Short Arguments: Some General Rules Arguments begin by marshaling reasons and organizing them in a clear and fair way. Chapter I offers general rules for ...

Taking a refreshingly hands-on approach to introductory ethics, A 21st Century Ethical Toolbox provides students with a set of tools to help them understand and make a constructive difference in real-life moral controversies. Thoroughly optimistic, it invites students to approach ethical issues with a reconstructive intent, making room for more and better options than the traditional "pro" and "con" positions that have grown up around tough problems like abortion and animal rights. Ideal for introductory and applied ethics courses, this unique (...) text does not treat ethics as a purely academic, historical, or theoretical subject, but as a wide-ranging and ongoing set of challenges that calls for multiple and interwoven kinds of intelligence. It covers the skills that are most vital to making real progress in ethics, including paying careful attention to the values at stake on all sides of an issue; looking for creative opportunities within difficult problems; critical-thinking skills such as defining key terms and making sure to judge similar cases alike; and learning how to engage in constructive dialogue. Instructors can readily use the experiential and applied activities inspired by this "toolbox" of practical skills to design an interactive and collaborative ethics course. Students can carry these essential skills directly from this book into such projects as campaigning for environmental awareness and staffing local homeless shelters. In addition to his own discussion, Weston includes gripping and provocative short selections from essayists, activists, and philosophers, and also cites his own students. Extensive "Exercises and Notes" sections end each chapter, and a detailed appendix offers instructors advice on how to use the Toolbox in the classroom. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie twórczości Pawła Jaszczuka, który dzięki swoim dokonaniom stał się reprezentatywny, zarówno dla literatury kryminalnej, jak i dla środowiska Warmii i Mazur. Od wielu lat pisze powieści kryminalne, przyczyniając się do rozwoju odmian gatunku, a jednocześnie korzystając z tej formy, porusza ważne współcześnie tematy. W jego utworach widać także przebieg pewnego procesu: rozpoczynając od narracji historycznej, w której ważne miejsce pełniła przeszłość, coraz częściej zabiera głos w sprawie teraźniejszości i jej wyznaczników: dominacji polityki w życiu, rozprzestrzeniania się (...) kultury masowej, rozpadu rodziny czy wszechobecnego ageizmu. Przedstawienie jego powieści kryminalnych ma wykazać, że w jego metodzie twórczej z jednej strony widoczna jest tendencja do eksponowania tematów związanych z przeszłością, a z drugiej strony mechanizm łączenia narracji historycznej z wątkami popkulturowymi. (shrink)

A Practical Companion to Ethics, Fourth Edition, is a concise and accessible introduction to the basic attitudes and skills that make ethics work, like thinking for oneself, creative and integrative problem-solving, and keeping an open mind. This unique volume illuminates the broad kinds of practical intelligence required in moral judgment, complementing the narrower theoretical considerations that often dominate ethics courses. The optimistic tone and brisk pace of the narrative provide an entertaining and intelligent guide to "everyday" morality. The fourth edition (...) features a new chapter on ethical theories; significantly revised and expanded chapters on conflicts of value and creative problem- solving in ethics; and a new concluding chapter on "Making a Difference, " which explains how students can incorporate ethical thinking and practice into their daily lives. (shrink)

This popular selection of Wittgenstein’s key writings has now been updated to include new material relevant to recent debates about the philosopher. Follows the evolution of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus through to the Philosophical Investigations. Excerpts are arranged by topic and introduce readers to all the central concerns of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Now includes a new chapter on ‘Sense, Nonsense and Philosophy’ incorporating material relevant to recent debates about Wittgenstein.

Introspective evidence is still treated with great suspicion in cognitive science. This work is designed to encourage cognitive scientists to take more account of the subject's unique perspective.

While philosophers of mind have been arguing over the status of mental representations in cognitive science, cognitive scientists have been quietly engaged in studying perception, action, and cognition without explaining them in terms of mental representation. In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach, puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and (...) John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment. Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, "shored up" and clarified. Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. "Jerry Fodor is my favorite philosopher," Chemero writes in his preface, adding, "I think that Jerry Fodor is wrong about nearly everything." With this book, Chemero explains nonrepresentational, dynamical, ecological cognitive science as clearly and as rigorously as Jerry Fodor explained computational cognitive science in his classic work The Language of Thought. (shrink)

Using randomly generated sequences of binary events we asked participants to make predictions about the next event. It turned out that while predicting uncertain events, people do not behave unsystematically. Our research identifies four types of relatively consistent strategies for predicting uncertain binary events: a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run majority events, hereafter called the long-run momentum strategy ; a strategy immune to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the persistent prediction of long-run (...) minority events, called the long-run contrarian strategy ; a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run majority events, called the short-run momentum strategy ; and a strategy sensitive to short-run sequential dependencies consisting of the prediction of short-run minority events, called the short-run contrarian strategy . When the character of events remains unknown, the most common strategy is the short-run momentum strategy. With the increase of a perceived randomness of the situation, people tend more often to use the short-run contrarian strategy. People differ in their general beliefs about the continuation or reversal of a trend in various natural and social processes. Trend believers, when facing sequences of binary events commonly perceived as random, tend to use momentum strategies, whereas those who believe in the trend's reversal tend to use contrarian strategies. (shrink)

Several Gentzen-style syntactic type calculi with product are considered. They form a hierarchy in such a way that one calculus results from another by imposing a new condition upon the sequent-forming operation. It turns out that, at some steps of this process, two different functors collapse to a single one. For the remaining stages of the hierarchy, analogues of Wajsbergs's theorem on non-mutual-definability are proved.

The paper continues a series of results on cut-rule axiomatizability of the Lambek calculus. It provides a complete solution of a problem which was solved partially in one of the author''s earlier papers. It is proved that the product-free Lambek Calculus with the empty string (L 0) is not finitely axiomatizable if the only rule of inference admitted is Lambek''s cut rule. The proof makes use of the (infinitely) cut-rule axiomatized calculus C designed by the author exactly for this purpose.

In [2], Bar-Hillel, Gaifman, and Shamir prove that the simple phrase structure grammars (SPGs) defined by Chomsky are equivalent in a certain sense to Bar-Hillel's bidirectional categorial grammars (BCGs). On the other hand, Cohen [3] proves the equivalence of the latter ones to what the calls free categorial grammars (FCGs). They are closely related to Lambek's syntactic calculus which, in turn, is based on the idea due to Ajdukiewicz [1]. For the reasons which will be discussed in the last section, (...) Cohen's proof seems to be at least incomplete. This paper yields a direct proof of the equivalence ofFCGs andSPGs. (shrink)

Axiomatics which do not employ rules of inference other than the cut rule are given for commutative product-free Lambek calculus in two variants: with and without the empty string. Unlike the former variant, the latter one turns out not to be finitely axiomatizable in that way.

The calculus DNL results from the non-associative Lambek calculus NL by splitting the product functor into the right (⊲) and left (⊳) product interacting respectively with the right (/) and left () residuation. Unlike NL, sequent antecedents in the Gentzen-style axiomatics of DNL are not phrase structures (i.e., bracketed strings) but functor-argument structures. DNL − is a weaker variant of DNL restricted to fa-structures of order ≤ 1. When axiomatized by means of introduction/elimination rules for / and , it shows (...) a perfect analogy to NL which DNL lacks. (shrink)

Kant’s critique/doctrine distinction tracks the difference between a canon for the understanding’s proper use and an organon for its dialectical misuse. The latter reflects the dogmatic use of reason to attain a doctrine of knowledge with no antecedent critique. In the 1790s, Fichte collapses Kant’s distinction and redefines dogmatism. He argues that deriving a canon is essentially dialectical and thus yields an organon: critical idealism is properly a doctrine of science or Wissenschaftslehre. Criticism is furthermore said to refute dogmatism, by (...) which Fichte means Spinozism. Schelling repudiates Fichte’s position in his Philosophical Letters by reviving Kant’s distinction. First, ‘critique’ for Schelling names a canon that is valid for all systems—including Spinozism—and thus favours none—not even the Wissenschaftslehre. Second, Schelling coins ‘dogmaticism’ to refer to what Kant calls ‘dogmatism’: reason’s uncritical claim to doctrine. Hence, he says all systems—even Fichte’s—are susceptible to the ‘enthusiasm’ of mistaking themselves for doctrines or ‘objects of knowledge’, instead of subjectively valid ‘objects of freedom’. I reconstruct Schelling’s argument for reviving Kant’s distinction, while noting two consequences for German idealism. First, if criticism favours no system, a system’s origin cannot be an act of knowledge, e.g., intellectual intuition, but only an act of endorsement. Second, if dogmaticism entails enthusiasm, a system’s goal cannot be absolute knowledge, but only infinite striving. Hence, by retrieving Schelling’s notion of dogmaticism, we can both gain a better understanding of the Letters and register the impact of a core Kantian distinction on the German idealist project. (shrink)

Despite recent increasing support for the brain disease model of alcohol and drug addiction, the extent to which the model may clinically impact addiction treatment and client behaviour remains unclear. This qualitative study explored the views of community-based clinicians in Australia and examined: whether Australian community-based clinicians support the BDM of addiction; their attitudes on the impact the model may have on clinical treatment; and their views on how framing addiction as a brain disease may impact addicted clients’ behaviour. Six (...) Australian community-based clinicians participated in semi-structured in-depth interviews that were analysed using thematic analysis. Whilst the BDM was not fully supported by this purposive sample of Australian community-based clinicians, there was acceptance that addiction neuroscience formed a key part of a wider addiction framework. Participants believed the BDM ignored key social, psychological and environmental factors important for successful treatment. The BDM was seen as potentially irrelevant for certain client types, however the model was believed to integrate with particular therapies. Participants believed that for clients viewing their addiction in terms of a brain disease, there were potential positive and negative impacts on client behaviour. Implications for addiction treatment practice and public health policy are discussed. (shrink)

In Zielonka (1981a, 1989), I found an axiomatics for the product-free calculus L of Lambek whose only rule is the cut rule. Following Buszkowski (1987), we shall call such an axiomatics linear. It was proved that there is no finite axiomatics of that kind. In Lambek's original version of the calculus (cf. Lambek, 1958), sequent antecedents are non empty. By dropping this restriction, we obtain the variant L0 of L. This modification, introduced in the early 1980s (see, e.g., Buszkowski, (...) 1985; Zielonka, 1981b), did not gain much popularity initially; a more common use of L0 has only occurred within the last few years (cf. Roorda, 1991: 29). In Zielonka (1988), I established analogous results for the restriction of L0 to sequents without left (or, equivalently, right) division. Here, I present a similar (cut-rule) axiomatics for the whole of L0.This paper is an extended, corrected, and completed version of Zielonka (1997). Unlike in Zielonka (1997), the notion of rank of an axiom is introduced which, although inessential for the results given below, may be useful for the expected non-finite-axiomatizability proof.The paper follows the same way of subject exposition as Zielonka (2000) but it is technically much less complicated. I restrict myself to giving bare results; all the ideological background is exactly the same as in case of the non-associative calculusNL0 and those who are interested in it are requested to consult the introductory section of Zielonka (2000). (shrink)

The significance of consciousness in modern science is discussed by leading authorities from a variety of disciplines. Presenting a wide-ranging survey of current thinking on this important topic, the contributors address such issues as the status of different aspects of consciousness; the criteria for using the concept of consciousness and identifying instances of it; the basis of consciousness in functional brain organization; the relationship between different levels of theoretical discourse; and the functions of consciousness.

This powerful critique of Marx's historical materialism - as a theory of power, as an account of history, and as a political theory -has been revised to take note of the profound intellectual and political changes that have occurred since the first edition was published. Reviews from the first edition 'Giddens draws upon a formidable knowledge of anthropology, archaeology, geography, and philosophy to demonstrate the limitations of Marxism and to formulate his own interpretation of the history of societies ... He (...) does a masterful job of setting his theory within a historical and critical framework of writings on Marx. His clarity of thought and his deft and often humorous handling of the unavoidable jargon of sociology and Marxist political theory makes this book a critical work of the highest quality.' Journal of International Law and Politics 'By contrast with many practictioners in the rather murky area of social theory, Giddens clearly seeks to make himself understood, and he has the useful quality of provoking one to argument. He has let light into some dark places.' The Times Higher Education Supplement 'Although Marx, Durkheim, and Weber continue to fill more index space than any other authors, Critique is Giddens's most explicit and committed statement of his own conceptualization of social theory ... It is his most original and therefore most vulnerable book, at once a cause for celebration and an invitation to critical reappraisal of the author's entire theoretical project.' Environment and Planning. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a variety of agents that appear in Kantian ethics in order to determine which would be necessary to make a robot a genuine moral agent. However, building such an agent would require that we structure into a robot’s behavioral repertoire the possibility for immoral behavior, for only then can the moral law, according to Kant, manifest itself as an ought, a prerequisite for being able to hold an agent morally accountable for its actions. Since building (...) a moral robot requires the possibility of immoral behavior, I go on to argue that we cannot morally want robots to be genuine moral agents, but only beings that simulate moral behavior. Finally, I raise but do not answer the question that if morality requires us to want robots that are not genuine moral agents, why should we want something different in the case of human beings. (shrink)

Dr Edwards' stimulating and provocative book advances the thesis that the appropriate axiomatic basis for inductive inference is not that of probability, with its addition axiom, but rather likelihood - the concept introduced by Fisher as a measure of relative support amongst different hypotheses. Starting from the simplest considerations and assuming no more than a modest acquaintance with probability theory, the author sets out to reconstruct nothing less than a consistent theory of statistical inference in science.

In Zielonka (1981a, 1989), I found an axiomatics for the product-free calculus L of Lambek whose only rule is the cut rule. Following Buszkowski (1987), we shall call such an axiomatics linear. It was proved that there is no finite axiomatics of that kind. In Lambek's original version of the calculus (cf. Lambek, 1958), sequent antecedents are non empty. By dropping this restriction, we obtain the variant L 0 of L. This modification, introduced in the early 1980s (see, e.g., (...) Buszkowski, 1985; Zielonka, 1981b), did not gain much popularity initially; a more common use of L 0 has only occurred within the last few years (cf. Roorda, 1991: 29). In Zielonka (1988), I established analogous results for the restriction of L 0 to sequents without left (or, equivalently, right) division. Here, I present a similar (cut-rule) axiomatics for the whole of L 0. This paper is an extended, corrected, and completed version of Zielonka (1997). Unlike in Zielonka (1997), the notion of rank of an axiom is introduced which, although inessential for the results given below, may be useful for the expected non-finite-axiomatizability proof. (shrink)

In [4], I proved that the product-free fragment L of Lambek's syntactic calculus (cf. Lambek [2]) is not finitely axiomatizable if the only rule of inference admitted is Lambek's cut-rule. The proof (which is rather complicated and roundabout) was subsequently adapted by Kandulski [1] to the non-associative variant NL of L (cf. Lambek [3]). It turns out, however, that there exists an extremely simple method of non-finite-axiomatizability proofs which works uniformly for different subsystems of L (in particular, for NL). We (...) present it below to the use of those who refer to the results of [1] and [4]. (shrink)

An axiomatics of the product-free syntactic calculus L ofLambek has been presented whose only rule is the cut rule. It was alsoproved that there is no finite axiomatics of that kind. The proofs weresubsequently simplified. Analogous results for the nonassociativevariant NL of L were obtained by Kandulski. InLambek's original version of the calculus, sequent antecedents arerequired to be nonempty. By removing this restriction, we obtain theextensions L 0 and NL 0 ofL and NL, respectively. Later, the finiteaxiomatization problem for L (...) 0 andNL 0 was partially solved, viz., for formulas withoutleft (or, equivalently, right) division and an (infinite) cut-ruleaxiomatics for the whole of L 0 has been given. Thepresent paper yields an analogous axiomatics forNL 0. Like in the author's previous work, the notionof rank of an axiom is introduced which, although inessentialfor the results given below, may be useful for the expectednonfinite-axiomatizability proof. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 207 Seiten: 279-301.

Joel M. Cohen , pp. 475- 484) claims that Lambek’s categorial grammars are equivalent in a certain natural sense to those of Bar-Hillel, Gaifman, and Shamir. Unfortunately, it turns out that Cohen’s proof is based on a false lemma. Thus the equivalence of both kinds of grammars is still an open problem although there is much evidence in its favor. This paper yields a counterexample to Cohen’s lemma.

In [2], Bar-Hillel, Gaifman, and Shamir prove that the simple phrase structure grammars dened by Chomsky are equivalent in a cer- tain sense to Bar-Hillel's bidirectional categorial grammars . On the other hand, Cohen [3] proves the equivalence of the latter ones to what he calls free categorial grammars . They are closely related to Lambek's syntactic calculus which is, in turn, based on the idea due to Ajdukiewicz [1]. For some reasons, Cohen's proof seems to be at least in- (...) complete. Here, I give a short outline of the direct proof of the equivalence between SF G's and F CG's. (shrink)

Part 1 - Beginnings: from Pythagoras to Plato -- Schools of thought: from Aristotle to Augustine -- How to argue: logic -- Knowledge and its limits: epistemology -- How things happen: physics -- What there is: metaphysics -- Soul and mind -- How to live: ethics -- God.

In this series of extended interviews with Chris Pierson, Giddens lays out the principal themes in the development of his social theory and the distinctive political agenda which he recommends.

Meillassoux seeks knowledge of transcendental reality, blaming Kant for the ‘correlationist’ proscription of independent access to either thought or being. For Meillassoux, correlationism blocks an account of the meaning of ‘ancestral statements’ regarding reality prior to humans. I examine three charges on which Meillassoux’s argument depends: (1) Kant distorts ancestral statements’ meaning; (2) Kant fallaciously infers causality’s necessity; (3) Kant’s transcendental idealism cannot grasp ‘the great outdoors’. I reject these charges: (1) imposes a Cartesian misreading, hence Meillassoux’s false assumption that, (...) for Kant, objects don’t exist without subjects; (2) misreads Kant, who infers causality’s necessity from the possibility of experience; (3) casts Kant’s idealism as subjective, ignoring his perspectival portrayal of it. (shrink)

The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend (...) upon meaning- conferring inferences. Instead the animal simply gathers information from a meaning- laden environment. But if the environment contains meanings, then it cannot be merely physical. This places a heavy theoretical burden on direct theories of perception, a burden so severe that it may outweigh all the advantages to conceiving perception as. (shrink)

Anthony Rudd presents a striking new account of the self as an ethical, evaluative being.

Anthony Quinton; I*—The Presidential Address: Social Objects, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 76, Issue 1, 1 June 1976, Pages 1–28, https://doi.