According to Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in a society, such as the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation is found in lesser but, nonetheless, troubling forms of racial inequality. Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser recognize, is often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities and by the disproportionate use of race in profiling. These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not mean that all (...) forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling. In fact, one of the aims of their paper is to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality.” Hence, one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, is that one can endorse racial profiling without being in any way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial minorities. In an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to underestimate the harms of racial profiling. I suggested two main reasons why they did so. The first is that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling itself. The second reason is that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I concluded, racial profiling cannot be a normal part of police practice in a society still struggling with racism, although under very special conditions and with special regulation and compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure. I want to stand by those claims. However, Risse’s response to my arguments persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect. So I will start by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made. I will then argue that despite Risse’s patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification of profiling remain valid. -/- . (shrink)

One puzzling result in training-test paradigms is that effects of reward-associated stimuli on attention are often seen in test but not in training. We focus on one study, where reward-related performance benefits occur in the training and which was discussed contentiously. By using a similar design, we conceptually replicated the results. Moreover, we investigated the underlying mechanisms and processes resulting in these reward-related performance benefits. In two experiments, using search tasks and having participants perform the tasks either with or without (...) individually adjusted time pressure, we disentangled the mechanisms and processes contributing to the reward-related benefits. We found evidence that not only search efficiency is increased with increasing reward, but also that non-search factors contribute to the results. By also investigating response time distributions, we were able to show that reward-related performance effects increased as search time increased in demanding tasks but not in less demanding tasks. Theoretical implications of the results regarding how reward influences attentional processing are discussed. (shrink)

Every day, we are confronted with a vast amount of information that all competes for our attention. Some of this information might be associated with rewards or losses. To what extent such information, even if irrelevant for our current task, not only attracts attention but also affects our actions is still a topic under examination. To address this issue, we applied a new experimental paradigm that combines visual search and a spatial compatibility task. Although colored stimuli did not modulate the (...) spatial compatibility effect more than gray stimuli, we found clear evidence that reward and loss associations attenuated this effect, presumably by affecting attention and response selection. Moreover, there are hints that differences in these associations are also reflected in a modulation of the spatial compatibility effect. We discuss theoretical implications of our results with respect to the influences of color, reward, and loss association on selective attention and response selection. (shrink)

In what sense is The Right to Sex philosophical? On the one hand, Amia Srinivasan’s philosophical credentials are beyond question; she holds a named professorship in social and political theory at...

This book is a very practical guide to help managers put their own and their employees' professional values to work. Through real life stories and case studies, the author brings to life and light the ethical challenges that present themselves in corporate and institutional settings. The reader gets to see that ethics lie not only in the big, dramatic defining moments, but in the everyday behaviors of people as they work together in the service of organizational goals. The text is (...) punctuated with summaries, exercises, and opportunities for reflection where the reader has an opportunity to review their own ethical frameworks and to see how these show up in the daily choices they make. Ideas are provided to help managers coach their employees in strategize around ethical issues, how to communicate their views with clarity and conviction, and how to find support in the organization to tackle difficult issues. (shrink)

This book is about the postructural Franco-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. This book covers Jewish ethics in the twentieth century and also cultural philosophy.

In their article, “Racial Profiling,” Risse and Zeckhauser offer a qualified defense of racial profiling in a racist society, such as the contemporary United States of America. It is a qualified defense, because they wish to distinguish racial profiling as it is, and as it might be, and to argue that while the former is not justified, the latter might be. Racial profiling as it is, they recognize, is marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities, and by (...) the disproportionate use of race in profiling.These, on their view, are unjustified. But, they contend, this does not mean that all forms of racial profiling are unjustified, even in a racist society, or that one has to be indifferent to the harms of racism to believe that this is so. Indeed, one of the aims of their article is to show that racial profiling, suitably qualified, “is consistent with support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality” (p. 134), and so to challenge the assumption that “arguments in support of profiling can speak only to those who callously disregard the disadvantaged status of racial minorities.” In a long and provocative article there is, inevitably, a great deal to discuss. However, I will concentrate on two claims about the harms of racial profiling advanced on page 146, both because these merit careful discussion and because they are critical to Risse and Zeckhauser’s argumentative strategy. Those two claims are (1) that “the harm caused byprofiling per se is largely due to underlying racism” and is, therefore, purely expressive; and (2) that “the incremental harm done by profiling often factors into utilitarian considerations in such a way as to support profiling.” We can call the first the expressive harm thesis and the second the incremental harm thesis. I am no expert on racial profiling, or on racism, however, I will suggest that these two theses are far more controversial than Risse and Zeckhauser assume, and point to serious difficulties with their justification of profiling. (shrink)

Among the processes of canon-formation is the habit of coupling writers; and among the most powerful of couples in the traditional English literary canon is Spenser-and-Milton. Much of my own professional life has probably been determined by my first teaching assignment of 1963, which included “Spenser-and-Milton,” in those days at Toronto a famous cornerstone course carrying the tamp of the stamp of the formidable Renaissance scholar A. S. P. Woodhouse, known affectionately if disrespectfully to his students as Professor Nature-and-Grace. For (...) several years I labored mightily, though neither naturally nor, I suspect, gracefully, on Spenser-and-Milton, sensing all the time that the connections I made, the doctrines I was conveying, lacked persuasion; and no doubt the seed of this essay was sown in those days, although its angle of sight was not then available, obscured on all sides by institutional pillars.When we couple writers we usually imply a criterion of fit or at least explicable mating. While there is nothing to prohibit a merely comparativist curiosity, or coupling in the service of some other agenda, we presumably give greater authority to relationships that imply causality, even, or especially, if causality is defined as the influence of the one writer on the other. Most of such relationships are unidirectional, from the earlier to the later dead, and a plausible coupling requires either the successor’s own testimony that the influence-relation existed, or other evidence that the influence-relation was strong enough to be formative; or, preferably, both. Annabel Patterson, professor of literature and English at Duke University, is the author of Hermogenes and the Renaissance , Marvell and the Civic Crown , Censorship and Interpretation , Pastoral and Ideology: Virgil to Valéry , and Shakespeare and the Popular Voice. (shrink)

In May 2013 a new Assisted Dying Bill was tabled in the House of Lords and is currently scheduled for a second reading in May 2014. The Bill was informed by the report of the Commission on Assisted Dying which itself was informed by evidence presented by invited experts.

What can philosophy tell us about ethics and public policy? What can the ethics of public policy tell us about philosophy? Those are the questions that Jonathan Wolff addresses in his wonderful little book. At one level, of course, the answer is straightforward – ethics is a branch of philosophy, so philosophy can tell us about the ethics of public policy, understood as a matter of deciding ‘what we should do’ in a manner that is institutionalised and collectively binding. But (...) at another level, as Wolff shows, there is something deeply puzzling about the idea that philosophy can tell us anything very useful about public policy and about the ethical dilemmas that it raises. Those dilemmas arise as a result of political constraints, struggles and resources which generally have little to do with philosophy and, for the most part, rather little to do with ethics. So what, exactly, should philosophers expect from an engagement with public policy? (shrink)

In Considerations on Representative Government, John Stuart Mill concedes that secrecy in voting is often justified but, nonetheless, maintains that it should be the exception rather than the rule. This paper critically examines Mill’s arguments. It shows that Mill’s idea of voting depends on a sharp public/private distinction which is difficult to square with democratic ideas about the different powers and responsibilities of voters and their representatives, or with legitimate differences of belief and interest amongst voters themselves. Hence, it concludes, (...) we should reject the assumption, which many of us share with Mill, that the secret ballot is justified only on prudential grounds and recognise how central privacy is to any democratic conception of citizenship and politics. (shrink)

Résumé Nous posons dans cet article que l’humour dans le discours publicitaire est un mécanisme privilégié de la communication multicanale et plurisémiotique pour transformer le discours marchand en pratique communicationnelle agissante. Dans son rapport à une normativité donnée comme potentiellement divergente, il est mobilisé dans le double objectif de construire un ethos décalé, identifiable et mémorisable pour le locuteur-annonceur, et de produire du plaisir intellectuel pour susciter la connivence du récepteur, qui devient ainsi co-énonciateur. Est alors interrogée la sémiosis de (...) ce discours publicitaire dont chaque élément est porteur de signification aux yeux du récepteur lors de l’acte d’énonciation. Par la lecture connivente que le processus induit, l’acte humoristique comme acte de parole du côté de la production vise ensuite à s’actualiser en acte d’achat proprement dit du côté de la réception. (shrink)

In a recent article in Respublica, Jesper Ryberg argues that CCTV can be compared to a little old lady gazing out onto the street below. This article takes issue with the claim that government surveillance can be justified in this manner. Governments have powers and responsibilities that little old ladies lack. Even if CCTV is effective at preventing crime, there may be less intrusive ways of doing so. People have a variety of legitimate interests in privacy, and protection for these (...) is important to their status as free and equal citizens. Consequently, though necessary, effectiveness is insufficient to justify CCTV in a democracy. (shrink)

Objective The objective of this article is to provide an ethical analysis of a high-risk, advanced treatment case where the patient received transcatheter aortic valve insertion, for aortic valve stenosis. Particular emphasis will be placed upon the significance of evidence and the implications for priority setting. Method One paradigmatic case involving a TAVI patient from a large university hospital in Norway is described and analysed. The method used was ethical case analysis modified after Kymlicka by Miljeteig et al. Perioperative mortality (...) risk was estimated using the Euroscore risk-logarithm and the Society of Thoracic Surgeons’ risk model, STS. These predict the risk of operative mortality and morbidity associated with adult cardiac surgery. GRADE, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation, was used to evaluate the evidence. Results In the case analysis, we found that it would be ethically justifiable not to recommend TAVI treatment for this patient. Although the patient had a severe condition in need of treatment, the expected improvement was marginal, the quality of evidence was low and the opportunity costs for other patients and society were higher than usually deemed appropriate. Conclusions Decision-making in the absence of high quality evidence from randomized trials is a complex process involving difficult ethical judgments. Novel high-risk devices often enter the European market with limited clinical evidence. Transparency and improved clinical evaluation are required so patient safety is not jeopardized. We argue that implementation of high risk, high cost interventions should be better regulated at a national level. Background All clinical decisions imply priority setting and therefore indirectly affect other patients and other patient groups. The use of expensive, innovative health technologies has an affect on individual patients as well as on other patient groups competing for the same resources. (shrink)

Dynamic, interactive sports require athletes to identify, pick-up and process relevant information in a very limited time, in order to then make an appropriate response. Perceptual-cognitive skills are, therefore, a key determinant of elite sporting performance. Recently, sport scientists have investigated ways to assess and train perceptual-cognitive skills, with one such method involving the use of blurred stimuli. Here, we describe the two main methods used to generate blur and then review the current findings in a sports context. Overall, it (...) has been shown the use of blur can enhance performance and learning of sporting tasks in novice participants, especially when the blur is applied to peripheral stimuli. However, while intermediate and expert level participants are relatively impervious to the presence of blur, it remains to be determined if they are positive effects on learning. In a final section, we describe some of the methodological issues that limit the application of blur and then discuss the potential use of virtual reality to extend the current research base in sporting contexts. (shrink)

Logics designed to deal with vague statements typically allow algebraic semantics such that propositions are interpreted by elements of residuated lattices. The structure of these algebras is in general still unknown, and in the cases that a detailed description is available, to understand its significance for logics can be difficult. So the question seems interesting under which circumstances residuated lattices arise from simpler algebras in some natural way. A possible construction is described in this paper.Namely, we consider pairs consisting of (...) a Brouwerian algebra and an equivalence relation. The latter is assumed to be in a certain sense compatible with the partial order, with the formation of differences, and with the formation of suprema of pseudoorthogonal elements; we then call it an s-equivalence relation. We consider operations which, under a suitable additional assumption, naturally arise on the quotient set. The result is that the quotient set bears the structure of a residuated lattice. Further postulates lead to dual BL-algebras. In the case that we begin with Boolean algebras instead, we arrive at dual MV-algebras. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

In Levinas’s philosophy, “nature” refers to two distinct and sometimes opposed concepts. Most often it stands for being and perseverance in being (i.e., conatus): it is what is and wants to be. In some places, however, “nature” indicates the limits of human power, violence, or hubris, and reveals the uncanny unlimitedness of transcendence. In other words, “nature” designates primarily the ontological character of Creation but also sometimes the otherness beyond ontology. It expresses the egoistic but also sometimes the altruistic. It (...) commonly discourages ethics but also sometimes encourages it. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these two meanings of “nature” meet and contradict each other in Levinas’s philosophy, and to interpret their meeting and contradiction. Levinas never offers a studied reflection on nature per se. However, his Talmudic Readings include descriptions of nature as both ontological and inspiring the ethical. Reinterpreting some of the Readings I show that, for Levinas, nature is associated with war, conquest and destruction, but is sometimes presented as the cure for these ontological evils. In other words, its function is similar to that of politics. It embodies a necessity that must be moderated by an ethics which, in a way, comes from nature itself. (shrink)

The visual system is known to extract summary representations of visually similar objects which bias the perception of individual objects toward the ensemble average. Although vision plays a large role in guiding action, less is known about whether ensemble representation is informative for action. Motor behavior is tuned to the veridical dimensions of objects and generally considered resistant to perceptual biases. However, when the relevant grasp dimension is not available or is unconstrained, ensemble perception may be informative to behavior by (...) providing gist information about surrounding objects. In the present study, we examined if summary representations of a surrounding ensemble display influenced grip aperture and orientation when participants reached-to-grasp a central circular target which had an explicit size but importantly no explicit orientation that the visuomotor system could selectively attend to. Maximum grip aperture and grip orientation were not biased by ensemble statistics during grasping, although participants were able to perceive and provide manual estimations of the average size and orientation of the ensemble display. Support vector machine classification of ensemble statistics achieved above-chance classification accuracy when trained on kinematic and electromyography data of the perceptual but not grasping conditions, supporting our univariate findings. These results suggest that even along unconstrained grasping dimensions, visually-guided behaviors toward real-world objects are not biased by ensemble processing. (shrink)

The common opposition between the imaginary and the real prevents us from genuinely understanding either one. Indeed, the imaginary embodies a certain intuitive presence of the thing and not an empty signitive intention. Moreover it is able to compete with perception and even to offer an increased presence, a sur-real display, of the things, as shown by Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of art in Eye and Mind. As a result, we have to overcome the conception according to which the imaginary field is (...) a mere figment of my imagination, a mental entity that I could still possess in the very absence of its object. On the other hand, the presence of reality is never complete or solid: “The transcendence of the far-off encroaches upon my present and brings a hint of unreality even into the experiences with which I believe myself to coincide.” Therefore, first, the imaginary has to be redefined as a special hovering modality of the presence of the beings themselves. Second and furthermore: is not the imaginary always intertwined with perception? Merleau-Ponty advocates the puzzling thesis that there is an “imaginary texture of the real.” What is the meaning of this assertion? To what extent will it be able to blur the classical categories without arousing confusion? Can we avoid reducing reality to illusion? Lastly, consistently followed, this reflection leads as far as to discover, in the imaginary mode of being, an ontological model, the canon enabling Merleau-Ponty to think Being, an “Oneiric Being.” Thus we will venture the apparently paradoxical contention that the imaginary is the fundamental dimension of the real. The notion of “fundament” becomes indeed problematic and receives an ironical connotation, however this is precisely what is at stake in a non-positivist ontology. Existence “lies” in a ghost-like, sketchy and unsubstantial ground, in a restlessly creative being that is open to creative interpretations. And there it finds the principle of the ever-recurring crisis that both tears it apart and makes it rich in future promise. (shrink)

In Levinas’s philosophy, “nature” refers to two distinct and sometimes opposed concepts. Most often it stands for being and perseverance in being : it is what is and wants to be. In some places, however, “nature” indicates the limits of human power, violence, or hubris, and reveals the uncanny unlimitedness of transcendence. In other words, “nature” designates primarily the ontological character of Creation but also sometimes the otherness beyond ontology. It expresses the egoistic but also sometimes the altruistic. It commonly (...) discourages ethics but also sometimes encourages it. The aim of this paper is to analyze how these two meanings of “nature” meet and contradict each other in Levinas’s philosophy, and to interpret their meeting and contradiction. Levinas never offers a studied reflection on nature per se. However, his Talmudic Readings include descriptions of nature as both ontological and inspiring the ethical. Reinterpreting some of the Readings I show that, for Levinas, nature is associated with war, conquest and destruction, but is sometimes presented as the cure for these ontological evils. In other words, its function is similar to that of politics. It embodies a necessity that must be moderated by an ethics which, in a way, comes from nature itself. (shrink)

Fuzzy logics are in most cases based on an ad-hoc decision about the interpretation of the conjunction. If they are useful or not can typically be found out only by testing them with example data. Why we should use a specific fuzzy logic can in general not be made plausible. Since the difficulties arise from the use of additional, unmotivated structure with which the set of truth values is endowed, the only way to base fuzzy logics on firm ground is (...) the development of alternative semantics to all of whose components we can associate a meaning. In this paper, we present one possible approach to justify ex post Łukasiewicz Logic as well as Basic Logic. The notion of ambiguity is central. Our framework consists of a Boolean or a Heyting algebra, respectively, endowed with an equivalence relation expressing ambiguity. The quotient set bears naturally the structure of an MV- or a BL-algebra, respectively, and thus can be used to interpret propositions of the mentioned logics. (shrink)

It is a well-known fact that MV-algebras, the algebraic counterpart of Łukasiewicz logic, correspond to a certain type of partial algebras: lattice-ordered effect algebras fulfilling the Riesz decomposition property. The latter are based on a partial, but cancellative addition, and we may construct from them the representing ℓ-groups in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we consider several logics differing from Łukasiewicz logics in that they contain further connectives: the PŁ-, PŁ'-, PŁ'△-, and ŁΠ-logics. For all their algebraic counterparts, we (...) characterise the corresponding type of partial algebras. We moreover consider the representing f-rings. All in all, we get three-fold correspondences: the total algebras - the partial algebras - the representing rings. (shrink)

This is a book about the theory of the city or commonwealth, what would come to be called the state, in early modern natural law discourse. Annabel Brett takes a fresh approach by looking at this political entity from the perspective of its boundaries and those who crossed them. She begins with a classic debate from the Spanish sixteenth century over the political treatment of mendicants, showing how cosmopolitan ideals of porous boundaries could simultaneously justify the freedoms of itinerant (...) beggars and the activities of European colonists in the Indies. She goes on to examine the boundaries of the state in multiple senses, including the fundamental barrier between human beings and animals and the limits of the state in the face of the natural lives of its subjects, as well as territorial frontiers. Drawing on a wide range of authors, Brett reveals how early modern political space was constructed from a complex dynamic of inclusion and exclusion. Throughout, she shows that early modern debates about political boundaries displayed unheralded creativity and virtuosity but were nevertheless vulnerable to innumerable paradoxes, contradictions, and loose ends.Changes of State is a major work of intellectual history that resonates with modern debates about globalization and the transformation of the nation-state. (shrink)

Hobbes's relation to the later Aristotelian tradition, in both its scholastic and its humanists variants, has been increasingly explored by scholars. However, on two fundamental points (the naturalness of the city and the use of the matter/form distinction in the political works), there is more to be said in this connection. A close examination of a range of late Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's Politics shows that they elucidate a picture of pre-civic human nature that had (contrary to Hobbes's implication) much (...) in common with that of Hobbes. Moreover, they deployed the matter-form distinction in their analysis of the city or civitas in ways that are in important respects similar to Hobbes's procedure in De cive and Leviathan . The paper concludes that Hobbes drew on this tradition in multiple ways while at the same time undermining some of its principal conclusions; Hobbes was in no sense an 'Aristotelian' even if his philosophy has substantial debts to Aristotelianism. (shrink)

_Est-ce réel?_ collects exciting new perspectives on the crucial role of the imaginary in contemporary phenomenology. Redrawing the boundaries of real and imaginary, this collection renews investigation into a range of ontological issues and their many practical and ethical implications.

« Sous les masques, il n’y a pas de visages, l’homme historique n’a jamais été homme, et pourtant nul homme n’est seul » : notre article s’interroge sur le sens et les enjeux éthiques de cette affirmation merleau-pontyenne énoncée dans la préface de Signes. Partant du caractère énigmatique et très inquiétant de cette thèse et constatant sa résonance avec l’affirmations deleuzienne, dans Différence et répétition, « Les masques ne recouvrent rien, sauf d’autres masques », nous avons voulu explorer la possibilité (...) de prendre pleinement au sérieux la formule merleau-pontyenne et de lui donner l’envergure d’une théorie des simulacres rendue éthiquement féconde. Le contexte, un dialogue avec Sartre et Nizan entre désenchantement, découragement et nouvelles perspectives éthiques et politiques, nous projette d’emblée dans un pensée de l’adversité et des apories indissociables de la rencontre d’autrui. Il permet également d’entrer avec Merleau-Ponty dans la quête d’une théorie éthique et politique de la communauté non exclusive de l’altérité radicale. A partir d’une analyse de la notion de masques et de ses occurrences dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, nous montrons que toute image est essentiellement un masque ontologiquement premier, c’est-à-dire qui ne copie ni ne recouvre une réalité plus authentique. La formulation de Signes qui nous intéresse fait d’emblée apparaître la dimension éthiquement dramatique de cette ontologie. Ce qui est en cause est une hyper-crise, une pensée de l’abîme et des ruptures de sens. Comment agir quand tout être est évasif et autre que soi? Nous aimerions montrer que surgit, dans l’oeuvre merleau-pontyenne, une tension entre une première solution pratique centrée sur la foi et une seconde voie « centrée », si l’on peut dire, sur la temporalité tourbillonnaire de l’institution. Ces deux issues pratiques, qui ne sont pas si nettement circonscrites explicitement par Merleau-Ponty, mais se déploient plutôt de texte en texte sous des formes parfois entremêlées, parfois incompatibles, doivent être, selon nous, soigneusement distinguées. La première, la solution de la foi, fait trop peu de cas du caractère trompeur de l’Urdoxa et des dangers d’une action qui ne s’inquiète pas de la mystification et des biais sur lesquels, peut-être, elle repose. La seconde, la voie de l’institution ne prétend plus surmonter le vertige, mais parvient à en faire un atout. Les masques, compris comme essentiellement instituants – en même temps qu’ils éclairent sur le sens de la notion merleau-pontyenne d’institution – peuvent retrouver un rôle éthique : passer de masque en masque sans jamais trouver de visage, autrement dit répondre à côté, c’est répondre tout de même et cela peut même être la meilleure réponse et compréhension possibles puisque les masques euxmêmes, comme institutions, sont des « visées à côté » qui réclament indéfiniment de nouvelles reprises et ont le pouvoir de relier entre elles, dans une structure de dialogue sans fin, des réinstitutions pourtant minées par une opacité à soi et aux autres. Les simulacres peuvent ainsi devenir en tant que tels notre plus grande chance : véhicules d’altérité radicale et de communication pourtant ininterrompue. Cette théorie élaborée à partir des thèses et analyses merleau-pontyennes fait place aux expériences commotionnantes, mais a, en même temps et sans contradiction, le mérite d’insister davantage, sans attendrissement, sur l’heureuse nature de l’être au lieu de déboucher sur la misosophie que développera Deleuze.“Under the masks, there are no faces: historical man has never been man, and yet, no man is alone.” This article questions the meaning and the ethical stakes of this Merleau-Pontian affirmation articulated in the preface of Signs. Beginning with the enigmatic and very worrisome character of this thesis, and while noticing its resonance with Deleuzian affirmations in Difference and Repetition—“masks recover nothing apart from other masks”—we wanted to explore the possibility of taking seriously the Merleau-Pontian formula and to give it meaning as a theory of ethically productive simulacra. The context, a dialogue between Sartre and Nizan regarding disenchantment, despondency and new ethical as well as political perspectives, immediately projects us toward the thought of adversity and the inseparable aporias in the encounter with the Other. Equally, it permits us to enter with Merleau-Ponty into a search for a political and ethical theory of the community that is not exclusive to radical alterity. Starting from an analysis of the concept of masks and its occurrences in the works of Merleau-Ponty, we show that all image is essentially first an ontological mask; that is to say, one that does not copy nor recovers a more authentic reality. The formulation in Signs which interests us immediately reveals the dramatic ethical dimension of this ontology. That which is a cause is a hyper-crisis, a thought of the damage and the rupture of meaning. How does one act when all being is evasive and other than oneself? We would like to show that what surfaces in Merleau-Ponty’s work is a tension between a primary practical solution centered on faith and a second path “centered,” if we can say this, on the turbulent temporality of the institution. These two practical issues, which are not so explicitly circumscribed by Merleau-Ponty, but which rather reveal themselves from text to text in somewhat intermingled and sometimes incompatible forms must be carefully distinguished. The first, the solution of faith, makes too little of the falsifying character of the Urdoxa and the dangers of an action that is not concerned with the mystification and biases on which, perhaps, it rests. The second, the path of the institution, does not attempt to surmount the vertigo, but nevertheless manages to hold the advantage. The masks, understood essentially as “instituted,” which at the same time clarify the meaning of the Merleau-Pontian notion of the institution, are able to rediscover an ethical role: passing from mask to mask without ever uncovering a face or, stated otherwise, responding side by side, is nevertheless a response. Moreover, this might provide an even better response and possible understanding since the masks themselves, as institutions, are proximate viewfinders which indefinitely reclaim new recoveries and which have the ability to link up with each other in a never-ending structure of dialogue regarding “reinstitutions” despite being undermined by the opacity of self and other. The simulacra can also become as they are in themselves a greatest chance: vehicles of radical alterity and communication, but uninterrupted. This theory, elaborated from the theses and analyses of Merleau-Ponty, gives way to experiences of shock, but, at the same time and without contradiction, to the right to insist further, without tenderness, on the happy nature of being instead of opening itself up to the misosophie that Deleuze will develop.“Dietro le maschere non ci sono volti, l’uomo storico non è mai stato uomo, e tuttavia nessun uomo è solo”: il nostro articolo si interroga sul senso e sulla posta in gioco etica di questa affermazione merleau-pontyana che troviamo nella Prefazione a Segni. Partendo dal tratto enigmatico e inquietante di questa tesi, e dalla constatazione della sua risonanza con l’affermazione deleuziana secondo cui “le maschere non ricoprono nulla, se non altre maschere”, abbiamo voluto esplorare la possibilità di prendere sul serio la formula merleau-pontyana ricavandone una teoria dei simulacri eticamente feconda. Il contesto, quello di un dialogo con Sartre e Nizan intorno ai temi del disincanto e delle nuove prospettive etiche e politiche, ci proietta direttamente nello spazio di un pensiero dell’avversità e delle aporie indissociabili dall’incontro con l’altro, e consente parimenti di farci strada con Merleau-Ponty in direzione di un’etica e di una politica della comunità non esclusiva della dimensione dell’alterità radicale. A partire da un’analisi della nozione di maschera e delle sue occorrenze nei testi merleau-pontyani mostriamo che ogni immagine è una maschera ontologicamente prima, che non copia e non ricopre affatto una realtà più autentica. La formulazione richiamata da Segni introduce immediatamente alla dimensione eticamente drammatica di tale ontologia. La sua posta in gioco è quella di un ipercriticismo, di un pensiero dell’abisso e dell’interruzione del senso. Come agire quando ogni essere è evasivo ed è altro rispetto a se stesso? Vorremmo mostrare che a quest’altezza si fa strada nell’opera merleau-pontyana una tensione tra una prima soluzione pratica, affidata alla dimensione della fede, e una seconda via d’uscita “incentrata”, se così si può dire, sulla temporalità spiraliforme dell’istituzione. Questi due esiti pratici, che in Merleau-Ponty non risultano nettamente ed esplicitamente circoscritti, ma si dispiegano di testo in testo dando luogo a sovrapposizioni e al limite a contraddizioni, vanno invece, a nostro avviso, accuratamente distinte. La prima, la soluzione della fede, fa troppo poco spazio al carattere ingannevole dell’Urdoxa e ai pericoli di un’azione che non si preoccupa di farsi carico delle mistificazioni e delle deformazioni su cui essa forse si fonda. La seconda, la soluzione dell’istituzione, non pretende più di oltrepassare la vertigine ma arriva a farne una risorsa. Le maschere, intese come essenzialmente istitutive, facendo luce sulla nozione merleau-pontyana di istituzione vengono a giocare un ruolo etico: passare di maschera in maschera senza mai trovare volti, in altri termini rispondere “a lato”, significa rispondere comunque e forse rispondere nel modo migliore, secondo la migliore comprensione possibile. Poiché le maschere stesse in quanto istituzioni sono delle “visées à côté” che chiamano indefinitiamente a nuove riprese e hanno il potere di legare tra loro in un dialogo senza fine una serie di re-istituzioni inevitabilmente opache a sé e agli altri. I simulacri possono così diventare, proprio in quanto simulacri, la nostra più grande chance: veicoli di alterità radicale e di comunicazione ininterrotta. Questa teoria, elaborata a partire dalle tesi e dalle analisi merleau-pontyane, consente di fare spazio a esperienze di grande momento emotivo, e allo stesso tempo, senza contraddizione, di insistere senza sentimentalismi sulla felice natura dell’essere, evitando infine la “misosophia” a cui approda Deleuze. (shrink)

The deconstruction of stupidity [in French bêtise] plays a crucial role in Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign. Through the concept of stupidity/bêtise the violence of our relationship with others, as inseparable from our relation to animality comes into view. “Stupidity” is deeply political, but also directly connected to the trace and, thus, cannot be simply overcome. While Sartre claimed that there are no fools, but just wicked men, Derrida embraces an uncanny version of stupidity. In this paper, guided by (...) Derrida’s reflections, we will examine the many paradoxes that undermine the pseudo-concept of stupidity, as well as several key moments of its history in Schelling’s, Nietzsche’s, Sartre’s, and Deleuze’s philosophies. Eventually our purpose will be to display the ethical statements which can be extrapolated from Derrida’s perspective: when the world is gone, how can we carry stupidity? (shrink)