Speeches delivered in Tamil at various schools in Tamil Nadu, during 2010-2015, by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, 1931-2015, former President of India.

The place of scientific results, the role of scientific method, and the impact of the scientific temper in ethical theory are surveyed. The concept of an "existential perspective of an ethical theory"--"its view of the world and its properties, man's nature and condition, insofar as these enter into its understanding of moral processes and moral judgments"--is sketched and used to clarify the diversity of ethical approaches. Edel promises, but does not here develop, a scientific ethics based on the behavioral sciences.--A. (...) P. D. M. (shrink)

The authors ably demonstrate the value and relevance of sophisticated conceptual analysis in law. Such concepts as cause, reason, consequence, condition, opportunity, and explanation are carefully investigated. The use of the causal notions in the Anglo-American tradition of tort, contract, and criminal law, as well as in continental theories, is examined in detail. A book of importance which carries out English analysis in a subtle and exciting way. It is sure to be one of the lasting contributions of the recent (...) analytic movement.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

The substance and development of Eddington's "scientific epistemology" are presented in close parallelism with the philosophy of Kant. The author argues that Kant was far more successful in displaying the philosophical structure of Newtonian physics than Eddington is in showing the philosophy behind quantum mechanics and relativity.--A. P. D. M.

More than half of the book is devoted to what is almost a catalogue exposition of Western moral philosophy from Kant to Nowell-Smith. Although the author claims in the preface to have included "suitable references to Indian points of view, including the Buddhist," what references there are are usually too general, and never fully explained to be of any use to Western readers. Exposition tends to be disjointed, and the English leaves much to be desired. On the whole there is (...) much eclecticism and little originality.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

Topics in the standard introductory logic course are all covered, with emphasis on the understanding of concepts rather than the development of skills in symbolic manipulation. Exposition is informal and rich in illustrations from reasoning in ordinary life. Exercises are also drawn from ordinary discourse, but they often call for the application of symbolic techniques. In combining accuracy and sophistication with simplicity and liveliness of style, the book is indeed a pedagogic success. --A. P. D. M.

M. Piguet believes that philosophy is, in a strict sense, a compromise between science and art. In the course of establishing this thesis he makes some interesting suggestions on the question of ordinary language. For him this idiom is the "culture language"; it embodies the cultural experience of an age; it can be neither technical nor colloquial; it is the language of the honnête homme. It is also the basic "translation language" with which all other technical and artistic idioms must (...) be ultimately coordinated.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

This little volume shows a remarkable familiarity with both continental and Anglo-American literature on the subjects of probability and induction. Discussion is both expository and critical. The author argues in favor of a psychological-pragmatic interpretation of the principle of induction and the theory of confirmation.--A. P. D. M.

Langan believes that the writings of Merleau-Ponty "do not merely parallel roughly the three Kantian Critiques but... the development they reveal is impelled by the same internal necessity implicit in both philosophers' transcendental starting point." This interpretive scheme, like many sweeping generalizations sprinkled throughout the book, begs more questions than it solves. What exactly is the transcendental starting point? Does Merleau-Ponty believe that the claims of reason are wholly provisory and that "their value is essentially practical"? Does he make a (...) sharp distinction between the theoretical and the practical? If Langan believes that the two latter questions should be answered affirmatively, then his overall interpretation is downright misleading. Moreover, continual use is made of a whole battery of terms requiring clarification—e.g., "given," "dialectic," "ontological," "sense," "natural world." But Langan has captured much of the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's thought—especially in Chapter 2, "Incarnated Intentionality," a helpful, imaginative reconstruction of The Phenomenology of Perception. And in the last chapter he rightly attacks Merleau-Ponty for his vacillation between realistic and idealistic points of view. But, almost entirely on the basis of a few textual citations, Langan quickly pushes Merleau-Ponty into the idealist camp. If our critic is "convinced that although description from the transcendental viewpoint may invite disaster, it does not necessarily lead to it," then where did Merleau-Ponty make a wrong turn? Or did he?—A. P. (shrink)

In this posthumously published work the author deplores the decline in standards of rigor and clarity in recent German philosophy. A return to Socratic methods and to Brentano's early conception of a "phenomenal psychology" is urged.--A. P. D. M.

Meanings are construed by analogy with offices. But in contrast with similar views, offices are seen as "entities." In the final analysis all offices are reduced to that of stating facts. If the latter thesis were adequately defended the book would mark another reversal of philosophical thinking. But the author limits himself to reviving, restating, and modifying earlier positivist attempts to reduce all meaning to description.--A. P. D. M.

This is a book both sober and optimistic, both analytical and humane. In the course of a virtual reinstatement of a Socratic ethics, it is claimed that: analytic philosophy can decide moral issues, at least indirectly, by clarifying the relevant concepts; moral philosophers are wrong in saying that there can be no argument about generally accepted standards; our failure to resolve cases of ultimate ethical disagreement is only a measure of our ignorance of the human machine, and confusion about our (...) shared purposes; students of moral concepts cannot be neutral with respect to morals--analytic philosophers should not disguise their role as social reformers.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

Meaning is interpreted in terms of distributional regularities in the corpus of a language; synonymy in terms of contrastive and non-contrastive sets of morphemic environments. For this blending of philosophical analysis and empirical linguistics, however, no defense is offered, though in the course of his sketch the author registers subtle and unconventional insights into key concepts and issues in philosophy of language.--A. P. D. M.

In refutation of Cajetan, the sixteenth century commentator who is still considered an authority on Thomas' doctrine of analogy, it is argued that "the analogy of names is, for St. Thomas, a logical intention, and in speaking of it we must observe the general rule that the logical and real orders must not be confused. St. Thomas does not see any peculiar significance of analogy for metaphysics--apart, i.e., from the significance it has for science and ordinary discourse." The thesis is (...) closely argued for and painstakingly documented.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)

A collection of essays on the nature of science, concept formation, causality and counterfactuals, and the theory of real numbers. The argument is in the form of an exposition and critique of classical and recent literature; but more programmatic remarks are registered, and more promissory notes issued, than are made good.--A. P. D. M.

A series of four lectures given in Athens during the author's tenure of a Fulbright Fellowship. The intention is to introduce Athenian public to three classical American philosophers, as well as to contemporary trends. The author sees interesting parallels between Emerson and the Byzantine Mystics and predicts that the interest of Americans in Ancient Greek philosophy will lead to closer studies of Byzantine philosophy. The chief defect of the book is its willingness to sacrifice content for coverage. Presentation is cursory (...) and often by terms which are misleading in themselves and particularly unfortunate when rendered into modern Greek.--. (shrink)

A series of brief discussions of such key topics of analytic philosophy as qualities vs. grammatical variables, descriptions, the problem of perception, the notion of proposition and determinism. The views of Carnap and Strawson receive special attention and are, on the whole, sympathetically appraised.--A. P. D. M.

This controversial book professes to be a "critical account of Linguistic Philosophy and a study of Ideology." It is clearly written and abounds with entertaining aphorisms. Philosophically important objections against the Oxford School are developed in the first hundred pages. The rest is highly repetitious, and, aside from rhetorical effects and remarks on the psychology and sociology of the movement, contribute little to a "refutation" of Linguistic Philosophy. As an alternative to Linguistic Philosophy, the book only vaguely hints to a (...) "clean," "non-oblique," and "non-insinuated" form of naturalism.--A. P. D. M. (shrink)