In his preface to the English edition, Apel (identified with critical theory) explains that the title of his two-volume German collection connotes both a reconstruction of the process of hermeneutic transformation in recent philosophy and the author's semiotical transformation of transcendental logic. The emphasis here is on the latter with discussions of the a priori nature of language per Wittgenstein, Peirce, and Chomsky, and its implications for a rational foundation for ethics in modern science. Includes a new foreword. Name index (...) only. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik. Bd. 2. Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.

Reflecting a revival of Peirce studies and the rediscovery of the pragmatist tradition in American philosophical thinking, this study articulates a contemporary and relevant interpretation that may offer a challenge to neo-pragmatists.

Collected together for the first time in English, Karl-Otto Apel’s most recent work covers a broad spectrum of philosophical issues. Highly original, this work will be valuable to academics and students concerned with (post-) analytic philosophy, epistemology, history of science, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, current debates about transcendental modes of argument, second-generation Frankfurt School thinkers and American pragmatists. It will be no less useful to all those interested in reformulations of Kantian themes and redefinitions of older ideas within the linguistic paradigm, (...) as well as those who, being familiar with Habermas’s work, wish to know more about the controversies and debates within the circle of the Frankfurt School itself. (shrink)

Starting from the problem of tolerance in a multicultural society, the author undermines the limits of a classical‐liberal foundation (negative tolerance) and suggests the need for a new meaning: a positive concern of tolerance implying appreciation of a variety of social cultures and value traditions. On an ethical level, positive tolerance can be grounded in the Discourse Theory, developing the classical Kantian deontological ethics in a transcendental‐pragmatic and in a transcendental‐hermeneutic sense. In this way, discourse ethics can answer two questions (...) posed by tolerance in a multicultural society: the duty to support all in the pursuit of their ideals and realize positive tolerance as well as its restrictions. (shrink)

The explanation versus understanding debate was important to the philosophy of thesocial sciences from the time of Dilthey and Weber through the work of Popper and Hempel.

Accused of the murder of two men and the rape and murder of a Tombstone businessman's fiancâee, Matt Donohue must find the girl in the middle of Apache territory in order to clear his name.

The present book tries to show that the transcentendal-pragmatic approach to discourse ethics can reconstruct the genesis of this situation and provide a ...

In this article the author tries to give an answer - from the point of view of the transcendental pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics - to the title question, which was raised by the Unesco conferences entitled `Universal Ethics' in Paris (27 March 1997) and Naples (December 1997). The article should be understood as a supplement to the empiristic-comparative responses of S. Bok and H. Küng, and especially to the communitarian approach of M. Walzer, proposed at the first conference. Unlike (...) traditional rationalism, this approach does not try to deduce concrete moral norms from axiomatic first principles; it begins with transcendental reflection on the undeniable moral presuppositions of argumentative discourse (which is not circumventable in philosophy). The approach first deduces from these presuppositions only the ideal procedures for the moral discourses through which all concrete moral problems ought to be solved, if possible. The second step provides a strategic-counter-strategic supplementation principle for those cases where undistorted moral discourses are not possible. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena with patterns in data (...) sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive empiricism. (shrink)

Der Wissenschaftskonzeption der "kritischen Theorie" der zu verändernden Gesellschaft wird im wesentlichen zugestimmt. Sie wird verteidigt insbesondere gegen ein Selbstverständnis der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften, das sich im Namen der "Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre" auf einen Begriff "der" interesse- bzw. wertfreien Wissenschaft zurückzieht. Andererseits will der Autor die genannte Konzeption ergänzen bzw. präzisieren: Zwar stellt die Einheit von Theorie und Praxis ein Postulat philosophischer Reflexion dar, letztere erweist aber auf ihrer höchsten Stufe das politisch interessierte Engagement und das wissenschaftliche Interesse (...) an entdogmatisierender Reflexion jedes Engagements unter den Bedingungen menschlicher Endlichkeit als polar-entgegengesetzte, auseinandertretende Momente. (shrink)

Enrique Dussel's writings span the theology of liberation, critiques of discourse ethics, evaluations of Marx, Levinas, Habermas, and others, but most importantly, the development of a philosophy written from the underside of Eurocentric modernist teleologies, an ethics of the impoverished, and the articulation of a unique Latin American theoretical perspective. This anthology of original articles by U.S. philosophers elucidating Dussel's thought, offers critical analyses from a variety of perspectives, including feminist ones. Also included is an essay by Dussel that responds (...) to these essays. (shrink)

As the title of my paper indicates, I wish to establish a relationship between the problem of an adequate explication of the truth-conception that underlies modern empirical science and the philosophy of C. S. Peirce who is often called the founder of American Pragmatism. In speaking of the truth-conception of modern empirical science, I am thinking of a conception of truth that is necessarily presupposed for an adequate epistemological and methodological understanding of experimental and theoretical natural science and, indeed, for (...) such types of quasi-nomological social science as can be practiced according to the paradigm of natural science. This means that I do not propose directly to thematize the truth-problematics of so called “hermeneutic Geisteswissenschaften” or “critical-reconstructive social sciences” which, in my opinion, transcend the truth-conception as well as the very concept of science. (shrink)

As the title of my paper indicates, I wish to establish a relationship between the problem of an adequate explication of the truth-conception that underlies modern empirical science and the philosophy of C. S. Peirce who is often called the founder of American Pragmatism. In speaking of the truth-conception of modern empirical science, I am thinking of a conception of truth that is necessarily presupposed for an adequate epistemological and methodological understanding of experimental and theoretical natural science and, indeed, for (...) such types of quasi-nomological social science as can be practiced according to the paradigm of natural science. This means that I do not propose directly to thematize the truth-problematics of so called “hermeneutic Geisteswissenschaften” or “critical-reconstructive social sciences” which, in my opinion, transcend the truth-conception as well as the very concept of science. (shrink)