Collection of Kagyudpa scholar's texts on Buddhist logics.

On Buddhist doctrinal and philosophical interpretation of Sakyapa tradition.

Study on general principles of Buddhist logic.

本书不仅介绍了藏传因明的产生发展,而且也介绍了作为藏族文化重要组成部分的藏传因明的理论意义,以便能探讨藏传因明的深层内涵,挖掘其理论价值。.

Collected works of Dpal-sprul O-rgyan-ʼjigs-med-chos-kyi-dbaṅ-po, b. 1808, on diverse topics predominantly on Rnying-ma-pa doctrines and Budhist philosophy; includes rituals.

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical (...) reason involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

Explanation of the philosophical position (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

정체전중변(正體傳重辨) 3편과 논문 6편을 우리말 로 옮기고 주를 달았다.

Elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

On Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Matti Eklund (2017) has argued that ardent realists face a serious dilemma. Ardent realists believe that there is a mind-independent fact as to which normative concepts we are to use. Eklund claims that the ardent realist cannot explain why this is so without plumping in favor of their own normative concepts or changing the topic. The paper first advances the discussion by clarifying two ways of understanding the question of which normative concepts to choose: a theoretical question about which concepts (...) have the abstract property of being normatively privileged and a further practical question of which concepts we are to choose even granting some concepts are thus privileged. I argue that the ardent realist’s best bet for answering the theoretical question while avoiding Eklund’s dilemma is to provide a real definition of this property. I point out the difficulties for providing such a definition. I then argue that even with an answer to the theoretical question, the ardent realist faces a further dilemma in answering the practical question. In sum, though I see no knock-down argument against ardent realism, it may nonetheless die a death by a thousand cuts. I close by considering a deeper reason for why ardent realism is so difficult to defend: every argument starts somewhere. It is unclear how there can be an Archimedean point that makes no reference to any normative concepts that can nonetheless be employed to convince everyone to adopt ours. I then briefly propose two options for someone still inclined towards realism: (i) accept that our normative concepts are normatively privileged without attempting to explain why this is so, or (ii) be less ardent and accept a perspective-dependent account of normativity. (shrink)

Big data and artificial intelligence (“AI”) promise to transform virtually all aspects of biomedical research and health care (Matheny et al. 2019), through facilitation of drug development, diagno...

The American Buddhist nun and author of the best-selling When Things Fall Apart counsels readers on how to live compassionately and well during times of instability, demonstrating the use of the Three Commitments practice to promote ...

Gemass ihrer grundlegenden Bedeutung wurde die Ousia- und Eidoslehre des Aristoteles uber viele Forschergenerationen hinweg intensiv diskutiert und steht immer noch im Mittelpunkt der Aristoteles-Forschung. Die Lehre bleibt jedoch nur einseitig interpretiert und verstanden. Ihre bisherige Interpretation hat sich allzu sehr auf die sogenannten Substanzbucher der Metaphysik beschrankt, ohne dabei den der Lehre wesentlichen biologischen Aspekten gebuhrende Beachtung zu schenken. Der Autor schliesst diese Forschungslucke. So wird im ersten Teil des Werkes Metaphysik Z, der Haupttext der Ousialehre, sorgfaltig kommentiert, und (...) im anschliessenden zweiten Teil werden unter Bezugnahme auf die im vorhergehenden Teil erorterte Problematik drei wichtigste biologische Schriften des Aristoteles besprochen. Dadurch wird ein wesentlicher Zusammenhang zwischen der Ousia- und Eidoslehre in der Metaphysik und der Biologie hergestellt. (shrink)