This chapter contains sections titled: Interests and Obligations Self‐Knowledge Moral Development Through Humility, Courage, and Wisdom Character and the Common Good Further Down the Road Notes.

Trust is a topic of longstanding philosophical interest. It is indispensable to every kind of coordinated human activity, from sport to scientific research. Even more, trust is necessary for the successful dissemination of knowledge, and by extension, for nearly any form of practical deliberation and planning. Without trust, we could achieve few of our goals and would know very little. Despite trust’s fundamental importance in human life, there is substantial philosophical disagreement about what trust is, and (...) further, how trusting is normatively constrained and best theorized about in relation to other things we value. This entry is divided into three sections, which explore key (and sometimes interconnected) ethical and epistemological themes in the philosophy of trust: (1) The Nature of Trust; (2) The Normativity of Trust, and (3) The Value of Trust. (shrink)

This essay examines the fundamental role of veterinarians in companion animal practice by developing the idea of veterinarians as strong advocates for their nonhuman animal patients. While the practitioner-patient relationship has been explored extensively in medical ethics, the relation between practitioner and animal patient has received relatively less attention in the expanding but still young field of veterinary ethics. Over recent decades, social and professional ethical perspectives on human-animal relationships have undergone major change. Today, the essential role of (...) veterinarians is not entirely clear. Furthermore, veterinarians routinely face pressure, often insidious, to refrain from pursuing their patients’ vital interests. In exploring the concept of strong patient advocacy, this essay investigates the increasingly common suggestion that veterinarians have ‘primary obligation’ and ‘first allegiance’ to their animal patients rather than to other parties, such as their clients or employers. The related concept of a fiduciary duty, which is sometimes encountered in medical ethics, is similarly explored as it applies to companion animal practice. The resultant idea of a strong patient advocate places companion animal veterinarians conceptually and ethically close to human health professionals, not least pediatricians. (shrink)

The article is about the freedom in Rousseau splitting of two basic ideas. The first is that the freedom existed markedly in the natural man and the second is this man came to lose it along his history, when by far historical processes constituted in society. The text proposes a discussion – from the reading of two works of Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men and The Social Contract – of the possibility of a return (...) to freedom in civil society, where perceives the opportunity of this rescue. For Rousseau, the man in the state of nature lived happy and in peace, whereas in the state of society there is a predominance of the inequality between the men: the moral inequality. The social pact is guarantee of the life in society and of the convergence of interests of his members. A pact by the freedom of the individual and by the democratic society. (shrink)

The question of the ethical life is arguably one of the most compelling, and urgent, questions of our time. As Peter Singer, among others, has pointed out, almost 10 million children die each year due to poverty, some of whom would not die if the amount of aid that we now offer increases significantly. As Singer has also pointed out, the exploitation of human beings and other animals is a major ethical and practical concern. There can be little (...) reasonable doubt that pain and suffering abound, in the world today, due to many causes such as poverty, disease, environmental degradation and destruction and anthropocentrism among others, just as there can be little reasonable doubt that some of the pain and suffering is preventable. So, what does it mean to live ethically today? Does it mean taking the point of view of the universe, as Sidgwick put it, memorably, rather than a narrow anthropocentric or speciesist view? Does it mean living in accordance with duties or obligations, or in light of recognised virtues, or with the minimisation of pain and suffering primarily in mind? Does it entail a consideration of the interests of other species and a rejection of the principle of the sanctity of human life? Does it mean not eating animals when other healthy alternatives are available, especially when those animals have been treated in ways that are inconsistent with their interests, whatever they may be? Does it mean taking active steps to reduce poverty on our part on a day to day basis? Is ethics exhausted in some sense today? And if we could reach some consensus on these questions, what difference would the ethical life make? Some argue that speciesism and the exploitation of human beings and other animals might diminish; that pain and suffering, especially gratuitous pain and suffering, would decrease, or at the very least, not increase; or that we will become more aware of the limitations of things such as "the traditional ethic of the sanctity of life", as Singer calls it. Some argue that the ethical life is closely related to a life of relationships, reflection and deliberation, all of which deepen our understanding and enrich us personally. Others argue that the ethical life is closely related to our search for a meaningful life - that the ethical life can help us to find meaning in a world in which "meaning", defined broadly, can seem elusive, enigmatic or unsubstantial. These and related issues and questions are explored in this collection, which illustrates the relevance, vitality and dynamism of ethics today. (shrink)

This collection of original essays, from both established scholars and newcomers, takes up a debate that has recently flared up in philosophy, sociology, and disability studies on whether disability is intrinsically a harm that lowers a person's quality of life. While this is a new question in disability scholarship, it is also touches on one of the oldest philosophical questions: What is the good human life? Historically, philosophers have not been interested in the topic of disability, and (...) when they are it is usually only in relation to questions such as euthanasia, abortion, or the moral status of disabled people. Consequently, implicitly or explicitly, disability has been either ignored by moral and political philosophers or simply equated with a bad human life, a life not worth living. This collection takes up the challenge that disability poses to basic questions of political philosophy and bioethics, among others, by focusing on fundamental issues as well as practical implications of the relationship between disability and the good human life. (shrink)

This book collects Thomas Nagel's recent philosophical reflections on topics of fundamental interest: ethics, moral psychology, science and religion, death and the holocaust, and the metaphysics of mind. Among the figures discussed are Peter Singer, Alvin Plantinga, Christine Korsgaard, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Iris Murdoch, T. M. Scanlon, Ronald Dworkin, Samuel Scheffler, Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene, and Daniel Dennett. Nagel consistently defends a realist interpretation of moral truth and resists reductive attempts to subsume ethics to psychology and (...) evolutionary theory. He also defends a pluralistic conception of the content of morality against utilitarianism, including deontological elements such as rights and special responsibilities. A realist outlook also informs his discussions of metaphysical and epistemological questions. The book closes with tributes to a number of people Nagel has known over the course of his career. The essays are all addressed to a general audience, and should appeal not only to philosophers but to anyone interested in current attempts to understand human life, human values, and how we fit into the world. (shrink)

This paper puts Jane Bennett’s vital materialism into dialogue with Luce Irigaray’s ontology of sexuate difference. Together these thinkers challenge the image of dead or intrinsically inanimate matter that is bound up with both the instrumentalization of the earth and the disavowal of sexual difference and the maternal. In its place they seek to affirm a vital, generative materiality: an ‘active matter’ whose differential becomings no longer oppose activity to passivity, subject to object, or one body, self or (...) entity to its ‘other’. For both thinkers, displacing the hylomorphic conceptual structures that have tended to dominate western metaphysical thought is inseparable from critiquing the model of the individual subject as bounded, autonomous and self-identical. Such individualism is countered by the relational ontologies figured in Bennett’s ‘distributed agencies’ and Irigaray’s ‘placental economy’, and by a shared attentiveness to the capacities of the human body to bear others within. Nonetheless, this paper argues that each thinker renders this ‘other within’ in very different ways. On the one hand, Bennett’s approach complements and expands Irigaray’s notion of the elemental by affording a greater attentiveness to inorganic and non-sexuate matters. On the other, Irigaray’s conception of generative relationality and the ontological priority of the in-between allows us to think such material entanglements in ways that more fully displace the twinned logics of individualism and instrumentalization. Her project thereby affirms the relational and irreducible differences on which the ‘vitality’ of a vital materiality depends. If there is no more “earth” to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and always to desire, no opaque matter which in theory does not know herself, then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the “subject”? If the earth turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of the subject might thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and penetration. For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over? And in? Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman Jane Bennett has recently argued that “the image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption”, continuing that: “The figure of an intrinsically inanimate matter may be one of the impediments to the emergence of more ecological and more materially sustainable modes of production and consumption”.11J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010, ix. Henceforth VM. View all notes This insight is prefigured and re-affirmed by the work of Irigaray. Her sustained analysis of western thought and culture shows how its constitutive disavowal of sexual difference and the maternal is inextricably bound up with an equally deep-rooted disavowal of matter and corporeality. As the above passage from Speculum suggests,22L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. G. Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985, 133. Henceforth S. View all notes Irigaray seeks to expose woman's reduction to an object for a subject and a maternal-material resource for man's speculations; but in disentangling woman from her symbolic identification with the earth, she also seeks to release the earth from its identification with a passive and manipulable matter. Her work thus bears directly on the revaluation required to transform human beings' relations to materiality: both their own, and that of the earth they inhabit. At the centre of this revaluation is Irigaray's work to displace the image of dead or intrinsically inanimate matter that Bennett also critiques, and to affirm instead a sexuate materiality that is both living and generative. Her consistent troubling of hylomorphism is as unsettling for the subject as her question: “But what if the ‘object’ started to speak?” This question is echoed in Bennett's concern with “the moment when the object becomes the Other, when the sardine can looks back, when the mute idol speaks”.33 VM, 2, citing W.J.T. Mitchell, What Do Pictures Want?, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2005, 157. View all notes As this passage indicates, Bennett's own project is more concerned with the agency of non-human materialities – including their role in the constitution of the human – than with specifically sexed bodies or a materiality inflected by sexual difference. It is these crucial differences in emphasis, I will suggest, that allow the work of these two thinkers to be brought together in productive dialogue. On the one hand, Bennett's approach affords a greater attentiveness to inorganic and non-sexuate matter; on the other, Irigaray's twinned ontology of sexual difference and maternal relation is better able to affirm the relational differences on which the “vitality” of a vital materiality depends. The paper begins by outlining several key elements of Irigaray's philosophy of sexual difference to show how it leads necessarily to a rethinking of matter. This rethinking is especially helpful for shifting away from the hylomorphism that has been a dominant strand in western thought, informing an understanding of the earth as a fundamentally inert and ever-ready resource. As I will show, the figures through which Irigaray re-articulates female specificity also allow her to refigure the earth as active matter that “turns upon herself ” in generative flux. In the second section, I will situate Irigaray's re-thinking of matter in relation to Bennett's “vital materiality”.44Bennett can be aligned with a number of thinkers who have come to be grouped under the heading “new materialisms”. See S. Alaimo and S. Hekman, eds., Material Feminisms, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008; D. Coole and S. Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010. View all notes An advantage of this concept is that it refuses the separation between humans and matter still implicit in concepts such as “the environment”. By attending to “our own constitution as vital materiality”, as well as the ways our “own” bodies are never “fully or exclusively human”, Bennett adjusts the status of human actants while re-evaluating non-human bodies “as actants rather than as objects”. As I will show, her approach provides a constructive critical perspective on Irigaray's work by drawing attention to the specifically non-sexuate nature of the elemental. Equally, however, Irigaray's insistence on sexuate difference problematises any appeal to a generic notion of “the human”. This is especially helpful, I will suggest, in relation to contemporary descriptions of climate change as “anthropogenic”. By homogenising human beings, such descriptions make it more difficult to address the ways in which current ecological problems are inseparable from global patterns of social, political and economic inequity. For both thinkers, challenging hylomorphism needs to be matched with a critique of the dominant modern model of the subject as bounded, autonomous and self-identical. And for both, this model is displaced and undone by the capacity of the human body to bear others within, in ways that engender and sustain human life. Yet as I will discuss in the final two sections, each thinker renders this “other within” in very different ways, with significant implications for the ethics and politics of a “vital materiality”. In the end it is Irigaray's rendering of a distinctively female capacity to bear an other within, explored via the generative relationality of a placental economy, that more fully escapes the individualism of the One and the Same. Together, Irigaray and Bennett show that to take seriously the ecological crises that currently confront us means overcoming the disavowal of both human beings' own fundamental materiality and our dependency on the sustaining materialities of the earth. In contrast, a dominant strand in contemporary responses to these crises is an environmental politics of “enlightened self-interest”55I borrow this phrase from H. Kopnina's critical discussion in “Forsaking Nature? Contesting ‘Biodiversity’ Through Competing Discourses of Sustainability”, Journal of Education for Sustainable Development 7, no. 1 : 51–63. that precludes any serious re-evaluation of human beings' relations to matter and the earth. If human beings can be persuaded that current levels of environmental degradation are damaging to them, threatening perhaps their very survival, they are more likely to take decisive steps to alter their behaviour. Insofar as such approaches demand action only for the sake of human interests and ends, they are both anthropocentric and spring from the same instrumentalising rationality that has engendered the ecological crises we currently face. They may well be successful in prompting action. But by foregrounding the survival of “the human species” per se, such approaches foreclose discussion of whose interests are served if survival is all that is allowed to be at stake, and whose lives are thereby consigned to ongoing exploitation. Moreover, as I will argue below, the instrumental rationality that serves survival is at odds with an affirmation of life, as a becoming that depends on difference. With this in mind, I will problematise Bennett's proposed politics of “expanded self-interest”, while seeking to retain many of the insights her approach brings. To more fully displace the “rational” self-interest that has encouraged human exploitation of the earth, we might take up Bennett's “vital materiality” in ways informed by Irigaray's conception of generative difference and the relational space-time of the in-between. (shrink)

Human dignity, a normative category developed by the Colombian Constitutional Court, is seen from "humanist constitutionalism", due to its functionality for the configuration of the fundamental human right of access to the Internet that translates into a digital vital minimum of the human person, emphasizing in the inclusion of the poor and vulnerable affected by digital inequality. A complex fundamental hyperright that obliges the State to guarantee the human rights of their essential core (...) and formulate public policies for their effective satisfaction inherent in the realization of the valuable life project of the person and their effective functioning in society. (shrink)

What is recognition and why is it so important? This book develops a synoptic conception of the significance of recognition in its many forms for human persons by means of a rational reconstruction and internal critique of classical and contemporary accounts. The book begins with a clarification of several fundamental questions concerning recognition. It then reconstructs the core ideas of Fichte, Hegel, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth and utilizes the insights and conceptual tools developed across these (...) chapters for developing a case for the universal importance of recognition for humans. It argues in favour of a universalist anthropological position, unusual in the literature on recognition, that aims to construe a philosophically sound basis for a discourse of common humanity, or of a shared human life-form for which moral relations of recognition are essential. This synthetic conception of the importance of recognition provides tools for articulating deep intuitions shared across cultures about what makes human life and forms of human co-existence better or worse, and thus tools for mutual understanding about the deepest shared concerns of humanity, or of what makes us all human persons despite our differences. -/- Recognition and the Human Life-Form will appeal to readers interested in philosophical anthropology, social and political philosophy, critical theory, and the history of philosophy. It also provides ideas and conceptual tools for fields such as anthropology, education, disability studies, international relations, law, politics, religious studies, sociology, and social research. (shrink)

Aristotle and Xunzi on Shame, Moral Education and the Good Life is the first major work that takes two philosophers from the ancient Greek and early Chinese traditions to stimulate discussion of an interdisciplinary nature on the rich and complex topic of the emotions, in particular shame. It features sophisticated comparative analysis of the Greek and Chinese texts while bringing the ancient materials to bear on modern controversies such as the role of shame in moral education and social cohesion. (...) Despite fundamental differences in their social-historical and intellectual backgrounds, Aristotle and Xunzi bear striking similarities in several respects: their concept of humans as essentially members of communities, as having a unique set of characteristics that set them apart from other living things, and as beings in need of moral training to fulfil their potential and become integrated into a well-ordered society. The two philosophers' discourses on shame reveal important insights into their ideals of human nature, moral education and the good life. This book tackles directly the methodological problems that are relevant to anyone interested in cross-cultural comparisons and organises discussion of the ancient sources in such a way as to facilitate a thorough integration of perspectives from the cultural traditions concerned. This approach provides sufficient focus to allow for detailed textual analysis while giving scope for making constant connections to the broader comparative questions at issue. (shrink)

Although important philosophers have questioned the moral defensibility of our treatment of animals, the topic has never had a significant place in ethical theory. By bringing together papers by authors with diverse views, this anthology focuses attention on the topic which, primarily due to the writings of Peter Singer, has received increasing study in recent years. According to Singer, the major moral theories offer arbitrary bases for giving preference to humans, and so they cannot be used to justify the widespread (...) beliefs that eating and experimenting upon animals are morally acceptable practices. Insofar as humans, regardless of rational or physical capacity, are deemed worthy of equal consideration, there is no good reason to withhold such consideration from animals. The first of the four sections into which the readings are divided describes the brutal treatment animals often receive from people. The second section provides a variety of opinions on the difference between men and animals ranging from Descartes’ claim that animals are mere automatons to Darwin’s claim that there is no fundamental difference between the mental faculties of men and higher mammals. The third section considers whether any of the supposed differences between men and animals can justify different treatment. The main conflict here is between those who contend that we have duties only to free or rational beings and those who, like Singer, contend that we have the duty to heed the interests of all sentient beings. The fourth section examines the nature of rights and whether animals have them. Some writers contend that animals have the right not only to life and happiness but also to liberty and property. Those unfamiliar with the heretofore neglected problem of our treatment of animals will find the readings in this collection valuable and provocative.—M.G. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gifts and Obligations: The Living Donor as StorytellerPaul Root WolpeThe Illness NarrativeEach of us lives with an inner biographical narrative, the story we tell ourselves about ourselves, the story that becomes our account of who we are. It is the story we have constructed about our life and its meaning, built from memories of our past—our childhood, our parents, our friends, our experiences. We construct that story (...) through our subjective experience and memories of our past, bringing together the disparate parts of our lives and weaving them into a coherent whole by which we make sense of ourselves.Under the pressures of the advent of sudden illness, or in the face of chronic illness that becomes a dominant status, “individuals often feel a pressing need to re-examine and re–fashion their personal narratives in an attempt to maintain a sense of identity” (Bury, 2001, p.264). Illness forces us to re–imagine our life in the face of often sudden new circumstances. Illness narratives about chronic or lifelong illness are not necessarily about suddenly needing to recast one’s life due to new circumstances, but about the need to understand the way chronic illness positions and defines us in the web of social and institutional relationships.The narratives in this collection might be thought of as a peculiar type of illness narrative. The people who populate these stories are not themselves sick (or at least were not when their stories began); yet they are bound up in the medical world, have had their bodies cut open and pieces removed, have had, at times, problematic recoveries and lasting physical and mental challenges. For that reason, the stories of living donors are particularly interesting in the illness narrative literature, and they raise a unique set of questions. Living donors have not discovered a sudden illness that requires re–imagining their lives, nor are they coping with a long illness that has become a thematic frame for how they conceptualize their world. The key aspect that differentiates the living donors’ narratives from the usual illness narratives is volition; the donors have chosen to enter the world of the infirm, have chosen to subject themselves to surgery and medical management, and have chosen to join their stories to someone else’s—and in so doing to become allied to, and yet never fully a part of, the illness narratives of the recipients.Gifting and OwnershipIf it is true that we tell our stories informed by the other stories of our culture, that we must fit our own stories into the narrative resources available in our particular society, then the living donors need to find a cultural frame to make sense of this strange position they find themselves in: joining the world of the sick and infirm not because of intrinsic illness but, to the contrary, because of their relative health. Almost thirty years ago, Renée Fox and Judith Swazey began their ground-breaking work The Courage to Fail (1974) with a clear [End Page 39] statement of the way in which the donor’s role is understood:The donor who offers a part of his body for transplantation is making an inestimably precious gift. The acutely ill patient who receives the organ accepts a priceless gift. The giving and receiving of a gift of enormous value, we believe, is the most significant meaning of human organ transplantation. The extraordinary gift exchange, moreover, is not a private transaction between the donor and the recipient. Rather, it takes place within the complex network of personal relationships that extends to the families, the physicians, and all the members of the medical team who are involved in the operation. Within the network of these relations, a complex exchange occurs through which considerably more than the organ itself is transferred(p. 5).It is the sociological and psychological power of the idea of the gift that makes transplantation an especially evocative case. Eighteen years later, in their second book about organ transplantation, Spare Parts (1992), Fox and Swazey cite their own quote above and comment about it that “Despite all the biomedical and social changes that have ensued within and around the... (shrink)

The weakening of mechanisms for international cooperation within the context of the right to minimum wage can be explained by the increasing power of new players, the transnational corporations on the one hand, and the waning of the power of the state, on the other hand. These processes of globalization produce various challenges to the modern welfare state, such as the ability to attain minimum wage. This right is vital particularly to weakened workers that would otherwise be remunerated at (...) a very low wage, which could likely lead to poverty. This right poses, however, numerous challenges, in particular the ability of international labor law to define it across borders. The article describes three models for defining this right: the existential deficiency model, the welfare model, and the comfort model and analyzes the various forms regulating the right to minimum wage in international regulations, state regulations, and codes of conduct of transnational corporations examining the ramifications of globalization within the context of labor rights. Moreover, the article suggests changes to international labor law, required to ensure that it functions as an effective instrument in protecting labor rights and proposes establishing regional parliaments—a supra-governmental body—composed of states and a broad array of interested private parties in its activities to establish fundamental principles relating to various areas of life, such as the basic rights of workers, taxation principles, and principles for protecting the environment. These regional bodies would decide which of the various models used for shaping the right to minimum wage should be adopted as a fundamental principle. (shrink)

The experience of the twentieth century bears witness to the abuse, mutilation and homicide of the vulnerable made possible by the power of the state, mass markets, and medical and financial interests. Suggestions for reform of the law regarding food and fluids typically take place in the context of utilitarian personistic “quality-of-life” presuppositions, and interests in shifting legal responsibility for life-and-death decisions, medical research, drug trials, organ harvesting as well as more mundane bureaucratic concerns like bed-clearing. (...) With the Western world undergoing massive demographic change and a growing ageing and non-productive population, it cannot be assumed that these alterations to the positive law are problem-free. By allowing new agents power to require that food and fluids be withdrawn, non-therapeutic research and other procedures (like abortion and sterilisation) be performed on non-consenting patients, novel legislation such as that discussed cannot be regarded as autonomy enhancing so much as a threat to human rights. These laws although touted as progressive, more often than not invite routine abuse and destruction of the vulnerable, obscure accountability and create an inconsistent body of law, with conflicting obligations for health professionals. (shrink)

How can the abortion issue be resolved? Many believe that the issue can be resolved if, and only if, we can determine when human life begins. Those opposed to abortion choice typically say that human life begins at conception. Many who favor abortion choice say that we will never know when human life begins. The importance of the when-does-human-life-begin issue is not so much argued for as it is taken to be self-evident. (...) Furthermore, belief that this issue is fundamental is taken for granted – at least outside of philosophy – by many of the people who seem to disagree about almost everything else concerning abortion. It has been my experience that – with rare exceptions – even those who insist that the issue of abortion should focus on the interests of pregnant women believe that this focus is warranted because fetuses are either not yet fully alive or not yet fully human. (shrink)

Their paper begins with the observation that, even though many philosophers, especially in the twentieth century, have had personal experience of exile, they rarely treat the topic of exile directly in their philosophical works. Existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, it is true, have employed exile as a metaphor for the human condition, yet the concrete experience of political exile has been treated as somehow lacking the universality that canonical philosophy needs. This paper warns against the temptation to conflate the (...) real situation of exile with a general condition of existential unbelongingness. It goes on to trace two major threads in the history of the philosophical treatment of citizenship, the one deriving from Plato and the other from Kant and to explore their relevance to contemporary debate around the moral and legal status of those who seek refuge abroad from war, oppression, or other kinds of threat in their homeland. The Platonic tradition treats citizenship as deriving primarily from association with a land; it views foreigners as having the potential to contaminate the polis and any citizen who spends time away from the polis as likely to betray it. While many features of the Platonic position have not survived to the present, it is noteworthy that, for indigenous peoples in many parts of the world, attachment to the land remains of fundamental importance. At the same time, though migration of many kinds has become extremely common, some individuals and governments in the first world still demonstrate a visceral belief that refugees and immigrants to their country will somehow corrupt or contaminate it. The Kantian position, by contrast, treats citizenship as, ideally at least, cosmopolitan and global. It envisages nation states as moving towards “an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war”. Consequently, the stranger seeking refuge abroad from life-threatening persecution in his or her own country has what Kant refers to as a “right of resort” in another country. While Kant argues that we must therefore not show hostility to such people, our obligations to them do not extend to philanthropic hospitality. This assertion of a limited obligation to displaced persons forms the basis for much contemporary discussion around the rights of refugees and migrants. Globalization, of course, has not taken quite the form that Kant envisaged. While the United Nations asserts the universality of human rights, and certain clusters of countries, such as those in Western Europe, have moved towards federation and free internal movement of their citizens, so-called globalization has taken place primarily on the economic, rather than the political, level. The extreme international mobility of investment capital from first-world countries in search of cheap labour is not currently matched by an acceptance within such countries of the rights of third-world citizens to migrate to their shores in search of higher wages and improved living conditions. Finally, this paper offers a critique of both the Platonic and the Kantian positions and argues the need in the modern world for institutional arrangements which represent a variety of interests and struggles across national boundaries. (shrink)

Muwāsāt encompasses the moral duty to provide aid to those in need, prioritising those closest to us while sharing what resources we can spare. However, should a person's legally protected values be at risk, assistance and solidarity become mandatory obligations. Islamic law recognises this social duty as fard al-kifāya, with muwāsāt as the justification for this sufficient obligation. On the other hand, muwāsāt is also included in the legal justification of in-kind obligations such as zakat and alimony. Muwāsāt (...) actually has a broad conceptual content that includes each individual in the society helping each other, sharing, and sharing what they have when necessary. The aim of muwāsāt is to keep social sensitivity towards those in need alive. Muwāsāt constitutes the wisdom of meeting the needs of the other party by sharing the resources available to each individual in the society when the legal values that Islam aims to protect are in danger. In this context, this study aims to evaluate the rights of those in need over those who have the means to meet their needs by considering the proposal in the context of the provisions. To prioritize the legal values of Islam and safeguard the sanctity of life, as well as protect bodily integrity and uphold the right to privacy, the principle of muwāsāt necessitates that all Muslims must uphold these responsibilities towards themselves, each other and the state. This study aims to investigate muwāsāt, which defines the duty to provide assistance to any individual who is cognisant of their plight, within their capacity, when their legal rights that must be safeguarded are threatened, in the framework of social accountability. In this context, it can be said that muwāsāt has a direct connection with the proposed obligations in Islamic law. Muwāsāt is included in the justification of fard al-kifāya obligations. However, the fact that the obligation of zakat, the obligation of fidya, and the responsibility of alimony are included in the legal justification of meeting the needs of the needy by those who are not dependent on anyone, shows us that muwāsāt is the basis of obligations involving cooperation. Similarly, the legal reason for banning interest is that it destroys the balance in society. In particular, the basis for the state to impose an upper limit on exorbitant prices is based on the principle that every individual has an equal right to meet basic needs. In other words, determining the profit margin in the prices of basic needs is a requirement of muwāsāt. The definition of the state’s obligation, along with individual responsibility in muwāsāt, aims to ensure that there is no individual in society whose basic needs are not met. Consequently, muwāsāt has an aspect that includes social responsibility and legal liability along with conscientious responsibility. This shows that Islam adopts the protection of life as the highest legal value. Muwāsāt is not limited to meeting basic needs, but also includes giving this support to a person when he needs moral support, sharing his pain by standing next to him, feeling him and internalizing his pain. For this reason, muwāsāt actually defines the moral stance that a Muslim should have. Based on this moral stance, it is safe to say that the most fundamental concern of Islam is to protect the material and spiritual integrity and human existence. This study aims to express, in the context of Islamic law, that the main purpose of Islam is to protect human beings in their material and spiritual integrity by examining and evaluating muwāsāt in its broad scope. (shrink)

This book addresses key topics in social theory such as the basic structures of social life, the character of human activity, and the nature of individuality. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, the author develops an account of social existence that argues that social practices are the fundamental phenomenon in social life. This approach offers insight into the social formation of individuals, surpassing and critiquing the existing practice theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, Lyotard and Oakeshott. In bringing (...) Wittgenstein's work to bear on issues of social theory the book shows the relevance of his work to a body of thought to which it has never been applied. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences, a wide range of social theorists in political science and sociology, as well as some literary theorists. (shrink)

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back (...) to Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem. (shrink)

In Biodeconstruction (2018) I argued that Derrida, in the Life Death seminar (1975–76), would have anticipated the most recent developments in epigenetics, a field in which the dogma of genetic determinism is radically challenged by noting the influence of the environment in the production of mutations in the genetic program, particularly when a genetic population is faced with a radical change in its environmental conditions, which I propose to call an ‘ecological event’. I explore a comparison between the Derridean (...) deconstruction of genetic determinism and the theoretical elaborations of epigenesis, referring to the work of Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Dimensions (2005). Jablonka and Lamb propose a theory of genetic variation in which mutations would be the result of the interpretation of unpredictable environmental events by the individual whose survival would be in danger. Through this comparison, I show that the study of ‘interpretive Mutations’ as reactions to unpredictable environmental events can be helpful in understanding the Derridean theme of the ‘event’, rearticulating it in relation to the radical environmental changes that humanity will sooner or later face. (shrink)

Advances in genetic technology in general and medical genetics in particular will enable us to intervene in the process of human biological development which extends from zygotes and embryos to people. This will allow us to control to a great extent the identities and the length and quality of the lives of people who already exist, as well as those we bring into existence in the near and distant future. Genes and Future People explores two general philosophical questions, one (...) metaphysical, the other moral: (1) How do genes, and different forms of genetic intervention (gene therapy, genetic enhancement, presymptomatic genetic testing of adults, genetic testing of preimplantation embryos), affect the identities of the people who already exist and those we bring into existence? and (2) How do these interventions benefit or harm the people we cause to exist in the near future and those who will exist in the distant future by satisfying or defeating their interest in having reasonably long and disease-free lives? Genes and Future People begins by explaining the connection between genes and disease, placing genetic within a framework of evolutionary biology. It then discusses such topics as how genes and genetic intervention influence personal identity, what genetic testing of individuals and the knowledge resulting from it entails about responsibility to others who may be at risk, as well as how gene therapy and genetic enhancement can affect the identities of people and benefit or harm them. Furthermore, it discusses various moral aspects of cloning human beings and body parts. Finally, it explores the metaphysical and moral implications of genetic manipulation of the mechanisms of aging to extend the human life span.The aim Genes and Future People is to move philosophers, bioethicists, and readers in general to reflect on the extent to which genes determine whether we are healthy or diseased, our identities as persons, the quality of our lives, and our moral obligations to future generations of people. (shrink)

_The Ethics of Pregnancy, Abortion and Childbirth_ addresses the unique moral questions raised by pregnancy and its intimate bodily nature. From assisted reproduction to abortion and ‘vital conflict’ resolution to more everyday concerns of the pregnant woman, this book argues for pregnancy as a close human relationship with the woman as guardian or custodian. Four approaches to pregnancy are explored: ‘uni-personal’, ‘neighborly’, ‘maternal’ and ‘spousal’. The author challenges not only the view that there is only one moral subject (...) to consider in pregnancy, but also the idea that the location of the fetus lacks all inherent, unique significance. It is argued that the pregnant woman is not a mere ‘neighbor’ or helpful stranger to the fetus but is rather already in a real familial relationship bringing real familial rights and obligations. If the status of the fetus is conclusive for at least some moral questions raised by pregnancy, so too are facts about its bodily relationship with, and presence in, the woman who supports it. This lucid, accessible and original book explores fundamental ethical issues in a rich and often neglected area of philosophy in ways of interest also to those from other disciplines. (shrink)

It is commonly understood that in its focus on rights and obligations law is centrally concerned with organising responsibility. In defining how obligations are created, in contract or property law, say, or imposed, as in tort, public, or criminal law, law and legal institutions are usually seen as society’s key mode of asserting and defining the content and scope of responsibilities. This book takes the converse view: legal institutions are centrally involved in organising irresponsibility. Particularly with respect to (...) the production of large-scale harms – including extensive human rights violations, forms of colonialism, or environmental or nuclear devastation – and in opposition to conventional understandings of responsibility in law, morality and politics, the book provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which legal institutions – their practices, concepts, and categories – themselves operate as much to deflect responsibility for harms suffered as they do to acknowledge them. Drawing on a series of case studies from local, national, and global concerns the book analyses how law facilitates dispersals and disavowals of responsibility, and it shows how it does so in consistent and patterned ways. In assessing how this ‘organised irresponsibility’ operates, and what its consequences are for both legal analysis and society generally, a thoroughgoing re-evaluation of law’s methods, operation, and consequences is required. At stake is nothing less than a fundamental re-assessment of the role of modern law in the production and legitimation of human suffering. This innovative and interdisciplinary book provides a sustained challenge to conventional thinking about law and legal institutions. It will be of major interest to those working in law, political and legal theory, sociology and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Agriculture has been recently viewed as the primary destructive force of biodiversity, but the places that produce our food and fiber may also hold the key to saving the richness of life on earth. This argument is based on three fundamental positions. First, it is argued that to value and thereby preserve and restore biodiversity we must begin by employing anthropocentric ethics. While changing our understanding of intrinsic values (i.e., the unconditional values of biodiversity as a state and (...) process in-and-of-itself, without reference to human interests) is often advocated as the means by which our behavior will reflect the importance of biodiversity, a change in how we perceive and conditionally value biodiversity is proposed as a more effective and compelling approach. Second, I suggest that anthropocentric values can be linked to a sense of “Place,” with agriculture playing a vital role in this context. Agriculture forms a powerful basis for personal, experiential development of a profound meaning and connection to a setting or landscape. The agricultural setting has tremendous potential for arational (emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual) values that ultimately compel our actions. The constancy of relationship and mutuality of dependency between humans and agricultural lands, particularly extensive agroecosystems, fosters an intensity of association that transcends our recent affinity to wildlands. Third, a mature understanding of places and their biodiversity must include those organisms that account for many of the ecological processes and the majority of the species richness -- the insects. The importance of these insects in structuring the landscape and the effects of habitat destruction on these organisms both suggest a vital, intimate, and reciprocal link between insects and Places. Finally, it is argued that the most important avenue for future efforts to protect and restore biodiversity on the part of agricultural and other scientists is educational -- the presentation of our research to the public in terms that provoke emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual meaning which lies at the core of human values and actions. (shrink)

While interactions with other animate beings seem mostly to serve our own human interests, there are, at times, fugitive glimpses, passing contacts, momentary motions, and fleeting feelings of vital connection with other life forms. Life phenomenology attempts to realize these relational, interactive and intercorporeal possibilities. It challenges the language game of presuming the muteness and bruteness of non-human creatures and, at best, of speaking for them. It critiques the capture of non-human species within (...) the inhibiting ring of human functions and forms to reveal feelings and flows of interspecies commonality. It brings to expression the experiences of being moved to act and speak with others who do not share the human tongue. In part a critique of the logocentric, anthropocentric phenomenologies of intentionality, life phenomenology is more positively a means of coming to terms with the life-affirming kinetic, kinesthetic and affective dynamics of interspecies relationality. I take up the interrogation of this phenomenality, this humanimality, with the assistance of phenomenological scholarship that lends fuller credence to the experiences we have of moving in concert with other animate beings. In doing so, I aim to show the important insights that life phenomenology offers us in fostering not only greater appreciation of, responsivenss to and connection with other animals, but also in indicating the qualitative dynamics of relating with greater animate consciousness to one anotherof our own animal kind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December (...) 1948;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

Human concern over the urgency of current environmental issues increasingly entails wide-ranging discussions of how we may rethink the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world. In order to provide a context for such discussions this anthology provides a selection of some of the most important, interesting and influential readings on the subject from classical times through to the late nineteenth century. Included are such figures as Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Hildegard of Bingen, St Francis of Assisi, (...) Bacon, Decartes, Kant, Mill, Emerson and Thoreau. As the collection as a whole amply demonstrates, the history of western philosophical accounts of nature can help us to better understand current attitudes and problems. Human Life and the Natural World may also be of interest to a broad range of philosophers and students of philosophy, and more generally to those with a concern for the environment that engages the intellect as well as the heart. (shrink)

This book provides extensive and critical engagement with some of the most recent and compelling arguments favoring abortion choice. It features original essays from leading and emerging philosophers, bioethicists and medical professionals that present philosophically sophisticated and novel arguments against abortion choice. The chapters in this book are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of essays focuses primarily on unborn human individuals--zygotes, embryos and fetuses. In these chapters it is argued, for example, that human organisms begin (...) to exist at conception and that zygotes, embryos and fetuses are persons. These chapters also explore questions about whether or not zygotes, embryos and fetuses are part of their mothers' bodies. The second set of essays focuses primarily on elective abortion and the debates surrounding it. These chapters consider whether or not opponents of abortion are commonly hypocritical, how opponents of abortion should think about adoption, how emerging technologies may affect the current debate and whether or not those participating in the debate should rely on analogies to support their case. Finally, the third set of essays shifts focus from the legal and moral status of elective abortion to its place in medical practice. In these chapters it is argued that elective abortion embodies a kind of ableism, and that elective abortion is medically unnecessary, harmful to women's mental health and that telemedicine abortion poses significant risks to women's health. Agency, Pregnancy and Persons offers an up-to-date examination of unborn human beings, the debates surrounding elective abortion and the place of elective abortion within medical practice. It will be of interest to medical professionals and those who work in philosophy, bioethics and medical ethics alike. (shrink)

Philosophical defenses of parents’ rights typically appeal to the interests of parents, the interests of children, or some combination of these. Here I propose that at least in the case of biological, non-adoptive parents, these rights have a different normative basis: namely, these rights should be accorded to biological parents because of the compensatory duties such parents owe their children by virtue of having brought them into existence. Inspried by Seana Shiffrin, I argue that procreation inevitably encumbers the (...) wills of children in otherwise morally objectionable ways. Such subjection generates duties to compensate children, even if the child’s life is on balance a benefit to her. The right to procreate is thus conditioned on prospective parent’s willingness to compensate for the harms of procreation. And because parents bear such compensatory duties, they must be accorded permissions (i.e., rights) to fulfill these duties. These rights include familiar exclusionary rights to promote children’s welfare, etc. Moreover, because subjecting children to harms or the risks thereof violates their autonomy, parental duties (and rights) include the provision of education and other goods that enable their subsequent autonomy as adults. Grounding parental rights in compensatory procreative duties avoids problems associated with appeals to the interests of children (e.g., that these interests do not seem to generate exclusive parental rights) or to the interests of parents (e.g., that these interests do not appear strong enough to permit the creation of a new, vulnerable human individual). (shrink)

The target paper of Schoeller, Perlovsky, and Arseniev is an essential and timely contribution to a current shift of focus in neuroscience aiming to merge neurophysiological, psychological and physical principles in order to build the foundation for the physics of mind. Extending on previous work of Perlovsky et al. and Badre, the authors of the target paper present interesting mathematical models of several basic principles of the physics of mind, such as perception and cognition, concepts and emotions, instincts and learning. (...) Their conceptualization helps to clarify the distinction between conscious and unconscious aspects of mind that is often neglected and further provide a clear description of the mental hierarchy, which extends from physical objects in the physical world to abstract ideas in the mental/subjective realm. While we agree that identification of a few fundamental principles is a first step toward developing the physics of the mind, and we concur with the selection of those principles in the target review paper, we think that the theory of the physics of mind would much benefit from considering also the most basic principles that are common for the physics/matter/brain and the mind/subjectivity/cognition. In this respect, such basic principles as time and space, as well as criticality, self-organization, and emergence seem to be the most interesting. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhism, Christianity, and Modern Science:A Response to Masao AbeFrank FairAfter number of years of teaching philosophy of science, a few years ago I took up the challenge of teaching philosophy of religion. As one might imagine, it has always seemed to me to be important that our religious convictions harmonize with our best scientific knowledge of how the world works, and this became a more interesting issue when the (...) change in my teaching assignment brought me into contact with the work of Masao Abe, the eminent Japanese Buddhist scholar. His essay "Religion and Science in the Global Age—Their Essential Character and Mutual Relationship" (Abe 1985: 241–248) challenged me to expand my thinking to consider not only how theistic religions such as Christianity relate to science, but also to consider how nontheistic religions, such as Buddhism, might fare when interacting with modern science.In his essay on religion and science Abe expressed his agreement with the thought of Keiji Nishitani in this way:1. It is necessary for each religion to re-examine the basis of its world view. For any religion its world view is not like clothes that one can change whenever one pleases. A world view is to religion what water is to a fish. It is the indispensable condition through which religion can actually come into existence. Water is neither the life of the fish as such, nor its body, yet it is fundamentally linked to both. For a religion to change its world view is a matter no less fatal to it than for a fish to change from salt water to fresh.2. What is even more crucial and important is that each religion re-examine and reinterpret that tradition's understanding of God or the 'ultimate' and His or its relation to human beings and the world. With regard to this second point, Buddhism which is fundamentally non-theistic, is in a somewhat different situation from Christianity, which is basically theistic. (Abe 1985: 244–245)Abe continues: "Theistic answers to the question 'why' in Christianity, such as the 'will of God' and the 'rule of God' are incompatible with modern scientific answers to the question 'how.' This is because the former strongly emphasize the personality of the ultimate while the latter is essentially impersonal" (Abe 1985: 245). In this [End Page 67] discussion, I will follow Abe's lead and consider the question of whether Buddhism is more compatible with modern science than Christianity.Christianity and Modern Science: Tensions and HarmoniesOne set of issues causing tension between modern science and Christianity has to do with history. Briefly, ideas about the creation of the universe, about the special creation of humankind, and about miracles, as in the claims about the resurrection of Jesus, are ideas about the action of God in history. These ideas relate the stance that Abe attributed to Christianity as involving an attempt to answer "why" questions about meaning and purpose, an attempt which he feels brings Christianity into conflict with modern science. I will give a brief account of what I take to be the current state of the discussion about each of these matters, and my point is to argue that Abe's conclusion about the relative superiority of Buddhism over Christianity in relation to modern science is premature at best.The Creation of the UniverseThe rise of the Big Bang theory, which traces the origin of the universe back to a tremendously powerful event several billion years ago, at first gave comfort to traditional ideas of divine creation. However, it soon became apparent that this comfort was ambiguous at best. It was not clear, for instance, that one could really prove on the basis of observational evidence that there was an absolute starting point those many billions of years ago, or whether the totality of things could be going through a huge set of cycles. Then there is the issue that even if there is a "First Cause" responsible for the Big Bang, this does not automatically give evidence that the First Cause is a personal being who cares about us or has any immediate involvement in our lives. The First Cause... (shrink)

The various statements and declarations of the World Medical Association that address conflicts of interest on the part of physicians as (1) researchers, and (2) practitioners, are examined, with particular reference to the October 2000 revision of the Declaration of Helsinki. Recent contributions to the literature, notably on conflicts of interest in medical research, are noted. Finally, key provisions of the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics (2000–2001 Edition) that address the various forms of conflict of interest that can (...) arise in the practice of medicine are outlined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 268-269 [Access article in PDF] A. A. Long. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 310. Cloth, $29.95. Anthony Long's new book on Epictetus is a signal achievement for which scholars of Hellenistic philosophy, historians of intellectual culture, and thoughtful people generally ought to feel an enormous gratitude. (...) And here's why: Epictetus, a Greek philosopher (ca. 50-ca. 135 AD) in the Roman Empire, was popular in his own day and was influential with Marcus Aurelius as well as with Christian writers in the medieval period. Often cited and quoted, his influence perhaps reached an acme in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His reputation languished in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. And even toward the end of the twentieth century—barring the interest of a handful of scholars—Epictetus was regarded primarily as a popularizer of Stoicism. Against this background Long's luminous study of Epictetus's philosophy can be measured, for what Long has done is to make us see that Epictetus is an important philosopher in his own right and not merely a popular purveyor of Stoic thought. He has done this by expounding three of the fundamental strands in Epictetus's thought. One is the immense role that Socrates plays in [End Page 268] Epictetus's teaching. The second is the unique character of Epictetus's teaching method—conversational and directly confrontational. And, thirdly, is the emphatic way in which Epictetus attempts to inculcate the Stoic doctrine that he found most congenial for the conduct of human life: that a human being's happiness and destiny is in his own power. For in his power and only in his power are those things alone which will secure him that happiness: his judgments and his desires. There is much else in Long's lucid account but by his emphasis on these themes and his inclusion of key passages he has translated from the Discourses he has with keen discernment brought to the world's attention both the cultural significance and the philosophical importance of this neglected philosopher. I now consider these themes in turn.In "the most creative appropriation of Socrates subsequent to the works of Plato and Xenophon" (94), Epictetus applies Socratic elenchus in his educational practice, for he uses it in conversational contexts to expose inconsistencies in students' preconceptions (regarding the desirability of goodness and the identity of goodness with the advantageous) and their judgments about the goodness or badness of some particular thing. In fact, part of Long's argument that Epictetus's discourses are wrongly construed as diatribes or sermons is that on analysis they can often be shown to be elenctic conversations in which the aim is to expose contradictions in a student's belief, say, that the happy life consists in the pursuit of what is advantageous and that running away from a dying daughter is an advantageous thing to do. More generally, the student is made to concentrate his attention on his preconceptions and motivations. While Long emphasizes the extent to which Epictetus, more than any other Stoic, appropriates Socratic elenchus in his educational methodology, he also, while directing attention to another aspect of that methodology, points out Epictetus's major departure from Socrates' use of elenchus. In Plato's Dialogues Socrates is always represented as engaged in conversations with others. Epictetus, by contrast, seems most bent on encouraging the student to engage in dialogue with himself, to try in an interior conversation with himself to bring to the surface of consciousness conflicts between his own moral preconceptions and motivations, on the one hand, and particular value judgments, on the other; and, in this way, to use the internal elenchus as his "principal instrument of moral progress" (86).Epictetus makes volition the central element in a human being's identity, character, and purpose. In the domain of volition are the only two things that are up to the individual—assents to impressions and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y GassetBob SandmeyerHoward N. Tuttle. Human Life is Radical Reality: An Idea Developed from the Conceptions of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset. New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Pp. x + 200. Cloth, $59.95.This is a book which seeks to sketch out a coherent philosophy of life. (...) By arguing that "human life is radical reality," Professor Tuttle places the ontological priority of "my life" over and against that of every reality encountered in that life. Yet the life at issue in this book is no solus ipse, and the things or pragmata of this life do not therefore depend on the I for their being. As Ortega y Gasset asserts, I am myself and my circumstances. Neither subject nor substance exists independently of the other. As such, each bears the mark of this bi-polarity (40, 45). Hence human life, "my life," is not conceived here as a subjective immanence but rather as a carnate life that projects itself, i.e., its possibilities, into the concrete situation of its worldly circumstances. Indeed, the narrative structure of this projection expresses a central categorical feature of human life, its historicity. "Human life becomes here conceived as the historical stream of the inner and outer, the 'I' and its world" (155). Every reality takes its meaning from—in truth, has its status as a transcendent reality from—the manner and the guise in which it appears within the narrative of this self-construction of my life (5, 26, 40, 45, 88, 156, 171). This is a thesis, Tuttle argues, that has its roots in the writings of three figures: Wilhelm Dilthey, to whom the author refers as the "founder of the philosophy of human life," Martin Heidegger, the famous German philosopher whose explication of the structure of Dasein is central to the situated intersubjectivity of "my life" articulated in this book, and José Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher whose writings arguably play the most central role in the work (6, 26, 142, 155, 166).Professor Tuttle ought to be commended for the breadth of his undertaking and the economy of his presentation. Given its ambition, this is a short work of no more than 179 pages excluding notes and bibliography. This pithiness and a general lack of technical jargon speak well of the work, especially as it seems likely to find its way into the hands of young scholars interested in existential phenomenology, Lebensphilosophie, and continental philosophy generally. Indeed, within this broad field there are too few efforts like this one which seek to examine the interconnection of these three philosophers. Yet the very attributes that make this book a favorable addition to any collection also contribute to a serious defect in the work. Where its brevity demands precise articulation, the book often falls into repetition. The discussion of the distinction between clock time and lived time, for instance, comes across as especially belabored. Throughout the work, there are passages which appear virtually identical in different sections. And where its accessible presentation offers an easy introduction to some very difficult material, its lack of focus leaves one to wonder about the efficacy of its message. As Professor Tuttle remarks in the last lines of the work, "this essay is at very best only a collection of abstract and skeletal thought forms that have been generated within my life in its relation to its circumstances" (178).Reading the work, then, one wonders if it is best suited for the young scholar, the accomplished academic, or both. A lack of sufficient background footnoting restricts the acceptability of this work as a tool for serious research. For instance, given the aims of the book one would expect that Heidegger's lectures on "Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Struggle for a Historical Worldview" would have a prominent role in the essay, yet it is not even cited. The essay thus seems best directed towards more novice scholars. Yet the skeletal feel of the work and the unfocused integration of many of the themes from the different writings of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset... (shrink)

“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life on Earth.” How can we understand Jonas’ “maxim”? Is it too anthropocentric to be of any interest for an environmental ethic? Is is too limited to survival to have a moral signification in a truly human ethic? One can argue first that it is not so much anti-Kantian than that it challenges the current prevailing “presentism” and obliges us to take (...) into consideration not only future generations, but also the context in which one anticipates these future generations to be living. Therefore, we can distinguish two different interpretations of Jonas’ maxim: in a first stage, that of sustainable development, it was understood as taking into consideration not only the needs but also the rights of future generations; in a second stage, that of an Anthropocene and ecological transition, it means that making sense of humanity implies connecting human beings to the Earth and other living beings far from opposing them. (shrink)

Imagine you suddenly find yourself in the control room of a vast technological apparatus, sometime in the future, where you are told that science has satisfied all the needs of all living humans. Furthermore, you learn, the next generation of the species will not be produced in the usual way, but instead by this machine, provided only that somebody push a little red button. The catch: you have to give a reason for pushing it. You hesitate: what do you say? (...) Our own world is more like this scenario than we at first may be inclined to admit, not least in the fact that, mutatis mutandis, we seem to be struggling to come up with a good answer. The problem, says Rémi Brague, is fundamentally a metaphysical one. Now, mention of 'metaphysics' in decent society these days is likely to elicit a smile or an unimpressed shrug. If there is a shelf with that label on it in your typical bookstore you are as likely to find guides to crystals, chakras, or hemp care there as you are treatises by Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant. And, in spite of the ongoing revival of academic interest in metaphysics, it remains a rather specialist domain, a marginal sub-discipline in departments of philosophy, be they analytical or continental in cast. But if you should take it too seriously, you'll lose your bearings in the real world, and you'll go adrift in some ethereal sea of dreams. It is, in a word, irrelevant--right? (shrink)

Our concept of the universe and the material world is foundational for our thinking and our moral lives. In an earlier contribution to the URAM project I presented what I called 'the ultimate organizational principle' of the universe. In that article (Grandpierre 2000, pp. 12-35) I took as an adversary the wide-spread system of thinking which I called 'materialism'. According to those who espouse this way of thinking, the universe consists of inanimate units or sets of material such as atoms (...) or elementary particles. Against this point of view on reality, I argued that it is 'logic', which exists in our inner world as a function of our mind, that is the universal organizing power of the universe. The present contribution builds upon this insight. Then I focussed on rationality; now I am interested in the responsibility that is the driving force behind our effort to find coherence and ultimate perspectives in our cosmos. It is shown that biology fundamentally differs from physics. Biology has its own fundamental principle, which is formulated for the first time in history in a scientific manner by Ervin Bauer. This fundamental principle is the cosmic life principle. I show that if one considers the physical laws as corresponding to reality, as in scientific realism, than physicalism becomes fundamentally spiritual because the physical laws are not material. I point out that the physical laws originate from the fundamental principle of physics which is the least action principle. I show that the fundamental principle of physics can be considered as the "instinct of atoms". Our research has found deep and meaningful connections between the basic principle of physics and the ultimate principles of the universe: matter, life and reason. Therefore, the principle of least action is not necessarily an expression of sterile inanimateness. On the contrary, the principle of physics is related to the life principle of the universe, to the world of instincts behind the atomic world, in which the principles of physics, biology, and psychology arise from the same ultimate principle. Our research sheds new light to the sciences of physics, biology, and psychology in close relation to the basic principles. These ultimate principles have a primary importance in our understanding of the nature of Man and the Universe, together with the relations between Man and Nature, Man and the Universe. The results offer new foundations for our understanding our own role in the Earth, in the Nature and in the Universe. Even the apparently inanimate world of physics shows itself to be animate on long timescales and having a kind of pre- human consciousness in its basic organisation. This hypothesis offers a way to understand when and how the biological laws may direct physical laws, and, moreover, offers a new perspective to study and understand under which conditions can self-consciousness govern the laws of biology and physics. This point of view offers living beings and humans the possibility of strengthening our natural identity, and recognising the wide perspective arising from having access to the deepest ranges of our own human resources and realising the task for which human and individual life has been created. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 268-269 [Access article in PDF] A. A. Long. Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 310. Cloth, $29.95. Anthony Long's new book on Epictetus is a signal achievement for which scholars of Hellenistic philosophy, historians of intellectual culture, and thoughtful people generally ought to feel an enormous gratitude. (...) And here's why: Epictetus, a Greek philosopher (ca. 50-ca. 135 AD) in the Roman Empire, was popular in his own day and was influential with Marcus Aurelius as well as with Christian writers in the medieval period. Often cited and quoted, his influence perhaps reached an acme in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. His reputation languished in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. And even toward the end of the twentieth century—barring the interest of a handful of scholars—Epictetus was regarded primarily as a popularizer of Stoicism. Against this background Long's luminous study of Epictetus's philosophy can be measured, for what Long has done is to make us see that Epictetus is an important philosopher in his own right and not merely a popular purveyor of Stoic thought. He has done this by expounding three of the fundamental strands in Epictetus's thought. One is the immense role that Socrates plays in [End Page 268] Epictetus's teaching. The second is the unique character of Epictetus's teaching method—conversational and directly confrontational. And, thirdly, is the emphatic way in which Epictetus attempts to inculcate the Stoic doctrine that he found most congenial for the conduct of human life: that a human being's happiness and destiny is in his own power. For in his power and only in his power are those things alone which will secure him that happiness: his judgments and his desires. There is much else in Long's lucid account but by his emphasis on these themes and his inclusion of key passages he has translated from the Discourses he has with keen discernment brought to the world's attention both the cultural significance and the philosophical importance of this neglected philosopher. I now consider these themes in turn.In "the most creative appropriation of Socrates subsequent to the works of Plato and Xenophon" (94), Epictetus applies Socratic elenchus in his educational practice, for he uses it in conversational contexts to expose inconsistencies in students' preconceptions (regarding the desirability of goodness and the identity of goodness with the advantageous) and their judgments about the goodness or badness of some particular thing. In fact, part of Long's argument that Epictetus's discourses are wrongly construed as diatribes or sermons is that on analysis they can often be shown to be elenctic conversations in which the aim is to expose contradictions in a student's belief, say, that the happy life consists in the pursuit of what is advantageous and that running away from a dying daughter is an advantageous thing to do. More generally, the student is made to concentrate his attention on his preconceptions and motivations. While Long emphasizes the extent to which Epictetus, more than any other Stoic, appropriates Socratic elenchus in his educational methodology, he also, while directing attention to another aspect of that methodology, points out Epictetus's major departure from Socrates' use of elenchus. In Plato's Dialogues Socrates is always represented as engaged in conversations with others. Epictetus, by contrast, seems most bent on encouraging the student to engage in dialogue with himself, to try in an interior conversation with himself to bring to the surface of consciousness conflicts between his own moral preconceptions and motivations, on the one hand, and particular value judgments, on the other; and, in this way, to use the internal elenchus as his "principal instrument of moral progress" (86).Epictetus makes volition the central element in a human being's identity, character, and purpose. In the domain of volition are the only two things that are up to the individual—assents to impressions and... (shrink)

Meaning and Purpose of Life are perhaps the most thought about, if not talked about, issues on the planet since human beings have walked on earth. This book is another attempt to understand the Meaning and Purpose of Life using ideas of Vedanta in Indian philosophy, and of mainstream economics. Starting from first principles, Dr Agarwal explores the core concept of Brahman in Vedanta, and builds an axiomatic foundation for understanding the meaning and purpose of life (...) using the fundamental ideas of the Prasthana Traya, and in particular of The Bhagavad Gita and The Principal Upanishads. Dr Agarwal adheres to the philosophy of Karma Yoga as his chosen area of interest for the exploration of meaning and purpose, which allows him to seek linkages between the concepts of social welfare in Vedanta and economics. Ideas of lokasamgraha in Indian Philosophy and of externalities in economics provide a clear common ground between the two apparently disparate disciplines. Throughout the book, he emphasizes simple practical approaches for making life more meaningful and happier, while relying fundamentally on the basic ideas of Vedanta. (shrink)

_Philosophy and Animal Life_ offers a new way of thinking about animal rights, our obligation to animals, and the nature of philosophy itself. Cora Diamond begins with "The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy," in which she accuses analytical philosophy of evading, or deflecting, the responsibility of human beings toward nonhuman animals. Diamond then explores the animal question as it is bound up with the more general problem of philosophical skepticism. Focusing specifically on J. M. Coetzee's _The (...) Lives of Animals_, she considers the failure of language to capture the vulnerability of humans and animals. Stanley Cavell responds to Diamond's argument with his own close reading of Coetzee's work, connecting the human-animal relation to further themes of morality and philosophy. John McDowell follows with a critique of both Diamond and Cavell, and Ian Hacking explains why Cora Diamond's essay is so deeply perturbing and, paradoxically for a philosopher, he favors poetry over philosophy as a way of overcoming some of her difficulties. Cary Wolfe's introduction situates these arguments within the broader context of contemporary continental philosophy and theory, particularly Jacques Derrida's work on deconstruction and the question of the animal. _Philosophy and Animal Life_ is a crucial collection for those interested in animal rights, ethics, and the development of philosophical inquiry. It also offers a unique exploration of the role of ethics in Coetzee's fiction. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the figurative and symbolic reflection and transformation of the dynamic reality of life in the cinematic space of modern culture. The purpose of the work is to identify and substantiate trends in the development of cinematographic cultural texts based on the figurative and symbolic representation of the phenomenon of success in the existential space of human existence. The scientific novelty of the work is represented by the evidence base of the study, which (...) determines the figurative correspondence of the philosophical and sociological representation of cinematic texts to the phenomenon of success as a value-symbolic aspect of personal activity. Based on the analysis of cinema screen products created at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries and devoted to the characterization of the image of a subject whose existential level of being is characterized in the symbols of success/ failure, several trends in the development of cinematic culture can be identified. Firstly, the characteristic of the "sunset" of the previously dominant ideological trend of symbolization of the actual phenomenology of success. Secondly, the stage of axiological instability and ambivalence in the evaluation of the symbols of success, unevenly implemented in the scenario and staging part. And, thirdly, the formation and consolidation of new cinematic paradigms through the constant convergence of private symbols of success, manifested in different ways both in reality and on the cinema screen, and accompanied by constant attempts at their non-contextual universalization. (shrink)

The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation argues for the philosophical importance of the notion of need and for an ethical framework through which we can determine which needs have moral significance. In the volume, Sarah Clark Miller synthesizes insights from Kantian and feminist care ethics to establish that our mutual and inevitable interdependence gives rise to a duty to care for the needs of others. Further, she argues that we are obligated not merely to meet others’ needs but (...) to do so in a manner that expresses "dignifying care," a concept that captures how human interactions can grant or deny equal moral standing and inclusion in a moral community. She illuminates these theoretical developments by examining two cases where urgent needs require a caring and dignifying response: the needs of the elderly and the needs of global strangers. Those working in the areas of feminist theory, women’s studies, aging studies, bioethics, and global studies should find this volume of interest. (shrink)

In offering his analysis of the concepts of the good and the just, the author combines certain techniques of social science with a philosophical reflection upon certain fundamental issues. It is the objective of this book to establish a balanced approach differing from relativism and historicism on the one hand, and normative absolutism on the other. The task is not an easy one; many may view the attempt here to be less than conclusive, though it is certainly challenging. Essentially (...) the book argues for a concept of human nature that is "dispositional," and defined contextually, but in some sense not bound to circumstances in the way in which the historicist would have it. Kaplan utilizes the principles of "systems analysis," explained in detail in the first chapter of the book, to reach this contextual understanding of human nature. It is by identification of social systems as homeostatic that the argument is advanced that units of social and political analysis cannot be treated in the abstract, nor can they be understood without acknowledging contextual rules that are in some sense objective. (shrink)

Somerville, Margaret Over the millennia of human history, the idea that children - at least those born into a marriage - had rights with respect to their biological parents was taken for granted and reflected in law and public policy. But with same-sex marriage, which gives same-sex spouses the right to found a family, that is no longer the case. Likewise, children's rights with respect to their biological origins were not an issue when there was no technoscience that could (...) be used to manipulate or change those origins: a baby could only be conceived in vivo through sexual reproduction. But with assisted human reproductive technologies and genetic technologies, that, too, is no longer the case. So, in light of these new realities, what are our obligations, as societies, to children with respect to their biological origins and biological families? What protections do children need and deserve? I propose that the most fundamental human right of all is a child's right to be born from natural human biological origins and that children also have human rights with respect to knowing who their biological parents and families are, and that these rights must be recognized. Children also have a right to be reared within their biological families and to have a mother and a father, unless an exception can be justified as being in the 'best interests' of a particular child. The connection among adoption, the use of new reproductive technologies, and same-sex marriage is that they all unlink child-parent biological bonds. Each context raises one or more of three important issues: children's right to know the identities of their biological parents; children's right to both a mother and a father, preferably their own biological parents; and children's right to come into being with genetic origins that have not been tampered with; that is, 'designing' our children should be prohibited. Such 'designing' would result in losses with implications far beyond those persons directly affected and far beyond the present time. It would undermine the rights to equality and freedom of future generations. Because the liberty and equality of all citizens is at the heart of democratic societal institutions and of the values that democratic societies promote, to create people who are neither free nor equal undermines those institutions and values. In short, not to prohibit 'designer children' would undermine the very foundations of our Western democratic societies. (shrink)

This essay considers Pamela Sue Anderson’s work in relation to her participation in the Enhancing Life Project from 2015 until her death in 2017. Offering a critical interpretation and reconstruction of Anderson’s final work, this essay also gestures beyond it. It begins by narrating her participation in the Enhancing Life Project. Next, it focuses on her treatment of capability and vulnerability, identifying shifts in her thought and bringing theological symbols and a constructive theological interest to the conversation. Anderson (...) depicted the relation of capability and vulnerability as a “threshold for enhancing human life.” This contribution examines her implied metaphor of a spatial or temporal crossing point and evaluates Anderson’s original post-Kantian conceptualization of threshold in relation to the shifts in her thinking. A sympathetic but more adequate approach to enhancing vulnerable life can be informed by Simone de Beauvoir’s phenomenological approach to lived experience and her construal of the body as a lived situation. When vulnerability is interpreted as a situated susceptibility to being changed, for good or for ill, then threshold language can be reintroduced in relation to the intensification, enhancement, and transformation of life, that is, of the “aliveness of life.”. (shrink)

In previous chapters, it has become clear that Proclus’ metaphysics is often relevant to human life. In this chapter, that relation is elaborated on in detail, starting from the notion of a ‘textual community’. In the first section, the author presents the Neoplatonic goal of human life, assimilation to the divine. In the second section, he elaborates the scale of virtues through which, according to Proclus, one may reach that assimilation. The third section is devoted to (...) establishing the interesting hypothesis that the philosophical curriculum was in fact considered a mystagogy, aimed at internalizing semantic associations and thereby acquiring the different virtues. In the last section the author turns to Proclus’ political philosophy, and specifically the analogical relation between the philosopher-ruler and the demiurge. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is aimed at substantiation of the process of formation of various human images in the postmodernism era in the context of biophilosophy, taking into account the need to find an adequate response to historical challenges and the production of new value orientations reflecting succession of civilization development. Theoretical basis. The author in his theoretical constructs proceeds from the need of taking into account the biophilosophical aspect of postmodern man, as the one who, remaining a representative of (...) the species Homo sapiens, began to dynamically change, losing its own natural and functional qualities, acquiring to a large extent the socio-technology-related qualities. The thesis that in the postmodern society the moral and legal foundations of existence of human being, as the subject of actions and responsibility for these actions, practically coincide with the biological foundations is taken as initial argument. New biological knowledge, as well as the related technologies, orient the public consciousness towards production of fundamentally new or modernization of the existing bio-philosophical ideas. The author's vision of the anthropological collision of the Post-Modernism era is caused by the fact that the issues of a postmodern man acquire a special urgency at the end of the ХХ – early XXI century. A progressive disproportion between a human being, whose abilities as a representative of the species Homo sapiens are biologically limited, and the human community, which sees no limits in its information and technological expansion, is of current interest. Originality. The author reveals the key features of the Post-Modernism era, in which a fundamentally different civilizational space originates, and where a new type of person emerges in its internal culture, which is called the postmodern man. The postmodern man was considered through the prism of bio-philosophy. Its interest in man is caused by his or her place in nature, the prospects of development at the individual, population and species levels. Conclusions. In the process of development of bio-philosophy, its research field will be naturally expanded with the use of philosophical means of perception of life as such and filling the bio-philosophy with philosophical and biological issues. In contemporary conditions, the study of the boundaries of biological reality and its previously unknown properties, definition of new horizons of theoretical knowledge in the science of life, the critical rethinking of the concepts of biocentrism and anthropocentrism in the space of modern scientific knowledge, the definition of perspective trends in the study of man, his or her place and role in the planetary being is of great importance. (shrink)

If human rights express the equal claim of every person to the recognition and protection of their vital interests, they necessarily assert universal obligations of justice that cross borders. Sharon Anderson-Gold asks here whether there is a normative consensus on human rights and articulates the role of a cosmopolitan or global community in shaping the theory and practice of international politics. She considers several important works in the field of universal human rights and discusses (...) whether a cosmopolitan system of law is a necessary condition for the stable association of nation states. _Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights_ presents an ethical foundation for the idea of human development and attempts to demonstrate the normative character of universal human rights. It claims that Kant's idea of a federation of nations based upon principles of international right remains highly relevant to contemporary aspirations for global justice, and concludes by suggesting that a ‘cosmopolitan community’ is the locus of a global democratic order and is the necessary framework for the maintenance of human rights. (shrink)