본 논문은 하이데거와 레비나스의 존재이해의 차이를 존재론적 차이대(對) 존재론적 분리라는 문제틀 속에서 접근하는 작업의 두 번째 시도로서, 이번에는 불교의 조명을 통하여 문제의 차이를 해명한다. 이를 통하여 얻은 결과는 크게 두 가지다. 첫째, 존재의 문제와 관련하여 레비나스가 하이데거의 존재와 시간에 가한 비판은 불심(佛心)의 발로라 해도 무리가 없다. 그리하여 삶의 고통과 그로부터의 해탈, 그리고 무아론과 연기설 등, 불교의 근본적 가르침과 깊이 공명하는 것은 하이데거의 존재론적 차이라기보다는 레비나스의 존재론적 분리이다. 둘째, 레비나스의 성찰은 불교의 전통을 쇄신하는 데 이바지할 수 있다. 그의 존재론적 분리는 불교적 (...) 사태의 존재론적 의미를 깊이 있게 밝혀 주고, 그의 현상학적 연출기법은 『대승기신론』의 삼세론에 대한 이해를 구체화·심화시켜 주는 한편, 그의 침전론은 불교가 정신분석과 같은 현대 담론과도 회통할 수 있는 지점 또한 시사한다. (shrink)

본 논문은 초기 레비나스가 하이데거와 벌인 존재론적 논쟁의 쟁점과 의의를 밝히고자 한다. 이 논쟁은, 무엇보다 인간의 근원적인 존재론적 정황성에 대한 두 가지 이해 사이의 대립으로서, 존재론적 차이(하이데거) 대 존재론적 분리(레비나스)의 대립으로 요약될 수 있다. 이 점에 주목한 기존의 연구성과들이 적지 않음에도 불구하고, 이들은 대체로 어떤 공통된 한계를 노정하고 있다. 이는 문제의 존재론적 정황성이 연출되는 구체적인 장면을 그들이 추체험하지 못하고 있다는 데서 기인한다. 그런 한계를 극복하게 해 줄 단초를 우리는 정신분석에서 발견한다. 왜냐하면 존재론적 정황성의 문제를 두고 정신분석은 하이데거에 맞서 레비나스와 공동 (...) 전선을 형성하고 있음이 밝혀지기 때문이다. 이 공동 전선의 지형도를 그려보면, 하이데거에 대한 레비나스 사유의 향배(向背)를 결정지은 문제의 구체적 장면을 목도하는 추체험이 가능해진다. 이로써 드러나는 바, 존재론적 차이는 아이의 심정을 망각한 어른의 철학이자 노예의 처지에 무심한 주인의 철학이다. 하이데거의 이러한 이중적 무경험(無經驗)을 반영하는 한에서, 존재론적 차이는 힘의 철학이다. 이에 상응하여 존재론적 차이는 철학적 차원에서 이중적 한계를 가진다. 그것은 존재 일반에 대한 기초 접근로가 될 수 없을 뿐만 아니라, 존재 일반을 배경으로 도래하는 존재자의 성립을 해명할 수 없다. 반면 레비나스의 존재론적 분리는 이 이중적 한계를 극복하는 존재론적 성찰을 제시한다. 이로부터 존재론적 차이는 존재론적 분리를 전제한다는 결론이 도출된다. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Meillassoux defines “correlationism” as the view that we can only access the mutual dependence of thought and being—specifically, subjectivity and objectivity—which he attributes to Heidegger. This attribution is inapt. It is only by accessing being—via existential analysis—that we can properly distinguish beings like subjects and objects. I propose that Meillassoux’s misattribution ignores the ontological difference that drives Heidegger’s project. First, I demonstrate the inadequacy of Meillassoux’s account of correlationism as a criticism of Heidegger and dispense with an objection. (...) Second, I argue that Meillassoux’s neglect of the ontological difference stems from a question-begging appeal to transcendental realism, which is at odds with Heidegger’s twin claims for a variety of transcendental idealism in Being and Time. Third, I offer a reflection on three general marks of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

This paper intends to offer a new assessment of the “Ontological Difference”, one of Martin Heidegger’s mainstays, in the light of the metaphysical view called “dialetheism”. In the first paragraph I briefly summarize the main argument of Heidegger’s contradiction of Being, where OD is present as a premise. In the second paragraph I introduce dialetheism, indicate two kinds of dialetheic solutions to the paradox and explain why they face comeback troubles from OD. The third paragraph is devoted to (...) a review of Heidegger’s uses of OD and underlines the crucial role of negation in it. In the fourth paragraph I investigate the philosopher’s account of negation and show similarities with the account provided by the paraconsistent logic called “Logic of Paradox”. The fifth paragraph puts forward two possible readings of OD, the first based on the classical notion of negation and the second on the notion of negation pointed out in the previous paragraph. The second reading is proved suitable for dialetheists and in accordance with the exegesis of some textual passages from Heidegger’s late works. (shrink)

Aristotle’s discussions, in Metaphysics Delta 7 and 8, of things designated by the terms we translate ‘being’ and ‘substance’ are revealing in several respects. The discussion in chapter 7 reveals the centrality in his thinking of the distinction between in itself and accidental being, a distinction different from that between substance and the other categories. The discussion in chapter 8 in turn reveals not only two related criteria for calling things substance, but a distinction as well between entities that are (...) called substances and the substance being which is the principle of their being so called. (shrink)

At issue in this paper is the unfinished dialogue between hermeneutic phenomenology and hermeneutic logic. The paper touches upon two historical contexts of this dialogue. In scrutinizing them I discuss the relationship between philosophical hermeneutics and non-representationalist epistemology. The view gets spelled out that the norms of truthfulness, objectivity, empirical adequacy, and other epistemological characteristics of interpretation become generated within characteristic hermeneutic situations. By elaborating on Heidegger’s nexus between projected understanding and interpretative articulation, the notion of hermeneutic forestructuring of interpretative (...) practices is introduced. Scrutinizing this notion allows one to circumscribe characteristic hermeneutic situations.El tema de este artículo es el diálogo inacabado entre la fenomenología hermenéutica y la lógica hermenéutica. El artículo toma dos contextos históricos de este diálogo. Al investigarlos, discuto la relación entre la hermenéutica filosófica y la epistemología no-representacionalista. Esta visión explica que las normas de veracidad, la objetividad, la adecuación empírica y otras características epistemológicas de la interpretación llegan a generarse dentro de situaciones hermenéuticas características. Al elaborar el nexo de Heidegger entre la comprensión proyectada y la articulación interpretativa, se introduce la noción de preestructuración hermenéutica de las prácticas interpretativas. Investigar esta noción permite circunscribir situaciones hermenéuticas características. (shrink)

This paper offers a phenomenological or hermeneutic reading—employing Heidegger's notion of the 'ontological difference'—of certain central aspects of schizophrenic experience. The main focus is on signs and symptoms that have traditionally been taken to indicate either 'poor reality-testing' or else 'poverty of content of speech' (defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III-R as: “speech that is adequate in amount but conveys little information because of vagueness, empty repetitions, or use of stereotyped or obscure phrases"). (...) I argue that, at least in some cases, the tendency to attribute these signs of illness to the schizophrenic patient results from a failure to recognize that such patients—as part of a quasi-solipsistic orientation and alienation from more normal, pragmatic concerns—may be grappling with issues of what Heidegger would call an ontological rather than an ontic type, issues concerned not with entities but with Being (i.e. not with objects in the world but with the overall status of the world itself). An application of the Heideggerian concept of the ontological difference has the potential to alter one's sense of the lived-worlds of such patients, of what they may be attempting to communicate, and of why communication with them so often breaks down. (shrink)

Ginev works out a conception of the constitution of scientific objects in terms of hermeneutic phenomenology. Recently there has been a revival of interest in hermeneutic theories of scientific inquiry. The present study is furthering this interest by shifting the focus from interpretive methods and procedures to the kinds of reflexivity operating in scientific conceptualization. According to the book's central thesis, a reflexive conceptualization enables one to take into consideartion the role which the ontic-ontological difference plays in the (...) constitution of scientific objects. The book argues for this thesis by analyzing the formation of objects of inquiry in a range of scientific domains stretching from highly formalized domains where the quest for objects' identities is carried out in terms of objects' emancipation from structures to linguistic and historiographic programs that avoid procedural objectification in their modes of conceptualization. The book sets up a new strategy for the dialogue between scientifc inquiry and hermeneutic phenomenology. (shrink)

This essay gives an interpretation of Heidegger's "What is Metaphysics?" lecture in light of passages from his other writings and lecture courses of the period. This exegetical task is important, for interpreters of "What is Metaphysics?" have been confused by puzzling phrases in the lecture without noticing that Heidegger makes the same points in clearer terms elsewhere. In particular, these interpreters ignore Heidegger's crucial distinction between entities and the being of entities. Since Heidegger's "nothing" is an aspect of being, this (...) difference is at the core of Heidegger's lecture. The present interpretation establishes a conditional conclusion: If the ontological difference makes sense, then we have a sound basis for understanding "What is Metaphysics?" and do not need to read Heidegger as an irrationalist who debunks science or rejects the principle of contradiction. This paper does not give independent justification for the ontological difference. (shrink)

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Recently there has been a revival of interest in hermeneutic theories of scientific inquiry. Ginev is furthering this interest by shifting the focus from interpretive methods and procedures to the kinds of reflexivity operating in scientific concept.

Animating Luce Irigaray’s oeuvre are two indissociable projects: the disruption of Western metaphysics and the thinking of sexual difference. The intersection of these two projects implies that any attempt to think through the meaning and significance of Irigaray’s notoriously fraught invocation of sexual difference must take seriously the way in which this invocation is itself always already inflected by her disruptive gesture. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate one moment of this intersection by focusing on her (...) critical engagement with Heidegger. In L’oubli de l’air, Irigaray criticizes Heidegger’s interpretation of the principle of identity as instantiating the same neglect of sexual difference that has been inscribed throughout the history of Western metaphysics. Moreover, Irigaray identifies the vestigial traces of this metaphysical legacy in Heidegger’s commitments to phenomenology. My claim, however, is that if we turn to Derrida’s second Geschlecht essay in order to mediate between Irigaray and Heidegger, the coimplicative nature of their projects comes into focus: on one hand, Derrida identifies within Heidegger’s work an incipient articulation of the very notion of sexuate difference that, on Irigaray’s reading, Heidegger’s work requires but nonetheless elides; on the other hand, Derrida’s rereading of Heidegger’s phenomenological commitments corroborates the philosophical significance of Irigaray’s intervention by recontextualizing the parameters that delimit her invocation of sexuate difference. (shrink)

Le présent article interprète la lecture heideggerienne de la phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel comme une critique voilée de la phénoménologie de la conscience de Husserl. Je défends l'idée qu'en dernier ressort, Heidegger affirme l'insuffisance des deux phénoménologies, exclusivement préoccupées par l'être ou les étants, et montre la voie pour une troisième phénoménologie, celle de la différence ontico-ontologique.

ABSTRACT In a passage from the addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art” often ignored in the secondary literature, Heidegger expands on how art institutes the unconcealment of the truth of Being with reference to the ontological difference—the difference between Being and beings which cannot rely on the comparison of predicates for clarification. The relationship between art and the ontological difference is not immediately obvious and lacks further explication in Heidegger’s other texts. This (...) paper argues that there are two fundamental elements to the ontological difference that Heidegger focuses on that can be used to elucidate art as a strife of world and earth: “the Nothing” [das Nichts] outlined in “What is Metaphysics?” (1929) and world-projection described in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1929–30). Understanding these two elements of the ontological difference (world-projection and the Nothing) as present together in the event of unconcealment (aletheia) thereby clarifies for the notorious concepts of earth, world, strife, and rift (Riß) that characterize the work of art. Recourse to the ontological difference as an explanatory mechanism for conceptualising Heidegger’s philosophy of art is a useful way of avoiding common issues in the prevailing literature that will be laid out below. (shrink)

In this volume, the author is concerned with working out one of the most fundamental themes in Heidegger’s thought, the "difference" between Being and that-which-is. The expression "ontological difference" is found neither in Being and Time nor Heidegger’s later works, where the term "ontological" is abandoned; nonetheless, what the term signified when it was used—the distinction itself—is central to all of Heidegger’s writings. Vail has written a careful analysis of the role this distinction plays in Heidegger’s (...) later writings, examining it from a multiplicity of perspectives. After discussing the way in which this distinction is opened up by Being itself, viz., by Being’s withdrawal in the very process of revealing itself in beings, Vail then analyzes the relation of this distinction to human thinking, to the "destiny" which lies behind the history of metaphysics, to the Region and, finally, to language. (shrink)

Animating Luce Irigaray’s oeuvre are two indissociable projects: the disruption of Western metaphysics and the thinking of sexual difference. The intersection of these two projects implies that any attempt to think through the meaning and significance of Irigaray’s notoriously fraught invocation of sexual difference must take seriously the way in which this invocation is itself always already inflected by her disruptive gesture. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate one moment of this intersection by focusing on her (...) critical engagement with Heidegger. In L’oubli de l’air , Irigaray criticizes Heidegger’s interpretation of the principle of identity as instantiating the same neglect of sexual difference that has been inscribed throughout the history of Western metaphysics. Moreover, Irigaray identifies the vestigial traces of this metaphysical legacy in Heidegger’s commitments to phenomenology. My claim, however, is that if we turn to Derrida’s second Geschlecht essay in order to mediate between Irigaray and Heidegger, the coimplicative nature of their projects comes into focus: on one hand, Derrida identifies within Heidegger’s work an incipient articulation of the very notion of sexuate difference that, on Irigaray’s reading, Heidegger’s work requires but nonetheless elides; on the other hand, Derrida’s rereading of Heidegger’s phenomenological commitments corroborates the philosophical significance of Irigaray’s intervention by recontextualizing the parameters that delimit her invocation of sexuate difference. (shrink)