Despite recognition as an important, potentially unifying construct within the social sciences and humanities, value lacks an overarching theoretical framework. One theory within the social sciences, personal construct theory, is suggested as a theoretical foundation for human values, and an attempt to situate values within this theory is presented. It is argued that human values are core constructs in the language of personal construct theory, while ordinary beliefs are peripheral constructs. Various (...) implications and applications of this formulation are discussed. (shrink)

People construe reality by using words as basic units of meaningful categorization. The present theory-driven study applied the method of a free association task to explore how people express the concepts of the world and the self in words. The respondents were asked to recall any five words relating with the word world. Afterwards they were asked to recall any five words relating with the word self. The method of free association provided the respondents with absolute freedom to choose (...) any words they wanted. Such free recall task is suggested as being a relatively direct approach to the respondents’ self- and world-related conceptual categories, without enormous rational processing. The results provide us, first, with associative ranges for constructs of the world and the self, where some associative dimensions are defined by semantic polarities in the meanings of peripheral categories (e.g., Nature vs. Culture). Second, our analysis showed that some groups of verbal categories that were associated with the words world and self are central, while others are peripheral with respect to the central position. Third, the analysis of category networks revealed that some categories play the role of a transmitter, mediating the pathway between other categories in the network. (shrink)

This book traces the philosophical history of Personal Construct Psychology through the broad and complex tradition of phenomenology and thinkers such as Spinoza, Hegel and Heidegger.

Kelly’s work was formed and developed in the context of the American philosophical movement known as pragmatism. The major figures to which this tradition is attributed are Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. In Personal Construct Psychology, Dewey was acknowledged by Kelly and by subsequent writers as perhaps his most important influence. It has recently become increasingly apparent, however that Peirce was a much more pervasive and crucial influence on James and Dewey than has previously been (...) recognized. Kelly did not mention Peirce but a close reading of the two writers reveals a remarkable correspondence and relationship between their two bodies of work. To set these two thinkers side by side proves to be an interesting and productive exercise. In this paper, after introducing Peirce and examining the relationship between him and Dewey, Kelly’s basic philosophical assumptions, as outlined at the beginning of Volume 1 of the Psychology of Personal Constructs, are used as a framework for exploring their similarities and differences. The result is an enrichment of our understanding of Kelly’s philosophy which allows us to make links with many different subsequent thinkers’ ideas and provides a basis for exploring the psychological aspects of the two men’s work. The latter forms the subject of Part II of this series which is in preparation. (shrink)

In this book Frank Dumont presents personality psychology with a fresh description of its current status as well as its prospects. Play, sex, cuisine, creativity, altruism, pets, grieving rituals, and other oft-neglected topics broaden the scope of this fascinating study. This tract is imbued with historical perspectives that reveal the continuity in the evolving science and research of this discipline over the past century. The author places classic schemas and constructs, as well as current principles, in the context of their (...) socio-political catalysts. He further relates this study of the person to life-span developmental issues and to cultural, gender-specific, trait-based, genetic/epigenetic, and evolutionary research findings. Personality psychology has recently reconciled itself to more modest paradigms for describing, explaining, and predicting human behaviour than it generated in the 19th and 20th centuries. This book documents that transformation, providing valuable information for health-service professionals as well as to teachers, researchers, and scientists. (shrink)

Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.

Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.

Tan and Moghaddam’s ‘reflexive positioning’ expansion of Harré’s positioning theory provokes consideration of psychological factors underlying the discursive production of selves. However, it understates the issue, why do people appropriate particular positions, hearable in utterances, as applicable to themselves. Some of the theoretical ambiguities dissipate when positioning is approached from a personal-constructs perspective , which draws attention to personal construction of selves, as distinct from social construction, and describes the dynamics of individual continuity, though understating the concrete (...) contextuality of personal becoming. The present essay considers the compatibility of the personal constructs approach with Harré’s positioning theory. (shrink)

Kelly suggested that it was useful to consider anyone as functioning as a scientist, in the business of applying theories, making hypotheses and predictions and testing them out in the practice of everyday life. One of Charles Peirce’s major contributions was to develop the disciplines of logic and the philosophy of science. We can deepen and enrich our understanding of Kelly’s vision by looking at what Peirce has to say about the process of science. For Peirce, the essence of science (...) was the application of the laws of inference. He developed a much broader concept of logic, elaborating the processes of deduction and induction and adding to these the logic of hypothetical inference, or ‘abduction’, even as Kelly broadened it further in his “departure from classical logic”. Examining the implications of these three forms of inference allows us to elaborate the dynamics involved in the process of construing, ordinacy and the cycles of experience, creativity and decision making. This is the second of a three part series examining the relationship between the work of Peirce and Kelly. The third will include a look at phenomenology, bipolarity, the self, dialogical process and sociological considerations. (shrink)

This article addresses the use of computer-assisted career guidance systems in career interventions. Major CACGS developed in the past decades were based on the trait-factor or person-environment fit approaches in their conceptualization and design. The strengths and limitations of these CACGS in addressing the career development needs of individuals are discussed. The Career Construction Theory is a promising paradigm to guide the development of new generations of CACGS. The narrative tradition, career adaptability model, and life-design interventions of CCT offer (...) rich conceptual and practical applications that could expand the scope and breadth of career exploration and identity construction through using CACGS. A digital system developed in Hong Kong called Infinity is a case-in-point of a CACGS where users could learn about career planning, engage in self and career construction through using the quantitative and qualitative assessment applications and gamified tools, take career planning actions over time, and communicate with their social supportive systems. Initial findings suggested that users of the system reported lesser decision-making difficulties, higher levels of decision clarity, and better understanding of what is career planning than non-users. Users from high academic achievement schools reported higher levels of career adaptability than their counterparts in schools of similar academic background. Users from low achievement schools reported higher intention to pursue government-supported universities than non-users from schools of similar background. Research and practice implications in schools and organizational settings are discussed. (shrink)

Sartre’s conception of “the look” creates an ontological conflict with no real resolution with regard to intersubjective relations. However, through turning to the pages of The Transcendence of the Ego one will be able to begin constructing a rich public ego theory that can outline a dynamic and fruitful notion with regard to interpersonal relations. Such a dynamic plays itself out between the bad faith extremes of believing too much in an all-powerful look on the one hand, as well (...) as believing too much in some deep “I” or persona on the other. Indeed: Through a rigorous analysis of Sartre’s main principles regarding his conception of the ego, we will see that the latter is first and foremost a transcendent object for reflective consciousness; an object, moreover, that gets “magically” reversed into a subject-bearer of states, qualities, and the like, only in a secondary moment. This has the consequence that there is no deep, graspable “I”; but precisely because of this one’s personality is there in the world, to be shared and displayed, discussed and challenged, at every turn. Thus a Sartrean notion of personality involves a matching up of external aspects of ourselves that others in fact know better, with our own interiorities that can nevertheless always be shared through a reflective language that always has the same structural core. (shrink)

This text, the first of a planned series, sets out a general theory of psychotherapy and therapeutic change. It borrows from developmental, cognitive and social psychology, and mingles theories of human development, conversation, memory and construction theories of the self.

The notion of cognitive act is of importance for an epistemology that is apt for constructive type theory, and for epistemology in general. Instead of taking knowledge attributions as the primary use of the verb 'to know' that needs to be given an account of, and understanding a first-person knowledge claim as a special case of knowledge attribution, the account of knowledge that is given here understands first-person knowledge claims as the primary use of the verb 'to know'. This (...) means that a cognitive act is an act that counts as cognitive from a first-person point of view. The method of linguistic phenomenology is used to explain or elucidate our epistemic notions. One of the advantages of the theory is that an answer can be given to some of the problems in modern epistemology, such as the Gettier problem. (shrink)

Insightful ideals on the subtle and dynamic relation between the person and the environment have been expressed by Vygotsky, Lewin, Bronfenbrenner and Stern. Carefully following their intricate dialogue reveals that their ideas are mutually enriching. The present essay aims to revitalize this intricate dialogue, and to show how it converges to supply rich meaning to the concept of personal space-time totality. With a view to an empirical study of the personal space-time totality, a four-phase inquiry is proposed, which (...) is essentially a refined co-construction between the subject and the researcher. It is suggested that such a co-construction can be meaningfully integrated into research areas such as autobiographical and narrative studies, commonsense psychology, and optimal human development. (shrink)

Architectural theory arises from building, when the mind considers its symbolic relations to its own constructions. The intent of this essay is to discuss the intellectual causes that precede building and precede theory. It considers certain fundamental dualities in our thinking about architecture—such as image and word; type and model; imitation and invention—and the role they play in its making, its perfection as an art, and the eventual elaboration of its tenets into a theory. At a time (...) when theories of architecture proliferate as expressions of ‘personal philosophies,’ a careful and incisive philosophical approach to if, how, and when does theory become formative of building, may ensure that architecture remain faithful to its intrinsic purposes. (shrink)

The problem of personal identity is often said to be one of accounting for what it is that gives persons their identity over time. However, once the problem has been construed in these terms, it is plain that too much has already been assumed. For what has been assumed is just that persons do have an identity. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive view of (...) class='Hi'>personal identity, and by approaching the problem in terms of phenomenology, Buddhist psychology, and the idea of a constructed self-image. (shrink)

. Implicit in the cognitive social learning model of personality as articulated by Walter Mischel, Albert Bandura, and others, is an epistemology which emphasizes the activity of the mind in the construction of knowledge. Using Mischel's five person variables as an outline, the epistemic implications of this model of personality are developed and then illustrated by application to William James's typology of the religious personality and to the current debate over hermeneutic and empirical approaches to studying human behavior. This approach (...) explicates the connection between personality characteristics and epistemological approaches in terms of cognitive social learning theory. (shrink)

Polanyi’s post-critical philosophy contains a tension between the personal commitment of the knower to the apprehension of knowledge and the understanding of the incomplete, or potentially mistaken, nature of current understanding. This essay addresses this tension, both theoretically and practically, by drawing parallels between Polanyi’s theory and George Kelly’s Personal Construct Psychology. The two approaches share many similar assumptions about the development of knowledge. Application of Kelly’s perspective may assist us in developing direct awareness of our (...) active participation in creating knowledge, and helping us to articulate some of our underlying assumptions. Such activities facilitate movement toward more comprehensive understanding. (shrink)

Despite considerable recent attention, important features of Schelling’s famous work, the 1809 treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, remain under-explored. One of these is the methodological dualism which Schelling advocates at the very start of the text. Schelling aims to weld together into a coherent position a first-person phenomenology of freedom and an explanation achieved by locating freedom within a conceptual system articulating the basic structure of the world. Most interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift, however, concentrate on only one of (...) these approaches, thus foreshortening their understanding of Schelling’s enterprise. The article explores this tendency towards one-sidedness by considering two sophisticated recent interpretations of the work, taking opposite tacks. One, by Markus Gabriel, focuses on the distinctive, self-reflexive metaphysics which Schelling proposes, while the other, by Sebastian Gardner, claims that Schelling’s ontology is extrapolated entirely from his account of our moral consciousness, a procedure pioneered by Kant. The article argues that neither of these interpretations can do full justice to Schelling’s project. Furthermore, although the Freiheitsschrift is not entirely successful, and hence points towards later developments in Schelling’s thinking, its treatment of freedom is superior to the ‘soft naturalism’ pioneered by Peter Strawson, and currently influential across various philosophical traditions. (shrink)

I want to examine the implications of a metaphysical thesis which is presupposed in various objections to Rawls' theory of justice.Although their criticisms differ in many respects, they concur in employing what I shall refer to as the continuity thesis. This consists of the following claims conjointly: (1) The parties in the original position (henceforth the OP) are, and know themselves to be, fully mature persons who will be among the members of the well-ordered society (henceforth the WOS) which (...) is generated by their choice of principles of justice. (2) The OP is a conscious event among others, integrated (compatibly with the constraints on knowledge and motivation imposed on the parties) into the regular continuity of experience that comprises each of their ongoing constitutes lives. (3) The parties in the OP thus are, and regard themselves as, psychologically continuing persons, partially determined in personality and interests by prior experiences, capable of recollection and regret concerning the past, anticipation and apprehensiveness regarding the future, and so on. Although the continuity thesis as stated above is not at odds with any of the conditions that define the OP, its exegetical validity is a matter for discussion. I shall be concerned to argue that if it is indeed contained in or a consequence of Rawls' theory, then it casts into doubt the capacity of the OP to generate or justify any principles of justice at all. On the other hand, if the continuity thesis is viewed as dispensable and unnecessary to the Rawlsian enterprise, then Rawls is correct in maintaining the irrelevance of the question of personal identity to the construction of his moral theory. In this case, the contract-theoretic, instrumentalist justification for the two principles of justice (henceforth the 2PJ) needs to be supplanted by a modified conception of wide reflective equilibrium. The considerations that form the bulk of this discussion then may be understood as providing a rationale for Rawls' recent revisions in the model of justification on which his theory of justice rests, and for his increasing emphasis on us as moral mediators between the OP and the WOS. Now I want to consider the question of whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls, and what problems for his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. -/- . (shrink)

The theory of evolution: The rise and impact of evolutionary ideas, by R. Scoon. Evolution in its relation to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture, by F.S.C. Northrop. The genetic nature of differences among men, by T. Dobzhansky. Evolutionary thought in America: Evolution and American sociology by R.E.L. Faris. The impact of the idea of evolution on the American political and constitutional tradition, by E.S. Corwin. Evolutionism in American economics, 1800-1946, by J.J. Spengler. The influence of (...) evolutionary theory upon American psychological thought, by E.G. Boring. Naturalism in American literature, by M. Cowley. The idea of organic expression and American architecture, by D.D. Egbert. Evolution and moral theory in America, W.F. Quillian, Jr. Evolution and theology in America, by S. Persons. (shrink)

This paper deals with some formal properties of objects that are supposed to be internal to persons, that is, mental structures and mental functions. Depending on the ways of talking about these internal objects, they will appear different. Two types of discourse will be presented, to be called the realist and the nominalist discourses, and for eachdiscourse I will focus upon the construction of `self'.The realist discourse assumes an identity between the person and his construction of himself. I will illustrate (...) this discourse in terms of Descartes' ideas on himself as a `thinking substance'. The nominalist discourse assumes an impossibility to attain this identity, and instead to imply a complementarity between the person and his self-construction. I will illustrate this discourse in terms of the problems both William James and Sartre discerned when a conscious person chases after his own consciousness (termed `judging thought' and `pour-soi' respectively). (shrink)

Beginning with liberalism's foundational idea of moral equality as the basis for treating people with equal concern and respect, Christine Koggel offers a modified account of what makes human beings equal and what is needed to achieve equality. Koggel utilizes insights from care ethics but switches the focus from care as a moral response within personal relationships to the broader network of relationships within which care is given or withheld. The result is an account of moral personhood and agency (...) that is richer than the view propounded by liberal theory and care ethics. This exciting and original work challenges theoretical resistance to the idea that relationships are relevant to an understanding of equality, and it provides an opening to a critical analysis of relationships and care that informs and transforms our understanding of what is needed to treat all people with equal concern and respect. (shrink)

In this lively and accessible book Lorraine Code addresses one of the most controversial questions in contemporary theory of knowledge, a question of fundamental concern for feminist theory as well: Is the sex of the knower epistemologically significant? Responding in the affirmative, Code offers a radical alterantive to mainstream philosophy's terms for what counts as knowledge and how it is to be evaluated. Code first reviews the literature of established epistemologies and unmasks the prevailing assumption in Anglo-American philosophy (...) that "the knower" is a value-free and ideologically neutral abstraction. Approaching knowledge as a social construct produced and validated through critical dialogue, she defines the knower in light of a conception of subjectivity based on a personal relational model. Code maps out the relevance of the particular people involved in knowing: their historical specificity, the kinds of relationships they have, the effects of social position and power on those relationships, and the ways in which knowledge can change both knower and known. In an exploration of the politics of knowledge that mainstream epistemologies sustain, she examines such issues as the function of knowledge in shaping institutions and the unequal distribution of cognitive resources. What Can She Know? will raise the level of debate concerning epistemological issues among philosophers, political and social scientists, and anyone interested in feminist theory. (shrink)

Proponents of the epistemic companions in guilt argument argue that we should reject the moral error theory because it entails that there are no epistemic reasons. In this paper, I investigate whether a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons. I argue that there are no irreducibly normative second-personal reasons even if there are irreducibly normative reasons. And epistemic reasons are not second-personal (...) reasons. In this case, a plausible version of the moral error theory can be constructed that does not entail an error theory about epistemic reasons if facts and claims about morality entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. And, as I explain, there is a good case that facts and claims about morality do entail facts and claims about irreducibly normative second-personal reasons. (shrink)

In this lively and accessible book Lorraine Code addresses one of the most controversial questions in contemporary theory of knowledge, a question of fundamental concern for feminist theory as well: Is the sex of the knower epistemologically significant? Responding in the affirmative, Code offers a radical alterantive to mainstream philosophy's terms for what counts as knowledge and how it is to be evaluated. Code first reviews the literature of established epistemologies and unmasks the prevailing assumption in Anglo-American philosophy (...) that "the knower" is a value-free and ideologically neutral abstraction. Approaching knowledge as a social construct produced and validated through critical dialogue, she defines the knower in light of a conception of subjectivity based on a personal relational model. Code maps out the relevance of the particular people involved in knowing: their historical specificity, the kinds of relationships they have, the effects of social position and power on those relationships, and the ways in which knowledge can change both knower and known. In an exploration of the politics of knowledge that mainstream epistemologies sustain, she examines such issues as the function of knowledge in shaping institutions and the unequal distribution of cognitive resources. What Can She Know? will raise the level of debate concerning epistemological issues among philosophers, political and social scientists, and anyone interested in feminist theory. (shrink)

IV. SummaryIn the history of Psychology the theoretical fate of the individual and the attendant norms for interpreting his behavior have evolved in an idiodynamic direction. The essential postulates of the idiodynamic approach are response dominance, configuration dominance, and idioverse dominance. Personality theory of this type is fundamental to any compelling conceptualization of the projective techniques but can not be used in isolation from the relevant aspects of the general‐experimental and psychometric points of view. In thus integrating personality (...) class='Hi'>theory with the newer methods of psychodiagnosis, the traditional concepts and methods of test construction and standardization, notably reliability and validity, must be recast. (shrink)

This paper critques a new mathod which I have termed third person analysis and gives perspective on its range and application in clinical practice. Third person analysis turns the analysand into a narrator who will speak of herself in the third person. It is believed that the basic analytic principle inherent in narration can be employed in the form of third person analysis with a wide variety of patients. This new form of psychotherapy provides the analysand with the necessary tool (...) of the narrator, an objectivity needed for the construction of her story. The idea of this paper, then, is not to denigrate the values of free association but rather to shed light on a new form of the mechanism. Free association in the third person may allow the narrating analysand a more creative spontaneity wherein a certain leakage of unguarded and heretofore unrealized material may guiltlessly emerge. (shrink)

Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implications: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I explicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct claims aimed at (...) avoiding the counterintuitive implications plaguing the TCE. Further, because of the changes that comprise the TCE*, emotions are not constitutively social phenomena. (shrink)

Studying personal identity, the continuity and sameness of persons across lifetimes, is notoriously difficult and competing conceptualizations exist within philosophy and psychology. Personal reidentification, linking persons between points in time is a fundamental step in allocating merit and blame and assigning rights and privileges. Based on Nozick’s closest continuer theory we develop a theoretical framework that explicitly invites a meaningful empirical approach and offers a constructive, integrative solution to current disputes about appropriate experiments. Following Nozick, reidentification involves (...) judging continuers on a metric of continuity and choosing the continuer with the highest acceptable value on this metric. We explore both the metric and its implications for personal identity. Since James, academic theories have variously attributed personal identity to the continuity of memories, psychology, bodies, social networks, and possessions. In our experiments, we measure how participants weighted the relative contributions of these five dimensions in hypothetical fission accidents, in which a person was split into two continuers. Participants allocated compensation money or adjudicated inheritance claims and reidentified the original person. Most decided based on the continuity of memory, personality, and psychology, with some consideration given to the body and social relations. Importantly, many participants identified the original with both continuers simultaneously, violating the transitivity of identity relations. We discuss the findings and their relevance for philosophy and psychology and place our approach within the current theoretical and empirical landscape. (shrink)

Psychological and philosophical perspectives are employed in an exploration of the reasons particular individuals experience an activity as personally expressive while others may find the same activity neutral or even aversive. The relationships between personal expressiveness and intrinsic motivation, flow, and self-actualization are considered. The construct of personal expressiveness is shown to have its roots in eudaimonistic philosophy. Living in a manner consistent with one's daimon or "true self" gives rise to a cognitive-affective state labeled "eudaimonia" that (...) is distinguishable from hedonic enjoyment. A personally expressive personality pattern is described integrating concepts from diverse theories including a sense of personal identity, self-actualization, an internal locus of control, and principled moral reasoning. A series of empirical investigations is proposed to test the theoretical concepts of personal expressiveness advanced. (shrink)

Few observers of relationship dynamics would dispute the claim of interdependence theorists that a defining feature of close relationships is the extent to which partners influence each other's thoughts, feelings, or behaviors. However, partners do not behave simply in response to each other's behavior; both partners in a given relationship bring themselves - indeed, their selves - into the relationship as well. Not only are individuals' selves enormously complex and rich in content, but so too are the multitude of personality (...) characteristics, including traits, values, attitudes, motives, and emotions, that contribute to selves' richness. Gaines, Jr provides a major integration of research on personality with research on relationship science, and demonstrates how personality constructs can be readily incorporated into the two most influential theories of close relationships: attachment theory and interdependence theory. This study will be of value to scholars in the fields of close relationships, personality psychology, communication studies, and family studies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REID' S CRITICISM OF HUME'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY One of the most interesting philosophical controversies is that between Reid and Hume, considered as representatives of two different sorts of empiricism. Hume, for these purposes, represents 'radical' empiricism, and the attempt to base knowledge solely on experience and what can be validly inferred from it, regardless of how far this leads one from everyday notions and beliefs. (...) Reid, in contrast, represents 'common sense' empiricism, and the view that the. results of experience and deduction must conform to a number of 'first principles or intuitive judgments' (Essays on the intellectual powers of man, VI, 4), which aie unprovable, but which no one can avoid accepting. It is important to be clear about the status of Reid' s 'intuitive judgments', or 'principles of common sense'. They are not merely the general beliefs of a particular culture, which could be 'vulgar errors or preJUdICeS''. Nor are they merely beliefs generally held by people uncorrupted by philosophy. They are assumptions which have to be made if theoretical or practical activity is to be possible at all, principles which are always accepted in practice even by those who deny them in theory. For example, although the uniformity of nature is not a logically necessary truth, everybody always thinks and acts in ways that presuppose that it is true: 'Nature is governed by fixed laws, and if it were not so, there could be no such thing as prudence in human conduct.... the whole fabric of natural philosophy is built upon this principle.' (Essays, VI, 5) Again, everyone, even a theoretical determinist, makes moral judgments and deliberates what to do; and these activities presuppose a belief in human free will. (Essays, ibid.) Hume himself, as Reid was aware, accepted the validity of some principles of this sort, notably of the 42. uniformity of nature. But Reid was dissatisfied with Hume's account, partly because he thought Hume had rejected far too much, and partly because of the grounds Hume gives for accepting, for example, the validity of induction, and the existence of the external physical world. Hume regards these beliefs as non-rational, and deriving from our psychological make-up; it is nature and not reason which causes the belief in an ordered physical reality. In Hume's eyes this is a sufficient justification: if our nature compels us to believe something, this is as good a ground for believing it as any other. Reid, on the other hand, believed, first, that there were many more principles of this sort than Hume had acknowledged, and secondly, that the justification of them was rational, and not merely psychologically determined, since it was based on the impossibility of thinking and acting coherently without them. Hence, even though Hume builds up with one hand what he pulls 'down with the other, and destroys the rational basis for belief only to replace it by one based on human nature and psychology, Reid continues to treat him as the archsceptic. In constructing his list of first principles in Essays, VI, 5, Reid explicitly or implicitly attacks Hume's 'scepticism' on five points - the existence of the mind; the existence of the physical world and the reliability of our senses; the reliability of memory; the reliability of reason; and the uniformity of nature. Against this scepticism he deploys three types of argument. The first is the argument from the universal beliefs of mankind, particular!/ as displayed in the structural features supposedly common to all languages. The second is the argument that the position of the sceptic is, when its consequences are worked out, either self-contradictory or incoherent. And the third is the argument already mentioned, that this position is inconsistent with other beliefs which the sceptic inevitably holds, since he thinks and acts in ways which are 43. inconsistent with their falsity, and cannot avoid doing so. To assess the force of Reid' s attacks, we have to consider both the strength of arguments of this sort in general and whether they apply in all these five cases. In this article, I want to concentrate on the first issue of the five, that of personal identity. Apart from displaying Reid... (shrink)

I defend a conception of the relationship between the personal and sub-personal levels as interaction withoutreduction.There are downward inferences from the personal to the sub-personal level but we find upward explanatory gaps when we try to construct illuminating accounts of personal level conditions using just sub-personal level notions. This conception faces several serious challenges but the objection that I consider in this paper says that, when theories support downward inferences from the personal (...) to the sub-personal level, this is the product of an unacceptably • mechanistic view of persons. According to this objection, if we were to focus on persons as conscious rational thinkers and agents then the support for putative downward inferences would be undermined. I consider and reject developments of this objection in response to two arguments for downward inferences. (shrink)

What is a person? This fundamental question is a perennial concern of philosophers and theologians. But, Christian Smith here argues, it also lies at the center of the social scientist’s quest to interpret and explain social life. In this ambitious book, Smith presents a new model for social theory that does justice to the best of our humanistic visions of people, life, and society. Finding much current thinking on personhood to be confusing or misleading, Smith finds inspiration in critical (...) realism and personalism. Drawing on these ideas, he constructs a theory of personhood that forges a middle path between the extremes of positivist science and relativism. Smith then builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and William Sewell to demonstrate the importance of personhood to our understanding of social structures. From there he broadens his scope to consider how we can know what is good in personal and social life and what sociology can tell us about human rights and dignity. Innovative, critical, and constructive,_ What Is a Person?_ offers an inspiring vision of a social science committed to pursuing causal explanations, interpretive understanding, and general knowledge in the service of truth and the moral good. (shrink)

We argue that constructive approaches in epistemology and systems science, which are focused on normativity, knowledge, and communication of organisms and emphasize the primacy of activity, self-construction, and niche-construction in the cognitive agents, fit naturally to the both methodology and theory of biosemiotics. In particular, constructive view was already present in the works of the major precursors of biosemiotics: von Uexküll and Bateson, and to some extent Peirce. Biosemiotics has a chance to function as a mediating field in the (...) theoretical integration of semiotics with its construction-related sister disciplines (e.g., second order cybernetics, autopoiesis, constructivism, enactivism, and interactivism) because of its explicit assumption of the semiotic nature of life and agency and its objectified “first person” view to biosemiotic agents, the view that nevertheless avoids the agnostic attitude towards reality. (shrink)