I introduce definition by genus and specific difference, afterwards using it to show that Karl Jaspers rejected the classic criteria for pathologically falsified judgment: ‘Absolute conviction,’ ‘incorrigibility,’ and ‘impossibility of content.’ Next I draw attention to the primary experience of delusion. Famously, Jaspers reckoned that that experience was “ununderstandable”—usually taken to imply something negative about one’s ability to empathize with the delusion holder. All the same, I propose that it was actually our static mode of understanding that he felt was (...) defeated by the aforementioned experience, not our genetic one. (shrink)

This chapter gives an illustrated overview of recent philosophical work on the concept of delusion. Drawing on a number of case vignettes, examples are given of the wide range of theories that has been advanced to explain this most challenging of experiences. Some have agreed with the philosophical founder of modern descriptive psychopathology, Karl Jaspers, that delusions are “ununderstandable.” The large majority, though, has sought to understand delusion in terms of aberrations of one kind or another either of beliefs or (...) of the grounds or preconditions for beliefs. As a project in understanding, these theories offer helpful insights. A further group of theories focuses on the agential aspects of delusion as reflected, for example, in their role in the insanity defense. Agential theories converge with the person-centered approaches of contemporary empirical and clinical work on delusion. Such approaches bring an additional level of complexity in the form of delusions that are not pathological but adaptive in the life of the person concerned. As such they show the challenge of understanding delusion to be a project not just of understanding but of mutual understanding. (shrink)

According to Proudhon, before Kant, the believer and the philosopher moved “by an irresistible impulse,” asked themselves, “What is God!” They then asked themselves “Which, of all religions, is the best!” “In fact, if there does exist a Being superior to Humanity, there must also exist a system of the relations between this Being and Humanity. What then is this system! The search for the best religion is the second step that the human mind takes in reason and in faith. (...) Kant gave up these insolvable questions. He no longer asked himself what is God, and which is the best religion; he set about explaining the origin and development of the Idea of God; he undertook to work out the biography of this idea.” And the results he attained were as great as they were unexpected. “What we seek, what we see, in God, as Malebranche said ... is our own Ideal, the pure essence of Humanity ... The human soul does not become conscious of its Ego through premeditated contemplation, as the psychologists put it; the soul perceives something outside itself, as if it were a different Being face to face with itself, and it is this inverted image which it calls God. Thus morality, justice, order, law, are no longer things revealed from above, imposed upon our free will by a socalled Creator, unknown and ununderstandable; they are things that are proper and essential to us as our faculties and our organs, as our flesh and our blood. In two words religion and society are synonymous terms, man is as sacred to himself as if he were God.”. (shrink)

This article develops a phenomenological contribution to biological psychiatry. Grounded in the principles of transformation, heterogeneity, proportionality and particularity, a paradigm of phenomenological orientation allocates to biology a role different from that assumed by official Cartesian psychiatry. First, no clear definition of what is biological may be established a priori—as a general application, and useful to each and every studied phenomenon. Biology may be understood only as the experience of ununderstandable elements within consciousness, and as belonging necessarily to a whole (...) unity of conscious experience. Second, the research agenda in biological psychiatry necessarily intersects with the investigation of the particularities of each individual clinical case with its unique characteristics. Without this, the very notion of biological psychiatry becomes merely a theoretical abstraction. Finally, the continuity of the biological agenda needs to resume the construction and investigation of psychopathological categories that cohere with the reality of the mental universe. (shrink)

The Orthodox Christian thought is the most modally rigorous way of inferring. The subject of the book is to investigate possibilities of explicating the Orthodox thought from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy and symbolic logic. The claim that Orthodox thinking is just mystic and illogical is not true. The logical culture of Orthodox Christian thinking is unknown and ununderstandable for the West, although its schemata are very influential in Eastern Europe till now (Marxism-Leninism is just one of their possible instances). (...) This thought can be called totalistic or even totalitarian. For this thought any truth or falsity is necessary. As a result, the whole world is presented as logical and nomothetic and there is no place for contingency. (shrink)

I introduce definition by genus and specific difference, afterwards using it to show that Karl Jaspers rejected the classic criteria for pathologically falsified judgment: ‘Absolute conviction,’ ‘incorrigibility,’ and ‘impossibility of content.’ Next I draw attention to the primary experience of delusion. Famously, Jaspers reckoned that that experience was “ununderstandable”—usually taken to imply something negative about one’s ability to empathize with the delusion holder. All the same, I propose that it was actually our static mode of understanding that he felt was (...) defeated by the aforementioned experience, not our genetic one. (shrink)