February 1, 2000 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................... .......................ii STATEMENT OF INTEREST.................................................................................................... ......... v..

La notion d’intérêt général est, aujourd’hui, autant un concept du droit qu’un topos rhétorique. Elle est censée désigner l’ordre public, l’intérêt du peuple ou bien la priorité des décisions administratives sur les intérêts privés, sectoriels, les droits individuels et les contrats entre particuliers (à travers des mécanismes juridiques comme la préemption, l’expropriation pour des motifs d’intérêt général ou d’utilité publique ou le travail d’intérêt général…). Pourtant cette notion a une d...

L’intérêt général (contrairement à l’intérêt commun) se présente comme une position de surplomb prenant le point de vue de la société et des exigences de rationalisation supposées la structurer. Nous nous proposons d’examiner trois options différentes concernant la nature et la détermination de cet intérêt en suivant, par facilité, une démarche chronologique qui, en réalité, se rapporte à des distinctions conceptuelles et thétiques de premier plan. L’approche du physiocrate, Lemercier de La Rivière dégage un intérêt général comme simple épiphénomène de (...) l’intérêt des membres de la société qui cherchent tous à voir leurs gains individuels maximisés. L’approche de Saint-Simon, étudiée ensuite, renverse celle-ci car, pour ce dernier, les droits des individus dépendent entièrement de leur fonction sociale dans le système industriel de telle sorte que le seul intérêt commun des individus est leur intérêt d’industriel qui converge dans une coopération universelle, de telle sorte que l’intérêt général assumé par l’État exprime les exigences générales de l’industrie, c.-à-d. de la production et de la distribution optimale des ressources dans tout le corps de la société. Enfin, l’approche de Léon Bourgeois permet d’articuler une thèse basée sur les droits et la protection des individus avec une thèse fondée sur la promotion d’intérêts sociaux irréductibles aux intérêts individuels. L’intérêt général incarné par l’État vise alors à réinscrire l’individu dans les exigences et les obligations civiques notamment par des devoirs comme celui de payer l’impôt. (shrink)

L’article s’efforce, à partir de l’analyse des expressions allemandes employées par le jeune Marx, de vérifier la thèse communément admise selon laquelle on ne trouverait dans ce corpus qu’une critique de l’intérêt général tel qu’il a été formulé sous la Révolution française, censé dissimuler l’intérêt de la bourgeoisie. L’analyse fait apparaître qu’une telle critique côtoie un effort théorique pour penser un « intérêt commun » ou « humain » qui, dépassant l’antagonisme des classes, pourrait prendre en charge l’intérêt de tous (...) et de chacun. (shrink)

En faisant du sujet de droit la prémisse anthropologique de la société, la modernité bouleverse la nature de l’intérêt général qui se mesure désormais à l’aune des aspirations individuelles. L’intérêt général est moins un principe qu’une notion relationnelle, qui articule, par le moyen du contrat, la composition des droits et des intérêts particuliers. Pourtant, la réciprocité initiale entre le droit et l’intérêt débouche sur une tension contrariant le projet de composer un intérêt général apte à les satisfaire également. L’étude conjointe (...) de deux auteurs, Thomas Hobbes et John Locke, permet de saisir que la priorité accordée à l’un des deux pôles, le droit et l’intérêt, aboutit à des pensées politiques radicalement divergentes, selon qu’elles portent l’accent sur l’exigence de la justice ou sur la poursuite de l’utilité sociale. Parce que la satisfaction des intérêts menace parfois de se retourner contre les droits, tandis que la protection des droits tend à discriminer les intérêts, la question se pose de savoir si l’univocité de la formule « intérêt général » ne masque pas une dualité dans sa nature, rendant problématique son statut d’idéal régulateur pour les sociétés modernes. (shrink)

Cette contribution examine les rapports entre le matérialisme des intérêts que revendique Bakounine dans ses derniers textes et la critique qu’il propose des notions d’intérêt général, de représentation politique et de centralisation dans La théologie politique de Mazzini et l’Internationale (1871). Son objet est de montrer que la prise en compte du rôle social et historique des intérêts rend caduque toute possibilité d’un intérêt général qui viendrait à son tour fonder la légitimité d’une représentation politique dans une assemblée centraliste. La (...) première partie de l’article examine le rapport entre ce matérialisme des intérêts et la conception matérialiste de l’histoire proposée par Marx et Engels. La seconde insiste sur la critique de l’intérêt général comme fiction et sur l’impossibilité qui en découle de toute représentation dans le cadre d’un système centralisé, la reconnaissance de cette impossibilité débouchant même sur une critique du mandat impératif. (shrink)

This article aims to shed some light on the concepts embedded in the expressions ‘services of general interest’ (‘SGI’), ‘services of general economic interest’ (‘SGEI’), ‘non-economic services of general interest’ (‘NSGI’) and ‘social services of general interest’ (‘SSGI’). It is submitted that the expression ‘SGI’ conveys a general concept which comprises both SGEI and NSGI. SGEI may be distinguished from NSGI in that only the former involve an economic activity. In contrast (...) to SGI, SGEI and NSGI, the expression ‘SSGI’ is nowhere to be found in primary EU law. This means that it is for the EU legislator and, as the case may be, for the Member States to define such expression. Furthermore, this article supports the contention that a definition of the principles and conditions underpinning the operation of SGI must be capable of adapting to changing times and social perceptions, whilst being respectful of the vertical and horizontal allocation of powers set out in the Treaties. Vertically, a definition of SGI must not impinge upon the powers retained by the Member States. In the absence of harmonisation, it is for the Member States to define the services they consider to be of general interest, unless they commit a manifest error of assessment. In the presence of EU harmonising measures, the margin of discretion enjoyed by the Member States is, if still existent, narrowed down, given that national authorities are required to comply with the objectives pursued by the EU legislator. Horizontally, a definition of SGI must not encroach upon the prerogatives of the Commission in the realm of competition law. Moreover, in light of Article 9 TFEU and secondary EU legislation, the specific features of SSGI must be taken into consideration when determining the compatibility with EU State aid rules of public service compensation awarded to the providers of those services. An EU conceptual framework for the SGI must thus be the result of a constructive dialogue between the different levels of governance, as well as of a balanced solution among different policy areas in relation to which the EU enjoys competences. (shrink)

Dans cet article, je reviens sur un constat bien connu, mais jamais parfaitement élucidé : Rousseau n’emploie que très exceptionnellement l’expression « intérêt général », à laquelle il préfère celle d’« intérêt commun ». Je m’efforce d’y apporter une explication nouvelle, en partant d’un réexamen du concept même d’« intérêt » dans son œuvre, auquel il faut prêter un sens assez différent de celui auquel la philosophie politique nous a accoutumés : l’intérêt ne saurait être individuel, il ne saurait s’identifier (...) à l’« avantage », il ne saurait faire l’objet d’un « calcul ». À ce titre, il existe une véritable antinomie entre la notion d’intérêt commun chez Rousseau et celle d’intérêt général qui se formalise chez les physiocrates de façon quasi contemporaine. L’intérêt commun est la base de formation démocratique d’une volonté politiquement orientée, qui prend comme telle le nom de « volonté générale », là où l’intérêt général est le langage normatif dans lequel une décision politique non nécessairement démocratique cherche à fonder sa légitimité en raison. (shrink)

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As family physicians, general practitioners play a key role in safeguarding children. Should they suspect child abuse or neglect they may experience a conflict between responding to the needs and interests of the child and those of an adult patient. English law insists on the paramountcy of the interests of the child, but in family practice many other interests may be at stake. The authors argue that uncritical adoption of the paramountcy principle is too simplistic and can lead, paradoxically, (...) to greater harm. They argue for a more subtle and nuanced view of interests and of conflicts of interest in safeguarding children. (shrink)

Next SectionWainwright and Gallagher propose that when child protection concerns emerge significant difficulties arise for General Practitioners because of conflicts between the individual interests of children and parents who are their patients and the Paramountcy Principle. From a psychodynamic perspective their analysis does not give sufficient weight to the nature of personal as opposed to interpersonal conflict of a conscious or unconscious nature. When issues of major import arise, ordinary parenting inevitably involves parents in putting their children's needs first (...) if competing possibilities occur. It is an over-simplification to present this as a conflict between the interests of children and parents. Parents' own best interests are served by securing their children's safety and welfare. An appreciation of this is crucial in order to implement child protection procedures appropriately. Errors may occur because the complex emotions and relationships involved lead professionals to experience themselves as potential agents of harm rather than benefit. (shrink)

Bender, Robert Review of: In the public interest: 150 years of the Victorian Auditor-General's office, by Peter Yule, 2002, VAGO, 304 pages.

This article about the social responsibility of the large corporation is not a paper about stewardship in general. If it were, it would have to focus primarily on the principle of long-term market accountability and the related principle of fidelity to long-term stockholder interests. Most of management's stewardship responsibilities can be subsumed under those two principles.This paper will deal with areas in which those two principles alone are not adequate to define management's stewardship responsibilities. These areas of social accountability (...) occur chiefly where the interests of employees or the general public are at stake — where their human and social purposes sometimes collide with the more limited commercial purposes of the large corporation. (shrink)

We examined the public interest reports of General Motors from 1971 to 1990 and presented the contents thereof herein. The principal areas disclosed by GM during those years that are discussed in this paper were minorities, women, and employment issues, energy and the environment, international operations, automotive safety, and philanthropic activity. The purpose of this study was to examine the public interest report as a vehicle through which a firm might disclose information in the public interest. (...) We concluded that there were at least three principal forces driving GM's disclosures. They included public attention focused on, potential costs associated with, and the relative subjectivity of an issue.In reading their public interest reports, it became clear that GM is socially responsive in matters of public interest. Whether they are socially responsible is a judgment not within the scope of this study. However, we do not preclude the possibility that the report may serve as a vehicle which would build a certain momentum in public responsibility, and thus partially drive decisions made by management in social issues. (shrink)

Community-based healthcare organisations manage competing, and often conflicting, priorities. These conflicts can arise from the multiple roles these organisations take up, and from the diverse range of stakeholders to whom they must be responsive. Often such conflicts may be titled conflicts of interest; however, what precisely constitutes such conflicts and what should be done about them is not always clear. Clarity about the duties owed by organisations and the roles they assume can help identify and manage some of these (...) conflicts. Taking divisions of general practice in Australia as an example, this paper sets out to distinguish two main types of conflicts of interest, so that they may be more clearly identified and more effectively managed. (shrink)

The dynamics of general relativity is encoded in a set of ten differential equations, the so-called Einstein field equations. It is usually believed that Einstein's equations represent a physical law describing the coupling of spacetime with material fields. However, just six of these equations actually describe the coupling mechanism: the remaining four represent a set of differential relations known as Bianchi identities. The paper discusses the physical role that the Bianchi identities play in general relativity, and investigates whether (...) these identities --qua part of a physical law-- highlight some kind of a posteriori necessity in a Kripkean sense. The inquiry shows that general relativistic physics has an interesting bearing on the debate about the metaphysics of the laws of nature. (shrink)

On ne retrouve nulle part dans l’œuvre de Proudhon la notion d’intérêt général, ni en termes positifs ni en termes négatifs. Ce n’est pas, je pense, que Proudhon refusait le terme en tant que tel, mais il prêtait à mon avis trop à confusion avec la notion de volonté générale de Rousseau, envers qui il était très critique. Je pense que nous retrouvons néanmoins chez Proudhon plusieurs façons de concevoir l’intérêt général, qu’il assimile, me semble-t-il, au problème de l’unité : (...) nous verrons qu’il estime qu’il existe de fausses unités et une réelle unité. Il est important de noter que Proudhon, dans son premier mémoire, se réclame de l’anarchisme. Il récuse donc le qualificatif de monarchiste, de démocrate, etc., mais revendique celui de républicain dans la mesure où il désigne la chose publique. (shrink)

Owing to a genral dissatisfaction with hedonistic theories of value, a number of recent discussions have sought to identify an agent's selfinterest, individual utility, or personal welfare with what the agent most wants to do, all things considered. Two features of these accounts merit special attention for the argument in this paper. First, on such accounts any desire or aversion which persists in the face of complete information is logically relevant to the determination of an agent's self interest. This (...) includes apparently altruistic desires like a desire for another's happiness as well as more narrow and self-regarding desires like a desire to eat a good meal. Second, when the agent finds himself in a situation where he must choose between incompatible desires, his informed preference determines the act which is most in his self-interest. (shrink)

I present and motivate a new solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. I suggest that we shift our focus from process-types that can be characterized independently of a subject’s epistemic concerns to process-types that play important roles in the life of the epistemic agent. Once we do so, a simple, promising solution suggests itself: the C-Typing Thesis. According to the C-Typing Thesis, how an epistemic agent forms her degree of confidence in a believed proposition determines the epistemically relevant type (...) of belief-forming process for that belief. First I motivate this view generally, arguing that it satisfies important desiderata for a solution to the generality problem. Then I show that it makes the intuitively correct predictions for a wide range of cases. I also show how it can solve Brian Weatherson’s temporal generality problem, and, relatedly, Jonathan Vogel’s bootstrapping problem for reliabilism. The C-Typing Thesis is plausible not only because it makes correct predictions, but also because it does so in a way that responds to a common charge against reliabilism: that reliability is disconnected from our lives as epistemic inquirers. The C-Typing Thesis shows how epistemic agency can play a significant role in an externalist account of justification and knowledge. (shrink)

The potential for financial conflicts of interest (COIs) to damage the credibility of scientific research has become a significant social concern, especially in the wake of high-profile incidents involving the pharmaceutical, tobacco, fossil-fuel, and chemical industries. Scientists and policy makers have debated whether the presence of financial COIs should count as a reason for treating research with suspicion or whether research should instead be evaluated solely based on its scientific quality. This paper examines a recent proposal to develop criteria (...) for evaluating the credibility of research without considering its source of funding. It concludes that proposals of this sort are likely to be either ineffective or impractical in many cases. Nevertheless, this does not imply that all research funded by those with an interest in the outcome must be placed under a cloud of suspicion; there are conditions under which research is at much more serious risk of being corrupted than in other cases, and attention to these conditions can guide productive responses to financial COIs. (shrink)

General practitioners (GPs) have to negotiate a range of challenges when they suspect child abuse or neglect. This article details findings from a Delphi exercise that was part of a larger study exploring the conflicts of interest that arise for UK GPs in safeguarding children. The specific objectives of the Delphi exercise were to understand how these conflicts of interest are seen from the perspectives of an expert panel, and to identify best practice for GPs. The Delphi (...) exercise involved four iterative rounds with questionnaires completed by an expert panel. Results from each round were distilled and findings sent to panel members until consensus was reached. Panel members shared insights regarding their understanding of conflicts of interest in relation to GPs and safeguarding children and responses when conflicts of interests arise. Findings suggested a broader understanding of conflicts of interest (intrapersonal, interpersonal, interprofessional and interagency), the importance of professional judgement in uncertain situations when both action and inaction have potentially negative consequences and the importance of trust. The Delphi exercise was an effective means to bring together a wide range of professional and disciplinary perspectives on a complex topic. Findings caution against the oversimplification of the conceptual and practical issues, emphasise the importance of professional judgement, and support the development of open and trusting relationships with families and among professionals in health and social care agencies. (shrink)

During the last fifteen years or so there has been much debate, among philosophers interested in perception, on the question of whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or nonconceptual. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have challenged the terms of this debate, arguing that one of its most basic assumptions is mistaken. Experience, they claim, does not have representational content at all. On the kind of approach they suggest, having a perceptual experience is not to be understood (...) on the model of thought or belief, as a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way, or of having this or that feature. Nor is it to be understood on the model of receiving testimony about how things are in the world, as a matter of its being represented to us that things are this or that way. Rather, it is simply a matter of our being presented with things. Having a perceptual experience of an object is a matter of our standing in a certain kind of relation to it which makes it available to us to be represented in thought or belief, but which does not itself involve our representing it, or its being represented to us.1 Much of the motivation for rejecting the view that experience has representational content springs from a concern to do justice to what is distinctive about perceptual experience in contrast to thought and belief. In particular, perceptual experience seems to be more "primitive" than thought, in that it seems natural to appeal to the character of perceptual experience to explain the possibility of thought about objects rather than the other way around. There is thus a concern that we will deprive.. (shrink)

In this paper, however, I will argue that Kant’s restriction of interest to natural rather than artistic beauty should not be taken as a basic aspect of his aesthetic theory, and thus need not affect our assessment of that theory’s more basic claims. First, I will suggest that Kant’s theory of intellectual interest is not really necessary to explain what we ordinarily mean by an interest in beautiful objects—a desire to preserve them for repeated experience, a motivation (...) for our efforts to see them and our willingness to pay for them, and the like—and that the exclusion of art from a special moral interest thus does not leave our general interest in its objects unexplained. But, I will also argue, Kant’s own theory of art and our response to it actually allows beauties of art to have just as much claim to this intellectual interest as do objects of natural beauty. Kant’s differentiation of natural and artistic beauty with regard to moral interest turns on an ambiguity in the concept of nature itself, as well as on Kant’s assumptions that art, unlike nature, is a product of an intention to produce pleasure through determinately conceived objects, and that our response to art, again unlike that to nature, must be connected to a recognition of its intentionality. But Kant’s own theory of artistic creation—his theory of genius—undermines the force of the first of these assumptions, for it teaches us that art, while indeed the product of intentional activity, also calls upon the use of a natural talent that deserves our admiration as much as any other gift of nature. In other words, Kant’s own view of the complexity of artistic intentions forbids the simple differentiation of art and nature that he employs in §42, and while Kant’s theory of aesthetic response does not clearly preclude the view that our response to art must take into account the intentions with which art is produced, it also hardly entails this view. This may have been obscured from Kant by the indeterminacy of his own key concept of the freedom of the imagination, but, I will suggest, this freedom might actually have to be extended to the case of art if it is to work even in Kant’s paradigmatic case of natural beauty. Thus, on Kant’s own account the beauties of nature and of art are far more intimately connected, both in their own ontological status and in our response to them, than his theory of intellectual interest concedes. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: De manière générale, les désirs sont aux intérêts ce que les croyances sont aux vérités. Étant admis que ce qui est conforme à vos intérêts est ce que vous désireriez, tout compte fait, si vous étiez en possession d'une information telle au sujet de ses effets potentiels qu'aucune information additionnelle sur ces effets ne modifierait vos désirs, la conclusion selon laquelle vous désirez déjà, tout compte fait, favoriser vos intérêts peut être tirée moyennant certaines suppositions plausibles en philosophie de (...) l'esprit. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: De manière générale, les désirs sont aux intérêts ce que les croyances sont aux vérités. Étant admis que ce qui est conforme à vos intérêts est ce que vous désireriez, tout compte fait, si vous étiez en possession d'une information telle au sujet de ses effets potentiels qu'aucune information additionnelle sur ces effets ne modifierait vos désirs, la conclusion selon laquelle vous désirez déjà, tout compte fait, favoriser vos intérêts peut être tirée moyennant certaines suppositions plausibles en philosophie de (...) l'esprit. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explicate causal generalizations such as.

Christopher D. Stone has claimed that natural objects can and should have rights. I accept Stone’s premise that the possession of rights is tied to the possession of interests; however, I argue that the concept of a natural object needs a more careful analysis than is given by Stone. Not everything that Stone calls a natural object is an object “naturally.” Some must be taken as artificial rather than as natural. Thistype of object cannot be said to have intrinsic interests (...) and hence cannot be given rights that can protect “its own sake”-which is the sort of right that Stone focuses on. Further, there are other sorts of natural objects which, although they are objects “naturally,” cannot meaningfully be said to have intrinsic interests, and thus cannot have the sorts of rights that Stone is concerned with. Finally, there are other sorts of natural objects which are objects naturally and which have intrinsic interests, but which are not proper candidates for the possession of rights. The prerequisites for being “owed” rights are the possession of intrinsic interests and the capability to suffer when those interests are interfered with or denied or threatened. (shrink)