In 2011, two Chinese municipalities, Chongqing and Shanghai, enacted a property tax on rich homeowners. However, the two municipal governments sharply diverged in their designs of the tax and the justifying frames used. Whereas Chongqing explicitly framed the tax as a redistributive measure targeting the economic elite, Shanghai framed it as an ad hoc technical intervention in the housing market that would antagonize no one. This article explains how the only two Chinese cities that introduced this unconventional tax ended up (...) enacting the tax in such different ways. In doing so, this article proposes a theoretical framework synthesizing two main pillars of Bourdieu’s state theory – a conceptualization of the state as a field of competition, and a careful consideration of the symbolic dimension of state power. The political competition in which the top leaders of the two municipalities were engaged drove them to enact the tax. The positions these leaders occupied in the field of competition shaped their specific strategies of accumulating competition-specific capital, getting their capital noted and recognized by other players in the field, and theatricalizing their capital-seeking acts as serving some universal interest. These dynamics gave rise to divergent styles of enacting the tax. (shrink)

Radical “Westernizing” transformations in extra-European countries, from Peter I’s Russia to Meiji Japan, are traditionally presented as a response to pressures from the more militarily and technologically advanced European powers. This corresponds to the general tendency to view war as the driving force behind early modern state-building. However, the question remains: how exactly did such transformations happen, and what explains their timing? Why did some countries, such as Russia, embark on radical institutional restructuring that threatened large sections of the traditional (...) military classes in the absence of any obvious existential threat, while in others even clear and immediate dangers failed to ignite a full-scale “Westernization”? This article seeks to complicate the “bellicist” narrative of “Westernizing” transformations and to generalize about the role of elite conflict in propelling “self-strengthening” reforms. It argues that “Westernizations” in extra-European polities were enabled by breakdown of domestic political balance and driven by “challengers” emerging in the course of these conflicts, as they strove to maximize their power. Factional struggles accompanying “Westernizations” are interpreted here not as a conservative reaction against reforms, but as a process that preceded and enabled institutional restructuring. (shrink)

Competitive Governments, explores in a systematic way the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to (...) the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services. In the real world where information is costly, the links may not be first-best, but they will be efficient if competition is vigorous. (shrink)

By examining his account of individual virtues, making inferences from his analyses of flawed cities, and teasing out the tacit assumptions behind claims about the nature of political activity, I argue that Aristotle thinks of competition as being a political ideal rather than as an inevitable corruption of civic life. Virtuous citizens compete for civic honor through traditional "competitive outlays" and contend against one another for prestigious offices in the city. Moreover, I argue that the very structure (...) of political deliberation is competitive. It is through a "vis-à-vis" competition among proposals that a winning policy is adopted, and the speakers who offer these proposals are themselves involved in a competition for political influence. (shrink)

The essays in this volume, written by well-known economists and other social scientists from North America, Europe and Australia, share to an unusual degree a common concern with the competitive mechanisms that underlie collective decisions and with the way they are embedded in institutional settings. This gives the book a unitary inspiration whose value is clear from the understanding and insights its chapters provide on important theoretical and practical issues such as the social dimension and impact of trust, the management (...) of information in bureaucratic settings, the role of political parties in constitutional evolution, inter-level rivalry and reassignments of powers in federal and unitary systems of government, the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on federal institutions or arrangements, and the response of governments and overarching institutions of globalization. The essays were written in honour of Albert Breton, a pioneer in this field of investigation. (shrink)

Many tensions exist within the nexus of corporate social responsibility, competitive strategy, and political activity. Previously, these aspects of strategic management have been considered in relative isolation or at best in pairs. Accordingly, an attempt is made here to set out a general strategic problem of the corporation, in which all three aspects are combined. This project reveals a particular need to explicate the political assumptions held by or on behalf of the corporation. Examples might include the classical (...) liberal model, global hypercompetition, or variants of the stakeholder model. The project also reinforces the broader notion that when one adopts the perspective of a corporate strategist, one can sometimes find potentially productive ways of reframing issues in ethics, economics, and politics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT“Post-truth” politics is often framed as a failure of the competition of idea­s. Yet there are different ways of thinking about the competition of ideas, with different implications for the way we understand its benefits and risks. The dominant way of framing the competition of ideas is in terms of a marketplace, which, however, obscures the different ways ideas can compete. Several theorists can help us think through the competition of ideas. J. S. Mill, for example, (...) avoided the metaphor of the market by focusing, instead, on competition as the testing of arguments in adversarial encounters before a critical audience. Georg Simmel, alternatively, conceived of competition as a form of indirect conflict, where two individuals strive in parallel to gain audience approval. This view emphasizes innovation and creativity in the competition of “all for all.” More recently, theorists have developed the market logic of competition by thinking of a marketplace not for ideas but for rationalizations. This articulates some of the features of Simmel’s view of competition, but underestimates the degrees of constraint required to secure the goods of competition. Ultimately, recognizing these different modes of competition in the public sphere can enrich our theories of deliberative democracy and sharpen our view of the problem of “post-truth” politics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Demands have been growing upon firms to take actions in the interests of workers, the environment, local communities, and others. Firms sometimes have felt they could best discharge such responsibilities by cooperating with other firms. This, however, is suspect from the point of view of a purely economic interpretation of competition law, since interfirm agreements may raise prices and thus lower welfare for consumers. Should competition law remain focused on competition enhancing economic welfare, or be reformed to (...) allow for acts of cooperation that are socially beneficial? To answer this question, the article provides a philosophical reevaluation of the deep-seated view that firms are merely private actors. It argues that demands of political legitimacy should also be addressed at firms cooperating together, and that standard views of democratic accountability should be broadened, introducing a model of delegated, sequential decision making which allows regulatory agencies and parliaments to control interfirm agreements. (shrink)

The paper is a close reading of Nietzsche's early essay, "Homer on Competition". It explores the understanding of nature as strife presented in that essay, how this strife channels itself into cultural or state forms, and how these forms cultivate the creative individual or genius. The article concludes by asserting that Nietzsche's central point in "Homer on Competition" concerns the contest across the ages that is fought by these geniuses. For Nietzsche, therefore, competition has a political (...) significance — the forging of the unity and identity of a particular community — and a transpolitical significance — the forging of a "republic of geniuses" on the part of artists and philosophers across the expanse of the tradition. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel competition criterion for evaluating institutional schemes. Roughly, this criterion says that one institutional scheme is normatively superior to another to the extent that the former would engender more widespread political competition than the latter. I show that this criterion should be endorsed by both global egalitarians and their statist rivals, as it follows from their common commitment to the moral equality of all persons. I illustrate the normative import of the competition (...) criterion by exploring its potential implications for the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. In particular, I highlight the challenges it raises for global egalitarians' efforts to justify extending the scope of egalitarian justice beyond the state. (shrink)

In this comment, I highlight similarities between Russia’s contemporary political system and other post-Cold War dictatorships. Most modern dictatorships hold semi-competitive elections. That is, regime officials face competition in elections, but playing fields are tilted so as to leave little suspense about who will win. I suggest that semi-competitive elections and the encouragement of litigation by citizens against local and regional officials, as described by Thornhill and Smirnova, have similar functions from the dictator’s point of view. They help (...) the ruling elite with monitoring and controlling local officials whose behavior might otherwise alienate citizens enough to threaten the dictatorial elite with overthrow. Thus the real benefits citizens receive from the increased use of the courts to resolve disputes and electoral competition among politicians are counterbalanced by the contribution these institutions make to the prolongation of dictatorship. (shrink)

This paper considers whether, and if so how, the modelling of joint action in social philosophy – principally in the work of Margaret Gilbert and Michael Bratman – might assist in understanding and applying the concept of concerted practices in European competition law. More specifically, the paper focuses on a well-known difficulty in the application of that concept, namely, distinguishing between concerted practice and rational or intelligent adaptation in oligopolistic markets. The paper argues that although Bratman's model of joint (...) action is more psychologically plausible and phenomenologically resonant, its less demanding character also makes it less useful than Gilbert's in our understanding of the legal concept of concerted practice and in dealing with the above difficulty. The paper proceeds in two parts: first, a discussion of the concept of concerted practices in European competition law; and second, a discussion of Gilbert and' Bratman's models of joint action, including a comparative assessment of their ability to provide an evidentiary target and an evidentiary platform for conceited practices. (shrink)

갈등과 경쟁에 대해 우리가 느끼는 일반적 감정은 부정적이다. 갈등의 양과 질은 경쟁 의 양과 질에 비례한다. 오랫동안 갈등과 경쟁은 인간의 원시적 충동에서 비롯되었고, 문 명과 야만은 갈등과 경쟁의 조절 능력에 있다고 믿어왔다. 이성적 존재인 인간은 과도한 갈등과 경쟁이 초래할 해악을 사전에 방지하기 위한 윤리적 규범과 법률적 금지를 고안하 기에 이른다. 그럼에도 현실은 전혀 다른 양상을 보여주고 있다. 갈등과 경쟁을 제거하거 나 제어할 수 있다는 이성주의자들의 믿음은 현실 앞에 무력하다. 니체와 무페는 갈등과 경쟁에 대한 또 다른 시선을 우리에게 제공한다. 두 사람은 (...) 모두 갈등과 경쟁이 인간의 자 연성으로부터 비롯되고, 결코 제거할 수 없다는 점에 동의한다. 동시에 그들은 갈등과 경 쟁을 독점과 지배를 위한 과정이 아니라 공동체의 역동성을 증진시키는 길을 탐색한다. (shrink)

Many countries around the world embrace freedom and democracy as part of their political culture. However, culture is at least in part a human response to the ecological challenges that a society faces; hence, it should not be surprising that the degree to which societies regulate the level of individual freedom is related to environmental circumstances. Previous research suggests that levels of societal freedom across countries are systematically related to three types of ecological threats: prevalence of pathogens, climate challenges, (...) and natural disaster threat. Though their incidence overlaps, the literature has not yet provided a competitive test. Drawing upon the ecocultural framework, we tested five rival hypotheses, alternately focused on the above ecological factors and their interactions with economic wealth in explaining country variations in socio-political freedom. Focusing on data from 150 countries, we performed a series of linear mixed-effects regressions predicting freedom in the domains of politics, media, and economy. We found that countries with higher pathogen prevalence were more likely to suppress democracy and media freedom. Economic wealth, however, moderated the effect of pathogen prevalence on economic freedom, with the main effect being only found among wealthy countries, but not among poor countries. In contrast, natural disaster threat predicted political freedom and press freedom only among poor countries, consistent with the idea that disaster threat accompanied by poor resources promote socio-political freedom as a means of increasing collective survival. Throughout our analyses, we found no support for hypotheses based on climatic challenges. In addition, our multilevel approach revealed that country scores for socio-political freedom were highly clustered within world regions, accounting for substantial portions of variance. Overall, the present research offers a nuanced view of the interplay between ecology and wealth in the emergence of socio-political freedom. We discuss new directions in future research considering methodological and theoretical contributions of the present findings. (shrink)

Drawing on models of the interaction order, we describe how planning is an inherently social activity. We argue that planning as a practice involves five core elements: mirroring, identifying, coordinating, timing, and surmounting. Specifically, planning depends on (1) a realization of likely responses of others, (2) a recognition of communal understandings, grounded in local cultures, (3) a commitment to collaborative engagements with allies, (4) an adjustment to temporal sequences involving the use of “in time” strategies and tactics, and (5) an (...) ability to overcome or avoid obstacles and blocking moves set by competitors and adversaries. Planning is evident in micro-, meso-, or macro-level domains. To demonstrate how planning is a social accomplishment, we analyze three distinct ethnographic sites: the world of competitive chess, dependent on the micro-interactions of two competitors; the meso-level process of homebuying, requiring the aid of real estate agents as allies; and macro-level structures in directing social movement activism in a contentious action field. Planning extends beyond cognitive achievement and is central to a sociology of the future. (shrink)

Rich people stash away trillions of dollars in tax havens like Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, or Singapore. Multinational corporations shift their profits to low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland or Panama to avoid paying tax. Recent stories in the media about Apple, Google, Starbucks, and Fiat are just the tip of the iceberg. There is hardly any multinational today that respects not just the letter but also the spirit of tax laws. All this becomes possible due to tax competition, with countries (...) strategically designing fiscal policy to attract capital from abroad. The loopholes in national tax regimes that tax competition generates and exploits draw into question political economic life as we presently know it. They undermine the fiscal autonomy of political communities and contribute to rising inequalities in income and wealth.Building on a careful analysis of the ethical challenges raised by a world of tax competition, this book puts forward a normative and institutional framework to regulate the practice. In short, individuals and corporations should pay tax in the jurisdictions of which they are members, where this membership can come in degrees. Moreover, the strategic tax setting of states should be limited in important ways. An International Tax Organisation should be created to enforce the principles of tax justice.The author defends this call for reform against two important objections. First, Dietsch refutes the suggestion that regulating tax competition is inefficient. Second, he argues that regulation of this sort, rather than representing a constraint on national sovereignty, in fact turns out to be a requirement of sovereignty in a global economy. The book closes with a series of reflections on the obligations that the beneficiaries of tax competition have towards the losers both prior to any institutional reform as well as in its aftermath. (shrink)

This paper proposes a model of human uniqueness based on an unusual distinction between two contrasted kinds of political competition and political status: (1) antagonistic competition, in quest of dominance (antagonistic status), a zero-sum, self-limiting game whose stake—who takes what, when, how—summarizes a classical definition of politics (Lasswell 1936), and (2) synergistic competition, in quest of merit (synergistic status), a positive-sum, self-reinforcing game whose stake becomes “who brings what to a team’s common good.” In this (...) view, Rawls’s (1971) famous virtual “veil of ignorance” mainly conceals politics’ antagonistic stakes so as to devise the principles of a just, egalitarian society, yet without providing any means to enforce these ideals (Sen 2009). Instead, this paper proposes that human uniqueness flourished under a real “adapted veil of ignorance” concealing the steady inflation of synergistic politics which resulted from early humans’ sturdy egalitarianism. This proposition divides into four parts: (1) early humans first stumbled on a purely cultural means to enforce a unique kind of within-team antagonistic equality—dyadic balanced deterrence thanks to handheld weapons (Chapais 2008); (2) this cultural innovation is thus closely tied to humans’ darkest side, but it also launched the cumulative evolution of humans’ brightest qualities—egalitarian team synergy and solidarity, together with the associated synergistic intelligence, culture, and communications; (3) runaway synergistic competition for differential merit among antagonistically equal obligate teammates is the single politically selective mechanism behind the cumulative evolution of all these brighter qualities, but numerous factors to be clarified here conceal this mighty evolutionary driver; (4) this veil of ignorance persists today, which explains why humans’ unique prosocial capacities are still not clearly understood by science. The purpose of this paper is to start lifting this now-ill-adapted veil of ignorance, thus uncovering the tight functional relations between egalitarian team solidarity and the evolution of human uniqueness. (shrink)

Intergroup competition over resources is attested since the dawn of history. Written and archaeological evidence go back to at least the fourth millennium BC. According to accepted views, evolution has favored humans because of their ability to have cumulative cultures, which has made flexible adaptation possible. One major aspect of this adaptation has been the ability to handle power contests without engaging physical force. Instead, increasing prestige dynamics has allowed contest management by displaying symbolic assets. These have growingly been (...) instrumental in deterring external assaults, thus guaranteeing the possession – or expansion – of a group’s resources. However, while material assets are believed to create status by the evidence of their tangible usefulness (such as foods, husbandry and tools), symbolic assets are by definition subject to ongoing negotiation, entirely dependent on being socio-semiotically recognized as types of capital. Symbolic stock exchanges thus appear to have been determinative since antiquity in hierarchizing ethnic and political groups fighting over resources, prioritizing ones over the others. They have culminated in repertoires of more solid tangible and intangible assets, from impressive buildings, city gates, gardens and temples, to ideas such as freedom, quality of life and wealth, justice, personal security, or whatever values that have gained universal recognition. The article discusses the creation and expansion of such symbolic repertoires and their uncertain position in recent times. (shrink)

This chapter provides an overview of the key European Union (EU) competition law provisions, focusing on their impact on the global economy and how this impact is managed. It considers the main transnational themes that arise. The first is the age‐old question of the extent to which national law applies across its borders. The second is the question of externalities, which has two ramifications. The first is an economic one, whereby the concern is that the enforcement of competition (...) law in one jurisdiction may have negative repercussions in others, reducing global welfare. The second branch is political in character and arises when the enforcement of competition law in one jurisdiction harms the economic interests of firms abroad. A third theme is collaboration among agencies in the context of global anticompetitive conduct. A fourth theme is hypocrisy. The chapter also sketches how competition policy became the European Union's first supranational policy. (shrink)

When a business has competitors that break a burdensome law, is it morally required to obey this law, or may it break the law to avoid an unfair competitive disadvantage? Though this ethical question is pervasive in the business world, many non-skeptical theories of the obligation to obey the law cannot give it a clear answer. A broadly Kantian account, by contrast, can explain why businesspeople ought to obey laws of a certain type even under competitive pressure, namely laws that (...) play a direct role in defining rights to use physical or financial resources free from substantial interference. Businesspeople must obey these laws even at the cost of allowing their businesses to fail and even when the acts proscribed are mala prohibita. This argument for obeying the law in competitive contexts has limited scope. Considerations of fairness or self-preservation may justify violating laws of other types under competitive pressure. (shrink)

By examining his account of individual virtues, making inferences from his analyses of flawed cities, and teasing out the tacit assumptions behind claims about the nature of political activity, I argue that Aristotle thinks of competition as being a political ideal rather than as an inevitable corruption of civic life. Virtuous citizens compete for civic honor through traditional “competitive outlays” and contend against one another for prestigious offices in the city. Moreover, I argue that the very structure (...) of political deliberation is competitive. It is through a “vis-à-vis” competition among proposals that a winning policy is adopted, and the speakers who offer these proposals are themselves involved in a competition for political influence. (shrink)

The outsourcing and offshoring of clinical trials has expanded a global field of experimental activity. This essay addresses the competitive logic and social norms by which a field of human subjects research for drug development has taken form. The clinical trials industry and its move to low- and middle-income countries serve as a telescope into the global clinical trial and how it is crafted and made to work in different locales. Lives often depend on new medical commodities as they enter (...) the value chains of transnational medicine and capital. Transparency remains a key problem. The essay explores the politics of creating centralized registries through which the scope of this experimental enterprise might be known. As the engine of pharmaceutical research molds itself to international and national regulatory norms, detection of adverse risk can be deferred or minimized. The essay also points to policy gaps with respect to how the benefits and insecurities of global experiments are distributed as well as to emergent political practices of care and accountability. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A key discourse underpinning US antitrust law is that it protects competition, not competitors. However, what this means in practice both has changed over time and betrays the politics underlying antitrust enforcement. This article interrogates this discourse and its contradictions in the context of the AT&T-Time Warner merger lawsuit through a critical discourse analysis of legal documents related to the case. The case represents a conflict over incentivizing competition in digital advertising markets at the expense of (...) class='Hi'>competition, particularly smaller competitors, in video markets. The analysis reveals how the discourse obscures the strategic choices made by courts to protect incumbent companies: by approving the merger, the court circumscribed the video programming and distribution market for consolidation to strengthen the competitive position of the merging parties in the digital advertising market dominated by Facebook and Google. Thus, this discourse masks not just the deference to dominant merging companies, but also the role of courts in shaping market competition at their behest. (shrink)

How to understand the "entrepreneurial university"? Three hundred years of popularised economic/philosophical thought, in which conflict/competition has been presented as progressive; lacking a normative context, this becomes warlike. Society presented as a "macro-market", linking people with money and media and frowning on political justice, leads to economism (economic totalitarianism). This instrumentalises universities and motivates bookkeeping rationality and goal rationality; the maximisation thesis guides managerial aims. Scholarship becomes industrialised and leadership managerialised. Empty concepts of "quality" and "competitiveness" become audit (...) measures of "excellence"; this is standardised scholarship, serving hedonistic leisure class values and neglecting perspectivised creative, critical involvement with the suffering world. (shrink)

How to understand the "entrepreneurial university"? Three hundred years of popularised economic/philosophical thought, in which conflict/competition has been presented as progressive; lacking a normative context, this becomes warlike. Society presented as a "macro-market", linking people with money and media and frowning on political justice, leads to economism (economic totalitarianism). This instrumentalises universities and motivates bookkeeping rationality and goal rationality; the maximisation thesis guides managerial aims. Scholarship becomes industrialised and leadership managerialised. Empty concepts of "quality" and "competitiveness" become audit (...) measures of "excellence"; this is standardised scholarship, serving hedonistic leisure class values and neglecting perspectivised creative, critical involvement with the suffering world. (shrink)

This book is a wide-ranging exploration of regions in the new world order. The author - one of the leading international figures in the field - explores the economic logic and political meaning of regions. Exploring developments from Silicon Valley to Hong Kong, he makes the case for the growing importance of regions as against the sovereign state in the `borderless world' of the 21st century.

The ‘marketplace of ideas’ is an influential metaphor with widespread currency in debates about freedom of speech. We explore a number of ways competition between ideas might be described as occurring in a marketplace and find that none support the use of the metaphor. We suggest that an alternative metaphor, that of the ‘garden of ideas’, may offer more productive insights into issues surrounding the regulation of speech.

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Countering the claims that competition contradicts and undermines ethical thought processes and actions, Christoph Lütge successfully argues that competition and ethics do not necessarily have to oppose one another. He highlights how intensified competition can in fact work in favour of ethical goals, and that many criticisms of competition stem from an out-dated understanding of how modern societies and economies function. Illustrating this view with examples from ecology, healthcare and education, the author calls for a more (...) entrepreneurial spirit in analysing the relationship between competition and ethics. This book delivers important arguments for the ethics of innovation, using a combination of theoretical and practical evidence to support it. Researchers and scholars of economics, business, philosophy and politics will greatly benefit from the fresh interdisciplinary perspectives and thorough exploration of the complex relationship between modern competition and ethics. (shrink)

Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A’s chances of getting the good, we reduce B’s chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish this from Non-competitive Affirmative Action. The latter has to (...) do with non-competitive goods, e.g., being granted early parole or freedom from arbitrary arrest. I argue that some of the most prominent objections against affirmative action—in particular, the reverse discrimination objection and the merit objection—speak less against Non-competitive Affirmative Action. And that some of the most prominent arguments in favor of affirmative action, insofar as they justify Competitive Affirmative Action, also justify Non-competitive Affirmative Action. (shrink)

The article is devoted to clarifying the significance of a political performance, which acts as a theatrical communication action designed to draw society’s attention to the important problems of certain social or political groups. The purpose of the research is to establish the peculiarities of the interpretation of political performance in the paradigmatic and methodological dimensions of modern discursive democracy. The development of political performance under the conditions of the modern Russian-Ukrainian war is characterized. It was (...) found that an important task of modern political science should be considered the identification of paradigmatic dimensions (or “poles”) of analytical judgments regarding the assessment of the significance of political performances. It was emphasized that political performance acts as a postmodern alternative to the realization of the unfinished project of political modernity. The importance of political performance for the discussion of society’s problems at the political level and its dependence on a specific topic and the subjects of its application are analyzed. The importance of public discussion and manifestation as signs of broad involvement of citizens in democratic political activity is revealed. It was found that the ability to express political meaning in a theatrical form is beyond the limits of rational planning and organization. It is revealed that the functionality of political performance stems from its connection with specific social groups. It has been proven that political performances are a form that contradicts the formal procedure of expressing the will and approving the results of the discussion. It has been established that, subject to regulatory support from the state, discussions require voluntary participation and a significant level of competence. It is assumed that political performance can provide certain advantages in political competition due to the imagery and emotionality of the political message. The limited suitability of performance for promoting the values of deliberative democracy has been established, since many cases of the use of performances in the modern period are related to the defense of the right to freedom of speech. It was concluded that in the conditions of political discussions, the importance of political performance consists in creating preliminary conditions for political dialogue. (shrink)

Historical studies on the relationship between science and diplomacy tend to focus on events since World War II and on initiatives for the maintenance of peace or to achieve cooperation over contentious matters. This article presents the case of José Vicente Barbosa du Bocage (1823–1907), a Portuguese zoologist who had formal diplomatic responsibilities in a context of competition for the colonization of Africa in the nineteenth century. He used his knowledge in African geography to implement colonial and diplomatic strategies (...) that aimed at outcompeting rival powers. The development of a network of actors with scientific, colonial, and diplomatic expertise was crucial for the negotiations that involved the partition of the Congo basin, which resulted in victories for Portugal that surpassed the country's marginal political relevance at the international level and had long‐lasting consequences. (shrink)

This paper examines the institutional and social dimensions of cooperation in the Alliance of Science Organisations, the central corporatist stakeholder in German science policy, in the 1970s and 1980s, which were a crucial period for this committee. In doing so, this essay mainly focuses on the way science organizations interact with each other, as well as with national politics. The Federal Ministry of Research invited the Alliance to regular meetings and thereby fostered its involvement into political decision-making processes. Consequently, (...) the question of who belonged to the Alliance came into the focus of different players. Although the members of the Alliance themselves decided on the composition of their committee, they were not able to completely insulate themselves from external demands. Including new members into the Alliance had a destabilizing effect on the carefully balanced distribution of power within this committee, as will be shown through the case study on the admission of the Association of the Major Research Centers (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Großforschungseinrichtungen, AGF) in 1976. In order to restabilize the situation, the members of the Alliance tried to exclude the AGF from certain issues. At the same time, the AGF itself was keen on being regarded as an equal partner and thus strove for its inclusion. This complex interplay of cooperative and competitive actions finally resulted in the institutionalization of the Alliance. (shrink)

This paper examines the institutional and social dimensions of cooperation in the Alliance of Science Organisations, the central corporatist stakeholder in German science policy, in the 1970s and 1980s, which were a crucial period for this committee. In doing so, this essay mainly focuses on the way science organizations interact with each other, as well as with national politics. The Federal Ministry of Research invited the Alliance to regular meetings and thereby fostered its involvement into political decision-making processes. Consequently, (...) the question of who belonged to the Alliance came into the focus of different players. Although the members of the Alliance themselves decided on the composition of their committee, they were not able to completely insulate themselves from external demands. Including new members into the Alliance had a destabilizing effect on the carefully balanced distribution of power within this committee, as will be shown through the case study on the admission of the Association of the Major Research Centers in 1976. In order to restabilize the situation, the members of the Alliance tried to exclude the AGF from certain issues. At the same time, the AGF itself was keen on being regarded as an equal partner and thus strove for its inclusion. This complex interplay of cooperative and competitive actions finally resulted in the institutionalization of the Alliance.ZusammenfassungDer vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die institutionelle und soziale Dimension der Zusammenarbeit in der Allianz der Wissenschaftsorganisationen, dem zentralen korporatistischen Akteur in der bundesdeutschen Wissenschaftspolitik, in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, einer wichtigen Scharnierphase für dieses Gremium. Dabei liegt der Fokus insbesondere auf der Analyse der vielfältigen Interaktionen zwischen den Wissenschaftsorganisationen, ebenso wie zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik.Um seine forschungspolitische Agenda mit den Wissenschaftsorganisationen abzustimmen, etablierte das Bundesforschungsministerium regelmäßige Konsultationen mit den Präsidenten der Allianz, die eine verstärkte Einbindung des Gremiums in politische Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse zur Folge hatte. Folglich rückte auch die Zusammensetzung der Allianz immer wieder in den Fokus verschiedener Akteure. Obwohl die Allianz prinzipiell selbst über ihre Zusammensetzung entschied, konnte sie sich nicht gänzlich gegenüber von außen an sie herangetragenen Forderungen verschließen, was zu Öffnungen des Gremiums führte – wie im Falle der Aufnahme der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Großforschungseinrichtungen 1976. Das wiederum wirkte destabilisierend auf das zuvor sorgfältig austarierte Machtverhältnis in der Allianz. Um die Situation zu restabilisieren, initiierten die Allianzmitglieder von innen heraus gegenüber der AGF in bestimmten Fragen partielle Schließungen, die allerdings erneute Öffnungen nach sich zogen, da die AGF selbst darum bemüht war, als gleichberechtigter Partner in der Allianz agieren zu können. Dieses komplexe Zusammenspiel von kooperativen und kompetitiven Handlungsmodi resultierte schlussendlich in einer Institutionalisierung und Festigung der Allianz. (shrink)

This article focuses on the general theoretical issue of realism versus constructivism in politics, with a case of the present-day Russia as the main and most telling example. We present four assertions that we are going to defend. First, we claim that in the sphere of international relations, political realism of the offensive type, after decades of more tempered USA–USSR relations, is again challenging its opponent: political constructivism. Second, political realism is winning in the sphere of domestic (...) politics and policy in the leading countries as well. Third, we touch upon theoretical issues and discuss the ontological nature of political realism in comparison with political constructivism and the kindred of the latter with normativism, legalism, constitutionalism and liberalism. Political constructivism as a concept is underestimated and rarely used. Our article explicates the concept of political constructivism, which is a novel contribution to political theory and political philosophy. Fourth, we show that political constructivism, being the most advanced achievement of political civilization compared to archaic realism, has not lost the game so far and should be upheld in its battle with the remnants of the wild political past. Sliding back to political realism would turn humankind into another degraded animal species instead of making it the pilot in continuing human progress. (shrink)

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns (...) out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where 'U' stands for the 'usual' fairness notion, and S-fairness, where 'S' stands for the 'sequential' aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an 'eclipse' of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors' choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness. (shrink)

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns (...) out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where ‘U’ stands for the ‘usual’ fairness notion, and S-fairness, where ‘S’ stands for the ‘sequential’ aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an ‘eclipse’ of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors’ choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness. (shrink)

In the discipline of international relations there are contending general theories or theoretical perspectives. Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. It is usually contrasted with idealism or liberalism, which tends to emphasize cooperation. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power. The negative side (...) of the realists’ emphasis on power and selfinterest is often their skepticism regarding the relevance of ethical norms to relations among states. National politics is the realm of authority and law, whereas international politics, they sometimes claim, is a sphere without justice, characterized by active or potential conflict among states. Not all realists, however, deny the presence of ethics in international relations. The article presents a comprehensive picture of political realism. -/- Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian, "Political Realism in International Relations", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (shrink)

According to the special-obligations challenge to the justice argument for more open borders, immigration restrictions to wealthier polities are justified because of special obligations owed to disadvantaged compatriots negatively impacted by the immigration of low-skilled foreign workers. We refute the special-obligations challenge by refuting its empirical premise and draw out the normative implications of the empirical evidence for border policies. We show that immigration to wealthier polities has negligible impact on domestic wages and that only previous cohorts of immigrants are (...) adversely affected. The special-obligations challenge therefore succeeds only if special obligations owed to previous immigrants justify closing borders to further immigration; we argue that they do not. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Some sharing economy firms have adopted a strategy of “regulatory entrepreneurship,” openly violating regulations with the aim of rendering them dead letters. This article argues that in a democracy, regulatory entrepreneurship is a presumptively unethical business strategy. In all but the most corrupt political environments, businesses that seek to change their regulatory environment should do so through the democratic political process, and they should do so without using illegal business practices to build a political constituency. To show (...) this, the article defends a qualified moral obligation for businesspeople to obey the law even in societies that fall short of ideal democracy and that are rife with economic injustice. Owners and managers of successful businesses have strong moral reasons to obey laws concerning resource allocation. Such laws include not only property law, but also tax laws, environmental regulations, and other laws that regulate businesses in competitive markets. The moral reasons to obey such laws apply even to laws that business leaders think unfair or inefficient, provided that the laws in question have reasonable, good faith defenders. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 2, Page 190-227, May 2022. There is a sense of fairness that is distinctive of markets. This is fairness among economic competitors, competitive fairness. We regularly make judgments of competitive fairness about market participants, public policies and institutions. However, it is not clear to what these judgments refer, or what moral significance they have. This paper offers a rational reconstruction of competitive fairness in terms of non-domination. It first identifies competitive fairness as a (...) distinctive claim, advanced within markets in turn characterized as antagonistic, instrumental and procedural. It distinguishes competitive fairness from a number of familiar ideals with which it might be confused: legitimate expectation, equality of opportunity, sporting fairness and economic efficiency. While many exponents likely assume competitive fairness can be explained in terms of one of these ideals, in each case there are significant objections to doing so. Instead, the paper argues that the most promising justification of competitive fairness is under the republican ideal of non-domination, which can reconstruct many of the intuitive judgments of competitive fairness that we make in particular cases. However, it concludes, this explanation makes it difficult for exponents to continue to emphasize competitive fairness, given diverse other risks of domination, and to other values, in markets. (shrink)

Cultivation research suggests that media use, particularly TV, is associated with a wide range of politically relevant views and attitudes, including perceptions of the world as a mean and dangerous place, authoritarianism, and perceived meritocracy. However, little attempt has been made to understand how these effects relate to one another and to broader models of political psychology. We present a new Cultivation–Political Psychology Interface Model, which uses Duckitt’s Dual Process Model of political psychology as a lens to (...) understand cultivation research. Many seemingly distinct cultivation effects related to political attitudes can thus be reduced to two overall dimensions: dangerous and competitive worldviews. We identify evidence gaps, particularly in terms of competitive-worldview effects and related political attitudes. Our model generates a landscape of attitudes and beliefs, whereby some attitudes are hypothesized to be more upstream than others, leading to testable hypotheses for future research. (shrink)