In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of relevant implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap's entailment. In this paper I provide for the first time the logic of first degree analytic containment, as presented in [2] and [3], with a semantical characterization—leaving higher degree systems for future investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special sort of truth-predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead (...) of individual formulas, and which behave in some respects like Gentzen's sequents. This semantics captures very general properties of the truth-functional connectives, and for that reason it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical consequence and Anderson and Belnap's tautological entailments. (shrink)

We give a simple sequent calculus presentation of R.B. Angell’s logic of analytic containment, recently championed by Kit Fine as a plausible logic of partial content.

One of the central and most distinctive theses of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is that mathematical knowledge is synthetic. In this context, synthetic judgments are defined in opposition to analytic ones, whose predicate concept is “contained in” the subject. Kant’s thesis has often been attacked as indefensible, but just as frequently critics have complained that the thesis itself, and even the analytic/synthetic distinction on which it rests, are simply unintelligible. Thus, even prior to questions of its correctness, the (...) Kantian doctrine has been rejected as unclear, based on general skepticism that there is a real distinction of “containment”—or indeed any tolerably clear distinction at all—between analytic and synthetic judgments. (shrink)

Illustrations: Numerous B/w Figures Description: Key questions in the history of Navya-nyaya (New Nyaya) remain unresolved: when did this school of logic begin, who was its founder, what distinguishes Navya-nyaya from Pracina-nyaya (Old Nyaya), and so on. This book attempts to answer these key questions in Part I. Part II provides a translation, analysis, and critical edition of the Lion and Tiger Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Simha-vyaghra-laksana: LT Chapter) of the Tattva-cintamani-rahasya (TCR) of Mathuranatha (16th-17th c.). The hypothesis adopted (...) by the author with regard to the first question is that Udayana, who lived in the 11th century, is the founder of Navya-nyaya. This hypothesis is closely linked to the hypothesis offered regarding the second question, which is that the feature that distinguishes Navya-nyaya from the earlier school is its description of concepts and the structure of the world in terms of relation. Early Navya-nyaya authors, who flourished between Udayana and Gangesa (14th c.), devised specific terminology, of which delimitor (avacchedaka) and describer (niËpaka) are the most important, in order to identify or specify relation. This book attempts to illustrate the function of these and other Navya-nyaya terms from the viewpoint of relation. The main sources upon which the author has based his conclusions are Udayana s Laksanavali and the chapters on invariable concomitance or pervasion (vyapti) of the Nyaya-siddhanta-dipa (NSD) of Sasadhara (13rd-14th c.), the Tattva-cintamaÆi (TC) of Gangesa, and the TCR. Of these Sanskrit texts no scholar has worked on the Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-vada) of the NSD in detail or the LT Chapter of the TCR. The latter chapter follows in the TCR the Five Definitions of Invariable Concomitance Chapter (Vyapti-pancaka), which Ingalls edited, translated, and analyzed in his epoch-making book Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyaya Logic (1951). One major innovation of this book made in Part II is to explain the structure of Navya-nyaya analysis by employing 86 diagrams based on the dharma-dharmin (property and property-possessor) relation, which serve as a visual aid and help readers to more easily understand the complicated structure of its analysis. The diagrams are also helpful in ascertaining how the definitions of invariable concomitance apply to individual cases and how the entities are connected in the application of the definitions. Another major innovation is: almost every sub-section of the LT Chapter of the TCR contains Mathuranatha s clarification of part of the two definitions; but this clarification does not give the definition incorporating prior clarifications and insertions; this book provides such a definition accompanied by a diagram. In other words, Part II illustrates the structure of the whole definition at every process of the clarification, which (definition) is never presented as such in Mathuranatha s text. (shrink)

I defend Kant’s definition of analyticity in terms of concept “containment”, which has engendered widespread scepticism. Kant deployed a clear, technical notion of containment based on ideas standard within traditional logic, notably genus/species hierarchies formed via logical division. Kant’s analytic/synthetic distinction thereby undermines the logico-metaphysical system of Christian Wolff, showing that the Wolffian paradigm lacks the expressive power even to represent essential knowledge, including elementary mathematics, and so cannot provide an adequate system of philosophy. The results clarify (...) the extent to which analyticity sensu Kant can illuminate the problem of a priori knowledge generally. (shrink)

/Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The (...) doctrine implies that the table's existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Analyticity theorists have alleged that this idea may be used to defend controversial existence claims against a battery of objections. I argue that this style of defense fails, because the doctrine faces counter-examples. An existence claim may be analytically entailed by some truth and still report a substantial further fact. (shrink)

BL Features of the new edition: The translation has been completely rewritten, and the commentary thoroughly revised in the light of recent scholarship There is an additional glossary, and extended bibliography The Posterior Analytics contains some of Aristotle's most influential thoughts in logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of science. The first book expounds and develops the notions of a demonstrative argument and of a formal, axiomatized science; the second discusses a cluster of problems raised by the axioms or principles (...) of such a science, and investigates in particular the theory of definition. (shrink)

This volume contains fifteen essays in honour of Wolfgang Künne. The essays deal with issues from the philosophy of language and logic, broadly conceived. They cover topics ranging from truth, reference, and the ontology of abstract objects, to action, intentionality, and speech acts. By taking into account the works of early analytic philosophers—including Bolzano, Frege, Peirce, Husserl, and Wittgenstein—they foster our understanding of the history of the ideas discussed, while at the same time contributing to the systematic debate. The (...) collection also includes an up-to-date bibliography of Künne’s published work. (shrink)

Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments is best known through his metaphoric definition of an analytic judgment as one in which “the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is contained in this subject A”. Although this is the most famous formulation of Kant’s distinction, what strikes a student most forcefully about Kant’s discussion of analyticity is the variety of different ways in which he explains the idea. One can identify passages which seem to (...) make analyticity depend upon containment, identity, contradiction, our way of knowing the judgment in question, our way of thinking the judgment in question, the function or role of the judgment in question. In addition to these six prima facie different conceptions of analyticity, there is also a question whether Kant intends his distinction to range over all judgments or only over subject-predicate judgments; if we apply these two alternatives to the six conceptions of analyticity, we have a total of twelve theories of analyticity contained in or suggested by Kant’s discussion. This is a bewildering situation indeed, and it is no wonder that subsequent discussions of analyticity have often lacked the decisiveness that one might wish for in matters of logic. (shrink)

STS research has devoted relatively little attention to the promotion and reception of science and technology by non-scientific actors and institutions. One consequence is that the relationship of science and technology to political power has tended to remain undertheorized. This article aims to fill that gap by introducing the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries. Through a comparative examination of the development and regulation of nuclear power in the US and South Korea, the article demonstrates the analytic potential of the imaginaries (...) concept. Although nuclear power and nationhood have long been imagined together in both countries, the nature of those imaginations has remained strikingly different. In the US, the state’s central move was to present itself as a responsible regulator of a potentially runaway technology that demands effective containment. In South Korea, the dominant imaginary was of atoms for development which the state not only imported but incorporated into its scientific, technological and political practices. In turn, these disparate imaginaries have underwritten very different responses to a variety of nuclear shocks and challenges, such as Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, and the spread of the anti-nuclear movement. (shrink)

In the 'Critique of Pure Reason' Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of “containment,” a second time in terms of “identity,” a third time in terms of the explicative–ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of “cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction.” The paper asks: Which of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—best captures Kant’s conception of analyticity in the first Critique? It suggests: “the second.” It argues, (...) further, that Kant’s distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject–predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction’s meaning, its epistemology, and its tenability. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Early Decades of Analytical Philosophy Analytic Philosophy of Education Criticism Contemporary Practice.

This chapter contains sections titled: John McDowell: From the Problems of Empiricism to Hegel's Absolute Idealism Robert Brandom: From the Problems of “Representationalism” to Hegel's “Inferentialism” Hegel and Brandom on the Recognitive Infrastructure of Intentionality Dialectical Logic and Ontology.

In this paper, I have tried to present, by a descriptive – analytic method, an analytical description of, the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid's ethical theory - which is known as "Common-Sense Intuitionism" – on the way of perceiving and acknowledging the moral values and norms, and through this analytical description, answering these two questions: "How far does the scope of Reid's ethical intuitionism contain?" and "What is Reid's explanation of the origin of moral error?" With reference to (...) the above-mentioned analytical description, and by clarifying some of the pros and cons of Reid's ethical theory, I have tried to show, first, "Whether Reid's ethical theory is a justified, defensible and acceptable theory in justifying the validity of ethical knowledge?" And then, “Whether Reid's explanation of the origin of men's moral error is a sufficient explanation?". (shrink)

The traditional understanding of analyticity in terms of concept containment is revisited, but with a concept explicitly understood as a certain kind of mental representation and containment being read correspondingly literally. The resulting conception of analyticity avoids much of the vagueness associated with attempts to explicate analyticity in terms of synonymy by moving the locus of discussion from the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind. The account provided here illustrates some interesting features of representations and explains, (...) at least in part, the special epistemic status of analytic judgments. (shrink)

The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis’ student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is “analytically contained” in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic semantics for (...) DAI, showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Argentina Mexico The Southern Cone The Northern Part of South America and Central America Conclusion References Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Analyticity and Meaning Realism Logical Truths Conclusion Addendum.

A family A ⊆ ℘(ω) is called countably splitting if for every countable $F \subseteq [\omega]^{\omega}$ , some element of A splits every member of F. We define a notion of a splitting tree, by means of which we prove that every analytic countably splitting family contains a closed countably splitting family. An application of this notion solves a problem of Blass. On the other hand we show that there exists an $F_{\sigma}$ splitting family that does not contain a (...) closed splitting family. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

This self-contained anthology collects some of the most influential primary source contributions to contemporary analytic philosophy, together with introductions and commentaries for each selection. It traces the development of a few central themes in analytic philosophy, in sufficient detail—from philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophical logic. Frege, Russell, Moore. Wittgenstein. Logical Empiricism. Ordinary Language Philosophy. Quine. Truth, Meaning, and Interpretation. Reference and Essence. For anyone interested in Analytic Philosophy.

Although Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction, and although this distinction has been immensely influential, very few philosophers find Kant’s formulation of the distinction acceptable. Quine, for example, rejects Kant’s characterization of analyticity on the grounds that “it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphorical level.” This criticism is, I believe, unwarranted, for, although Kant is not as clear about the notion of conceptual containment as one would like, in both the Critique of (...) Pure Reason and the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics he offers intentional characterizations of this notion which, I hope to show, can be given a clear and precise formulation. Moreover, I shall argue that the notion of conceptual containment can be used to provide both an adequate characterization of analyticity and a nonlinguistic solution to the paradox of analysis. (shrink)

The article presents a critical semantic analysis of the so-called analytical truths as they were discussed by R. Carnap and building on some new empirical data that are not fully satisfactorily explained by Carnap’s theory. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s theory of analytical truths is proposed. It is demonstrated how his understanding of analytical truths, as statements that are true in all possible worlds and amenable to a quite obvious definition on a par with the concepts of sense (meaning) and (...) synonymy, applies exclusively to artificial languages of logic. Therefore, Carnap’s theory remains unreachable for the well-known criticism of W. Quine, who, in turn, pointed out the difficulties in defining these concepts for natural languages. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s explication of the mentioned concepts in the theory of meaning for natural languages is carried out. The connection of Carnap’s approach with the perspective of contemporary formal semantics is established. Subsequently, problematic cases and the difficulties they pose for Carnap’s concept are examined. An explanation is proposed for analytical truths as containing in their logical form an (unpronounced) quantifier over possible worlds (situations). (shrink)

This collection of eleven new essays contains the latest developments in analytic feminist philosophy on the topic of pornography. While honoring early feminist work on the subject, it aims to go beyond speech act analyses of pornography and to reshape the philosophical discourse that surrounds pornography. A rich feminist literature on pornography has emerged since the 1980s, with Rae Langton's speech act theoretic analysis dominating specifically Anglo-American feminist philosophy on pornography. Despite the predominance of this literature, there remain considerable (...) disagreements and precious little agreement on many key issues: What is pornography? Does pornography constitute women's subordination and silencing? Does it objectify women in harmful ways? Is pornography authoritative enough to enact women's subordination? Is speech act theory the best way to approach pornography? Given the deep divergences over these questions, the first goal of this collection is to take stock of extant debates in order to clarify key feminist conceptual and political commitments regarding pornography. This volume further aims to go beyond the prevalent speech-acts approach to pornography, and to highlight novel issues in feminist pornography-debates, including the aesthetics of pornography, trans* identities and racialization in pornography, and putatively feminist pornography. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I contend that Michael Dummett’s works contain a distinction between analytic and synthetic (logical) deductions. Dummett does not use Kant’s terminology. Nevertheless, based on general considerations about theories of meaning, Dummett shows how one can distinguish between deductions whose validity is recognised by merely grasping the concepts and deductions whose validity can be recognised only by “going beyond the concepts”, as Kant wrote. The latter are synthetic deductions, through which we can increase (...) our knowledge. A special merit of Dummett’s distinction is its theoretical flexibility and generality. He does not propose a single clear-cut distinction between analytic and synthetic deductions; rather in his works we find an indication of how to draw a distinction once a theory of meaning is adopted. In the second part of the paper I consider possible developments within an inferentialist theory of meaning and draw some conclusions concerning the fallibility of deductions. (shrink)

_A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls_ presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts Includes listings of (...) suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

In Thomas Thomson's System of chemistry of 1802 Bergman and Scheele are actually considered as creators of the analytical concept of an element. With regard to this, a detailed investigation of the work of Bergman and Scheele shows that Thomson's statement contains mistakes as well as inadmissable simplifications and generalizations. It is correct, however, that Bergman in 1774–1777 specifically anticipated in essential aspects the analytical element concept proposed by Lavoisier in 1787–1789.

This new, second edition of the popular college textbook offers the beginning philosophy student a comprehensive introduction to several aspects of one of the most influential schools of thought in the twentieth century. Professor Klemke begins by pointing out the distinctions among the various types of analytic and linguistic philosophies, while emphasising that they all arose as a response to the formerly predominant school of absolute idealism. After a prologue section containing a representative exposition of idealism by Josiah Royce, (...) the following sections show the radically new philosophical approach of the analytic school in its various guises: realism and common sense (G. E. Moore); logical atomism (Bertrand Russell); logical positivism (A. J. Ayer); conceptual analysis (Gilbert Ryle, G. E. Moore, John Wisdom); logico-metaphysical analysis (Gustav Bergman, W. V. Quine); linguistic analysis (J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, J. R. Searle); and the recent development of new realism (Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Richard N. Boyd). (shrink)

This study contains three parts. The first tries to follow the spread of the study of the Prior Analytics in the first two centuries during which it was at all studied in Western Europe, providing in this connection a non-exhaustive list of extant commentaries. Part II points to a certain overlap between commentaries on the Prior Analytics and works from the genre of sophismata . Part III lists the questions discussed in a students' compendium from about the 1240s and in (...) six commentaries per modum quaestionis from the 1270s through the 1290s. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: ‘Knowing is a Belief State (or Something Similar)’ ‘Knowledge is Well Supported’ ‘Knowledge is Absolute’ ‘Knowing Includes not being Gettiered’ ‘Knowledge‐that is Fundamentally Theoretical, not Knowledge‐how’ The Standard Analytic Conception of Knowledge Prima Facie Core Problems.

We extend the notion of absolute convergence for real series in several variables to a notion of convergence for series in a power series field ℝ((t Γ)) with coefficients in ℝ. Subsequently, we define a natural notion of analytic function at a point of ℝ((t Γ))m. Then, given a real function f analytic on a open box I of ℝ m , we extend f to a function f ★ which is analytic on a subset of ℝ((t (...) Γ)) m containing I. We prove that the functions f ★ share with real analytic functions certain basic properties: they are , they have usual Taylor development, they satisfy the inverse function theorem and the implicit function theorem. (shrink)

This volume contains his programmatic essay 'Towards an Analytic Pragmatism', in which Brandom shows how analytic philosophy can broaden its perspective so as ...

We examine the sense in which logic is a priori, and explain how mathematical theories can be dichotomized non-trivially into analytic and synthetic portions. We argue that Core Logic contains exactly the a-priori-because-analytically-valid deductive principles. We introduce the reader to Core Logic by explaining its relationship to other logical systems, and stating its rules of inference. Important metatheorems about Core Logic are reported, and its important features noted. Core Logic can serve as the basis for a foundational program that (...) could be called Natural Logicism, an exposition of which will build on the (meta)logical ideas explained here. (shrink)

We investigate the existence of perfect homogeneous sets for analytic colorings. An analytic coloring of X is an analytic subset of [X]N, where N>1 is a natural number. We define an absolute rank function on trees representing analytic colorings, which gives an upper bound for possible cardinalities of homogeneous sets and which decides whether there exists a perfect homogeneous set. We construct universal σ-compact colorings of any prescribed rank γ<ω1. These colorings consistently contain homogeneous sets of (...) cardinality γ but they do not contain perfect homogeneous sets. As an application, we discuss the so-called defectedness coloring of subsets of Polish linear spaces. (shrink)

A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls presents a comprehensive overview of the historical development of all major aspects of analytic philosophy, the dominant Anglo-American philosophical tradition in the twentieth century. Features coverage of all the major subject areas and figures in analytic philosophy - including Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Putnam, and many others Contains explanatory background material to help make clear technical philosophical concepts Includes listings of (...) suggested further readings Written in a clear, direct style that presupposes little previous knowledge of philosophy. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of (...) the expressions contained in the sentences. In the dissertation I argue that these two ways of characterizing analyticity do not single out the same set of sentences, and that at least two different notions of meaning should be postulated to account for this fact. ;To show this I focus first on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning. I identify two ways in which a sentence can be said to be true in virtue of meaning: on the one hand, if the condition it expresses necessarily obtains; on the other hand, if semantic facts concerning the reference of the expressions that constitute it determine that it has to be true. I argue that the sets of sentences that can be said to be true in virtue of meaning according to these two criteria and the set of sentences ordinarily deemed analytically true do not coincide. ;I focus then on the second traditional criterion for analyticity--i.e., apriority. This criterion determines a set of sentences--what I call a priori acceptable sentences--that seems to coincide most closely with the set of sentences we ordinarily judge to be analytic. To account for the disparity between the extensions of this and the 'truth in virtue of meaning' criteria I propose that a distinction should be made between truth-conditional meaning--which concerns the contribution of expressions to truth-conditions--and conceptual meaning--which concerns the abilities necessary for competence in a language. I finally argue that conceptual meaning cannot always guarantee the truth of a priori acceptable sentences. (shrink)

We prove that for every family I of closed subsets of a Polish space each Σ 1 1 set can be covered by countably many members of I or else contains a nonempty Π 0 2 set which cannot be covered by countably many members of I. We prove an analogous result for κ-Souslin sets and show that if A ♯ exists for any $A \subset \omega^\omega$ , then the above result is true for Σ 1 2 sets. A theorem (...) of Martin is included stating that this result is also true for weakly homogeneously Souslin sets. As an application of our results we derive from them a general form of Hurewicz's theorem due to Kechris, Louveau, and Woodin and a theorem of Feng on the open covering axiom. Also some well-known theorems on finding "big" closed sets inside of "big" Σ 1 1 and Σ 1 2 sets are consequences of our results. (shrink)

The bimodal provability logics of analysis for ordinary provability and provability by the ω-rule are shown to be fragments of certain ‘polymodal’ logics introduced by G.K. Dzhaparidze. In addition to modal axiom schemes expressing Löb's theorem for the two kinds of provability, the logics treated here contain a scheme expressing that if a statement is consistent, then the statement that it is consistent is provable by the ω-rule.

This chapter contains sections titled: The “A Posteriori/A Priori” and “Analytic/Synthetic” Distinctions Synthetic A Priori Judgments A Priori Elements Analytic and Synthetic Method The Empirical/Transcendental Distinction Conclusion.

Let ⊢ be the ordinary deduction relation of classical first-order logic. We provide an "analytic" subrelation ⊢a of ⊢ which for propositional logic is defined by the usual "containment" criterion Γ ⊢a φ iff Γ⊢φ and Atom ⊆ Atom, whereas for predicate logic, ⊢a is defined by the extended criterion Γ⊢aφ iff Γ⊢aφ and Atom ⊆' Atom, where Atom ⊆' Atom means that every atomic formula occurring in φ "essentially occurs" also in Γ. If Γ, φ are quantifier-free, (...) then the notions "occurs" and "essentially occurs" for atoms between Γ and φ coincide. If ⊢ is formalized by Gentzen's calculus of sequents, then we show that ⊢a is axiomatizable by a proper fragment of analytic inference rules. This is mainly due to cut elimination. By "analytic inference rule " we understand here a rule r such that, if the sequent over the line is analytic, then so is the sequent under the line. We also discuss the notion of semantic relevance as contrasted to the previous syntactic one. We show that when introducing semantic sequents as axioms, i.e. when extending the pure logical axioms and rules by mathematical ones, the property of syntactic relevance is lost, since cut elimination no longer holds. We conclude that no purely syntactic notion of analytic deduction can ever replace successfully the complex semantico-syntactic deduction we already possess. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to examine the philosophical conditions of understanding. It is based on Wittgenstein’s talk on understanding recorded by Moritz Schlick. The first two sections contain an overview of the meaning of ‘understand’ and the diversity of language games in which ‘understand’ is used, respectively. The third part deals with the mode in which psychological states are expressed and analyses fallacies produced by the combining of scientific with prescientific expressions. The fourth section is dedicated to the (...) nature of ambiguous concepts and the role of grammar. Finally, the question of what it means to understand a piece of art is discussed by comparing visual language to verbal language. (shrink)

The classical theory of semantic information (ESI), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. This problem is connected with Cohen and Nagel's paradox of inference: Since the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, (...) it fails to provide any novel information. Again, ESI does not give a satisfactory account of the paradox. In this paper I propose a solution based on the distinction between empirical information and analytic information. Declarative sentences are informative due to their meanings. I construe meanings as structured hyperintensions, modelled in Transparent Intensional Logic as so-called constructions. These are abstract, algorithmically structured procedures whose constituents are sub-procedures. My main thesis is that constructions are the vehicles of information. Hence, although analytically true sentences provide no empirical information about the state of the world, they convey analytic information, in the shape of constructions prescribing how to arrive at the truths in question. Moreover, even though analytically equivalent sentences have equal empirical content, their analytic content may be different. Finally, though the empirical content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, its analytic content may be different from the analytic content of the premises and thus convey a new piece of information. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to argue for two separate, but related theses. The first is that contemporary analytic philosophy is incoherent. This is so, I argue, because its methods contain as an essential constituent a conception of intuition that cannot be rendered consistent with a key tenet of analytic philosophy unless we allow a Bayesian-subjectivist epistemology. I argue for this within a discussion of two theories of intuition: a classical account as proposed by Descartes and a (...) modern reliabilist account as proposed by Kornblith, maintaining that reliabilist accounts require a commitment to Bayesian subjectivism about probability. However, and this is the second thesis, Bayesian subjectivism is itself logically incoherent given two simple assumptions: (1) that some empirical propositions are known and (2) any proposition that is known is assigned a degree of subjective credence of 1. I establish this using a formal reductio proof. I argue for the first thesis in section 2 and for the second in section 3. The final section contains a summary and conclusion. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Hidden Tautologies Minimal Syntax.

Language was at the heart of philosophical inquiry for Plato and Aristotle, and in contemporary discussion it is no less central. In addition to the history of philosophy’s extensive investigations of language, analytic and continental philosophy too have focused intensively on the matter. But since most inquiries into language remain enclosed in their own methodology, terminology, and tradition, the multiplicity of approaches is often accompanied by their mutual isolation. This book shows, however, that these traditions can speak meaningfully to (...) each other on language: rather than preventing dialogue, their differences provide opportunities for fruitful inquiry. -/- The essays in this volume each treat a central topic in the contemporary study of language. Part One addresses how expression determines thought according to Humboldt, the use of paraphrase in Quine’s semantic ascent, and the non-ambiguity of the Frege-Russell senses of ‘is.’ Part Two includes treatments of the possibility and impossibility of promising in Nietzsche, and Derrida’s re-working of Saussure’s distinction between language and world. Topics in Part Three include the origin and end of language for Heidegger and Foucault, and the mutual sharpening of logic and ordinary speech in Anselm. -/- This book fills a gap in current scholarship by bringing together nine essays that, through rejecting the debilitating yet often unquestioned divisions between disciplines, are able to illuminate the fundamental nature of language. -/- Contributors: Jaakko Hintikka, Jo-Jo Koo, Geoffrey Bennington, Sarah Hansen, JohnChristopher Adorno Keller, Vernon Cisney, Alina Beary, Jeffrey Golub, Eileen Sweeney -/- In each part of this thought-provoking volume on the nature of language, there are essays that demonstrate the immense intellectual potential of writing that refuses to see any decisive distinction between the present of philosophy and its history, or between the ways in which Kant’s work has been inherited in Anglo-American and Franco-German traditions. —Stephen Mulhall, New College, Oxford University -/- With its robust range of complementary topics, each subjected to penetrating examination, this collection of essays makes a welcome contribution to the philosophy of language, past and present. —Daniel Dahlstrom, Boston University -/- The contributions to this impressive volume ignore traditional divides between “analytic” and “continental,” historical and systematic philosophy. This enables the authors to put a number of key issues in the philosophy of language into a striking new light…. Fully accessible to the advanced undergraduate in philosophy, the book also contains many provocative ideas for the specialist. —Martin Kusch, University of Cambridge -/- TABLE OF CONTENTS | INTRODUCTION -/- On Speech and Language, Mark Sentesy, Boston College -/- Structure and Overview of This Volume, Jon Burmeister, Boston College -/- PART ONE: HOW DO WE THINK WHAT WE ARE SAYING? -/- The Expressivist Conception of Language and World: Humboldt and the Charge of Linguistic Idealism and Relativism, Jo-Jo Koo, University of Pittsburgh -/- What Can We Learn About Language From Thinking About Philosophy? JohnChristopher Adorno Keller, University of Notre Dame -/- It All Depends On What ‘Is’ Is: A Brief History (And Theory) Of Being, Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University -/- PART TWO: HOW DOES LANGUAGE WORK IN THE WORLD? -/- The Ironic Stance and the Limitations of Philosophy, Jeffrey A. Golub, New School for Social Research -/- Nietzsche’s Scandalous Body and the Promise of Metaphor, Sarah Hansen, Vanderbilt University -/- The Limits of My Language, Geoffrey Bennington, Emory University -/- PART THREE: CAN WE SPEAK ABOUT EVERYTHING? -/- Gathering and Contestation: The Place of Silence in Heidegger and Foucault, Vernon Cisney, Purdue University -/- Religious Language in Jacques Derrida, Alina Beary, Criswell College -/- The Asymmetry Between Language and Being: The Case of Anselm, Eileen Sweeney, Boston College . (shrink)

The paper contains two concepts of implication that can be called analytic in the sense of Parry [5] or Fine [2]. Contrary to the Parry's approach, these implications do not involve S4 strict implication but the classical one. This fact refers to the similar notion of so-called demodalized analytic implication of Dunn [1] and strong implication of Vanderveken, cf. [4, 6]. The features of analytic classical implications are presented in the form of two propositional logics on the (...) pure implicational language. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Central Themes in Kant's Conceptual Revolution Frege, Russell, and the Synthetic A Priori The Rise and Fall of the Analytic A Priori and the Idea of a Relativized A Priori Transcendental Arguments and the Resurgence of Kantian Analytic Philosophy.