This volume presents two Leibnizian writings, the Specimen of Philosophical Questions Collected from the Law and the Dissertation on Perplexing Cases. These works, originally published in 1664 and 1666, constitute, respectively, Leibniz's thesis for the title of Master of Philosophy and his doctoral dissertation in law. Besides providing evidence of the earliest development of Leibniz's thought and amazing anticipations of his mature views, they present a genuine intellectual interest, for the freshness and originality of Leibniz's reflections on a striking variety (...) of logico-philosophical puzzles drawn from the law. The Specimen addresses puzzling issues resulting from apparent conflicts between law and philosophy (the latter broadly understood as comprising also mathematics, as well as empirical sciences). The Dissertation addresses cases whose solution is puzzling because of the convoluted logical form of legal dispositions and contractual clauses, or because of conflicting priorities between concurring parties. In each case, Leibniz dissects the problems with the greatest ingenuity, disentangling their different aspects, and proposing solutions always reasonable and sometimes surprising. And he does not refrain from peppering his intellectual acrobatics with some humorous comments. bbbbbb. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

This is the first book to provide a coherent overview over the ethical implications of AI-related technologies in medicine. It explores how these technologies transform practices, relationships, and environments in the clinical field. It provides an introduction into ethical issues such as data security and privacy protection, bias and algorithmic fairness, trust and transparency, challenges to the doctor-patient relationship, and new perspectives for informed consent. The book focuses on the transformative impact that technology is having on medicine, and discusses several (...) strategies for dealing with the resulting challenges. It also introduces innovative methods of ethics research for addressing existing desiderata and future challenges. This book is written to inform health care professionals, policy-makers, and researchers in medicine, health sciences, nursing science, social sciences, and ethics, but may also function as a primary textbook for graduate as well as undergraduate university courses. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between basic and higher cognition. In this (...) paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

The notion of being a burden to others is mostly discussed in the context of care‐intensive diseases or end‐of‐life decisions. But the notion is also crucial in decision‐making at the beginning of life, namely regarding prenatal testing. Ever more sophisticated testing methods, especially non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), allow the detection of genetic traits in the unborn child that may cause disabilities. A positive result often influences the decision of the pregnant women towards a termination of the pregnancy. Thus, critics claim (...) that these testing methods send a negative message to people with disabilities. At the core of this is what we call the burden assumption. This assumption claims that children with disabilities are necessarily a burden to others, especially to their parents and other family members. In this paper, we discuss what being a burden to others means in this context and how such an attitude can be avoided without restraining reproductive autonomy. A closer examination shows that the burden assumption is mostly based on misinformation and a false model of disability. Empirical studies as well as narrative evidence from parents who raise a child with disabilities show that the burden assumption is wrong. Raising a child with disabilities does not necessarily mean a decrease in the quality of life. We show how the burden assumption can be challenged through an advanced genetic counselling that combines empirical evidence with narratives from a first‐person perspective. (shrink)

We propose a view of embodied representations that is alternative to both symbolic/linguistic approaches and purely sensorimotor views of cognition, and can account for procedural and declarative knowledge manipulation. In accordance with recent evidence in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, we argue that anticipatory and simulative mechanisms, which arose during evolution for action control and not for cognition, determined the first form of representational content and were exapted for increasingly sophisticated cognitive uses. In particular, procedural and declarative forms of knowledge can (...) be explained, respectively, in terms of on-line sensorimotor anticipation and off-line simulations of potential actions, which can give access to tacit knowledge and make it explicit. That is, mechanisms that evolved for the on-line prediction of the consequences of one's own actions (i.e. forward models) determine a (procedural) form of representation, and became exapted for off-line use. They can therefore be used to produce (declarative) knowledge of the world, by running a simulation of the action that would produce the relevant information. We conclude by discussing how embodied representations afford a form of internal manipulation that can be described as internalized situated action. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions (...) does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism. (shrink)

Why is interaction so simple? This article presents a theory of interaction based on the use of shared representations as “coordination tools” (e.g., roundabouts that facilitate coordination of drivers). By aligning their representations (intentionally or unintentionally), interacting agents help one another to solve interaction problems in that they remain predictable, and offer cues for action selection and goal monitoring. We illustrate how this strategy works in a joint task (building together a tower of bricks) and discuss its requirements from a (...) computational viewpoint. (shrink)

The coronavirus COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented health crisis. Many governments around the world have responded by implementing lockdown measures of various degrees of intensity. To be effective, these measures must rely on citizens’ cooperation. In the present study, we drew samples from the United States (N= 597), Italy (N= 606), and South Korea (N= 693) and examined predictors of compliance with social distancing and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. Data were collected between April 6th (...) and 8th 2020. We investigated the role of cultural orientations of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, self-conscious emotions of shame and guilt related to the infection and trust in the government’s action. Across all countries, vertical collectivism (VC) predicted stronger shame, whereas horizontal collectivism predicted stronger trust in the government. Only in the United States, VC was associated with stronger trust. Stronger feelings of shame predicted lower compliance and intentions to report the infection to both authorities and acquaintances. In contrast, guilt was associated with stronger intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Finally, trust was associated with stronger compliance and intentions to report the infection to the authorities. Unlike Italy and South Korea, the association between trust on compliance was not statistically significant in the United States, implications of the findings, and directions for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Digital technologies have become a crucial factor in nursing. Given the fact that many tasks could also be done by robots or AI systems, the place for the nurse in this scenario is unclear. In what way and to what extent will the implementation of ever more sophisticated technology affect nursing practice? It is the aim of this paper to analyse the potential challenges of nursing practice in the digital age. The analysis is conducted through the lens of new materialism, (...) a set of theoretical models that understand the relationship between humans and technology as dynamic and performative. According to this view, there is no prefixed essence of technology. Rather, the meaning of technology is enacted in concrete practice. The analysis shows that in past debates on technology use in nursing, the nurses’ role has been defined as guardians of humanity, defending the patient against the dehumanizing effects of technology. This role has been transferred to the digital age, where it is the duty of nurses to cushion the negative effects of digital technology. As an alternative to this outdated role, nurses should be included in processes of technology design and policymaking. Enabling nursing professionals to shape the circumstances of a digitally enhanced holistic practice may empower their status within the healthcare system and also benefit the patient by contributing to a more person‐centred care. (shrink)

AgeTech involves the use of emerging technologies to support the health, well-being and independent living of older adults. In this paper we focus on how AgeTech based on artificial intelligence (AI) may better support older adults to remain in their own living environment for longer, provide social connectedness, support wellbeing and mental health, and enable social participation. In order to assess and better understand the positive as well as negative outcomes of AI-based AgeTech, a critical analysis of ethical design, digital (...) equity, and policy pathways is required. A crucial question is how AI-based AgeTech may drive practical, equitable, and inclusive multilevel solutions to support healthy, active ageing. In our paper, we aim to show that a focus on equity is key for AI-based AgeTech if it is to realize its full potential. We propose that equity should not just be an extra benefit or minimum requirement, but the explicit aim of designing AI-based health tech. This means that social determinants that affect the use of or access to these technologies have to be addressed. We will explore how complexity management as a crucial element of AI-based AgeTech may potentially create and exacerbate social inequities by marginalising or ignoring social determinants. We identify bias, standardization, and access as main ethical issues in this context and subsequently, make recommendations as to how inequities that stem form AI-based AgeTech can be addressed. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Medical ethics is increasingly faced with issues that result from power asymmetries and epistemic injustice. However, medical ethics lacks the epistemic lenses for analyzing these social context factors of clinical practice. A theoretical and conceptual reconfiguration is necessary in order to be able to address these issues. Arguments This paper discusses the foundations of critical medical ethics, which takes perspectives and epistemic categories from critical theories. This includes the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School as well (...) as those approaches from social sciences and cultural studies that reflect on power asymmetries. By drawing on these theories, the epistemic spectrum of medical ethics could be broadened in order to better include real power relations into normative analyses. The paper starts by outlining the contribution of social sciences to empirical medical ethics. This shows that an empirical approach as such cannot bridge the epistemic gap. In a further step, epistemic lenses and concepts from critical theories are discussed, such as Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, feminist approaches, postcolonial approaches, queer theory, gender studies, and science and technology studies (STS). The conclusion sums up the foundations of critical medical ethics and discusses its limitations. Conclusion Critical medical ethics possesses the epistemic categories and broader social perspective needed to address issues in medicine that result from power asymmetries and epistemic injustice in society. (shrink)

Euler developed a program which aimed to transform analysis into an autonomous discipline and reorganize the whole of mathematics around it. The implementation of this program presented many difficulties, and the result was not entirely satisfactory. Many of these difficulties concerned the integral calculus. In this paper, we deal with some topics relevant to understand Euler’s conception of analysis and how he developed and implemented his program. In particular, we examine Euler’s contribution to the construction of differential equations and his (...) notion of indefinite integrals and general integrals. We also deal with two remarkable difficulties of Euler’s program. The first concerns singular integrals, which were considered as paradoxical by Euler since they seemed to violate the generality of certain results. The second regards the explicitly use of the geometric representation and meaning of definite integrals, which was gone against his program. We clarify the nature of these difficulties and show that Euler never thought that they undermined his conception of mathematics and that a different foundation was necessary for analysis. (shrink)

We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article.

To be successful, the research agenda for a novel control view of cognition should foresee more detailed, computationally specified process models of cognitive operations including higher cognition. These models should cover all domains of cognition, including those cognitive abilities that can be characterized as online interactive loops and detached forms of cognition that depend on internally generated neuronal processing.

Gambles which induce the decision-maker to experience ambiguity about the relative likelihood of events often give rise to ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-avoidance, which imply violation of additivity and Savage's axioms. The inability of the subjective Bayesian theory to account for these empirical regularities has determined a dichotomy between normative and descriptive views of subjective probability. This paper proposes a framework within which the two perspectives can be reconciled. First, a formal definition of ambiguity is given over a continuum ranging from ignorance (...) to risk, and including ambiguous contexts as subsets. Second, it is shown that the systems of inductive logic account for the effects of ambiguity. Then, Carnap's X-system is applied as a psychological model and compared to Einhorn and Hogarth's non-normative psychological model. Finally, the implications of this research to the modeling of subjective probability judgements are discussed. (shrink)

Findlay and Lumsden have proposed a model of creative potential which accounts for divergent thinking but not for convergent thinking. This limitation impedes the applicability of the model to scientific creativity, where competence and thus convergent thinking play a fundamental role since the early stages of creation. This limitation is a natural consequence of the fact that Findlay and Lumsden's model is purely intrapsychic. This paper proposes a model of scientists' creative potential which accounts for both divergent and convergent processes. (...) First, drawing from Csikszentmihalyi's and Kuhn's theories, scientists' creative potential is defined as a matching between the cognitive structure and the epistemic and social structure of the domain. Second, based on this sociopsychological definition, an extension of Findlay and Lumsden's model is proposed. The model states that the highest creative potential is achieved by those scientists who deeply understand the core of the domain and still have cognitive power to access, and experiment on many ideas that are not presently included in the domain. The new model is shown to have greater explanatory power than Findlay and Lumsden's model and to include the latter as a limiting case. (shrink)

Die Möglichkeiten der Reproduktionsmedizin erweitern sich ständig. Bei einigen Maßnahmen assistierter Reproduktion ist es oft unklar, ob eine Indikation vorliegt oder ob diese Maßnahmen als wunscherfüllend anzusehen sind. Die Unterscheidung zwischen medizinisch indizierter Maßnahme und wunscherfüllender Behandlung hängt von dem hier verwendeten Konzept der Indikation ab. Daher kommt dem Konzept der Indikation auf dem Gebiet der Reproduktionsmedizin ein besonderer Stellenwert zu. Dabei fällt auf, dass die Abgrenzung zwischen medizinisch indizierter Behandlung und Wunschbehandlung nicht allein klinisch begründet ist, sondern implizit oder (...) explizit normative Urteile enthält. Der sprachlich-kommunikative Aspekt spielt hierbei eine zentrale Rolle. Der übliche Sprachgebrauch von „indiziert“ suggeriert ein Urteil, das allein auf empirisch-klinischen Fakten basiert, und verdeckt die normativen Urteile, die in das Konzept der Indikation einfließen. Ziel des vorliegenden Beitrags ist es, den normativen Gehalt der Indikation in der Reproduktionsmedizin zu analysieren. Grundlage ist die eingehende Betrachtung des Konzepts der Indikation und der besonderen Stellung der Indikation in der Reproduktionsmedizin. Aus dieser Betrachtung ergibt sich, dass der normative Gehalt der Indikation von einem soziokulturellen Skript bezüglich Elternschaft geprägt ist, das sich v. a. im Leistungsrecht niederschlägt. Dieses Skript enthält gesellschaftliche Anschauungen, Normen und Rollenbilder und kann als „gute Elternschaft“ bezeichnet werden. Das Skript der guten Elternschaft wirkt als Regulativ, das durch leistungsrechtliche Vorgaben über den Zugang zu reproduktionsmedizinischen Maßnahmen bestimmt. Es basiert auf traditionellen heteronormativen Ehe- und Familienkonzepten und sieht Elternschaft für heterosexuelle, verheiratete Paare vor. Somit ergibt sich der Widerspruch, dass Verfahren der Reproduktionsmedizin, die den Raum für die Fortpflanzung jenseits traditionell-heteronormativer Konzepte öffnen, von ebenjenen Konzepten legitimiert und limitiert werden. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe options of reproductive medicine are expanding. In some cases, it is unclear whether there is a medical indication for applying procedures of assisted reproduction or whether this application is wish-fulfilling. The distinction between medical indication and wish fulfilment depends on the concept of indication. Thus, the concept of indication has a special status in reproductive medicine. The distinction between medical indication and wish-fulfilling treatment is mostly based on implicit or explicit normative judgements, rather than on mere (...) clinical facts. The use of “indicated” suggests a purely empirical-clinical judgment, whereas the normative judgements behind the concept are concealed. The aim of this paper is to analyze the normative implications of indication in reproductive medicine. Therefore, the concept of indication and its special status within reproductive medicine is scrutinized.ArgumentsThe analysis shows that the normative implications of indication are tied to a sociocultural script of parenthood, which manifests in the regulations of reimbursement. This script encompasses societal views, norms, and role models, and can be described as “good parenting”. The script of good parenting acts as a regulatory instance that determines the access to procedures of assisted reproduction. It is based on traditional heteronormative concepts of marriage and family, and reserves reproduction exclusively for heterosexual, married couples.ConclusionThe sociocultural script of good parenting in reproductive medicine implies a contradiction: Assisted reproduction technologies provide the opportunity of reproduction for individuals outside the heteronormative frame, yet they are legitimized and limited by this exact frame. (shrink)

Definition of the problem Biomedical research based on big data offers immense benefits. Large multisite research that integrates large amounts of personal health data, especially genomic and genetic data, might contribute to a more personalized medicine. This type of research requires the transfer and storage of highly sensitive data, which raises the question of how to protect data subjects against data harm, such as privacy breach, disempowerment, disenfranchisement, and exploitation. As a result, there is a trade-off between reaping the benefits (...) of big-data-based biomedical research and protecting data subjects’ right to informational privacy. Arguments Blockchain technologies are often discussed as a technical fix for the abovementioned trade-off due to their specific features, namely data provenance, decentralization, immutability, and access and governance system. However, implementing blockchain technologies in biomedical research also raises questions regarding consent, legal frameworks, and workflow integration. Hence, accompanying measures, which I call enablers, are necessary to unleash the potential of blockchain technologies. These enablers are innovative models of consent, data ownership models, and regulatory models. Conclusion Blockchain technologies as a technical fix alone is insufficient to resolve the aforementioned trade-off. Combining this technical fix with the enablers outlined above might be the best way to perform biomedical research based on big data and at the same time protect the informational privacy of data subjects. (shrink)

Riassunto: Questo lavoro sviluppa due elementi, apparentemente lontani, ma per alcuni aspetti non secondari, convergenti. Per un verso l’attenzione è rivolta all’origine delle regole che disciplinano il comportamento sociale umano, oltrepassando le regole di matrice istituzionale e convenzionale, che sono spesso considerate le più nobili e le più umane, nel tentativo di far affiorare le regole più remote del nostro agire, legate al patrimonio genetico degli individui della nostra specie, al parlamento dei nostri istinti, sviluppatisi durante l’evoluzione filogenetica. Lungo questo (...) primo tratto del percorso l’articolo fa riferimento in particolare al pensiero di Konrad Lorenz e della sua scuola. Per altro verso, si seguono le tracce del pensiero etico di Lévinas, soffermandosi su alcuni punti fondamentali: il volto dell’altro, la passività, la responsabilità, al fine di porre in evidenza come tra il filosofo e l’etologo, pur nelle evidenti differenze di linguaggio, di approccio e di orizzonti, siano ravvisabili tratti e conclusioni comuni. Parole chiave: Alterità; Relazione; Istinto; Etica; Responsabilità Autrui: Ethics and anthropology in Lévinas: This paper moves along two seemingly distant paths, that turn out to converge in some significant ways. The first path leads us to the origin of what are often considered the most noble and essentially human principles that regulate our social behaviour, going beyond institutional and conventional norms. This allows us to highlight the deepest and most evolutionarily remote rules of human behaviour, related to our genetic code and instincts, which developed over phylogenetic evolution. As we move along this first path, we pay special attention to the work of Konrad Lorenz and his school. The second path follows the traces of Lévinas’ ethical thought, dwelling on some fundamental issues: the face of the other, passivity, and responsibility, and helps us shed light on some ideas and conclusions that are common to the philosopher and the ethologist, despite their clear differences in language, approach, and horizons. We hope this will show how the insights of each can be used to support of the theories of the other. Keywords: Otherness: relationship; Instinct; Ethics; Responsibility. (shrink)

In this article, we shall study the mechanism of the Shroud body image formation with the help of both natural sciences and religion. The various possibilities can be divided into three groups of hypothesis: the first one is that of the fake, the second is the miracle and the third one of the natural event. The first hypothesis is discarded by the interdisciplinary work of the STURP team. Their results do not support the hypothesis that the blood stains and the (...) body image are due to a forger. In our opinion, even if the Miracle by God is possible, the proposed hypotheses of the supernatural event are theologically unacceptable. So, the natural one remains well supported by the “Ockham’s razor”. Obviously, this last model must be verified by experimental evidence. However, this result is not contrary to the hypothesis that the body image is the one of the Nazarene. (shrink)

As Professor of Theoretical Medicine for Surgeons at Padua University between 1824 and 1849, Giacomini achieved a position of great academic professionalism and prestige, not only in Padua, but throughout Italy and Europe. His fundamental medical thesis became part of the established field of medical practise that existed into the first decades of the 19th century. This thesis, derived directly from a vitalistic concept of biological phenomena, was based on the existence of a 'life force' that is distinct from the (...) forces of physical-chemistry, having its own specific laws, contrary to those of physical-chemistry. Using this concept Giacomini was able to distinguish two causes of death: mechanical illness and dynamic illness. The nosographic and therapeutic beliefs of Giacomini were based on his distinction between the 'mechanical' or 'dynamic' effects of drugs. Giacomini's medical philosophy is the result of an interweaving of scientific theories and metaphysical ideas. The merits and limits of this philosophy must be analysed in the light of modern epistemology to explain why Giacomini was unable to develop fully clinical anatomy. (shrink)

Exploration into the concept, origins and meaning of place, taking Delphi, Rome and Jerusalem as principle examples.