The parameters governing our behavior are in constant flux, and capturing these dynamics in cognitive models remains a challenge. We demonstrate how a mapping between ACT‐R's model of declarative memory and the linear ballistic accumulator enables efficient estimation of memory parameters from data. The resulting estimates provide a cognitively meaningful explanation for observed differences in behavior over time and between individuals.

The parameters governing our behavior are in constant flux. Accurately capturing these dynamics in cognitive models poses a challenge to modelers. Here, we demonstrate a mapping of ACT-R's declarative memory onto the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA), a mathematical model describing a competition between evidence accumulation processes. We show that this mapping provides a method for inferring individual ACT-R parameters without requiring the modeler to build and fit an entire ACT-R model. Existing parameter estimation methods for the LBA can be used, (...) instead of the computationally expensive parameter sweeps that are traditionally done. We conduct a parameter recovery study to confirm that the LBA can recover ACT-R parameters from simulated data. Then, as a proof of concept, we use the LBA to estimate ACT-R parameters from an empirical dataset. The resulting parameter estimates provide a cognitively meaningful explanation for observed differences in behavior over time and between individuals. In addition, we find that the mapping between ACT-R and LBA lends a more concrete interpretation to ACT-R's latency factor parameter, namely as a measure of response caution. This work contributes to a growing movement towards integrating formal modeling approaches in cognitive science. (shrink)

The goal of cognitive modeling is to build faithful simulations of human cognition. One of the challenges is that multiple models can often explain the same phenomena. Another challenge is that models are often very hard to understand, explore, and reuse by others. We discuss some of the solutions that were discussed during the 2015 International Conference on Cognitive Modeling.

The goal of cognitive modeling is to build faithful simulations of human cognition. One of the challenges is that multiple models can often explain the same phenomena. Another challenge is that models are often very hard to understand, explore, and reuse by others. We discuss some of the solutions that were discussed during the 2015 International Conference on Cognitive Modeling.

Recent reasoning accounts suggest that people can process elementary logical principles intuitively. These controversial “logical intuitions” are believed to result from a learning process in which developing reasoners automatize their application. To verify this automatization hypothesis, we contrasted the reasoning performance of younger (7th grade) and older (12th grade) reasoners with a two-response paradigm. Participants initially responded with the first intuitive response that came to mind and subsequently were allowed to deliberate on classic “bias” problems (base-rate problems and syllogisms). Results (...) showed that in addition to showing less deliberate correction of an initial erroneous response, younger reasoners were specifically less likely to generate the correct response from the outset. The findings lend credence to the role of a developmental automatization process and indicate that developmental improvements in reasoning accuracy are at least partially driven by an improvement in the accuracy of our intuitions. (shrink)

Mind body, not a pseudo-problem, by H. Feigl.--Is consciousness a brain process? by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--The nature of mind, by D. M. Armstrong.--Materialism as a scientific hypothesis, by U. T. Place.--Sensations and brain processes: a reply to J. J. C. Smart, by J. T. Stevenson.--Further remarks on sensations and brain processes, by J. J. C. Smart.--Smart on sensations, by K. Baier.--Brain processes and incorrigibility, by J. J. C. Smart.--Could mental states be brain (...) processes? by J. Shaffer.--The identity of mind and body, by J. Cornman.--Shaffer on the identity of mental states and brain processes, by R. Coburn.--Mental events and the brain, by J. Shaffer.--Comment: mental events and the brain, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism and the mind-body problem, by P. Feyerabend.--Materialism, by J. J. C. Smart.--Scientific materialism and the identity theory, by N. Malcolm.--Professor Malcolm on scientific materialism and the identity theory, by E. Sosa.--Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa, by N. Malcolm.--Mind-body identity, privacy and categories, by R. Rorty.--Physicalism, by T. Nagel.--Mind-body identity, a side issue? by C. Taylor.--Illusions and identity, by J. M. Hinton.--Bibliography (p. [259]-261). (shrink)

Efforts to counteract abuse in health care, defined as patient-experienced abuse, have mainly focused on interventions among caregivers. This study is the first to test an online intervention focusing on how patients can counteract such abuse. The intervention aimed at increasing patients’ intention and perceived ability to act in future situations where they risk experiencing abuse.

BackgroundIt has been well documented that patients can feel abused in health care and that many patients suffer from these experiences. Insight lacks into contributing factors behind such events. Silence surrounding the abuse has been suggested as a possible mechanism. The present study explores silence surrounding the abuse as a possible contributing factor. We have explored whether this silence is connected with the staff’s hierarchical position and with the staff’s own experiences as patients abused in health care.MethodsDuring January 2008, a (...) paper questionnaire was sent to all staff members at a Swedish women’s clinic. The questionnaire included questions on sociodemography and profession and multiple questions about abuse in health care. After univariate testing, a binary logistic regression model including variables concerning profession and staff’s own experiences of abuse was built.ResultsOur data show that in contrast to midwives and gynaecologists, auxiliary nurses seldom report hearing about cases of abuse in health care. Staff who themselves experienced abuse in health care as patients, so-called wounded healers, were more likely to have heard about abuse in health care during the last 12 months.ConclusionsThis study suggests that a form of silence reigns over events of abuse in health care that is not randomly distributed over staff. Professional hierarchies and staff’s own experiences of abuse as patients could be considered in the design of interventions to break the silence surrounding patients’ experiences of abuse in health care. (shrink)

Bowers et al. counter deep neural networks (DNNs) as good models of human visual perception. From our color perspective we feel their view is based on three misconceptions: A misrepresentation of the state-of-the-art of color perception; the type of model required to move the field forward; and the attribution of shortcomings to DNN research that are already being resolved.

Der Aufsatz zielt auf eine nähere Präzisierung der üblicherweise gegebenen Bestimmung, Leibniz sei „Kompatibilist“ gewesen. Willensfreiheit ist für Leibniz mit Gottes Vorherwissen und Vorherbestimmung sowie mit dem Prinzip des zureichenden Grundes kompatibel, keineswegs jedoch mit Indifferenz. Urn die Vereinbarkeit der Willensfreiheit mit vollständigen individuellen Begriffen zu zeigen, scheint der Rekurs auf Gegenstücke in anderen möglichen Welten unerläßlich. Es wird argumentiert, daß Willensfreiheit für Leibniz nicht mit der prinzipiellen Vorhersagbarkeit von Willensentscheidungen durch einen menschlichen Beobachter oder durch einen Laplaceschen Dämon kompatibel (...) ist. (shrink)

The editors welcome letters from readers, although we cannot guarantee that all will be published. To ensure timeliness, correspondents must respond to an article within seven weeks and not exceed two double‐spaced pages. Letters become the property of the editors and may be edited and shortened at our discretion.

The European Union Commission’s whitepaper on Artificial Intelligence proposes shaping the emerging AI market so that it better reflects common European values. It is a master plan that builds upon the EU AI High-Level Expert Group guidelines. This article reviews the masterplan, from a culture cycle perspective, to reflect on its potential clashes with current societal, technical, and methodological constraints. We identify two main obstacles in the implementation of this plan: the lack of a coherent EU vision to drive future (...) decision-making processes at state and local levels and the lack of methods to support a sustainable diffusion of AI in our society. The lack of a coherent vision stems from not considering societal differences across the EU member states. We suggest that these differences may lead to a fractured market and an AI crisis in which different members of the EU will adopt nation-centric strategies to exploit AI, thus preventing the development of a frictionless market as envisaged by the EU. Moreover, the Commission aims at changing the AI development culture proposing a human-centred and safety-first perspective that is not supported by methodological advancements, thus taking the risks of unforeseen social and societal impacts of AI. We discuss potential societal, technical, and methodological gaps that should be filled to avoid the risks of developing AI systems at the expense of society. Our analysis results in the recommendation that the EU regulators and policymakers consider how to complement the EC programme with rules and compensatory mechanisms to avoid market fragmentation due to local and global ambitions. Moreover, regulators should go beyond the human-centred approach establishing a research agenda seeking answers to the technical and methodological open questions regarding the development and assessment of human-AI co-action aiming for a sustainable AI diffusion in the society. (shrink)

The editors welcome letters from readers, although we cannot guarantee that all will be published. To ensure timeliness, correspondents must respond to an article within seven weeks and not exceed two double‐spaced pages. Letters become the property of the editors and may be edited and shortened at our discretion.