodal TMS approaches are paramount for establishing more robust TMS effects, and to allow enhanced control over the individual outcome of TMS interventions aimed at modulating information flow in the brain to achieve desirable changes in cognition, mood, and behavior. (shrink)

Brain states, which correlate with specific motor, cognitive, and emotional states, may be monitored with noninvasive techniques such as electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography that measure macroscopic cortical activity manifested as oscillatory network dynamics. These rhythmic cortical signatures provide insight into the neuronal activity used to identify pathological cortical function in numerous neurological and psychiatric conditions. Sensory and transcranial stimulation, entraining the brain with specific brain rhythms, can effectively induce desired brain states correlated with such (...) cortical rhythms. Because brain states have distinct neural correlates, it may be possible to induce a desired brain state by replicating these neural correlates through stimulation. To do so, we propose recording brain waves from a “donor” in a particular brain state using EEG/MEG to extract cortical signatures of the brain state. These cortical signatures would then be inverted and used to entrain the brain of a “recipient” via sensory or transcranial stimulation. We propose that brain states may thus be transferred between people by acquiring an associated cortical signature from a donor, which, following processing, may be applied to a recipient through sensory or transcranial stimulation. This technique may provide a novel and effective neuromodulation approach to the noninvasive, non-pharmacological treatment of a variety of psychiatric and neurological disorders for which current treatments are mostly limited to pharmacotherapeutic interventions. (shrink)

Since its inception, roughly sixteen years ago, the theory of the contingent identity of mental-states and brain-states has been argued on many fronts. I want here to examine and to try to meet one in particular of the objections raised in connection with this theory. The objection has been stated with especial force by Peter Herbst.Let us then investigate a proposition that there is a particular mental entity which is contingently identical with a particular brain state. (...) In order to be able to test it, we must know which mental entity is supposed to be identical with what brain state. Therefore we need at least two clear and independent identifying references to serve as the basis of our proposition of identity. They must each be sufficient to individuate an entity, or else we cannot say what is identical with what, and they must be independent of each other, or else the identity proposition expressed in terms of them becomes tautologous. (shrink)

Answers to the title's question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and "free will" in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are the (...) sole carriers of symbolic representations, and thus have a central role in the explanation of mental activity and action-while specifying determinism and materialism as useful working assumptions. A mentalistic theory of causal learning, experimentally examined with phenomenal reports, is followed by examination of these questions: Are there common roles for phenomenal reports and brain imaging? Is there defensible evidence for unconscious brain states carrying symbolic representations? Are there interesting dissociations within consciousness? (shrink)

In the future, policies surrounding end-of-life decisions will be faced with the question of whether competent people in a completely locked-in state should be enabled to make end-of-life decisions via brain-computer interfaces (BCI). This article raises ethical issues with acting through BCIs in the context of these decisions, specifically self-administration requirements within assisted suicide policies. We argue that enabling patients to end their life even once they have entered completely locked-in state might, paradoxically, prolong and uphold their quality of (...) life. (shrink)

Most clinical neurofeedback studies based on functional magnetic resonance imaging use the patient's own neural activity as feedback. The objective of this study was to create a subject-independent brain state classifier as part of a real-time fMRI neurofeedback system that can guide patients with depression in achieving a healthy brain state, and then to examine subsequent clinical changes. In a first step, a brain classifier based on a support vector machine was trained from the neural information of (...) happy autobiographical imagery and motor imagery blocks received from a healthy female participant during an MRI session. In the second step, 7 right-handed female patients with mild or moderate depressive symptoms were trained to match their own neural activity with the neural activity corresponding to the “happiness emotional brain state” of the healthy participant. The training was carried out using the rt-fMRI NF system guided by the brain-state classifier we had created. Thus, the informative voxels previously obtained in the first step, using SVM classification and Effect Mapping, were used to classify the Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent activity of the patients and converted into real-time visual feedback during the neurofeedback training runs. Improvements in the classifier accuracy toward the end of the training were observed in all the patients [Session 4–1 Median = 6.563%; Range = 4.10–27.34; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.031]. Clinical improvement also was observed in a blind standardized clinical evaluation [HDRS CE2-1 Median = 7; Range 2 to 15; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.016], and in self-report assessments [BDI-II CE2-1 Median = 8; Range 1–15; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.031]. In addition, the clinical improvement was still present 10 days after the intervention [BDI-II CE3-2_Median = 0; Range −1 to 2; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.50/ HDRS CE3-2 Median = 0; Range −1 to 2; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.625]. Although the number of participants needs to be increased and a control group included to confirm these findings, the results suggest a novel option for neural modulation and clinical alleviation in depression using noninvasive stimulation technologies. (shrink)

We review the dissipative quantum model of the brain and present recent developments related to the role of entanglement, quantum noise and chaos in the model.

Discrediting 'mystical' or 'psychical' interpretations of out-of-body and near-death experiences, Michael Marsh demonstrates how these phenomena are explicable in terms of brain neurophysiology and its neuropathological disturbances, and discusses the theological and philosophical implications of his hypotheses.