The topic of the thesis is the challenge that religious diversity poses to religious belief. A key issue to be resolved is whether a reasonable person may believe in the epistemic superiority of any one religious ideology in the light of religious diversity. -/- After introducing the issues, I examine Richard Swinburne’s, and then Alvin Plantinga’s, view on religious diversity. These two philosophers both advocate religious epistemic exclusivism, the view that only (...) one religious ideology is true to the exclusion of all others. I argue that the positions of Swinburne and Plantinga are unsatisfactory. -/- In Chapter ‎4 I list a number of objections to religious epistemic exclusivism. One of these objections, namely the religious ambiguity objection, will be important in this thesis. I explain what religious ambiguity is in more detail and distinguish between temporary religious ambiguity and permanent religious ambiguity. -/- Chapters ‎5 & 6 deal with responses to religious diversity in the light of permanent religious ambiguity. William Alston advocates that religious epistemic exclusivism is still reasonable given religious ambiguity. Alston appeals to faith to justify exclusivist belief but this gives rise to the objection that tentative belief is more appropriate. Conversely, John Hick rejects exclusivism in favour of another position altogether, called religious epistemic pluralism. In Chapter ‎7 I assess the impact of Hick’s response to religious diversity on the ideology of a traditionally minded Muslim. I argue that the Muslim is not obliged to accept Hick’s solution in full. (shrink)

Contemporary Western culture is experiencing a heightened awareness of religious diversity. This article surveys a range of possible responses to such diversity, and distinguishes between responses that concern the salvation or moral transformation of persons (soteriological views) and those that concern the alethic or epistemic status of religious beliefs (doctrinal views). After providing a brief taxonomy of these positions and their possible relations to one another, the article focuses primarily on competing views about the (...) truth and rationality of religious beliefs (e.g., pluralism, exclusivism, and skepticism). Here a heavy emphasis is placed on arguments for and against the rationality and moral propriety of retaining one's religious beliefs in the face of disagreement. The article surveys some of the more prominent arguments from the literature on this topic and closes with suggestions for further research. (shrink)

With respect to many, if not most issues, there exist significant differences of opinion among individuals who seem to be equally knowledgeable and sincere. Individuals who apparently have access to the same information and are equally interested in the truth affirm incompatible perspectives on, for instance, significant social, political, and economic issues. Such diversity of opinion, though, is nowhere more evident than in the area of religious thought. On almost every religious issue, honest, knowledgeable people hold significantly (...) diverse, often incompatible beliefs. -/- Religious diversity of this sort can fruitfully be explored in many ways — for instance, from psychological, anthropological, or historical perspectives. The current discussion, however, will concern itself primarily with those key issues surrounding religious diversity with which philosophers, especially analytic philosophers of religion, are most concerned at present. Specifically, our discussion will focus primarily on the following questions: How pervasive is religious diversity? Does the reality of this diversity require a response? Can a person who acknowledges religious diversity remain justified in claiming just one perspective to be correct? If so, is it morally justifiable to attempt to convert others to a different perspective? Can it justifiably be claimed that only one religion offers a path into the eternal presence of God? The answers to such questions are not simply academic. They increasingly have great impact on how we treat others, both personally and corporately. (shrink)

Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious diversity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main (...) aim is to highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious experience as a major source of such problems. I conclude by examining the consequences of cognitive penetration for the reliability of the monotheistic doxastic practice. (shrink)

Philosophical responses to religious diversity range from outright rejection of divine reality to claims of religious pluralism. In this paper, I challenge those responses that take the problem of religious diversity to be merely an instance of the general problem of disagreement. To do so, I will take, as my starting point, William Alston’s treatment of the problems that religious diversity seems to pose for the rationality of theistic beliefs. My main (...) aim is to highlight the cognitive penetrability of religious experience as a major source of such problems. I conclude by examining the consequences of cognitive penetration for the reliability of the monotheistic doxastic practice. (shrink)

Religious diversity is a key topic in contemporary philosophy of religion. One way religious diversity has been of interest to philosophers is in the epistemological questions it gives rise to. In other words, religious diversity has been seen to pose a challenge for religious belief. In this study four approaches to dealing with this challenge are discussed. These approaches correspond to four well-known philosophers of religion, namely, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and (...) John Hick. The study is concluded by suggesting four factors which shape one’s response to the challenge religious diversity poses to religious belief. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Lauren Kapalka Richerme, "The Diversity Bargain and the Discourse Dance of Equitable and Best," Philosophy of Music Education Review 27, no. 2 (Fall, 2019)Nasim NiknafsI was asked to write a response to Lauren Richerme's convincing research on why and how one should distinguish between "equitable educational practices"1 and what she calls following Ellen Berry the "diversity bargain" where equity as the second-best option has always (...) taken a hit from the more dashing diversity. If I may metaphorically put this conversation into a romantic comedy, equity is always the wingperson of color to diversity as the main protagonist; by the end of the show it is the main protagonist who survives the hardship and reaches salvation, be it a long-lost love, an oasis of sorts, or making it to the finish line. The rest of the cast have the function of complementing and highlighting the main actor but never substituting for it; or they are as Homi Bhabha would say, "almost the same but not quite."2 For the sake of filling in the blank of let's-add-more-color-into-it, the genuine conversation over the nuances of equitable practices gets undermined and diffused of its poignancy. And this is what Richerme is arguing against: let us not forget that a more significant challenge than a mere technicolor presence is at play. In that, my response to Richerme's essay would [End Page 215] not be so much of a response but a grand nod, a body gesture, an embedded signal of approval between two human beings born and raised in two different parts of planet earth who after years of diverse and perhaps un-equitable educational access ended up in the same room at the same time. Thus, my nod to Richerme also originated from personal experiences and intimate familiarities with unequitable educational access. Yes, people of color can be assets to their institutions and their corresponding fields who add to the diversity of knowledge creation practices, but it is not people of color's project or responsibility to act as the trophy to alleviate the unhappy conscience of educational malpractice or give a helping hand to the main protagonists for whom the scenario has already been written. Undoubtedly, they can take on that role if they want to, but it is only contingent upon where their desires lie not where they should lie.I strongly agree with Richerme's claim that music classrooms and I would add any classroom and learning environment should be a place and space for "sharing stories and insights"3 to not only learn about the content material whatever it may be but to learn to empathize with one another, understand positive and negative human behaviors toward humans and their environment, and act against discriminatory practices, racial, ethnic, religious, and gender prejudices, and to the point of Richerme's essay, unequitable practices that are insistent in today's political climate on a global scale.At this very juncture I diverge not from Richerme's fine thesis and argumentation, but from the larger issue of the premise of her arguments grounded on Thomas Green's educational framework.4 Green argues that the "rank order of political arguments that can be mustered in support of the [educational] system … [is] roughly as follows": (1) the fundamental or compelling interests of the state; (2) the aggregate of individual or parental interests; (3) societal interests; and (4) educational goods for their own sake."5 Following Green's framework Richerme analyzes contemporary music education initiatives in relation to the differing political strengths of each group of stakeholders: the state, parents, society, and educational goods for their own sake.There is a sense of mistrust in the local and national government implied by Green's framework, reminding one of the cumulative mistrust of the elite by U.S. citizens. Years of neglect, condescension, and lack of attention to the real and tangible needs of people amalgamated into what today one sees as white nationalism, plutocracy, and protectionism across borders. Green wrote his book, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System, in 1980; historically the world order was increasingly metamorphosing and establishing itself... (shrink)

Philosophy of religion, approached from a comparative perspective, can be a valuable tool for advancing inter-religious dialogue. Unfortunately, “comparative religion” today is usually characterised by two extreme positions: 1) Comparing religions in order to come to the conclusion that one's own religion is superior 2) Arguing for a type of “religious pluralism” that relativises all religious truth claims. -/- The former approach reduces religion to a confrontational form of apologetics, theatrical “debates” and polemics, while the latter reduces (...) religion to a mere acceptance of pragmatically useful perspectivist narratives devoid of absolute reality or truth. -/- Inter-religious dialogue should follow a middle path between these two extremes by engaging with underlying philosophical themes that are common to all religious traditions instead of emphasising the comparison of theological and soteriological arguments that may depend on justifications that are exclusive to a particular religious practice. The philosophical theme explored here is that of dissatisfaction and existential suffering in an imperfect world, a theme found in all “world religions”. Indeed, the diagnosis of this existential predicament and the hope that religious practice may allow one to overcome it appears to be universal, while its causes and the prescribed remedies differ considerably among religious traditions. Nevertheless, inter-religious dialogue beginning from a conviction that all religious practitioners strive for truth and salvation in response to a common existential experience may lead to a more compassionate and productive dialogue between religious communities. This type of inter-religious dialogue avoids accusations of falling into religious syncretism or relativism while encouraging diverse religious communities to address contemporary issues from areas of philosophical common ground. This allows for a more fruitful type of inter-religious dialogue and comparative study of religion that can be pursued while maintaining one's own distinct religious identities and particular religious truths. (shrink)

This unique volume collects some of the best recent work on the philosophical challenge that religious diversity poses for religious belief. Featuring contributors from philosophy, religious studies, and theology, it is unified by the way in which many of the authors engage in sustained critical examination of one another's positions. John Hick's pluralism provides one focal point of the collection. Hick argues that all the major religious traditions make contact with the same ultimate reality, each (...) encountering it through a variety of culturally shaped forms of thought and experience but all offering equally effective paths to salvation or liberation. Another central position is William P. Alston's defense of the Christian practice of forming beliefs about manifestations of God in response to experiences of divine presence or activity. Articles by Hick and Alston develop their arguments and other selections respond, criticizing or defending various aspects of one or both positions. Religious skepticism, religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism, and other perspectives are also represented. In the introduction, the editors suggest connections among the articles and report on additional exchanges between the contributors. The only anthology that provides comprehensive coverage of the current philosophical debate about religious diversity, The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity is ideal for courses and seminars on the philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and world religions. (shrink)

This paper examines a variety of intellectual responses to the religious and philosophical issues raised by religious plurality. While the specific questions raised by religious plurality differ across traditions, the more general problem that faces all religious intellectuals is how to provide a compelling theoretical account of the relationship between the various religions of the world. The paper briefly reviews religious exclusivism and inclusivism, before focusing upon theories of religious pluralism. After clarifying the (...) distinction between religious pluralism and relativism about religion, and comparing and assessing various forms of pluralism, the paper concludes that how compelling any particular theory of religious diversity proves to be will be dependent upon how convincing one finds the underlying understanding of religion. This implies that the real priority for scholars concerned with rival theories of religious plurality is to strive towards a common understanding of the nature of religion. (shrink)

This is a response to Hick’s comments on my approach to the problem of religious diversity in Perceiving God. Before unearthing the bones I have to pick with him, let me fully acknowledge that I have not provided a fully satisfactory solution to the problem. At most I have done the best that can be done given the constraints within which I was working. But this best, if such it be, is not as bad as Hick makes it (...) appear. To show this I need to make several corrections in Hick’s depiction of the situation. (shrink)

In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a response to the problem of religious diversity or disagreement.

In this essay I describe seven central characteristics of Philip Quinn's approach to the epistemic challenge of religious diversity as they surface in his responses to other contemporary approaches. In the process an assessment is given of Quinn's contribution, and continued relevance, to the contemporary discussions about this topic. The first three sections describe Quinn's confrontations with Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The next section presents critical comments on Quinn's unique notion of thinning.

We recently argued that—contrary to what we call the dominant view— physicians ought to avoid engaging patients on religious grounds.1 The six responses to our article present an array of concerns and have provided us with the opportunity to consider further aspects of our view. While we cannot reply to all the relevant issues, our aim here is to reply to the most significant concerns. Against our Public Reason Argument, Nick Colgrove maintains that physicians are not relevantly akin (...) to public officials and should therefore not be constrained by public reasons. Colgrove does not take issue with the idea that it may be reasonable for public officials to justify their policymaking according to public reasons because their policies affect a diverse population. But since ‘the [medical] decision being made is not binding for other patients,’ physicians need not be constrained by public reasons.2 Colgrove’s criticism hinges on the claim that deliberation ought to be constrained by public reason only if the outcome of such deliberation is a policy or a rule that a diverse group of people must follow. We disagree with this claim. We do not believe, nor did we argue, that this is a necessary condition for when we are morally required to cite public reasons. Instead we believe that three facts together provide sufficient reason for why physicians should generally be constrained by public reasons: physicians are directly and indirectly paid by the state via Medicare and Medicaid; physicians allocate public resources; and physicians are regulated by the state. Colgrove takes particular issue with our ‘Dr Chatterjee case’, which is meant to illustrate why citing religious reasons is inappropriate. And our explanation for why we find this case jarring …. (shrink)

In this paper I examine some issues raised by conspicuous displays of religiosity in sports. In particular, important questions have been occasioned by the relatively recent pronouncements and behavior of a celebrated evangelical Christian athlete in American professional football. I explain reasons why some find such conspicuous piety worrisome. I raise concerns related to the nature of sport, consistency, divisiveness, trivialization, and religious diversity. After discussing objections to exclusivist forms of religion, especially theistic religions, I focus on how (...) religious beliefs should be held. I present what I call the Basic Argument from Religious Disagreement, whose conclusion claims that religious beliefs ought to be held fallibly, rather than confidently or with certainty. Fallible religious belief has important and valuable consequences, overall and in the specific context of sports. Celebrated athletes have strong reasons to hold religious beliefs fallibly and, if they claim to be role models, they may have epistemic responsibilities as well as moral responsibilities. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RESPONSE TO QAMAR-UL HUDA Robert Hamerton-Kelly Stanford University Qamar and I communicated by email. The text of my response is basically what I sent him by email. Dear Qamar: Thanks for your greeting. I have read your paper with interest and learned from it. Here is a brief account of what I plan to say. My response will be chiefly from the point of view of the mimetic theory (...) which holds that religion in its human, pagan, unrevealed form is a structure of sacred violence that lives by scapegoating and sacrifice and generates culture out ofthe victim by means of, firstly ritual, the repetition of the first murder as sacrifice, secondly prohibition, religious law that enforces differentiation, and thus prevents the crisis of undifferentiation, that is the precursor of surrogate victimage and thirdly myth, the account of the originary violence told from the point of views of the perpetrators, coverup for their violence. Islam's monotheism is a powerful antidote to this pagan sacred, indeed, in terms ofmimetic theory, all the great religions are more or less in reaction against the pagan sacred, against generative violence; and one ofthe marks oftheir greatness resides in the candor with which they address the problem of the residual sacred violence in themselves. This was my problem with Rabbi Kimelman's presentation yesterday, and I confess it is my problem with your presentation. In this regard Iconsider the Buddhistcontribution to this symposiumto be the best of the lot, precisely because it is so candid about the residue of sacred 100Robert Hamerton-Kelly violence in this truly great religion. I think that the presentation on Christianity too was, in this regard, candid. Islam's monotheism is a powerful antidote to this pagan sacred, and I want to drawjust for a minute on that. As you yourself mentioned, the rise ofIslamwas aconflictual phenomenon within thepagan diversity ofArabia in the sixth century. Andthat itselfis disclosive oftherelationshipbetween this emerging monotheism and the residual pagan sacred. Now, you understand, that in terms of mimetic theory, the god is the transfigured victim. So the god is essentially a center of violence. And the emergence of monotheism emerges as a critique of the pagan sacred, the transfigured victim. Now here are some indications in the biblical tradition that illustrate this that I find are quite interesting. You recall that monotheism in the Bible first emerges in the texts of Second Isaiah, Deutero Isaiah. Where the Israelite—in this case Jewish—experience of exile leads the prophet to perceive that God is not just the God of Israel—that is, it's not just henotheism—but is the God of all the world, and that he can indeed work through Cyrus, King ofthe Medes and Persians. It is surely significant that monotheism emerges in the very same text in which the figure of the Suffering Servant of Yahweh appears. It seems as if the emergence of monotheism goes along with the emerging recognition that the victim is innocent. That, ifyou like, is the demythologization ofthe sacred victim of the pagan divinity. I refer you now, secondly, to the ten commandments, the ten words of Moses from Sinai in Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 6. As we discussed in our seminar at Stanford and as René has made clear in his most recent book (ISee Satan Falling likeLightening ), the tenth commandment,"Thou shalt not covet" is indeed a prohibition on mimetic desire. This is what the Apostle Paul understood when he picked up in a book epithumesis—in Greek: "you shall not desire." By the way thuo, the root thu in Greek is the root for sacrifice. So epithumia/desire, is etymologically in Greek linked to sacrifice. "You shall not desire" is a prohibition on sacred violence. That's the last commandment and, I take it as an important summary of the previous nine commandments. What I have not seen generally appreciated is that the first commandment is a prohibition on idolatry. It is in fact the establishment of the absolute monotheism. So it is as if the ten commandments are bracketed by two stridently mimetic antimimetic injunctions: theinjunction on idolatry and the injunction on mimetic desire. And I think you can... (shrink)

Careful examination of the facts of record shows that the JRE has been as successful as its competitors in expanding the cultural range and scope of inquiry in religious ethics. Yet it should be noted that the debate between cultural particularists and philosophical ethicists, a debate that has shaped the actual practices of the field of comparative religious studies, has not been vigorously pursued in these pages. Likewise, the JRE has not yet realized its potential to foster collaborative (...) work among scholars working in different religious traditions, to encourage attention to neglected topics, or to enlarge, through fuller attention to diverse religious traditions, the range of ethical and metaethical interests that dominate inquiry in religious ethics. (shrink)

Focusing on current efforts to persuade the public to comply with Covid-19 best practices, this essay examines what role appeals to religious reasons should (or should not) play in leaders’ attempts to secure followers’ acceptance of group policies in contexts of religious and moral pluralism. While appeals to followers’ religious commitments can be helpful in promoting desirable public health outcomes, they also raise moral concerns when made in the contexts of secular institutions with religiously diverse participants. In (...) these contexts, leaders who appeal to religious reasons as bases of justification for imposing Covid policies may seem to fail to show respect for the autonomy of those who lack the relevant religious commitments, and—especially when a leader herself rejects the religious commitments she makes reference to to persuade others—her appeals to religious reasons may seem to constitute ethically problematic exercises of manipulation. This essay draws on the resources of contemporary political philosophy to analyze and respond to these concerns and concludes that they are not sufficiently well-founded. To the contrary, it contends that there are good moral grounds for leaders to appeal to religious reasons as (partial) bases of justification for why followers should accept Covid policies. In the course of the argument, this essay also highlights how contemporary political theory can enrich discussions about the distinctions between coercion, manipulation, and leadership, and thereby give insight not only into the ethics of leadership but also—at least by the lights of central theories of leadership like that of James MacGregor Burns (1978)—into whether and how appeals to religious reasons can figure into genuine exercises of leadership, in contrast with mere instances of the wielding of social power. (shrink)

I am grateful to Dr Stammers and Professor Vacek for their thoughtful commentaries on my paper.1 I will take their points one by one, though in no special order. Given the space available, I will confine myself to their most important remarks. Dr Stammers accuses me of aligning religion and conscience too closely.2 I agree with him that conscience is broader than religion and that the issue of conscientious objection should be framed so as to handle wholly non-religious ethical (...) objections. I wrote, ‘It is essential for the ethics of cooperation not to be seen as necessarily religious in nature in order for it to have proper application to disputed cases, whether or not brought by religious litigants’.3 A potential draftee might be a pacifist and not a religious adherent; the same in healthcare, where one might oppose abortion or euthanasia, say, on secular grounds. The main purpose of my paper is to show that a viable ‘ethics of cooperation’ can be used in all conscientious objection cases where complicity is at stake, whether the objection is religious or not. It is of course right, as Dr Stammers observes, that my ‘methodological neutralist’ will likely bridle at the claim that a top-level primary ethical or religious belief, such as that abortion at 12 weeks is immoral, is beyond a reasonableness test. Notoriously, in our secularised and diverse liberal society, a proposition that seems patently clear to one side of a major ethical debate can seem anything but clear to the other side, who will …. (shrink)

This study examines the leading early nineteenth-century Scottish moral philosopher Dugald Stewart’s discussion of the origin and development of religion. Stewart developed his account in his final work, The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man (1828), in an effort to show that the fact that polytheism was the first religion of humankind does not undermine the truth of monotheism. He wrote in response to similar discussions presented in David Hume’s “Natural History of Religion” (1757), which argued for (...) the primacy of polytheism, and Stewart’s old moral philosophy tutor Adam Ferguson’s Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792), which argued for the primacy of monotheism. Stewart accepted the conclusions of the Scots’ enlightened study of religion, which argued for truth of Hume’s account, but aimed to reassert many of the natural theological arguments about the naturalness of religion that the “Natural History” had challenged. Stewart’s discussion acts as a useful way by which we can assess the achievement of the literati’s study of religion. (shrink)

This paper argues that Article 8 of the ECHR, as applied to the protection of a person’s right to wear a headscarf, is an inappropriate locus for thrashing out arguments about the right to protection of religious freedom, and that Article 9 allows for a broader legal and political analysis of the multiple meanings and impacts of religion in our lives. However, the law should not prohibit women from wearing the headscarf. Legal regulation of the headscarf should be replaced (...) with robust political debate about the many diverse and intersecting ways in which it is possible to experience womanhood, sexuality, culture, religion, race, nationality and economic security in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Two general sorts of responses to the suffering caused by the 9/11 attacks are distinguishable in the statements of public officials, journalists, and citizens: one manifests a tragic sensibility, another takes the form of theodicy. Each response entails a distinctive set of expectations about the nature of political agency and solidarity in a democracy. With its claim of access to a transcendental form of truth, theodicy promises a robust sense of political solidarity and agency based on a shared (...) class='Hi'>religious belief. Tragic modes of appeal muster their consolatory effects by appealing to intuitions or taste rather than religious belief and therefore potentially remain open to more diverse public audiences. (shrink)

Among the philosophical and theological responses to the phenomenon of religious diversity, religious pluralism has been both prominent and influential. Of its various proponents, John Hick and John Cobb represent two important figures whose respective positions, especially that of Hick, have done much to shape the debate over religious pluralism. This article critically analyses their positions, arguing that, by unhelpfully homogenizing religious perspectives, each of them fails to do justice to the radical diversity (...) that exists. As an alternative to these homogenizing tendencies, the article builds upon D. Z. Phillips’ contemplative conception of philosophy to develop a radical pluralist approach, which prioritizes a deepening of understanding of religious diversity rather than the promotion of one’s own theological preferences. (shrink)

Nearly everyone recognizes the fact of deep pluralism: it is hard to deny that contemporary America is characterized by widespread diversity of beliefs, practices, and values. We disagree, not on this reality, but on the way we should respond to the pluralism around us. In this paper, Emily G. Wenneborg discusses one of the most common responses to pluralism in contemporary philosophy of education: autonomy-based liberalism. She praises liberalism for its attempt to navigate certain tensions that accompany its (...) approach to pluralism. At the same time, she raises several critiques of liberalism as a response to pluralism, particularly with regard to religious communities and belief systems. She suggests that trust provides a better framework than autonomy for educating in and for deep pluralism. (shrink)

Disagreement and debunking arguments threaten religious belief. In this paper, I draw attention to two types of propositions and show how they reveal new ways to respond to debunking arguments and disagreement. The first type of proposition is the epistemically self-promoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that one reliably believes it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield an epistemically circular argument in (...) response to certain debunking arguments. The second type of proposition is the epistemically others-demoting proposition, which, when justifiedly believed, gives one a reason to think that others are unreliable with respect to it. Such a proposition plays a key role in my argument that some religious believers can permissibly wield a question-begging argument to respond to certain types of disagreement. (shrink)

Among the philosophical and theological responses to the phenomenon of religious diversity, religious pluralism has been both prominent and influential. Of its various proponents, John Hick and John Cobb represent two important figures whose respective positions, especially that of Hick, have done much to shape the debate over religious pluralism. This article critically analyses their positions, arguing that, by unhelpfully homogenizing religious perspectives, each of them fails to do justice to the radical diversity (...) that exists. As an alternative to these homogenizing tendencies, the article builds upon D. Z. Phillips’ contemplative conception of philosophy to develop a radical pluralist approach, which prioritizes a deepening of understanding of religious diversity rather than the promotion of one’s own theological preferences. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the distinction between justified and unjustified religious diversity, a problem that Dirk-Martin Grube only hinted at in his article ‘Justified Religious Difference.’ This article’s focus is not so much on the epistemological question of justifying religious difference, but on how to deal with it in the societal sphere. This implies that religions and religious diversity will be approached from a practical perspective, that is, (...) as ways of life. I start by examining the opportunities and problems of religious diversity, opposing a universalist and a particularist view on this issue. Religious difference is an opportunity, because it is intertwined with creativity and innovation, but it is also a problem, because it confronts us with incompatible judgments, irreconcilable values, and contrary principles. Notwithstanding the legitimate objections that can be raised against the particularist position, the above observations seriously undermine Grube’s idea that the distinction between justified and unjustified religious difference can be made unambiguously, because of the heterogeneous character of the idea of justification itself. In order to deal with this issue, I propose a re-examination of the idea of tolerance, defined as a virtue: I disapprove of your manner of living, but I respect in it your liberty to live as you please and I recognize your right to manifest it publicly. But this virtue makes only sense against the background of the intolerable, which is the translation of the idea of unjustified religious difference into the language of the public debate. This idea serves as an always fragile limit to tolerance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Searching for a Universal Ethic: Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law Tradition ed. by John Berkman and William C. Mattison IIIStewart D. ClemSearching for a Universal Ethic: Multidisciplinary, Ecumenical, and Interfaith Responses to the Catholic Natural Law Tradition Edited by John Berkman and William C. Mattison III GRAND RAPIDS, MI: EERDMANS, 2014. 339 PP. $35.00Despite its generalist title, this book is the (...) result of a very specific and multilayered textual history. The core of the volume is the official English translation of the International Theological Commission (ITC) document In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law, which alone composes nearly a quarter of the book's text. Following five years of work, the commission first published the document in 2009. The following year, a special session at the annual meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics was convened for the purpose of discussing the document, and this session served as the impetus for the present volume. Along with Berkman and Mattison's introductory chapter, the remainder of the book is composed of responses to the document from no less than twenty-two scholars representing a broad range of religious and philosophical commitments.If there is anything approaching a consensus among the volume's diverse respondents, it is a nearly unanimous verdict that the ITC document offers a more winsome portrayal of natural law theorizing than anything that has been promulgated in official Church documents during the last several decades. As Serge-Thomas Bonino, OP (one of the document's coauthors), explains, the commission endeavored to situate the doctrine of natural law within "a larger theological framework that is both Christological and Trinitarian" (98). Many respondents praise the document's more nuanced and open-ended analysis of the natural law—one that accommodates a wide variety of sociocultural contexts—as well as the document's clarity and boldness in articulating a Christian (and specifically Christological) interpretation of the natural law tradition.The high level of admiration bestowed on the document does not mean that it is without its detractors, however. Some of the more critical respondents maintain that, in spite of the commission's "new look" at the natural law, many of the classical objections to the doctrine still hold. Gilbert Meilaender, for example, lauds the document's Christological commitments but worries that it fails to explain how this facet of the Catholic natural law tradition can help us to develop a universal ethic on which all can agree (226). Others express doubts precisely about what is "new" in this new look at the natural law. This [End Page 202] is perhaps best reflected by Jennifer Herdt's remark that "the note of epistemological modesty repeatedly sounded by In Search of a Universal Ethic seems to ring hollow" (210). In other words, the move toward less specificity regarding moral norms may in fact render the natural law inadequate as a framework for dialogue across cultures.Given the perennial subject matter of this volume, the editors have done an excellent job of balancing a vast range of perspectives and approaches to the natural law, rendering it useful to a wide audience. The sheer number of authors could easily have resulted in a collection that reflected breadth at the expense of depth. Thankfully, however, the presence of the ITC text as the locus of discussion helps to ground the conversation in such a way that all of the authors are fruitfully engaging the same set of questions. For this reason, it is among the best volumes currently available for those who wish to engage the most creative and rigorous thinking within the natural law tradition.Stewart D. ClemUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to a defense of the now quite familiar argument from the perceptual model of religious experience (hereafter PMR) to the rationality of beliefs formed on the basis of religious experience. The contribution will not, however, come in the form of a positive argument for PMR. Neither will this contribution take the form of a response to key objections to the plausibility of that model. Instead, I wish to argue that there is a widespread (...) assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience generally which, when assimilated by PMR, complicates the attempt to respond to the most serious objection to the argument from PMR to the rationality of religious belief—viz. the objection from conflicting religious claims. Again, this paper will not respond to the objection from conflicting religious claims. Rather, it will explain how a common assumption makes that problem worse (or even intractable) and it will offer a positive suggestion about how to avoid that common assumption. Of course, to have shown how not to make a problem worse is not yet to have solved the problem. But, if the argument of this paper succeeds, it is a crucial first step. In what follows, I will (i) very briefly summarize the role of PMR in an argument for the rationality of religious belief, (ii) state the problem of conflicting religious claims, (iii) explain how a widespread assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience exacerbates the problem and (iv) offer the beginnings of an alternative account of the role of concepts in perceptual experience and comment on the evidential force of religious experience construed along the lines of this alternative account. Of course, an adequate treatment of the points in (iv) would require far more attention than can be devoted to them here. The primary burden of this paper is to establish the critical point in (iii), i.e., to generate some dissatisfaction with the “widespread assumption,” and to use this dissatisfaction as a motivation for exploring an alternative account of conceptual contribution. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to a defense of the now quite familiar argument from the perceptual model of religious experience (hereafter PMR) to the rationality of beliefs formed on the basis of religious experience. The contribution will not, however, come in the form of a positive argument for PMR. Neither will this contribution take the form of a response to key objections to the plausibility of that model. Instead, I wish to argue that there is a widespread (...) assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience generally which, when assimilated by PMR, complicates the attempt to respond to the most serious objection to the argument from PMR to the rationality of religious belief—viz. the objection from conflicting religious claims. Again, this paper will not respond to the objection from conflicting religious claims. Rather, it will explain how a common assumption makes that problem worse (or even intractable) and it will offer a positive suggestion about how to avoid that common assumption. Of course, to have shown how not to make a problem worse is not yet to have solved the problem. But, if the argument of this paper succeeds, it is a crucial first step.In what follows, I will (i) very briefly summarize the role of PMR in an argument for the rationality of religious belief, (ii) state the problem of conflicting religious claims, (iii) explain how a widespread assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience exacerbates the problem and (iv) offer the beginningsof an alternative account of the role of concepts in perceptual experience and comment on the evidential force of religious experience construed along the lines of this alternative account. Of course, an adequate treatment of the points in (iv) would require far more attention than can be devoted to them here. The primary burden of this paper is to establish the critical point in (iii), i.e., to generate some dissatisfaction with the “widespread assumption,” and to use this dissatisfaction as a motivation for exploring an alternative account of conceptual contribution. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to a defense of the now quite familiar argument from the perceptual model of religious experience (hereafter PMR) to the rationality of beliefs formed on the basis of religious experience. The contribution will not, however, come in the form of a positive argument for PMR. Neither will this contribution take the form of a response to key objections to the plausibility of that model. Instead, I wish to argue that there is a widespread (...) assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience generally which, when assimilated by PMR, complicates the attempt to respond to the most serious objection to the argument from PMR to the rationality of religious belief—viz. the objection from conflicting religious claims. Again, this paper will not respond to the objection from conflicting religious claims. Rather, it will explain how a common assumption makes that problem worse (or even intractable) and it will offer a positive suggestion about how to avoid that common assumption. Of course, to have shown how not to make a problem worse is not yet to have solved the problem. But, if the argument of this paper succeeds, it is a crucial first step.In what follows, I will (i) very briefly summarize the role of PMR in an argument for the rationality of religious belief, (ii) state the problem of conflicting religious claims, (iii) explain how a widespread assumption about the role of concepts in perceptual experience exacerbates the problem and (iv) offer the beginningsof an alternative account of the role of concepts in perceptual experience and comment on the evidential force of religious experience construed along the lines of this alternative account. Of course, an adequate treatment of the points in (iv) would require far more attention than can be devoted to them here. The primary burden of this paper is to establish the critical point in (iii), i.e., to generate some dissatisfaction with the “widespread assumption,” and to use this dissatisfaction as a motivation for exploring an alternative account of conceptual contribution. (shrink)

The professional and institutional responsibility for handling genetic knowledge is well discussed; less attention has been paid to how lay people and particularly people who are affected by genetic diseases perceive and frame such responsibilities. In this exploratory study we qualitatively examine the attitudes of lay people, patients and relatives of patients in Germany and Israel towards genetic testing. These attitudes are further examined in the national context of Germany and Israel, which represent opposite regulatory approaches and bioethical debates concerning (...) genetic testing. Three major themes of responsibility emerged from the inter-group and cross-cultural comparison: self-responsibility, responsibility for kin, and responsibility of society towards its members. National contrast was apparent in the moral reasoning of lay respondents concerning, for example, the right not to know versus the duty to know (self-responsibility) and the moral conflict concerning informing kin versus the moral duty to inform (responsibility for kin). Attitudes of respondents affected by genetic diseases were, however, rather similar in both countries. We conclude by discussing how moral discourses of responsibility are embedded within cultural (national, religious) as well as phenomenological (being affected) narratives, and the role of public engagement in bioethical discourse. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Conflicting Truth Claims Hick's Pluralism Responses to Religious Diversity Openness to Other Traditions Attitudes Toward Those Who Disagree Certainty and Doubt Is God a Hypothesis? The Practice of Belief Notes.

The essay “The Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma: Revisions of Humean Thought, New Empirical Research, and the Limits of Rational Religious Belief‘ is a bold argument for the irrationality of “first-order‘ religious belief. However, unlike those associated with “New Atheism,‘ the paper’s authors Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican claim both that there are prospects for rational “second-order‘ religious belief and that religious belief and practice can play a positive role in human life. In response to Thornhill-Miller and Millican, (...) Janusz Salamon has argued that first- order religious belief can be rational, although not via the methods that philosophers who have typically defended the reasonability of faith have appealed to. Both papers are fascinating discussions of the epistemology of religious belief in general, and of the rationality of such commitment in light of modern science and religious disagreement in particular. In this paper, I’ll object to a few points made in each essay and argue that neither paper provides good reason to be dubious about the religious belief being rational along traditional lines. (shrink)

Major worldviews on ultimate reality and history -- Major worldviews on external reality -- Major worldviews on the nature and orientation of man -- Major worldviews concerning truth and ethics -- Major worldviews concerning the social location of religion -- The orders and root metaphors of the modern and postmodern condition -- Observations and strategies -- The true and false church.

In this paper, I provide a novel approach to the issue of religious diversity: I reject classical pluralist approaches to the issue, such as John Hick’s, and argue that their attempts to construe commonalities between the religions are contrived. The reason that they attempt to find commonalities at all costs is that they presuppose a bivalent notion of truth according to which that which is different is false. I suggest that, in order to get a robust theory on (...) religious diversity off the ground, we should rely on the notion of justification rather than that of bivalent truth. Justification is pluralizable, dependent upon the circumstances, whereas bivalent truth is not. Armed with a pluralizable notion of justification, we can acknowledge that other religious beliefs are genuinely different without necessarily being false: They can be justified, given the circumstances a believer of a different religion is in. Perceiving religious differences in this way allows to liberate the interreligious dialogue from the pressure to find commonalities between religions at all costs, to respect the religious Other in her Otherness, and to ‘mirror’ one’s own religion in light of other religions. (shrink)

Religious Pluralism Religious pluralism, broadly construed, is a response to the diversity of religious beliefs, practices, and traditions that exist both in the contemporary world and throughout history. The terms “pluralism” and “pluralist” can, depending on context or intended use, signify anything from the mere fact of religious diversity to a particular kind of philosophical … Continue reading Pluralism, Religious →.

This chapter surveys recent work on philosophical issues raised by religious diversity or pluralism. It focuses on four topics. The first is the epistemological challenge of religious diversity. The rationality of commitment to any particular religious tradition seems to be threatened by the existence of rival traditions. The second is the political problem of religious toleration. Religious conflict throughout the world suggests a need for better arguments against religious intolerance than those currently (...) available. The third is the task of understanding the concept of religion. Religious pluralism fuels debate about whether the concept of religion can be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions or, if it cannot, whether it must be analyzed in terms of family resemblances. And the fourth is the enterprise of making constructive comparisons in religious ethics. Similarities and differences between the virtue theories of diverse religious traditions illuminate strengths and weaknesses in the ethical thought of the religions subjected to comparison. The chapter argues from these examples to the conclusion that religious diversity gives rise to several exciting and important problems that ought to be high on the agenda of philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Epistemologists have shown increased interest in the epistemic significance of disagreement, and in particular, in whether there is a rational requirement concerning belief revision in the face of peer disagreement. This article examines some of the general issues discussed by epistemologists, and then considers how they may or may not apply to the case of religious disagreement, both within religious traditions and between religious (and non-religious) views.