Preferred Citation: R.A. Duff, Response, Is Accomplice Liability Superfluous?, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 444 (2008), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/04-2008/Duff.pdf.

Accomplice liability makes people guilty of crimes they knowingly helped or encouraged others to commit, even if they did not commit the crime themselves. But this method of criminalizing aiders and abettors is fraught with problems. In this chapter, I argue that accomplice liability in the criminal law should be replaced with a system in which agents are criminalized on the basis of their individual contributions to causings of harm—the larger the contribution, the more severe the crime—regardless of whether those (...) contributions were made “through” the actions of another person. Not only would this avoid the issues associated with making the guilt of accomplices parasitic on the guilt of the principal, it would also fill gaps in the law concerning other cases to which accomplice liability does not apply. (shrink)

At the end of 2017, Kristen Roupenian’s short story, Cat Person, went viral. Published at the height of the #MeToo movement, it depicted a ‘toxic date’ and a disturbing sexual encounter between Margot, a college student, and Robert, an older man she meets at work. The story was widely viewed as a relatable denunciation of women’s powerlessness and routine victimization. In this paper, I push against this common reading. I propose an alternative feminist interpretation through the lens of Simone de (...) Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism: a form of alienation that consists in making oneself both the subject and the ultimate project of one’s life. Framing Margot as a narcissist casts her as engaging, not in subtly coerced, undesired sex, but rather in sex that is desired in a tragically alienated way. I argue that Beauvoir’s notion of narcissism is an important tool for feminists today – well beyond the interpretation of Cat Person. It presses us to see systematic subordination not just as something done to women, but also as something women do to themselves. This in turn highlights the neglected role of self-transformation as a key aspect of feminist political resistance. (shrink)

This paper offers an intervention in recent debates about white anti-racism by revisiting James Cone’s treatment of this topic in his early writings. In the last decade, scholars and activists have sought to reimagine the conceptual framework of white anti-racism, criticizing the dominant paradigm of “the ally” and articulating an alternative: “the accomplice.” While these critiques of white allyship accurately expose the serious deficiencies of that paradigm, the failure of white allyship is a symptom of a more fundamental crisis within (...) white anti-racism as a whole, one which the accomplice paradigm is equally unable to resolve. Cone’s early account of the relationship between black liberation and those racialized as white, which he articulates using the theological concept of conversion, offers important resources for a constructive account of conversion from whiteness as a way to imagine an ambiguous and paradoxical future for people racialized as white beyond the crisis of white anti-racism. (shrink)

In this article, we demonstrate that individuals use motivated reasoning to convince themselves that their self-serving behavior is justified, which in turn affects the distribution of resources in business situations. Specifically, we explore how ambiguous contextual cues and individual beliefs can jointly form motivated reasoning. Across two experimental studies, we find that whereas individual ideologies that endorse status hierarchies can strengthen the relationship between contextual ambiguity and motivated reasoning, individual beliefs rooted in fairness and equality can weaken it. Our findings (...) contribute to person–situation theories of business ethics and provide evidence that two ubiquitous factors in business organizations—contextual ambiguity and social dominance orientation—give rise to motivated reasoning, enabling decision makers to engage in self-serving distributions of resources. (shrink)

:This essay undertakes two tasks: first, to describe the differing mens rea requirements for accomplice liability of both Anglo-American common law and the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code; and second, to recommend how the mens rea requirements of both of these two sources of criminal law in America should be amended so as to satisfy the goals of clarity and consistency and so as to more closely conform the criminal law to the requirements of moral blameworthiness. Three "pure models" (...) of the mens rea requirements for complicity are distinguished, based on the three theories of liability conventionally distinguished in the general part of Anglo-American criminal law. One of these, the vicarious responsibility model, is put aside initially because of both its descriptive inaccuracy and its normative undesirability. The analysis proceeds using the other two models: that of the mens rea requirements for principal liability for completed crimes, and that of the mens rea requirements for attempt liability. Both the common law and the Model Penal Code are seen as complicated admixtures of these two models, the common law being too narrow in the scope of its threatened liability and the Model Penal Code being both too broad and too opaque in its demands for accomplice liability. The normative recommendation of the paper is to adopt the model for the mens rea of complicity that treats it as a form of principal liability, recognizing that the overbreadth of liability resulting from adoption of that model would have to be redressed by adopting a "shopkeeper's privilege" as an affirmative defense separate from any mens rea requirement. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF MENS REA REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICESVolume 32, Issue 2Heidi M. Hurd and Michael S. Moore DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000157Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF MENS REA REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICESVolume 32, Issue 2Heidi M. Hurd and Michael S. Moore DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000157Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT OF MENS REA REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCOMPLICESVolume 32, Issue 2Heidi M. Hurd and Michael S. Moore DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000157Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

The Law Commission for England and Wales has published for consultation a proposal for an offence of first degree murder. A person found guilty of this offence whether as a principal or an accomplice will receive a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. It is argued that the conditions for liability as an accomplice put forward by the Commission do not fulfil the Commission's aspiration for a "parity of culpability" between principals and accomplices. The discussion has general implications for the (...) reform of complicity laws. (shrink)

Slippery slope‐, taboo‐breaking‐ or Nazi‐analogy‐arguments are common, but not uncontroversial examples of the complex relationship between bioethics and the various ways of using historical arguments in these debates. In our analysis we examine first the relationship between bioethics and medical history both as separate disciplines and as argumentative practices. Secondly, we then analyse six common types of historical arguments in bioethics (slippery slope‐, analogy‐, continuity‐, knockout/taboo‐, ethical progress‐ and accomplice‐arguments), some as arguments within the academic debate of bioethics, others as (...) arguments within political and public debates over bioethical issues. We conclude by suggesting to bioethicists to better understand historical arguments as socially and culturally embedded practices of critical reflection of power, medical and government paternalism and possible future scenarios. More interdisciplinarity between ethicists and medical historians is needed to appropriately rationalize and understand the different legacies. (shrink)

In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema presents a philosophical approach to the moral issues involved in complicity. Starting with a taxonomy of Thomas Aquinas, according to whom there are nine ways for one to become complicit in the wrongdoing of another, Mellema analyzes each kind of complicity and examines the moral status of someone complicit in each of these ways. Mellema's central argument is that one must perform a contributing action to qualify as an accomplice, and that it is (...) always morally blameworthy to perform such an action. Additionally, he argues that an accomplice frequently bears moral responsibility for the outcome of the other's wrongdoing, but he distinguishes this case from cases in which the accomplice is tainted by the wrongdoing of the principal actor. He further distinguishes between enabling, facilitating, and condoning harm, and introduces the concept of indirect complicity. Mellema tackles issues that are clearly important to any case of collective and shared responsibility, yet rarely discussed in depth, always presenting his arguments clearly, concisely, and engagingly. His account of the nonmoral as well as moral qualities of complicity in wrongdoing--especially of the many and varied ways in which principles and accomplices can interact--is highly illuminating. Liberally sprinkled with helpful and nuanced examples, Complicity and Moral Accountability vividly illustrates the many ways in which one may be complicit in wrongdoing. "In Complicity and Moral Accountability, Gregory Mellema has made an immensely important contribution to the discussion of group morality and collective responsibility both within and far beyond professional academic philosophy. His clearly written book will be essential reading." --Fergus Kerr, Honorary Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

I argue, contrary to standard claims, that accomplice liability need not be a causal relation. One can be an accomplice to another’s crime without causally contributing to the criminal act of the principal. This is because the acts of aid and encouragement that constitute the basis for accomplice liability typically occur in contexts of under- and over-determination, where causal analysis is confounded. While causation is relevant to justifying accomplice liability in general, only potential causation is necessary in particular cases. I (...) develop this argument through the example of the role of U.S. legal officials in abetting the acts of unlawful interrogation that have taken place since 2001. I also suggest that there may be a limited justification for ex post ratificatory accomplice liability. (shrink)

Indigenous nurse scholars across nations colonised by Europeans articulate the need for accomplices (as opposed to mere performative allies) to work alongside them and support their ongoing struggle for health equity and respect and to prioritise and promote culturally safe healthcare. Although cultural safety is now being mandated in nursing codes of practice as a strategy to address racism in healthcare, it is important that white nurse educators have a comprehensive understanding about cultural safety and the pedagogical skills needed (...) to teach it to undergraduate nurses. We open this article with stories of our journeys as two white nurses in becoming accomplices and working alongside Indigenous Peoples, as patients and colleagues. Our lived experience of the inertia of healthcare and education organisations to address systemic and institutional resistance to the practice of cultural safety underpins the intention of this article. We understand that delivering this challenging and complex topic effectively and respectfully is best achieved when Indigenous and white educators work together at the cultural interface. Doing so requires commitment from white nurses and power holders within universities and healthcare institutions. A decolonising approach to nurse education at individual and institutional levels is fundamental to support and grow the work that needs to be done to reduce health inequity and increase cultural safety. White nurse accomplices can play an important role in teaching future nurses the importance of critical reflection and aiming to reduce power imbalances and racism within healthcare environments. Reducing power imbalances in healthcare environments and decolonising nursing practice is the strength of a cultural safety framework. (shrink)

Chapter 14. Andrea Timár engages with literary representations of the experience of perpetrators of dehumanization. Her chapter focuses on perpetrators of dehumanization who do not violate laws of their society (i.e., they are not criminals) but exemplify what Simona Forti, inspired by Hannah Arendt, calls “the normality of evil.” Through the parallel examples of Dezső Kosztolányi’s Anna Édes (1926) and Doris Lessing’s The Grass is Singing (1950), Timár first explores a possible clash between criminals and perpetrators of dehumanization, showing literature’s (...) exceptional ability to reveal the gap between ethics and law. Second, she examines novels focalized through perpetrators and the difficult narrative empathy they provoke, arguing that only the critical reading of these novels can make one engage with the potential perpetrator in oneself. As case studies, Timár examines Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), which may potentially turn its reader into an accomplice in the process of dehumanization, and J.M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), which puts on critical display the dehumanizing potentials of both aesthetic representation and sympathy as imaginative violence. Third, she reads Jonathan Littell’s The Kindly Ones [Les Bienveillantes, 2006], which can make the reader question, through the polyphony of the voice of its protagonist, the notions of narrative voice and readerly empathy, only to reveal that the difficulty involved in empathizing with perpetrator characters lies not so much in the characters’ being perpetrators, but rather in their being literary characters. Eventually, Timár briefly touches upon the problem of the aesthetic and the comic via Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) to ask whether one can avoid some necessarily dehumanizing aspects of humor. (shrink)

Governments and companies are increasingly promoting and organizing Responsible Innovation. It is, however, unclear how the seemingly incompatible demands for responsibility, which is associated with care and caution, can be harmonized with demands for innovation, which is associated with risk-taking and speed. We turn to the tradition of virtue ethics and argue that it can be a strong accomplice to Responsible Innovation by focussing on the agential side of innovation. Virtue ethics offers an adequate response to the epistemic and moral (...) complexity in innovation and encourages moral behaviour. We enumerate a number of virtues that people involved in Responsible Innovation would need to cultivate both related to responsibility, such as justice, anticipation, civility and inclusion, and virtues related to innovation, such as courage, dedication, curiosity and creativity. We put forward practical wisdom as a key virtue to regulate relevant virtues and to deal with the tension between responsibility and innovation. Practical wisdom helps an agent to find an appropriate mean in exercising and expressing the other virtues—where the mean is relative to the specific context of action and the role and abilities of the agent. (shrink)

Unlike the question of whether self-deception can be understood on the model of other-deception, the relationship between the two phenomena at the level of practice is hardly ever explored. Other-deception can support self-deception and vice versa. Self-deception often affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person but also the beliefs and behavior of others who may become accomplices of self-deception. As I will show, however, it is difficult to describe this supportive relationship between self-deception and the (...) deception of others without conceptual contradiction. While “deflationary” approaches offer a convincing way to avoid the so-called paradoxes of self-deception, they do not resolve the conceptual tensions that arise here. I conclude by outlining a solution. (shrink)

There is a widely accepted distinction between being directly responsible for a wrongdoing versus being somehow indirectly or vicariously responsible for the wrongdoing of another person or collective. Often this is couched in analyses of complicity, and complicity’s role in the relationship between individual and collective wrongdoing. Complicity is important because, inter alia, it allows us to make sense of individuals who may be blameless or blameworthy to a relatively low degree for their immediate conduct, but are nevertheless blameworthy to (...) a higher degree for their implication in some larger (or another person’s) wrongdoing. In this paper, I argue that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of complicity. First, I motivate the distinction between direct and vicarious responsibility with three interlocking arguments, respectively appealing to: i) the structure of rational agency; ii) linguistic considerations; iii) the role of “principal vs. accomplice” in legal doctrine. I show how these arguments naturally extend to the epistemic domain, motivating an epistemic form of vicarious responsibility. I then examine complicity as a mechanism of vicarious epistemic responsibility. To fill this out, I engage with an epistemic analogue of the debate about the role of intention versus causal contribution in complicity. I propose a Casual Account of Epistemic Complicity, arguing that it accommodates a wide range of cases, and enables fine-grained explanations of degrees of culpability for epistemic complicity. With an adequate account of epistemic complicity on hand, we can explain what is objectionable about an important class of epistemic agent who, on an individual level, may be epistemically blameless or blameworthy to a relatively low degree, but whose relation to other individuals or collectives nevertheless makes them epistemically blameworthy to a higher degree. I explore some broader implications of this result. (shrink)

This paper considers some aspects of the morality of complicity, understood as participation in the wrongs of another. The central question is whether there is some way of participating in the wrongs of another other than by making a causal contribution to them. I suggest that there is not. In defending this view I encounter, and resist, the claim that it undermines the distinction between principals and accomplices. I argue that this distinction is embedded in the structure of rational (...) agency. (shrink)

In Insister, Hlne Cixous brings a unique mixture of theoretical speculation, breath-taking textual explication and scholarly erudition to an extremely close reading of Derrida's work, always attentive to the details of his thinking. At the same time, Insister is an extraordinarily poetic meditation, a work of literature and of mourning for Jacques Derrida the person, who was a close friend and accomplice of Cixous's from the beginning of their careers.

There are two primary purposes of this manuscript: (i) to evaluate the western buyers’ ethical issue in the setting of eastern and western economies, and (ii) to assess the ethical values of the employers and the government in their business dealing in the background of Bangladesh. Analyzing the present minimum wage (MW) policy of the garment global supply chain industry in Bangladesh and the extent to which the policy functions are two of the other purposes of this study. This study (...) is the mixed approached of exploratory, descriptive, and phenomenological qualitative research. Each of the exploratory, descriptive, and phenomenological qualitative research goals has identified and described in a systematic way to get the best outcome of the purposes set in this manuscript. This study shows that rule utilitarian ethics are being followed by the Western buyers in their business dealings in Western territories. The philosophy of rule utilitarianism holds moral principles, and this principle tends to place greater emphasis on ethical interests rather than economic gains. Unfortunately, Western buyers do not follow the rule utilitarianism in their business dealing in eastern countries. Thus, this study shows western business leaders/buyers are not ethically correct. The act utilitarian ethics, on the other hand, are being followed by the eastern buyers in their business dealing. The philosophy of act utilitarianism holds immoral principles, and this principle tends to place greater emphasis on economic gains rather than ethical interest. This philosophy permit firm’s unethical behavior such as an exploitation of MW on the ground that this practice increases its incomes and maximizes the owner’s interest. The employers and buyers unethically gain profit, keeping the workers in a disadvantaged situation, which contradicts John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Furthermore, the government has become an accomplice in exploiting and depriving the garment works of their entitlement and labor rights to appease the so-called investors. This study helps buyers, employers, government, and stakeholders to correct their unethical business deals. It also helps the policymakers to implement the MW policy for the betterment of garment global supply chain workers. (shrink)

This book explores the concept of and cases of complicity in an interdisciplinary context. It in part covers cases of direct complicity, where an agent or set of agents facilitates an identifiable act of wrongdoing. The book also draws attention to the manner in which agents become complicit in the reproduction of wider practices of wrongdoing. It goes on to explore the notion of complicity through a series of cases emerging from a variety of academic disciplines and professional practice, including (...) the complicity of politicians, medical practitioners, and the wider public in forms of state violence, protest movements and secret‐keeping. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Josiah Royce's "Enlightened" Antiblack Racism?Dwayne A. TunstallThis article has not been written by some ideal Roycean mediator whose interpretive acts can help heal the deep-seated racial and ethnic divisions of contemporary American society. Nor has it been written by an impartial judge adjudicating a dispute. Rather this article has been written by a Roycean scholar and a philosopher of race who feels compelled to examine Royce's social philosophy in (...) order to determine whether his positions on race in the United States of America and on racialized colonialism in the British Caribbean presuppose the legitimacy of antiblack racism. What has compelled me to examine Royce's social philosophy critically are the presentations made by Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley and Tommy J. Curry at the joint Josiah Royce Society and Personalist Discussion Group session for the 2008 American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division meeting.For those readers who might be familiar with Royce's philosophy, this entire article may seem pointless. I can imagine quite a few readers asking themselves the following questions: Why should we waste our time reading an article investigating whether Royce's social philosophy presupposes antiblack racism? Do we not already know that Royce's philosophy is an antiracist one? This response has been nurtured by those Roycean scholars who have interpreted his philosophy to be antiracist. Indeed, this has apparently been the standard approach to interpreting Royce's philosophy since the publication of his 1905 address to the Chicago Ethical Society, "Race Questions and Prejudices," in Race Questions, Provincialism and Other American Problems. These scholars have included American pragmatists, African-American philosophers, theologians, ethicists, and philosophers of race. Over the last forty years alone, these scholars have included William T. Fontaine, Cornel West, Eddie S. Glaude, Jr., Alain Locke, Shannon Sullivan, and Jacquelyn Kegley. [End Page 39]In this article I argue that the standard antiracist interpretation of Royce's philosophy is a mistaken one. This is an understandable mistake, though, given that many of those who interpret Royce this way presuppose that (1) one can analyze certain concepts and principles from Royce's ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics (e.g., his theory of interpretation) apart from his concrete social philosophy and (2) one can ignore his tacit acceptance of early twentieth-century, British-style racialized colonialism. I think Kegley's writings on Royce and race are paradigmatic examples of this reading of Royce.Kegley's recent APA presentation can be read as a further articulation of one of the central contentions in her 2005 article, "Is a Coherent Racial Identity Essential to Genuine Individuals and Communities?": "… Royce advocates and provides the foundation for an anti-essentialist and nonracialist understanding of race" (216). Following her earlier analysis, Kegley's presentation takes these two contentions for granted: First, when one criticizes an essentialist conception of race (that is, regarding race as a natural kind), that person is not racist. Second, when one regards the concept of race as a social kind, one is antiracist, if not an outright nonracist. However, I think that it is possible for one to criticize an essentialist conception of race and regard race as a social kind and still accept a form of cultural antiblack racism. Moreover, I think that Royce's social philosophy is a paradigmatic example of this phenomenon, with him being a nonessentialist with regards to the concept of race but yet being a cultural antiblack racist.Here, the significance of Curry's presentation for Royce scholars is obvious. In it he asks us Royce scholars if Royce's social philosophy, with regards to race issues, is an accomplice for the cultural perpetuation of white supremacy. I think that the answer to that question hinges on whether Royce's acceptance of British-style racialized colonialism in the West Indies is based on a misguided ethnocentrism or on a form of cultural antiblack racism.I take it for granted that Royce's recommendation that Southern Euro-Americans learn from the British colonial rule of Jamaica and Trinidad in "Race Questions and Prejudices" is evidence that he had accepted the legitimacy of British-style racialized colonialism. What I would like to do now is explain how Royce's... (shrink)

When does benefiting from others’ wrongdoing effectively make one a moral accomplice in their evil deeds? If stem cell research lives up to its therapeutic promise, this question (which has previously cropped up in debates over fetal tissue research or the use of Nazi research data) is likely to become a central one for opponents of embryo destruction. I argue that benefiting from wrongdoing is prima facie morally wrong under any of three conditions: (1) when the wrongdoer is one’s agent; (...) (2) when acceptance of benefit directly encourages the repetition of the wrongful deed (even though no agency relationship is involved); and (3) when acceptance of a benefit legitimates a wrongful practice. I conclude by showing that, because of the ways in which most embryonic stem cell lines come into being, people who oppose embryo destruction may use human embryonic stem cells without incurring moral blame. (shrink)

Baudrillard's unsettling coda: previously unpublished texts written just before the visionary theorist's death in 2007. History that repeats itself turns to farce. But a farce that repeats itself ends up making a history.—from The Agony of Power In these previously unpublished manuscripts written just before his death in 2007, Jean Baudrillard takes a last crack at the bewildering situation currently facing us as we exit the system of “domination” and enter a world of generalized “hegemony” in which everyone becomes both (...) hostage and accomplice of the global market. But in the free-form market of political and sexual liberation, as the possibility of revolution dissipates, Baudrillard sees the hegemonic process as only beginning. Once expelled, negativity returns from within ourselves as an antagonistic force—most vividly in the phenomenon of terrorism, but also as irony, mockery, and the symbolic liquidation of all human values. This is the dimension of hegemony marked by an unbridled circulation—of capital, goods, information, or manufactured history—that is bringing the very concept of exchange to an end and pushing capital beyond its limits: to the point at which it destroys the conditions of its own existence. In the system of hegemony, the alienated, the oppressed, and the colonized find themselves on the side of the system that holds them hostage. In this paradoxical moment in which history has turned to farce, domination itself may appear to have been a lesser evil.This book gathers together three essays—“From Domination to Hegemony,” "The White Terror of World Order," and "Where Good Grows"—and a 2005 interview with Baudrillard by Sylvère Lotringer. Semiotext launched Baudrillard into English back in the early 1980s; now, as our media and information infested “ultra-reality” finally catches up with his theory, Semiotext offers The Agony of Power, Baudrillard's unsettling coda. (shrink)

I assess the force of a justification for post-conflict amnesties that is aimed at overcoming the most common objection to their conferral: that they entail retributive injustice. According to this justification, retributivists ought to consider amnesties to be justified because they are analogous to plea bargains, and because retributivists need not consider plea bargains to be unacceptable. I argue with reference to the 2001 Timor-Leste immunity scheme that amnesties conditional upon perpetrators’ not only admitting guilt and confessing but also making (...) reparations may count as plea bargains. I show that plea bargains providing sentence discounts in return for guilty pleas, allowing offenders who accept these bargains to be punished in the absence of trials, and plea bargains offering leniency in punishment in exchange for offenders pleading guilty and providing testimony or other incriminating evidence against superiors or accomplices, may be consonant with versions of retributivism that allow less than the full measure of an offender’s deserved punishment to be exacted where necessary to maximise or expand deserved punishment overall. I argue that amnesties that are also plea bargains may be considered justified by plea bargain-defending retributivists. So too may amnesties conferred in exchange for perpetrators’ admitting guilt and providing incriminating testimony or other evidence against their superiors and accomplices, some of which count as plea bargains, since they too could in some cases maximise or expand deserved punishment. (shrink)

In my dissertation, I explore how emotions operate under conditions of injustice. Specifically, my interest is in how one should deploy their emotions in order to combat patriarchally informed, affective ways of making sense of and responding to the social world. My dissertation consists of the following three papers. In the first paper, “Vindictive Anger,” I argue for two claims. First, that anger is not necessarily made morally worse whenever and to the extent that it involves a desire for payback. (...) Second, that in certain cases, anger’s retributive component is precisely what moralizes the emotion. Victims of sexual violence, I argue, paradigmatically deploy their anger as a way of getting their transgressor or, in some cases, the broader moral community, to more fully understand, through affect, the wrongness of their action. One can see this occur in the anger expressed by Chanel Miller in her victim’s impact statement, read aloud during the case of People v. Turner. When anger functions in this way, I propose, it serves to moralize the emotion. In the second paper, titled “Feminism and Suspect Femininity,” I ask how feminists should feel towards women who conform to suspect norms of appearance, and of hyper-femininity in particular. I present a novel type of empathy – proleptic empathy – which avoids treating women as either pitiful victims or as accomplices deserving of harsh moral criticism. Proleptic empathy requires switching back and forth between two types of imaginings: on the one hand, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from her will. On the other, simulating what it is like to be in the woman’s shoes on the assumption that her suspect behavior stems from external cultural influences. In the third paper, “Transitional Moral Contexts,” I address how one should feel towards the perpetrators who figure in the cases that have gone by the language of ‘grey rape’ or ‘bad sex’. These cases are ones that are rife with disagreement, especially amongst members of the moral community, who even disagree over whether they ought to count as cases of ‘sexual assault’ or ‘rape’. My suggestion is that the reason we have such difficulty adjudicating individuals’ responsibility for cases of bad sex is because these are instances of transitional moral contexts where what it is to act morally is in the process of being actively negotiated by the moral community. With this analysis in place, I present reasons for and against deploying shame against those who falter in these cases. (shrink)

Suppose that God exists: what difference would that make to the world? The answer depends on the nature of God and the nature of the world. In this book, William E. Mann argues in one new and sixteen previously published essays for a modern interpretation of a traditional conception of God as a simple, necessarily existing, personal being. Divine simplicity entails that God has no physical composition or temporal stages; that there is in God no distinction between essence and existence; (...) that there is no partitioning of God's mental life into beliefs, desires, and intentions. God is thus a spiritual, eternal being, dependent on nothing else, whose essence is to exist and whose mode of existence is identical with omniscience, omnipotence, and perfectly goodness. In metaphysical contrast, the world is a spatial matrix populated most conspicuously by finite physical objects whose careers proceed sequentially from past to present to future. Mann defends a view according to which the world was created out of nothing and is sustained in existence from moment to moment by God. The differences in metaphysical status between creator and creatures raise questions for which Mann suggests answers. How can God know contingent facts and necessary truths without depending on them? Why is it so easy to overlook God's presence? Why would self-sufficient God create anything? Wouldn't a perfect God create the best world possible? Can God be free? Can we be free if God's power is continuously necessary to sustain us in existence? If God does sustain us, is God an accomplice whenever we sin? Mann responds to the Euthyphro dilemma by arguing for a kind of divine command metaethical theory, whose normative content lays emphasis on love. Given the metaphysical differences between us, how can there be loving relationships between God and creatures? Mann responds by examining the notions of piety and hope. (shrink)

This is a review of a book by the physician Uwe-Christian Arnold pleading for the right to assisted suicide. Arnold who has accompanied several patients to their end opens his book with several case studies. In the second part A. discusses the arguments against assisted suicide. One of the arguments is based on a reading of the Hippocratic Oath which is shared also by A. As against this reading, I argue that in this text the doctor is not committed to (...) withholding a poison from his patient, but rather to be no part as an accomplice in a poisoning ordered or wished for by a third party. Given the very painful dying caused by the poisons known in antiquity it is in itself rather unlikely that a patient wanting to commit suicide did asked his doctor for a poison. In the third part of the book, A. argues against the slippery slope argument brought forward by people like the catholic philosopher R. Spaemann. Pointing to empirical evidence from US-states as Oregon, A. insists that allowing assisted suicide has helped to enhance palliative medical care and reduced the number of suicides. (shrink)

Presque contemporains, Scholem et Barth ne se sont jamais rencontrés. S’ils avaient pu le faire, ils n’auraient sans doute pas été d’accord en tout point, mais on peut risquer l’hypothèse qu’ils se seraient entendus en profondeur. Ce qui fonde cette hypothèse, c’est la similitude du comportement de l’un et de l’autre à l’égard de leurs communautés religieuses respectives, qu’ils tenaient pour complices des aveuglements séculiers du monde où elles vivaient et coupables de ne pas élever les responsabilités séculières sur le (...) terrain de la liberté éthique. Les débats de l’un avec Rosenweig et de l’autre avec Troeltsch établissent Scholem et Barth dans un réel voisinage théologique, dans le même souci de la référence théologique de leurs communautés et de l’éthique des engagements séculiers. Dans ses recherches sur la Kabbale, Scholem veut réactiver la problématique de la création dans laquelle Dieu fait du néant son être. De façon semblable, Barth fonde sa Dogmatique sur la problématique de s. Anselme qui se refuse à penser Dieu dans un ordre du monde qui serait immuable. Dans des contextes différents, tous deux s’opposent à l’assimilation passive de leurs communautés au monde séculier, tout en soutenant leurs responsabilités éthiques à son égard. Un même message se dégage de leur rencontre posthume.Almost contemporaries, Scholem and Barth never met each other. If they had done so, they undoubtedly would have not agreed on everything, but the chances are that they would have had a fundamental understanding. This hypothesis is based on the similarity of each one’s attitude towards their respective religious communities, which they saw as accomplices of their world’s secular blindness, and its guilt in not raising secular responsibilities to the level of ethical freedom. Their debates – Scholem with Rosenweig and Barth with Troeltsch – made them theological neighbours, i.e., expressing identical concern for the theological implication of their communities and the ethics of secular committments. Scholem, in his research on the Cabala, wanted to revive the problem of God’s making his being from nothing. In the same fashion, Barth founded his Dogmatic on the problem of St. Anselm, who refused to think God in a world order that would be immutable. In different contexts, both were opposed to a passive assimilation of their communities to a secular world, while sustaining their ethical responsibilities to it. The same message comes out of their encounter. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hard Times:Philosophy and the Fundamentalist ImaginationRandall Everett Allsup"Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children, and this (...) is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to the Facts!" So admonishes headmaster Gradgrind in the very beginning of Hard Times, Charles Dickens' prescient tale of education in the industrial world.1 Facts—"addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, settle everything somehow and never wonder"—Facts form the essence of Gradgrind's philosophy.2A close reading of Gradgrind's opening monologue will provide the starting off point for an examination of the role and place of philosophy in the music curriculum. I am particularly intrigued by the question Reimer posed in his opening. He asked us to consider, Who is philosophy of music education for? We will return to this question at the close of this brief reflection.For the moment, however, I would like to continue on to the second paragraph of Hard Times, where Dickens does something very interesting. Following Gradgrind's inglorious monologue, he casts the scene of a small schoolroom, a "plain, bare, monotonous vault."3 Headmaster Gradgrind stands in front; he is described with a "square wall of a forehead," his mouth is "wide, thin, and hard set," his voice "inflexible and dry."4 His hair "bristled on the skirts of his bald head, a plantation of firs to keep the wind from its shining surface, all covered with knobs, like the crust of a plum pie, as if the head had scarcely warehouse-room for the hard facts stored inside."5 A square wall of a forehead, a lumpy head like the crust of a plum pie: these words give us more than "hard Facts"—they are more than mere descriptors. It seems that Dickens, through metaphor, mood, dynamic contrast—through the aesthetic imagination—has imbedded a quiet rebuke to the bold commonsense of Facts.The Gradgrind philosophy finds easy parallel to current thinking in American education. In the fundamentalist imagination, sources of ambiguity must be rooted out—basic skills make adults out of reasoning animals. "Children should be tested on basic reading and math skills every year, between grades three and eight. Measuring is the only way to know whether all our children are learning—and I want to know, because I refuse to leave any child behind."6 The speaker, of course, is George W. Bush whose call to basic skills and episodic testing appeals [End Page 139] to our sense of reason. Like Gradgrind suggests, it is the principle on which we brought up our own children, and this is the principle on which we will bring up today's children. Such a philosophy of education proudly combines folk beliefs about teaching and learning with the hard science of thorough assessment.The President further recommends that our children "must also be educated in the values of our civil society. Some people think it's inappropriate to make moral judgments anymore. Not me. We must be willing to draw a clear line between right and wrong. Those clear lines must be supported by political leaders, public schools, and our public institutions. Educating our children about their moral and civil responsibilities will serve them—and the nation—every bit as well as the academic learning they require."7 In addition to discipline-based standards of knowledge, Facts (in this view) govern the rules of citizenship, provide moral clarity, and as we will see shortly, inform the aesthetic. It is worth noting that such a linear equation—those clear straight lines—currently places skeptics in the category of unpatriotic, miseducative, and morally corrupt.8The fundamentalist philosophy of education is a governing philosophy—it is a philosophy for, not with, its initiates. Judgments are passed, not reached; answers are given, not argued. Teachers in this setting—whether willing accomplices or not—define what needs to be known and... (shrink)

Abstract:This paper scrutinizes some of our most enduring assumptions about the genre of autobiography. More particularly, it examines the predicative links, the transitivities, which bind notions of self-life-and-writing. It comes to this exercise through a reading of Madhavikutty-Kamala Das’ Balyakala Smaranakal (Memories of a Childhood) (1987). This autobiography promises to trace the self from its incipience—only to side-step the self’s emergence and to hide this deferral in plain sight. The paper argues that Balyakala Smaranakal (BS) uses our expectations of the (...) genre and our presumptions about the writer—particularly her abiding preoccupation with self-production—as accomplices. It invites us to witness the textual densities which the child-protagonist gathers and then deploys these strategies to un-do the self’s emergence. By deferring the production of the self BS stages the autobiography as “intransitive”. This paper goes some way in examining the reasons why it becomes impossible for BS to produce a legible self; for the child-protagonist to step into the social category that it summons forth. It examines the formal as well as socio-historical conditions within which this autobiography becomes the place of self-postponement—rather than of self-presentation and self-actualization. (shrink)

This essay examines Darwin's positiva use of theology in the first edition of the Origin of Species in three steps. First, the essay analyses the Origin's theological language about God's accessibility, honesty, methods of creating, relationship to natural laws and lack of responsibility for natural suffering; the essay contends that Darwin utilized positiva theology in order to help justify descent with modification and to attack special creation. Second, the essay offers critical analysis of this theology, drawing in part on Darwin's (...) mature ruminations to suggest that, from an epistemic point of view, the Origin's positiva theology manifests several internal tensions. Finally, the essay reflects on the relative epistemic importance of positiva theology in the Origin's overall case for evolution. The essay concludes that this theology served as a handmaiden and accomplice to Darwin's science. (shrink)

Kant’s essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ claims that everyone has an unconditional duty of right not to lie under any circumstances. This claim creates a conflict within the doctrine of right because Kant also claims that each of us is under an unconditional duty of right to obey the positive law in force in the civil condition in all circumstances. In Kant’s specific example, truthfulness would violate the positive law because it would make the speaker an (...) accomplice to a crime. Since both duties flow from the requirement that we not act inconsistently with the possibility of rightful relations among humans, a juridical solution to the conflict must be possible. That solution is to recognize that lying in appropriate circumstances is akin to the use of force in self-defence or defence of a third party. (shrink)

In Michael Moore's important book Causation and Responsibility, he holds that causal contribution matters to responsibility independently of its relevance to action. We are responsible for our actions, according to Moore, because where there is action, we typically also find the kind of causal contribution that is crucial for responsibility. But it is causation, and not action, that bears the normative weight. This paper assesses this claim and argues that Moore's reasons for it are unconvincing. It is suggested that sometimes (...) a person's responsibility for that to which he causally contributes depends on his recognition of an identity between himself and the protagonist of the event for which he is held responsible. Since this fact about identity is not captured by causal contribution, action matters to responsibility for reasons that are not exhausted by the fact that action involves causal contribution. The relevance of this idea for accomplice liability is also briefly discussed. (shrink)

This book goes beyond historical and psychological explanations of the Holocaust to directly address the moral responsibility of individuals involved in it. While defending the view that individuals caught up in large-scale historical events like the Holocaust are still responsible for their choices, he provides the philosophical tools needed to assess the responsibility, both negative and positive, of perpetrators, accomplices, bystanders, victims, helpers and rescuers. This book will be an important addition to courses on the Holocaust in social and (...) political philosophy, history, religion, and applied ethics. (shrink)

Since at least as far back as the infamous Derek Bentley case of the 1950s in which an unarmed 19-year-old was convicted and executed for murder based on his alleged uttering of the words _let him have it_ to his gun-wielding accomplice, the issue of incitement has been positioned firmly as an object of interest for forensic linguists. An example of a language crime—i.e. an unlawful speech act (as reported by Shuy in Language crimes: The use and abuse of language (...) evidence in the courtroom, Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken, 1993) the features of incitement—formalized as _intentionally encouraging or assisting others to commit an offence_ in the law of England & Wales under section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/27/contents)—have been widely debated by linguists and legal scholars alike. This paper draws on two webinars hosted by The Hunting Office in August 2020, which were subsequently leaked by the Hunt Saboteurs Association. Featuring senior figures from the hunting community addressing a nationwide audience of hunt masters, the webinars led to a police investigation and subsequent prosecution and conviction of one of the main speakers, Mark Hankinson, for _encouraging or assisting others to commit an offence under the Hunting Act 2004_. In this paper I explore what, linguistically, is meant by _encouraging or assisting_. Through corpus-assisted pragmatic and discourse analyses I interrogate the webinars to address the question of how precisely Hankinson implied his encouragement of illegal hunting with dogs. The phenomena of collocation and semantic prosody are crucial for understanding how such meanings came to be attached to the contributions Hankinson makes to the webinars. Moreover the paper will examine the contributions of other speakers and demonstrate that the same incriminating linguistic patterns in Hankinson’s talk are also evident in that of those who were not prosecuted. (shrink)

Verges' manifesto argues that feminists should no longer be accomplices of capitalism, racism, colonialism and imperialism: it is time to fight the system that created the boss, built the prisons and polices women's bodies. The author grapples with the central issues in feminist debates today: from Eurocentrism and whiteness, to power, inclusion and exclusion. Delving into feminist and anti-racist histories, Verges also assesses contemporary activism, movements and struggles, including #MeToo and the Women's Strike. Centering anticolonialism and anti-racism within an (...) intersectional Marxist feminism, the book puts forward an urgent demand to free ourselves from the capitalist, imperialist forces that oppress us. --From publisher description. (shrink)

Throughout most of the history of Western civilization, Christianity and Classical ideals played a dominant part in education. In most western countries, however, this is no longer the case. In modern pluralist Democracies, church influence struggles with pervasive influences from elsewhere for the hearts and minds of the public. Educational policy remains, however, an instrument to be used by major power groups, and in many countries has become, to a greater or lesser extent, an active or unwitting accomplice in furthering (...) acquisitiveness and the accumulation of material advantage. (shrink)

Confronted with the thoroughgoing marketisation of education, scholars have revisited the nature of pedagogy. The work of Immanuel Kant is a resource for critiquing the channelling of the transformation of self and society into rapacious consumerism. Kant's exploration of the connection between inner freedom and political freedom has been recast as pedagogy of the oppressed. Countering the dismissal of the Enlightenment as an accomplice of colonialism and imperialism, Kantian pedagogy is enlisted in the struggle against the forces undermining the very (...) structure of liberal democracy and humanity on a global scale. This essay points to the limitations of this revindication on the grounds that it leaves undisturbed the formative complicities at work in the current crisis, complicities all too familiar to those who teach and learn. (shrink)

In the criminal law of many jurisdictions complicity, though not itself a substantive crime but a way of committing a crime, is a doctrine that determines when one person is legally liable for a criminal offense that was committed by another person, typically by being an accomplice. That doctrine has a number of troubling moral implications with respect to responsibility, particularly when complicity is employed as a devise to capture one agent as morally accountable for the actions of another agent (...) and/or the consequences of those actions. I focus on the issue of responsibility for consequences and actus reus and mens rea difficulties with complicity as a moral concept in the light of two cases in which complicity is the basis for ascriptions of moral and criminal responsibility to someone who was not the primary wrongdoer. The book on the topic by Chiara Lepora and Robert E. Goodin provokes my discussion. (shrink)

Place-based policies tackle grand socio-economic challenges through differentiated, context-sensitive interventions. However, they often run the risk of under- or mis-performing. This work studies how grand challenges translate from policy to cross-sector partnerships through place. By focusing on the place-based policy of regional smart specialization (RIS3), I investigate how the setup of science and technology parks mediates the practices of the actors in the translation chain: a transnational policymaker (macro), a regional broker (meso), and a local partnership which served as prototype (...) for the regional policy (micro level). I document two types of practices—emplacement and space configuration—enacted at each level, and show how their interplay transformed the grand challenge from a cautious ideal at the macro level which balances risk and responsibility, to an optimistic and risk-prone approach at the partnership level. The study contributes to the policy and cross-sector partnerships literatures by documenting a two-sided effect of place-based policy and a consequent risk of ethical reversal, from an early attractor bringing partners together to a later accomplice keeping the partners together despite evident signs of failure. By adopting a strong multimodal approach, I also distinguish four types of multimodal outcomes—ideal type, prototype, virtual model, and lived artifact—which perform the two-sided effect and bring about the risk of reversal. Practical implications include a redistribution of the burden of failure from the CSPs implementing the grand challenges to the institutional fields in which these are bred. (shrink)

The confession quoted above by way of introduction reveals with tragic sincerity the fatal passion of an overly avid reader, unlimited in curiosity certainly but fully conscious of the demanding finality of the work he had to accomplish: the scientific critique of an international system of social organization, “in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and scornful being” (1844). Cultivating poetry and philosophy in a world felt to be unlivable meant becoming an accomplice of those individuals and institutions principally (...) responsible for the barbarity called modern civilization. But to combat this, it was necessary to scour the murky historical horizon issued from a distant past where only great social revolutions marked the stages of a progression seen as ambiguous because realized by means of unspeakable phenomena of regression. Only one revolution took place under the contradictory sign of an emancipation with universal ambitions and of a decline with indelible consequences: the French Revolution. Conclusion as well as beginning, it was studied by Marx as a unique event, both in relation to its antecedents as well as its liberating promises. Although it is true that Marx “never wrote a history of the ancien régime”, a hardly significant remark, it is no less true that he studied and compiled, with the eagerness of a schoolboy enthralled by history, an enormous mass of documentation that can “help understand how (the ancien regime) gave birth to the Revolution”, despite what François Furet might think (Marx et la Révolution française, Paris, 1986, p. 79). Moreover, the author of Das Kapital drew from the revolutionary history of France the inspiration for a “poetry of the future” in which the following vision was designed:“The old bourgeois society, with its classes and its class antagonism, gave way to an association in which the free development of each individual is the condition for the free development of the whole” (1848). (shrink)

This Article presents a theory whereby criminal punishments are routinely distributed in proportion to the weight of the evidence mounted against the defendant. According to this theory, the law relaxes the stringent decision threshold in criminal trials—beyond a reasonable doubt—by creating easy-to-prove evidentiary offenses. These offenses, in turn, are associated with less severe sanctions, thus creating a de-facto proportional liability regime. Against that backdrop, the Article examines the legal duty to report criminal activity to the authorities. As the analysis shows, (...) while legal scholars analyzing such duties have focused on the paradigmatic case in which an innocent bystander, friend or family member is unwittingly exposed to information about a crime, in practice these duties are rarely used in such cases. Rather, reporting duties are used to prosecute suspected accomplices whose involvement in the commission of the actual crime is difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, offenses imposing a reporting duty on criminal activity turn out to be part of the general framework of accomplice liability, and are used to apply less severe sanctions in cases of evidentiary uncertainty. (shrink)

Courts and commentators are notoriously puzzled about the mens rea standards for complicity. Accomplices intend to aid, but what attitude need they have towards the crimes that they aid? This paper both criticizes extant accounts of the mens rea of complicity and offers a new account. The paper argues that an intention can commit one to an event’s occurrence without committing one to promoting the event, or making it more likely to take place. Under the proposed account of the (...) mens rea of complicity, an accomplice must have an intention that commits him to the crime’s occurrence, but need not commit him to making it more likely that the crime occurs. The paper traces the implications of this view both for several difficult complicity cases, and for ongoing debates among philosophers of action about the necessary and sufficient conditions of joint agency. (shrink)

1960-ih i 1970-ih godina odbačeno je viđenje znanosti kao neutralne i bez utjecaja klase, rase, roda, nacionalnosti i politike. Neki od pokreta, koji su usmjereni na društvenu upotrebu znanosti, prepoznali su znanost kao produženu ruku kapitalističkog poretka i sredstvo eksploatacije te je proglasili suučesnicom u podčinjavanju žena, manjina i nerazvijenih zemalja. Jedan od tih pokreta je feministički. Do pojave ovih kritika znanost je bila shvaćena kao objektivna i vrijednosno neutralna.1970-ih godina suvremena feministička teorija podastrijela je kritički teorijski koncept roda predstavljen (...) kao način razlikovanja društvene konstrukcije maskulinosti i femininosti od bioloških kategorija muškog i ženskog. Polazeći od toga i usvojivši socijalni konstruktivizam, feministkinje su artikulirale feminističku teoriju stajališta koja pokušava konstruirati znanje iz perspektive života žena. Navedeni su bitni momenti zbog kojih je nepristranost u znanosti dosad bila onemogućena. Ključna postavka epistemologije stajališta sadrži tezu da epistemologija neutralnog, nezainteresiranoga promatrača svijeta treba biti zamijenjena epistemologijom senzibilnom na sve specifičnosti socijalnoga konteksta, a u slučaju feminističke inačice ove teorije drži se da način na koji žene doživljavaju društveni život daje jedinstveni uvid u način funkcioniranja društva, a stajalište žena, ili feminizma, manje je pristrano i iskrivljeno, za što se navode brojni razlozi.The view of science as neutral and not subject to the influence of class, race, gendernationality and politics, was largely rejected during the 1960s and 1970s. Certainmovements that focused on the social use of science had recognized science as a vehicleof the capitalist movement and as a means of exploitation, pronouncing sciencean extended accomplice to the subordination of women, minorities, and underdevelopedcountries. One of these movements is the feminist movement. Prior tothe criticism of these movements, science was thought of as objective and valueneutral.Modern feminist theory in the 1970s submitted a critical and theoretical concept ofgender presented as a way of differentiating between the social construction of mas-culinity and femininity and the biological categories of male and female. Using thisconcept as a starting point and incorporating social constructivism, the feministshave articulated the feminist standpoint theory which attempts to construct knowledgefrom the perspective of women’s lives. They stated key moments that have preventedthe impartiality of science. The key concept of the standpoint epistemologyincorporates the thesis that there exists a need to replace the epistemology of theneutral, disinterested observer of the world with the epistemology sensitive to allspecificities of the social context. The feminist version of the theory states that theway women experience social life gives them a unique view to the way the societyfunctions, and that the women’s, or feminist’s standpoint is less biased and distorted,for which they offer a number of arguments. (shrink)

Now that we possess the Nachlass version, we can finally state it: Cassirer’s The Myth of the State has been massacred, large parts have been omitted; entire sections moved around, the fundamental thesis deeply altered. Instead of the neo-Enlightenment intellectual who, when faced with the Nazi’s recourse to myth, had started to question the very idea of a Western road from mythos to logos, the 1946 edition transmitted to us the text of a self-confident intellectual carrying the torch of the (...) Enlightenment even in front of an event that could have potentially extinguished it forever. Why has the text been massacred? When? And by whom? The main suspect cannot but be Charles Hendel, who published it posthumously in 1946 by stating: ‘I hope I have not altered anything that would have mattered to him.’ By perhaps it was not a murder, but rather a suicide: perhaps Cassirer’s himself has killed his own self-criticism. In both cases, the motive could have been the desire to preserve Cassirer’s intellectual coherence, and thus reiterate that opposition of mythical versus rational consciousness upon which both Cassirer’s philosophy and philosophical self-narrative of the West ultimately rests. But if that is the case, then it does not matter who actually assassinated the text, because we are all, in a way or another, accomplices. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida offers his recent commentary on the early career of Paul de Man as an urgent intervention in a discussion he fears is going awry. The most pressing danger he sees in the recent revelations is that they have played into the hands of de Man’s antagonists, who are now ready to denounce the whole of his career and even deconstruction itself. Against such indiscriminate critiques Derrida hurls the epithet: totalitarian. He is attempting to reseize the initiative in the (...) discussion and to reset the terms of the debate. His agenda extends across historical, theoretical, and political questions.He wants to affirm that a radical, indeed absolute break separates the later from the earlier de Man. He also wants to show that the young de man, however firmly committed to fascist ideology and however much an accomplice of the Nazis occupying Belgium, at the same time regularly distanced himself from that ideology and even undermined its meanings. Moreover, Derrida boldly takes up the challenge that these revelations have cast on the intellectual movement he and de Man have shaped. Can deconstruction come to grips with the political and intellectual history of its own leading American proponent? And can deconstruction in the process make a distinctive contribution to the understanding of fascism and intellectuals’ participation in it? John Brenkman is associate professor of English at Northwestern University. He is the author of Culture and Domination . Jules David Law is assistant professor of English at Northwestern University. He is currently working on a book-length study of the metaphors of surface, depth, and reflection in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British prose. (shrink)

These words are a collaborative effort to think across different practices of knowing and sensing. They don’t pretend to compose a complete article. They are simply an assemblage that wants to open spaces for dwelling, for connecting, for dissenting. As such it gravitates around the images of Daniel Brittany Chávez’s performance: “Quisieron Enterrarnos … ”, his artist statement and Rolando’s notes on precedence, trans* and the decolonial. In this conversation, we are allies and accomplices in thinking through trans* as (...) a prefix both of non-binary transgender identity and from Rolando Vázquez’s conceptions of trans* from decolonial thought at praxis. In conversation, we offer this assemblage not from a space of tension but from a space of mutually nurturing decolonial praxis. (shrink)