We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does (...) not lead to a switch from ambiguity aversion to ambiguity neutrality and/or ambiguity seeking. We also find that making ambiguity easier to recognize has little effect. Finally, we find that while ambiguity aversion does not depend on consistency, other attitudes do: consistent choosers are much more likely to be ambiguity neutral, while ambiguity seeking is much more frequent among highly inconsistent choosers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a preferences representation model where ambiguity attitudes can be exogenous events or past experience-dependent. We adapt the Recursive Smooth Ambiguity model proposed by Klibanoff (Journal of Economic Theory 144:930-976, 2009) by introducing past experience described by a sequence of neutral events occurring up to the moment of the decision. These neutral events do not provide any information on the true process, but are likely to strengthen or weaken the decision-maker’s (...) ambiguity aversion degree by modifying emotions. Our model can explain some observed behaviors and market inefficiencies. We propose two illustrations. First, we provide a behavioral explanation for the decrease in influenza vaccination in France that followed the H1N1 crisis in 2009–2010. Second, we contribute to the broad literature on the annuity puzzle by introducing the impact of emotions on ambiguity attitudes. (shrink)

This paper will focus on physically impaired and disfigured soldiers and their perception in Roman antiquity from the late Republic until the early Imperial era (third century BC until third century AD). Based on case studies from literary sources, this paper aims to explore the integration of impaired and disfigured veterans into Roman civil society. The first part outlines the ambiguous attitudes shown towards these veterans, who were both praised and ridiculed, and seeks explanations. The second part argues that (...) few impairments and disfigurements precluded veterans from holding political or religious office. (shrink)

We provide here a general mathematical framework to model attitudes towards ambiguity which uses the formalism of quantum theory as a “purely mathematical formalism, detached from any physical interpretation”. We show that the quantum-theoretic framework enables modelling of the Ellsberg paradox, but it also successfully applies to more concrete human decision-making tests involving financial, managerial and medical decisions. In particular, we elaborate a mathematical representation of various empirical studies which reveal that attitudes of managers towards uncertainty shift (...) from ambiguity seeking to ambiguity aversion, and viceversa, thus exhibiting hope effects and fear effects. The present framework provides a promising direction towards the development of a unified theory of decisions in the presence of uncertainty. (shrink)

This article presents the results of a survey designed to test, with economically sophisticated participants, Ellsberg’s ambiguity aversion hypothesis, and Smithson’s conflict aversion hypothesis. Based on an original sample of 78 professional actuaries (all members of the French Institute of Actuaries), this article provides empirical evidence that ambiguity (i.e. uncertainty about the probability) affect insurers’ decision on pricing insurance. It first reveals that premiums are significantly higher for risks when there is ambiguity regarding the probability of the (...) loss. Second, it shows that insurers are sensitive to sources of ambiguity. The participants indeed, charged a higher premium when ambiguity came from conflict and disagreement regarding the probability of the loss than when ambiguity came from imprecision (imprecise forecast about the probability of the loss). This research thus documents the presence of both ambiguity aversion and conflict aversion in the field of insurance, and discuses economic and psychological rationales for the observed behaviours. (shrink)

We investigate risk and ambiguity attitudes among Ethiopian farmers in one of the poorest regions of the world. Strong risk aversion and ambiguity aversion were found with the Ethiopian farmers. We compared their attitudes to those of a Western university student sample elicited by the same decision task. Ambiguity aversion was similar for farmers and students, but farmers were more risk averse. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is not restricted to Western student populations, (...) and that studies of agricultural decisions may benefit from explicitly considering ambiguity attitudes. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean-Yves Jaffray’s ideas on ambiguity and the views underlying his ideas. His models, developed 20 years ago, provide the most tractable separation of risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and ambiguity beliefs available in the literature today.

The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi's and Rawls' that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent's behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity---which (...) is both the most commonly observed and a seemingly reasonable attitude to ambiguity---however supports a version of Egalitarianism, whose logical form is quite different from the theories defended by the aforementioned authors. Moreover, it turns out that the veil of ignorance argument neither supports standard Utilitarianism nor Prioritarianism unless we assume that rational people are insensitive to ambiguity. (shrink)

As the content of propositional attitudes, propositions are usually taken to help explain the behavior of rational agents. However, a closer look at signaling games suggests otherwise: rational agents often acquire partial beliefs, and many of their signals are ambiguous. Signaling games also suggest that it is rational for agents to mix their behavior in response to partial beliefs and ambiguous signals. But as I show in this paper, propositions cannot help explain the mixing behavior of rational agents: to (...) explain mixing behavior, we need a probabilistic notion of content. I also show that a probabilistic notion of content renders propositions explanatorily idle in the case of unambiguous signals and full beliefs as well. My suggestion is thus that we should abandon propositions in explanations of rational behavior and adopt instead a probabilistic notion of content. The notion of probabilistic content ultimately provides a simpler framework for explanations of rational behavior than the notion of propositional content. (shrink)

We use the multiple price list method and a recursive expected utility theory of smooth ambiguity to separate out attitude towards risk from that towards ambiguity. Based on this separation, we investigate if there are differences in agent behaviour under uncertainty over gain amounts vis-a-vis uncertainty over loss amounts. On an aggregate level, we find that (i) subjects are risk averse over gains and risk seeking over losses, displaying a “reflection effect” and (ii) they are ambiguity neutral (...) over gains and are mildly ambiguity seeking over losses. Further analysis shows that on an individual level, and with respect to both risky and ambiguous prospects, there is limited incidence of a reflection effect where subjects are risk/ambiguity averse (seeking) in gains and seeking (averse) in losses, though this incidence is higher for ambiguous prospects. A very high proportion of such cases of reflection exhibit risk (ambiguity) aversion in gains and risk (ambiguity) seeking in losses, with the reverse effect being significantly present in the case of risk but almost absent in case of ambiguity. Our results suggest that reflection across gains and losses is not a stable individual characteristic, but depends upon whether the form of uncertainty is precise or ambiguous, since we rarely find an individual who exhibits reflection in both risky and ambiguous prospects. We also find that correlations between attitudes towards risk and ambiguity were domain dependent. (shrink)

The general attitude towards Arthur Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is rather fiercely critical and at times even tendentious. It seems that the figure of Schopenhauer as an irredeemably flawed, stubborn, and contradictory philosopher serves as a leitmotiv among scholars. Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will continues to be a thorny puzzle in the secondary literature, and it presents perhaps the greatest challenge to Schopenhauer scholars. Schopenhauer borrows the term ‘thing-in-itself’ from Immanuel Kant, who uses it to refer to a reality (...) that is distinct from what appears to us, and hence unknowable. Despite the fact that several interpretations have been offered to make sense of Schopenhauer’s identification of the thing-in-itself with the will, there appears to be no consensus about how to interpret this identification as well as his understanding of the term ‘thing-in-itself’. Unlike the other interpretations, the interpretation that I offer here distinguishes between three distinct and mutually incompatible views that Schopenhauer formulates about the thing-in-itself. I argue that it is not only difficult to give a coherent, consistent account of Schopenhauer’s position, but also not worth trying, because such an endeavor comes at the cost of ignoring the textual richness and depth of thought that Schopenhauer’s works offer. (shrink)

We conducted a set of experiments to compare the effect of ambiguity in single-person decisions and games. Our results suggest that ambiguity has a bigger impact in games than in ball and urn problems. We find that ambiguity has the opposite effect in games of strategic substitutes and complements. This confirms a theoretical prediction made by Eichberger and Kelsey. In addition, we note that subjects’ ambiguity attitudes appear to be context dependent: ambiguity loving in (...) single-person decisions and ambiguity averse in games. This is consistent with the findings of Kelsey and le Roux. (shrink)

Our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, etc., concern primarily logical constructions of propositions. If we assume that iterating ‘belief attitudes’ is valid, i.e., that the agent is perfectly introspective, he knows what he knows, believes, etc., then the so-called propositional attitudes are actually hyperintensional attitudes, i.e., they are relations of an agent to the construction–concept expressed by the embedded clause. Their implicit counterparts, relations of an agent to the proposition denoted by the embedded clause, are just idealised cases of (...) an agent with unlimited inferential abilities. On the other hand, our wishes, intentions, seeking, finding, etc., concern particular intensions , and the so-called notional attitudes are not hyperintensional. In the paper we formulate some criteria for notional attitudes and examine basic categories of them. In general, notional attitudes are relations-in-intension between an agent and an object to which the agent is intentionally related. Even relations of an agent to a proposition can be notional ones, in case there is no salient constructional counterpart, the attitude is not influenced by agent’s inferential abilities. Another problem we meet is the ambiguity of sentences expressing notional attitudes. These statements can often be read both in the de dicto and in the de re way. Yet, a common feature that characterizes notional attitudes is using the construction of the respective intension in the de dicto way. The respective intension is mentioned; referring on such a situation, the reporter may use any of the equivalent constructions of the intension, but not just a co-referring notion of another intension. Still, unlike the cases of relations of an agent to an individual when the respective individual office serves just as a pointer to the individual, when referring on notional attitudes the use of the respective notion of the intension is indispensable, which might perhaps justify calling such attitudes notional, though they actually are intensional. We also show that a passive form of a sentence cannot be usually read in the de dicto way . Thus a common belief at the equivalence of the active and passive form of a statement is generally not justified. (shrink)

Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. (...) It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability. (shrink)

The ambiguity of the word ‘nature’ is so remarkable that I need not remark upon it. Except perhaps to emphasise that this ambiguity — scarcely less apparent, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, in its Greek near-equivalent physis — is by no means a merely accidental product of etymological confusions or conflations: it faithfully reflects the hesitancies, the doubts and the uncertainties, with which men have confronted the world around them. For my special purposes, it is enough to (...) say, I shall be using the word ‘nature’ in one of its narrower senses — so as to include only that which, setting aside the supernatural, is human neither in itself nor in its origins. This is the sense in which neither Sir Christopher Wren nor St Paul's Cathedral forms part of ‘nature’ and it may be hard to decide whether an oddly shaped flint or a landscape where the trees are evenly spaced is or is not ‘natural’. The question I am raising, then, is what our attitudes have been, and ought to be, to nature in this narrow sense of the word, in which it excludes both the human and the artificial. And more narrowly still, I shall be devoting most of my attention to our attitudes towards that part of nature which it lies within man's power to modify and, in particular, towards what Karl Barth calls ‘the strange life of beasts and plants which lies around us’, a life we can by our actions destroy. (shrink)

This study looks at the ways how the Reformed Church encountered the new modern mission movement in Transylvania with the arrival of Dr. Béla Kenessey and Dr. István Kecskeméthy to the newly established Reformed Theological Seminary at Cluj in 1895. By the time being, some theologians expressed grave concerns about the dangers of theological liberalism to the Confessions. The paper argues that these young professors, touched by the mission movement and revival also sought to encompass those who had an evangelistic (...) fervor to reach unbelievers and to serve those people in their personal and social needs. As a result, Christian Covenant was established in 1896, with official recognition in 1903 as the Christian Endeavor. It is hoped to unfold the major shifts regarding the attitudes to mission in the Reformed Church of Hungary and throw lights on ambiguous beginnings of mission movements. (shrink)

RESUMEN A partir de los análisis de la cosa perceptiva en la obra de Husserl, se indagará el mundo material como suelo en el cual nuestra vida práctica se sostiene. A partir de sus objeciones al empirismo de Locke, se cuestiona la certeza de la actitud natural sobre la aceptación de una realidad autónoma, para rebatir la noción de un mundo en sí que nos afecta. De este modo, un examen del mundo fenoménico señala que su materia es una dimensión (...) no homogénea ni completa, subrayando una estable variación de las cosas. Con ello, se detecta una ambigüedad esencial según la cual estas se nos ofrecen como apoyo de nuestra praxis. ABSTRACT From Husserl's analysis of the thing perceived, the material world will be investigated as the ground where our practical life is sustained. From Husserl's objections to Locke's Empiricism, the certainty of the natural attitude about the acceptance of an autonomous reality will be questioned, to refute the notion of a world in itself that affects us. Thus, an examination of the phenomenical world will point out that its matter is a non-homogeneous and non-complete dimension, by stressing a stable variation of things. This will reveal an essential ambiguity, according to which the things are offered to us as support for our praxis. (shrink)

The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

Our knowledge, beliefs, doubts, etc., concern primarily logical constructions of propositions. If we assume that iterating ‘belief attitudes’ is valid, i.e., that the agent is perfectly introspective, he knows what he knows, believes, etc., then the so-called propositional attitudes are actually hyperintensional attitudes, i.e., they are relations of an agent to the construction–concept expressed by the embedded clause. Their implicit counterparts, relations of an agent to the proposition denoted by the embedded clause, are just idealised cases of (...) an agent with unlimited inferential abilities. On the other hand, our wishes, intentions, seeking, finding, etc., concern particular intensions, and the so-called notional attitudes are not hyperintensional. In the paper we formulate some criteria for notional attitudes and examine basic categories of them. In general, notional attitudes are relations-in-intension between an agent and an object to which the agent is intentionally related. Even relations of an agent to a proposition can be notional ones, in case there is no salient constructional counterpart, the attitude is not influenced by agent’s inferential abilities. Another problem we meet is the ambiguity of sentences expressing notional attitudes. These statements can often be read both in the de dicto and in the de re way. Yet, a common feature that characterizes notional attitudes is using the construction of the respective intension in the de dicto way. The respective intension is mentioned; referring on such a situation, the reporter may use any of the equivalent constructions of the intension, but not just a co-referring notion of another intension. Still, unlike the cases of relations of an agent to an individual when the respective individual office serves just as a pointer to the individual, when referring on notional attitudes the use of the respective notion of the intension is indispensable, which might perhaps justify calling such attitudes notional, though they actually are intensional. We also show that a passive form of a sentence cannot be usually read in the de dicto way. Thus a common belief at the equivalence of the active and passive form of a statement is generally not justified. (shrink)

The ambiguity of the word ‘nature’ is so remarkable that I need not remark upon it. Except perhaps to emphasise that this ambiguity — scarcely less apparent, as Aristotle long ago pointed out, in its Greek near-equivalent physis — is by no means a merely accidental product of etymological confusions or conflations: it faithfully reflects the hesitancies, the doubts and the uncertainties, with which men have confronted the world around them. For my special purposes, it is enough to (...) say, I shall be using the word ‘nature’ in one of its narrower senses — so as to include only that which, setting aside the supernatural, is human neither in itself nor in its origins. This is the sense in which neither Sir Christopher Wren nor St Paul's Cathedral forms part of ‘nature’ and it may be hard to decide whether an oddly shaped flint or a landscape where the trees are evenly spaced is or is not ‘natural’. The question I am raising, then, is what our attitudes have been, and ought to be, to nature in this narrow sense of the word, in which it excludes both the human and the artificial. And more narrowly still, I shall be devoting most of my attention to our attitudes towards that part of nature which it lies within man's power to modify and, in particular, towards what Karl Barth calls ‘the strange life of beasts and plants which lies around us’, a life we can by our actions destroy. (shrink)

In this article, ambiguity attitude is measured through the maximum price a decision maker is willing to pay to know the probability of an event. Two problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case, buying information implies playing a lottery, while, in the other case, buying information gives also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on the Choquet expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk (...) and ambiguity attitudes affect the reservation price for ambiguity resolution. These effects are analyzed for different levels of ambiguity of the act. Operating instructions for the elicitation of the reservation price for ambiguity resolution in an experimental setting are provided at the end of the article. (shrink)

A major shift has taken place since the 1960s concerning disclosure to patients that they have a diagnosis of cancer and that their disease is considered terminal. Full disclosure is now considered the patient's right in the United States. However, there remain many countries in which nondisclosure is still the norm. When patients from those countries are diagnosed with cancer in America, differences in attitudes and expectations can cause conflict and misunderstanding.

Marriage is one of the most important topics in the education field since life in this world is structured by interaction among families and between families and other social institutions. Dissatisfaction and unsustainability of marriage have led the urgency of premarital education in various countries. The problem is that the spread of virtual reality has made marriage itself to become more complex and experience reinterpretation and reconfiguration, moreover with the emergence of new kind of marriage in the digital era, i.e. (...) virtual marriage. Everybody who has observed, known, or even tried, certainly asks the question, “Could (or: should) I accept virtual marriage?” . This study was aimed to investigate the role of tolerance of ambiguity and illusion of intimacy in online dating in predicting the acceptance of virtual marriage. There were 420 adolescents and young adults (212 males, 208 females; Mage=21.10 years old, SDage=1.459 years; 338 students, 82 employees or entrepreneurs) in the Greater Jakarta, Indonesia, participated in this study. It was found that the acceptance was not predicted by the ambiguity tolerance, but by the illusion of intimacy in online dating. The psychometric issues, substantive discussion, and recommendation are presented at the end of this article. The trend of virtual marriage should not be allowed to roll away, by autopilot, without loaded by strategies in designing an online game as one of the pivotal educational technologies that needs to shape appropriate character and attitude for it. (shrink)

Although sometimes forgotten in current uses of the term, ?hatred? is a notoriously complex and ambiguous phenomenon. Analyzing and identifying what characterizes hatred and articulating a concept that helps us think more clearly about hatred is difficult. It is not even clear whether hatred is an emotion, an attitude, a sentiment or a passion. This essay departs from the idea that perhaps hatred is analyzable as a retributive reactive attitude. More precisely, it presents a philosophical exploration of what happens if (...) one puts a messy bundle of notions and examples of hatred into the more clear conceptual framework offered by Strawson in ?Freedom and Resentment?. The question whether hatred can be seen as a retributive reactive attitude is examined both with respect to Strawson's division between participant and objective attitudes and with respect to the seemingly most closely related participant attitude, resentment. (shrink)

Often created by colonial societies characterized by violence and oppression, historical artefacts such as monuments are increasingly under criticism for perpetuating violent attitudes. While the links between artefacts and society are well understood, there has been little work that finds the opportunity for resistance to violence in these artefacts themselves. Developing a ‘spectrum of violence’ for artefacts, I argue that ambiguous artefacts move us towards non-violence by provoking critique, while absolute artefacts move us away from it by stilling critique. (...) Applying this spectrum to a discussion of a graffitied New York monument in 2020, I propose that the act of ‘refacement’ can turn absolute artefacts into ambiguous ones. In so doing, the artefacts that once upheld colonial values might be transformed to resist them. This paper offers a timely exploration of monuments and violence, and seeks to better understand how cultural artefacts can lay the foundations for a non-violent future. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the challenges of several authors to the claims I make in Decision Theory with a Human Face regarding the relation between preference and choice, the nature of conditional desire, the semantics of conditionals, attitudes to chances and their role in individuating prospects, belief change under growing awareness and choice under ambiguity.

How should an impartial social observer judge distributions of well-being across different individuals when there is uncertainty regarding the state of the world? I explore this question by imposing very weak conditions of rationality and benevolent sympathy on impartial betterness judgments under uncertainty. Although weak enough to be consistent with all the main theories of rationality, these conditions prove to be sufficient to rule out any heterogeneity in what is good for individuals, to require a neutral attitude to uncertainty on (...) the part of the social observer, and to require that both individual and social betterness be strongly separable. (shrink)

The Ellsberg Paradox documented the aversion to ambiguity in the probability of winning a prize. Using an original sample of 266 business owners and managers facing risks from climate change, this paper documents the presence of departures from rationality in both directions. Both ambiguity-seeking behavior and ambiguity-averse behavior are evident. People exhibit ‘fear’ effects of ambiguity for small probabilities of suffering a loss and ‘hope’ effects for large probabilities. Estimates of the crossover point from ambiguity (...) aversion (fear) to ambiguity seeking (hope) place this value between 0.3 and 0.7 for the risk per decade lotteries considered, with empirical estimates indicating a crossover mean risk of about 0.5. Attitudes toward the degree of ambiguity also reverse at the crossover point. (shrink)

In 1991, new political discourses emerged in the Soviet republics that had to reinvent themselves as independent states, redefining their national identity on several dimensions. This process matured ambiguous attitudes toward the former imperial center and different visions over the scopes, perspectives, and claims of a ‘Russian World’ in the former Soviet space, where Moscow still asserted an exclusive political and cultural sphere of influence. In this article, we will review the cases of Armenia and Uzbekistan with peculiar national (...) projects and relationships with Moscow, reviewing their inclusion within the USSR, their path to independence, their post-Soviet relations with Moscow, and the changes during the turning points of 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. (shrink)

We argue in favor of the adaptive value of acceptance and that it deserves a definite status within the 'positive paradigm'. Acceptance currently suffers from ambiguous connotations because of its lack of optimistic biases and its similarity to resignation. We endeavor to show that acceptance and resignation are distinct attitudes by exploring their relationships with various phenomena-frustration, disappointment, expectation, positive thinking, replanning, and accuracy. The resulting distinguishing features of acceptance-thriving versus returning to baseline; realistic optimism versus hopelessness; persistence and (...) flexible replanning versus disengagement-are crucial for adaptive coping, and appear to be in keeping with the positive paradigm. (shrink)

Many theories of the de dicto / de re ambiguity for quantifiers and descriptions follow the tradition started by Kaplan and Lewis in that they make use of notions that are epistemic in nature, such as the notion of acquaintance. This may create the impression that the question about de re in affitude report semantics should always be resolved by looking at the reported affitude; if the latter qualifies as de re according to some epistemological criteria, then also the (...) affitude report may be true de re. The present paper aims to provide an argument to the contrary. The argument proceeds in several steps. First, we point out the existence of a wide range of de re readings (mostly already known from the literature), some of which do not target referential or quantificational expressions at all. Second, we show that the existing analyses either give wrong predictions for such cases, or are incomplete, or at least inelegant. Third, we offer a new analysis (which, as it turns out, has predecessors not united by any single tradition) whose main ingredient is the observation that the right predictions result from modifying the Context Set of the conversation in certain intuitive ways before the affitude report is added to the Common Ground. This is the semantic contribution of the paper. The philosophical upshot is that the reasons for an affitude report being de re at least in some cases have little to do with the grounds on which the corresponding mental state - the affitude itself - qualifies as de re. We also speculate as to how the proposed analysis, which divorces de re'ness from epistemic rapport, may be extended onto more traditional cases. (shrink)

The paper studies the impact of informational ambiguity on behalf of informed traders on history-dependent price behaviour in a model of sequential trading in financial markets. Following Chateauneuf et al., we use neo-additive capacities to model ambiguity. Such ambiguity and attitudes to it can engender herd and contrarian behaviour, and also cause the market to break down. The latter, herd and contrarian behaviour, can be reduced by the existence of a bid-ask spread.

This paper reflects on the notion of partial ambiguity. Using a framework decomposing ambiguity into distinct layers of analysis, among which are risk and model uncertainty, and allowing for different attitudes toward these layers, I show that partial ambiguity may prove less desirable than full ambiguity, even under ambiguity aversion. This observation poses difficulties for interpreting the notion of partial ambiguity in relation to the partial information available to determine the potential compositions of (...) an ambiguous urn. Two Ellsberg-style thought experiments are described to challenge the meaning of partial ambiguity further, and an alternative interpretation, based on a more ambiguous relation, is discussed. (shrink)

The notion of the third culture forms the background of the study that seeks to unify humanistic and scientific approaches for a better appreciation of nature, culture, and the arts. This study draws on the kind of emotion and attitude that we may intuit and act out soon after noticing another individual demanding our help in nature and culture. Such feelings as sympathy and empathy, uncertainty and ambiguity, are perceived to be extremely useful in the context of strategy formation (...) and action taking. These preverbal traits that are already more or less encoded in our body and mind may enable us to devise rewarding strategies emerging from the deep inside when we are coping with strange oddities in nature and culture. Such operation is seen on the one hand to save our biologically valuable time in terms of thinking and imagining, and on the other, to achieve brilliant interpretations of various art and life forms. This study reveals that we are estimated to come up with: cogent and digestible propositions; sharpened perceptions and refined tastes; widened horizons of emulating and appreciating types of art and artifice. On top of polishing our own skills and swiftness of inventing strategies, we may also expect to forge encouraging and endearing partnerships between diverse life forms and us. All in all, this study develops the semio-aesthetic idea that we serve the community by way of developing balanced and intriguing viewpoints that may inspire individuals to regain linkages with beings and forms appearing unpleasant or unconvincing at first sight. (shrink)

We report in this paper the result of three experiments on risk, ambiguity and time attitude. The first two differed by the population considered (students vs. general population) while the third one used a different protocol and concerned students and portfolio managers. We find quite a lot of heterogeneity at the individual level. Of principal interest was the elicitation of risk, time and ambiguity attitudes and the relationship among these (model free) measures. We find that on the (...) student population, there is essentially no correlation. A non negligible fraction of the population behaves in an extremely cautious manner in the risk and ambiguity domain. When we drop this population from the sample, the correlation between our measures is also non significant. We also raise three questions linked to measurement of ambiguity attitudes that come out from our data sets. (shrink)

Jacob Talmon and Michael Oakeshott represent two opposite tendencies in the anti-totalitarian world view. Both thinkers share many central features of this broad intellectual trend, such as the equation between the Soviet and Nazi regimes, Anglophilia and the rejection of the utopian quest. Yet this basic agreement should not distract us from significant differences in attitude and temperament. Talmon, like most other critics of totalitarianism, was strongly affected by the atmosphere of a profound intellectual and political crisis in Europe, and (...) he regarded the danger of totalitarianism to be an inherent aspect of modernity itself. His liberalism was that of ‘fear’. By contrast, for Oakeshott, who believed in the strength of liberal, and specifically British, civilisation, totalitarianism was merely a child of resentment, a parasitic force with no positive message of its own. He thus displayed a greater measure of confidence in the fortunes of liberal modernity. (shrink)

This article addresses the value of information that affects the ambiguity faced by a decision maker. Our analysis is applied to the case of a farmer whose production can be damaged by a pest attack with unknown probability, this damage being reduced if the farmer decides to use a pesticide. Early warning systems have precisely been implemented in many countries to help farmers avoid inappropriate decisions in terms of pesticide use. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, how farmers value (...) these systems. We propose a two-state self-insurance model in which an α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha$$\end{document}-MaxMin Expected Utility farmer may use pesticides that reduce the loss in the accident state while incurring a cost in both states. Her decision to self-insure or not depends on risk and ambiguity attitudes. We compile and compare the value of two types of information leading to a reduction of ambiguity and analyze their properties with respect to ambiguity attitude. Both types of information are valued positively if the farmer is ambiguity averse. We conduct a framed field experiment in which farmers and agricultural students have to decide whether or not to apply pesticides depending on risk, ambiguity and the associated monetary gains resulting from pesticide cost. The experimental findings support the theory. The average value of information among all participants is between €0.9/ha and €3.3/ha depending on the information gain. (shrink)

The article discusses the relationship between the concepts of humanitarianism and humanity, which the author dissociates from each other, also separating them from the concept of humanism. The author believes that these concepts are often confused, they form a “semantic cloud,” intuitively comprehended as integrity and referring us to the image of man as the center of the world and the subject matter of discussion in ethics, aesthetics, psychology as well as philosophy and other “free arts.” However, these concepts need (...) to be distinguished. Humanism represents a conceptual theoretical setting for considering a person as a free, independent and active being, while, in the author’s opinion, humanitarianism is a literary form of statements about a person. At the same time, humanity is meant as a characteristic of behavior and attitudes that motivate this behavior, such as the motives of kindness, philanthropy, benevolence. The article reveals the main features of humanitarianism and also shows that humanitarian texts are not always texts originating from attitudes of humanity and pursuing humanity. Literary reflection on the subject of a man does not necessarily need kindness and benevolence. The article provides examples of both the coincidence of humanitarianism and humanity and their divergence. The author draws attention to the existence of humanitarian but not humane texts, some of which cannot be attributed as philanthropic and other ones – as optimistic. The author considers it necessary not to confuse closely related concepts, denoting different aspects of human life and culture. (shrink)

This book is about beliefs, language, communication and cognition. It deals with the fundamental issue of the interpretation of the speaker's utterance expressing a belief and reporting on beliefs of other people in the form of oratio obliqua. The main aim of the book is to present a new account of the problem of interpreting utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports in terms of an approach called Default Semantics.

The conventional wisdom has it that between 1905 and 1919 Russell was critical to pragmatism. In particular, in two essays written in 1908–9, he sharply attacked the pragmatist theory of truth, emphasizing that truth is not relative to human practice. In fact, however, Russell was much more indebted to the pragmatists, in particular to William James, as usually believed. For example, he borrowed from James two key concepts of his new epistemology: sense-data, and the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and (...) knowledge by description. Reasonable explanation of this is that, historically, Russell’s logical realism and James’s pragmatism have the same roots—the German philosopher Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817–1881). In this paper we are going to explore the fact that in 1905, under Lotze’s influence, Russell married propositions with beliefs. A few years later this step also made Russell prone to embrace the theory of truth-making that has its roots in James. In contrast to the concept of sense-data and to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, however, the understanding that we believe propositions—and not, for example, simply grasp them—was in tension with Russell’s Principle of Extensionality, according to which propositions can be logically connected with other propositions only as truth-functions. The point is that when we judge a mind-relation (for example, a relation of belief) to a proposition, the latter cannot be determined as true or false. The two most talented pupils of Russell, Wittgenstein and Ramsey, severely criticized the central place propositional attitudes play in Russell’s logic. Wittgenstein analyzed “A believes that p” to “ ‘p’ says p” (5.542). Ramsey criticized Russell’s beliefs in propositions the other way round: He stressed that belief is an ambiguous term that can be interpreted for the better in the sense of pragmatism. Prima facie surprisingly, he maintained that his “pragmatism is derived from Mr Russell.” (1927: 51). (shrink)

The medical practice of declawing has received much political debate over the past few years. Yet, empirical and theoretical research on how this practice is maintained and the ethical positions of those who actually participate in this work is lacking. Drawing from 9 months of ethnographic fieldwork in a feline-specific veterinary hospital and open-ended interviews with veterinarians and staff, this study examines veterinary staff members' attitudes toward, and strategies for, dealing with the medical practice of declawing. Specifically, findings show (...) that a number of staff felt uncomfortable with their participation in onychectomy and relied heavily on organizational support structures to cope both with these feelings and the moral ambiguity about the practice. Relying on these structures, the veterinarians and their staff are able simultaneously to define felines as subjects worthy of respect for their quality of life, protect their own self-identity as people who work toward the best interest of animals, and paradoxically support action toward felines that they find morally objectionable. (shrink)

Levinas’s comments on art appear contradictory. On the one hand, he criticizes art as being disengaged from ethical concerns and constituting a possibility of moral evasion; on the other hand, he engages quite closely and in a supportive fashion with some art, such as Paul Celan’s poetry. Interpreters commonly argue that only one of Levinas’s conceptions of art, either the affirmative or the negative, represents his true attitude towards art. In this article the author seeks to make both statements compatible (...) with each other and thus relevant to Levinas’s conception of art. She focuses on his essay ‘Reality and Its Shadow’, where art is diagnosed as an ambiguous phenomenon. She argues that full understanding of the ambiguity of art demands that Levinas’s different statements about art are considered together; only thus can the complete picture of the ambiguity emerge. Furthermore, it turns out that the very same feature which makes art open to misunderstanding – namely, its precarious materiality – also allows an artwork to sustain itself and to be revived. Art reveals a shadow, withdrawal, or resistance that belongs to reality itself. (shrink)

If we compare it with the fellow notion of liberty, equality has an ambivalent place in modern political thinking. Whilst it counts as one of the fundamental norms, many think that equality is valuable only as a way to realise some features of liberty. I take a historical perspective on this issue, and try to identify some of the pre-modern roots of such an ambivalent attitude towards equality. I do this by using Jacques Rancière’s political model as an analytical framework (...) and by taking a visual route, focusing on classical iconographic representations in which equality was present in the images’ subtexts. Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s allegory of good government is one iconic exposition of equality as a positive condition of civil peace. Already there, however, the positive value of equality is counterposed to the figure of violent retributive justice. Similarly, in the Christian narrative, equality is endorsed as the original condition of creatures under God, but is also associated with violent death. This signals one pre-modern root behind the ambivalence towards equality, particularly when the latter is understood dynamically, as levelling. Such a reversal of value finds an apotheosis, I suggest, in the revolutionary icon of the guillotine, a dramatic representation of equalisation that had a strong influence on modern political thinking. In J. E. Millais’ first painting, of Jesus in the House of his Parents, I find a more positive legacy of Christian equality in modern political thinking. (shrink)

Most decision-making research in economics focuses on individual decisions. Yet, we know, from psychological research in particular, that individual preferences can be sensitive to social pressures. In this paper, we study the impact of a group environment on individual preferences for risky and ambiguous prospects. In our experiment, each participant was invited to make a series of lottery-choice decisions in two different conditions. In the Alone condition, individuals made private choices, whereas in the Group condition, individuals belonged to a three-person (...) group and group members’ choices were aggregated according to either a majority or unanimity rule. This design allows us to study the impact of a group environment on individuals’ attitude towards both risky and ambiguous prospects, while controlling for the decision rule used in the group. Our experimental results show that when individuals are in the Group condition, they tend to be less risk averse and more ambiguity averse than when they are not part of a group. Our experiment also suggests that the decision rule matters as it shows that these two trends tend to be stronger when the group implements a unanimity rule. Specifically, we found that individuals who belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule are significantly less risk averse than individuals who belong to a group that relies on the majority rule. We obtained a similar—but non-significant—result under ambiguity. (shrink)

Asymmetric Choquet random walks are defined, in the form of dynamically consistent random walks allowing for asymmetric conditional capacities. By revisiting Kast and Lapied and Kast et al. we show that some findings regarding the effects of ambiguity aversion are preserved in the more general framework, which is of interest in several applications to policy making, risk management, corporate decisions, real option valuation of investment/ disinvestment projects, etc. The effect of ambiguity on the higher moments is investigated, as (...) well, as they have an interpretation in terms of the psychological attitude of a decision-maker towards ambiguity. Finally, some financial applications are provided as an illustration. (shrink)

The present work develops a new theory of meaning---which I call attitudinal semantics---and applies it to solving three concrete problems. ;Chapter 1 notes that theories are to be understood and judged in comparison to their rivals. It accordingly sets out the dominant theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics, which claims that to give the meaning of sentence is to give the conditions under which is true, as in . Chapter 2 articulates my alter native proposal, which claims that to give the (...) meaning of is to give the conditions under which is held under some appropriate propositional attitude by some subject S situated in a given bio/cultural matrix, as in . L'etat c'est moi. "L'etat, c'est moi" is true in French iff I am the state. For any proficient speaker of French S, S thinks "L'etat, c'est moi" iff S thinks that S is the state. Attitudinal semantics thus represents a challenge to the prevailing view of meaning. If it is at all defensible, then it is highly significant. ;Chapter 3. TC semantics claims that the meaning of pejorative statement is given by specifying whether is true or false in various possible worlds. Nietzsche was a kraut. Attitudinal semantics claims that the meaning of is given by specifying the attitudes that various speakers might have toward Nietzsche and Germans more generally. ;Chapters 4, 5 deploy the attitudinal framework to analyze two other phenomena that have resisted TC solutions, ambiguity and the Liar paradox. The Liar paradox, for instance, disproves the naive T-schema and poses difficulties for sophisticated versions. Since the T-schema fails when applied to the Liar sentence, and since the Liar sentence is meaningful, meaning cannot be explicated by means of the T-schema. Instead, the proper analysis of the predicate true, like the analysis of all other predicates, situates language as irrevocably embedded in human thought/use. ;Chapter 6 considers objections to attitudinal semantics, replies to them, and closes with reflections on subjectivity. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThere is an ongoing debate in New Testament scholarship on the correct interpretation of Paul’s pistis Christou formulations: are we justified by our own faith/trust in Christ, or by participating in Christ’s faith and faithfulness towards God? This article contributes to the position of purposeful or sustained ambiguity by reading Paul’s imitation – and faith – language against the background of Hellenistic-Roman thought on and practice of imitation. In particular, the mimetic chain between teachers and students training for a (...) philosophical disposition, and the philosophical topos of ‘becoming like God’ offer material valuable for comparison. Since pistis, fides and cognates are used in these settings as both a quality to imitate and as attitude towards a model, and since, conversely, imitation is very much involved in Paul’s pistis-vocabulary, it makes sense to read pistis Christou as shorthand for a mimetic movement of faith via Christ towards God. (shrink)

This new reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau challenges traditional views of the eighteenth-century political philosopher's attitudes toward women and his perceived pessimism about human experience. Mira Morgenstern finds in Rousseau an appreciation of the complexities and multidimensionality of life that allowed him to criticize various easy dualisms promoted by his fellow liberal thinkers and point to the crucial mediating role that women fulfill between the private and public spheres. Morgenstern sees Rousseau as an important contributor to the feminist thoughts and (...) concerns that animate so much of our public and private discourse today. While Rousseau is commonly seen as a patriarchal misogynist, Morgenstern finds evidence in his writing that belies much of this claim. Rousseau was very much a man of his time, but he also believed that women were the key to transmitting his ideals of personal and political authenticity, thereby transforming his theory from ephemeral ideas into practical reality. A careful evaluation of Rousseau's writings on women reveals his highly complex sense of reality, especially his awareness that the solutions to life's complex problems are often temporary and must be renegotiated over time. Rousseau is more persistent than most in highlighting the weaknesses and pitfalls of liberal political thought, whose fundamental characteristic is its categorization of life on the basis of dualistic categories: public and private, outside and inside, male and female. Ultimately, what makes Rousseau worth reading today, argues Morgenstern, is his ability to illuminate critical weaknesses in the dualisms of liberal political theory and his pointing out, if only by implication, alternative ways of reaching the full measure of our individual and communal humanity. In honoring the traditional liberal emphasis on individual liberty and self-development, Rousseau’s meditations on the proper aim of political life are especially helpful to those today who seek ways to expand liberalism's promise of freedom and authenticity, while not losing sight of the common threads of meaning and community that continue to bind us together. (shrink)

This article reports a follow-up study of Norwegian nursing students entitled ‘The helping motive -an important goal for choosing nursing education’. It presents and discusses a significant ambiguity within the altruistic helping motive of 301 nursing students in the light of classical and modern virtue ethics. A quantitative longitudinal survey design was used to study socialization and building professional identity. The follow-up study began after respondents had completed more than two-and-a-half years of the three-year educational programme. Data were collected (...) using a questionnaire with closed questions, supplemented by 18 semi-structured, in-depth, audiotaped interviews. A motive such as ‘desire for human contact/to help others’ appeared to be highly significant. The research questions employed were: What motivates nursing students at the end of their studies to help other people? What does helping others mean for nursing students? Factor analysis revealed two factors. Factor 1 can be expressed as an altruism factor and factor 2 can be interpreted as an ‘acknowledgement-from-the-patient factor’ that in fact indicates an ambiguity within the helping motive itself. Findings from the interviews also reveal ambiguous helping motives. On one hand the students want to be altruistic and on the other they wish to receive positive feedback from patients when giving help. The findings indicate that this positive feedback is essential to the students in order for them to provide altruistic care. (shrink)