This chapter contains sections titled: The False Cause Fallacy Hasty Generalizations Failure to Take Context into Account Suppressing Relevant Evidence The Gambler's Fallacy Affirming the Consequent/Denying the Antecedent The Fallacies of Composition and Division Missing the Forest for the Trees.

This paper enquires into the possibility of establishing a causal link between social performance (SP) and financial performance (FP) in corporate social responsibility (CSR). It shows that this endeavour is limited by several biasing factors (such as time horizons, sample choices and the tools chosen to measure SP and FP) and faces the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this), which indicates that a sequence of events does not necessarily establish a causal (...) link. The paper contributes to the methodological literature in CSR currently focused on empirical tests aiming to discern the linkages between SP and FP, both by emphasising the interest in interpreting and justifying SP and by suggesting a redirection of empirical efforts towards the understanding of entrepreneurial preference for a specific type of SP. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the false cause fallacy. This fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. The chapter deals with post hoc (...) ergo propter hoc. One example of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy that has had a great impact on public health has been the recent fear of childhood vaccines, particularly the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine and the concern it can cause autism. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: 'false cause'. In general, the false cause fallacy occurs when the “link between premises and conclusion depends on some imagined causal connection that probably does not exist”. There are three different ways an argument can commit the false cause fallacy: post hoc ergo propter hoc; cum hoc ergo propter hoc; and ignoring common cause. Like the post hoc (...) ergo propter hoc fallacy, this fallacy is guilty of trying to establish a causal connection between two events on dubious grounds. The way to avoid committing the cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy is to study correlative relationships more carefully in order to decipher if an actual causal relationship exists rather than assuming the latter follows from the former. (shrink)

Hypothesizing after the results are known, or HARKing, occurs when researchers check their research results and then add or remove hypotheses on the basis of those results without acknowledging this process in their research report (Kerr, 1998). In the present article, I discuss three forms of HARKing: (1) using current results to construct post hoc hypotheses that are then reported as if they were a priori hypotheses; (2) retrieving hypotheses from a post hoc literature search and reporting them (...) as a priori hypotheses; and (3) failing to report a priori hypotheses that are unsupported by the current results. These three types of HARKing are often characterized as being bad for science and a potential cause of the current replication crisis. In the present article, I use insights from the philosophy of science to present a more nuanced view. Specifically, I identify the conditions under which each of these three types of HARKing is most and least likely to be bad for science. I conclude with a brief discussion about the ethics of each type of HARKing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 177-188 [Access article in PDF] Chaïm Perelman's "First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy":Commentary and Translation David A. Frank Michelle K. Bolduc Chaïm Perelman's 1949 article, "First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy," has remained unavailable to readers unable to read French. Our commentary and translation is intended to provide English readers access to the context, influences, and themes that make the article an extraordinarily important work in (...) the history of twentieth-century rhetoric. In this article, Perelman offers a powerful critique of first philosophies and anticipates the problems of radical postmodernity. "First Philosophies" remains a strikingly elegant attempt to foil what Foucault (1984, 41-42) has called the "Enlightenment blackmail of reason," the assumption held by logical positivists and radical skeptics that if reason does not yield absolute and eternal Enlightenment knowledge, there can be no knowledge.Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric project avoids Enlightenment blackmail by charting a third way between logical positivism and radical relativism, and "First Philosophies" sets forth the project's philosophical blueprint. Commencing in 1947 and culminating in 1958 with the publication of Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca sought, discovered, and developed a philosophical system designed as a rapprochement between dialectic (reason and logic) and rhetoric (the art of adapting arguments to audiences). Historians of rhetoric judge the work a "grand revolution" (Meyer 1999, 259), believing it marks a rhetorical renaissance in Europe, and suggest nothing like it will appear for another 100 years after its publication (Johnstone 1971). The New Rhetoric project influenced Gadamer and a host of post-war European and American thinkers (Mootz 1998). Michael Leff calls the 1970 English translation of Traité a "bombshell" (1994, 510). Beyond its historical importance, Crosswhite suggests that the New Rhetoric project is "the single most important event in contemporary rhetorical theory" (1996, 35)and "First Philosophies" marks Perelman's turn from logical [End Page 177] positivism to rhetoric, offering prescient answers to the post-World War II crises of reason, and the ideas in the article provide the Traité'sphilosophical glue (see in particular the English translation, 62).Perelman joined many post-war theorists, including Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), in the resistance to the reign of a disembodied Enlightenment rationality. However, Perelman identified what Habermas (1987, 119) would later call the "performative contradiction" in the conclusion that radical skepticism was the only alternative to Enlightenment rationality. In "First Philosophies," Perelman responds directly to Sartre's 1943 Being and Nothingness (198; see translation below) by exposing the failure of radical skeptics to see that they had been held hostage by Enlightenment blackmail in accepting the Enlightenment criterion for truth, rejecting it, and then making skepticism an absolute. Indeed, "First Philosophies" navigates from this performative contradiction to chart a third way between Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism with an approach that he labels regressive philosophy. Regressive philosophy, Perelman argues, provides the human community with a mode of philosophical reasoning located between the extremes of Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism. In this space between extremes, Perelman identifies contingent truths and values dependent on a rhetorical mode of reasoning, one making moral judgments possible.To best understand "First Philosophies," we recognize the importance of historical context in the development of social theories of knowledge (see Delacampagne 1999; Kennedy 1999). The intellectual networks in which philosophers operate also influence the development of philosophical systems, as Randall Collins has aptly documented. In addition to historical context and intellectual networks, Frederick Beiser has recently noted: "[t] he best introduction to any philosophy is the biography of the person who created it" (1999, 5). He argues that textual analysis alone cannot illuminate the motivation or meaning of a philosophy. A sense of Perelman's biography and the cultural influences that gave rise to "First Philosophies" are necessary for a proper understanding of its themes. For Perelman, the primary intellectual exigencies of the post-war period were the interrelated crises of justice, philosophical reasoning, and responsibility to which "First Philosophies" is a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Recovering Aquinas's Common-Good-Oriented Right of RebellionNathaniel A. MoatsIntroductionAs recent events have woefully displayed, armed rebellion is not a topic of merely theoretical interest.1 While theory seemingly has very little impact on the citizens participating in armed rebellions, theory still remains of paramount importance, providing crucial criteria to evaluate, restrain, apply, and respond to such force. Criteria such as legitimate authority, just cause, right intention, necessity, proportionality, and likelihood (...) of success have been offered by thinkers advocating "just war" theory from across diverse political, philosophical, and religious backgrounds, garnering widespread agreement over the centuries. Contemporary scholars who identify as "historically oriented" just war thinkers have continued to defend that historical tradition as a sufficient and substantial guide for contemporary practice.2 Yet some have questioned whether the it can provide useful aid for dealing with contexts of political tyranny. In a 2013 article, Valeria Morkevičius describes [End Page 175] Western culture as divided over the moral permissibility of armed rebellion, with advocates basing their views on the Enlightenment ideas found in John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whereas traditional just war theorists have generally denied a right to armed rebellion.3 In Morkevičius's perspective, she argues that there can be justified use of armed force against tyranny and calls upon other scholars to help create a "just rebellion theory" that would "radically reimagine" traditional just war thinking.4 She claims that there is a "lack of a systematic and rigorous ethical framework for evaluating the justness of rebellions"5 and that "a new theory of just rebellion—a systematic way of evaluating the justness of real world rebellions, of determining appropriate state responses to domestic rebellions, and of weighing the pros and cons of intervention" is needed.6In line with Morkevičius' sentiments, the last ten years has seen the increasing rise of self-proclaimed just war revisionists.7 Jeff McMahan, the figurehead for this movement, claims that the classical just war criteria "can no longer stand."8 McMahan argues that traditional just war theory has [End Page 176] depicted war as a morally sui generis category of violence in which unique moral principles apply.9 The moral asymmetry of war is also reinforced by a "statist" and "collectivist" orientation that overrides the importance of individuals and their rights of life, liberty, property, and other fundamental goods. Instead of seeing war as a distinct category of violence, McMahan argues that war and self-defense are morally symmetrical. Further, he argues that combatants should be depicted as individuals distinct from their political or collective identity.10 In other words, McMahan offers a theory of war oriented around individuals and their rights based in the concept of justified self-defense.11 Extending McMahan's theory, Cécile Fabre has particularly targeted the criterion of legitimate authority as morally problematic.12 Rejecting the exclusive authorization of armed force by political authorities, she argues in favor of an individual's right to war, and by extension the right to rebellion.13 Therefore, given the historical just war tradition's emphasis on the criterion of legitimate authority (i.e., the restriction of armed force [End Page 177] to established authorities) and resistance to support armed rebellions due to the lack of recognized political leaders, revisionists conclude that traditional just war thinking is inadequate for providing contemporary guidance in the context of rebellion.14To challenge revisionist claims, I analyze Thomas Aquinas's ingenuity and relevance for future "just rebellion" thinking. First, I argue that classical just war thinking is not as antithetical to armed rebellion as suggested.15 One just rebellion theory has coexisted alongside the classical formation of just war theory, albeit often neglected or ignored by contemporary thinkers.16 It is well known that Aquinas formalized the Augustinian classical just war theory revolving around the criteria of legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention. Much less known, however, is the fact that Aquinas also crafted criteria for justified armed rebellions. While Aquinas's just war thinking rearticulates Augustine's perspective, Aquinas appropriated his mentor's views to allow for justified armed rebellions. Aquinas's originality was displayed not only in allowing justified armed... (shrink)

Monogenesis of language is widely accepted, but the conventional argument seems to be mistaken; a simple probabilistic model shows that polygenesis is likely. Other prehistoric inventions are discussed, as are problems in tracing linguistic lineages. Language is a system of representations; within such a system, words can evoke complex and systematic responses. Along with its social functions, language is important to humans as a mental instrument. Indeed, the invention of language,that is the accumulation of symbols to represent emotions, objects, and (...) acts may be the most important event in human evolution, because so many developments follow from it. For example, Edward Sapir speculated that some embryonic form of language must have been available to early man to help him fashion tools from stone (Sapir,1921). Sophisticated biface stone tools date to early Homo erectus some 1.5 million years ago, suggesting a similar age for language. This paper considers whether the invention of language occurred at only one pre-historic site or at several sites. In other words, did language emerge by monogenesis or polygenesis? Early thinkers believed in monogenesis, against a background of divine creation. Perhaps the best known account is the biblical story of Adam giving names to plants and animals in the Garden of Eden. Similar legends are found among many peoples. Modern linguists too assume monogenesis, but on probabilistic grounds (see, for instance, Southworth and Daswani, 1974, p.314). The argument seems to be that the invention of language is an extremely unlikely event, because symbolization involves abstraction and requires synchronized insight by several individuals; therefore, the probability of occurrence at more than one site must be vanishingly small. We have found no explicit quantitative treatment of this question in the literature, but the underlying logic has to be the multiplication of probabilities. If p is small at one site,then p.p for two sites is smaller still, and so on. This reasoning is false, as we show here. The fallacy lies in the focus on two particular sites rather than consideration of all pairs of sites. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.3 (2003) 177-188 [Access article in PDF] Chaïm Perelman's "First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy":Commentary and Translation David A. Frank Michelle K. Bolduc Chaïm Perelman's 1949 article, "First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy," has remained unavailable to readers unable to read French. Our commentary and translation is intended to provide English readers access to the context, influences, and themes that make the article an extraordinarily important work in (...) the history of twentieth-century rhetoric. In this article, Perelman offers a powerful critique of first philosophies and anticipates the problems of radical postmodernity. "First Philosophies" remains a strikingly elegant attempt to foil what Foucault (1984, 41-42) has called the "Enlightenment blackmail of reason," the assumption held by logical positivists and radical skeptics that if reason does not yield absolute and eternal Enlightenment knowledge, there can be no knowledge.Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric project avoids Enlightenment blackmail by charting a third way between logical positivism and radical relativism, and "First Philosophies" sets forth the project's philosophical blueprint. Commencing in 1947 and culminating in 1958 with the publication of Traité de l'argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca sought, discovered, and developed a philosophical system designed as a rapprochement between dialectic (reason and logic) and rhetoric (the art of adapting arguments to audiences). Historians of rhetoric judge the work a "grand revolution" (Meyer 1999, 259), believing it marks a rhetorical renaissance in Europe, and suggest nothing like it will appear for another 100 years after its publication (Johnstone 1971). The New Rhetoric project influenced Gadamer and a host of post-war European and American thinkers (Mootz 1998). Michael Leff calls the 1970 English translation of Traité a "bombshell" (1994, 510). Beyond its historical importance, Crosswhite suggests that the New Rhetoric project is "the single most important event in contemporary rhetorical theory" (1996, 35)and "First Philosophies" marks Perelman's turn from logical [End Page 177] positivism to rhetoric, offering prescient answers to the post-World War II crises of reason, and the ideas in the article provide the Traité'sphilosophical glue (see in particular the English translation, 62).Perelman joined many post-war theorists, including Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), in the resistance to the reign of a disembodied Enlightenment rationality. However, Perelman identified what Habermas (1987, 119) would later call the "performative contradiction" in the conclusion that radical skepticism was the only alternative to Enlightenment rationality. In "First Philosophies," Perelman responds directly to Sartre's 1943 Being and Nothingness (198; see translation below) by exposing the failure of radical skeptics to see that they had been held hostage by Enlightenment blackmail in accepting the Enlightenment criterion for truth, rejecting it, and then making skepticism an absolute. Indeed, "First Philosophies" navigates from this performative contradiction to chart a third way between Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism with an approach that he labels regressive philosophy. Regressive philosophy, Perelman argues, provides the human community with a mode of philosophical reasoning located between the extremes of Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism. In this space between extremes, Perelman identifies contingent truths and values dependent on a rhetorical mode of reasoning, one making moral judgments possible.To best understand "First Philosophies," we recognize the importance of historical context in the development of social theories of knowledge (see Delacampagne 1999; Kennedy 1999). The intellectual networks in which philosophers operate also influence the development of philosophical systems, as Randall Collins has aptly documented. In addition to historical context and intellectual networks, Frederick Beiser has recently noted: "[t] he best introduction to any philosophy is the biography of the person who created it" (1999, 5). He argues that textual analysis alone cannot illuminate the motivation or meaning of a philosophy. A sense of Perelman's biography and the cultural influences that gave rise to "First Philosophies" are necessary for a proper understanding of its themes. For Perelman, the primary intellectual exigencies of the post-war period were the interrelated crises of justice, philosophical reasoning, and responsibility to which "First Philosophies" is a... (shrink)

Topics related to ethical issues in agricultural production, particularly farm animal welfare, are increasingly featured in mainstream news media. Media representations of farm animal welfare issues are important because the media is a significant source of information, but also because the way that the issues are represented, or framed, defines these issues in particular ways, suggests causes or solutions, and provides moral evaluations. As such, analysis of media frames can reveal how issues are being made public and identify the (...) cues that audiences are given to help them make sense of complex ethical issues. Previous research on media frames and animal welfare has tended to focus on single issues or events; however we sought to identify whether media frames extended across different farm animal welfare-related issues to investigate whether there is any commonality between issues. We analysed articles published in the mainstream press in Australia between 2014 and 2016 related to farm animal welfare, and identified two dominant frames: that governments and the farm animal production industries cannot be trusted to ensure good farm animal welfare; and that consumers can act to improve animal welfare through ethical consumption. These frames have implications for how the Australian public interpret and understand the roles and responsibilities of different actors in the food production system. This research also contributes to discussion about the role of the media in shaping public opinion about ethical issues in agriculture and how, in turn, the media landscape itself is being shaped by consumer attitudes. (shrink)

The research identifies the amount of headline/article discrepancies in the corpora of western and Russian online articles on sensitive political topics. A quarter of the western headlines and nearly half of the Russian headlines distort the publications they introduce. Language means and manipulative strategies employed by different sides vary considerably. Extensive use of expressive language and style variation are seen as leading causes of distortions in the western corpus. The rich imagery used by the authors forms emotional implicatures that affect (...) the reader’s perception of the issue. In contrast, information substitution, subjective modality and selective citations are identified as major causes of distortions in the Russian corpus. Contributors to Russian news outlets rely on general rather than language manipulation strategies, including frequent use of logical fallacies and wrong generalizations. These techniques establish false logical sequences and wrong causative implicatures that compromise objective reporting. The underlying motives of the journalists’ creating false emotional and causative implicatures in the headlines lies beyond the scope of the study; however, it is assumed that intentional change of the information introduced by the headline could be viewed as a covert misinformation attempt. (shrink)

In section 96 of Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit offers his now familiar tripartite distinction among candidates for ‘what matters’: (1) Relation R with its normal cause; (2) R with any reliable cause; (3) R with any cause. He defends option (3). This paper tries to show that there is important ambiguity in this distinction and in Parfit's defence of his position. There is something strange about Parfit's way of dividing up the territory: I argue that (...) those who have followed him in viewing the choice among (1)–(3) as the (or an) important question in thinking about ‘what matters’ are mistaken, and that they bypass what seems to be a more important, even crucial, set of options and considerations. I am less concerned with what he does say than with what he ought to say, given his intuitions and arguments, and the general framework within which he is working. And I am particularly concerned to show that whether or not I am correct about what he is doing with his tripartite distinction, it is a distinction with which we should not be particularly concerned in the analysis either of what matters or of psychological continuity. (shrink)

Cultural competence literature and training aim to equip healthcare workers to better understand patients of different cultures and value systems, in an effort to ensure effective and equitable healthcare services for diverse patient populations. However, without nuanced awareness and contextual knowledge, the values embedded within cultural competence practice may cripple rather than empower the very people they mean to respect. A narrow cultural view can lessen cultural understanding rather than grow it. In its first part, this paper argues that a (...) hasty, unrestrained, and uneducated willingness to accept something as a cultural good, despite being well intentioned, can still cause significant harms—particularly when based on false, misinformed, and stereotypical conceptions—including the minimization of issues, the reinforcement of stereotypes, and the impediment of cultural change. The second part of this paper examines medical autonomy within the context of Saudi Arabian women. It pushes back on the common perception that Saudi women, by virtue of culture and religion, view dependency on and deference to male relatives as a cultural good. Through a historical examination and a presentation of the current women’s movement in Saudi Arabia, it is argued that the continued assumption that personal agency is a value external to Saudi women is false, misguided, and ethically problematic. Lastly, this paper considers some approaches to help providers navigate the narrow grounds between paternalism and patronization when caring for patients. (shrink)

In most common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, mistakes of law do not excuse. That is, the fact that one was ignorant of the content or requirements of some law does not excuse violations of that law. Many have argued that this doctrine is mistaken. In particular, many have argued that if an individual’s ignorance or false belief is blameless, if she held the false belief reasonably, then she ought to be able to use that ignorance as an excuse (...) for violating the law. It is much harder to find defenders of the doctrine, despite its prevalence. Pragmatic considerations are occasionally offered on its behalf, but these are generally not impressive. In this paper, I consider a more direct kind of justification for the doctrine, one that attempts to identify something more immediately normatively objectionable about being ignorant of the law. In particular, I consider an argument that suggests that legal ignorance is more like moral ignorance than like nonmoral ignorance and maintains that even nonculpable moral ignorance does not excuse. (shrink)

Stuttering is one of the most well-known speech disorders, but the underlying neurological mechanisms are debated. In addition to genetic factors there are also major non-genetic contributions. It is here proposed that infection with group A beta-hemolytic streptococcus (GAS) was a major underlying cause of stuttering until the mid 1900s, when penicillin was introduced for the treatment of streptococcal infections about 1946. The main mechanism proposed is an autoimmune reaction from tonsillitis, targeting specific molecules, for example within the basal (...) ganglia. It is here also proposed that GAS infections may have continued to cause stuttering to some extent, to the present date, though more rarely. If so, early diagnosis of such cases would be of importance. Childhood cases with sudden onset of stuttering after throat infection may be particularly important to assess for possible GAS infection. The support for this hypothesis primarily comes from three lines of argument. First, medical record data from the 1930s strongly indicates that there was one type of medical event in particular that preceded the onset of childhood stuttering with unexpected frequency: diseases related to GAS throat infections. In particular, this included tonsillitis and scarlet fever, but also rheumatic fever. Rheumatic fever is a childhood autoimmune sequela of GAS infection, which was a relatively widespread medical problem until the early 1960s. Secondly, available reports of changes of the childhood prevalence of stuttering indicates striking parallels between stuttering and the incidence of rheumatic fever, with (1) decline from the early 1900s, (2) marked decline from the introduction of penicillin about 1946, and (3) reaching a more stable level in the 1960s. The correlations between the data for stuttering and for rheumatic fever after introduction of penicillin are very high, at about 0.95. Thirdly, there are established biological mechanisms linking GAS tonsillitis to immunological effects on the brain. In addition, a small number of more recent case reports have provided further support for the hypothesis linking stuttering to GAS infection. Overall, it is proposed that the available data provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that GAS infection was a major cause of stuttering until the mid 1900s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Cultural Context of Post-traumatic Stress DisorderCarolyn Smith-Morris (bio)Keywordspost-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), culture, medical anthropology, fight-or-flight responseIn his Clinical Anecdote, Dr. Christopher Bailey gamely imagines the evolutionary underpinnings of his patient's distressing lack of war wounds. As part of a careful and engaged discussion of care for his suffering patient, Dr. Bailey suggests that our evolved fight-or-flight response to the alarms of the African savannah may be at (...) work in Colin's distress. The fight-or-flight response is something of great interest to anthropologists, who rely on Darwin's theory of evolution to explain much in human experience. According to Dr. Bailey's application of the theory, Colin's visceral response to threat is protective in the presence of danger, but destructive (particularly to his mental health) in the absence of such challenges. So Dr. Bailey considers whether we may have an evolved “need” for threat, and that Colin's trauma is in part related to the lack of such threat in his wartime experience.According to Darwin's ideas, evolved traits may be adaptive but may also simply be random appearances that have not yet produced cause for evolutionary eradication. The fight-or-flight response, or any of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis events initiated under either acute or chronic stress, is therefore occurring in Colin's reactions to everyday frustrations, to wartime exposures, and even during the stressful nontrauma of feeling “wimpy.” Dr. Bailey's idea about an evolved need for threat is tautological. That need is not biological, but cultural.Although post-traumatic stress disorder is medically real, it is an event that develops in a particular place and time. Likewise, gender roles that demand scar battles and trophies of a certain form are culturally determined. Culture is central to this anecdote: a culture-specific occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder and culturally driven gender roles for men, especially warriors. Stress is indeed present in Colin's life: our postindustrial culture's separation from everyday death and violence make episodes like war and combat all the more shocking or traumatic; the lack of social recognition for his service also seems to be one of Colin's stressors. Both the shock of warfare and the trauma of his social invisibility are as vivid to his evolutionarily informed body as is the presence of a crouching lioness in the room. So it is the host of cultural expectations, and his inability to mobilize social and cognitive resources to respond to them, that is wounding Colin. Talk therapy should draw out these cultural details [End Page 235] and, as Dr. Bailey has already begun to do, emplot Colin into a more heroic (his)story of his service to our nation.Related ArticlesFeature Article: Clinical Anecdotes: A Painful Lack of WoundsCommentary: The Nature of Proof in PsychiatryCommentary: Truth and Healing a Veteran's DepressionCommentary: Inappropriate RegretCommentary: The Cultural Context of Post-traumatic Stress DisorderCommentary: Explication or Explanation?Commentary: The Importance of What Psychiatrists Care AboutCommentary: Mourning or MelancholiaResponse: A Painful Lack of ConnectionCarolyn Smith-Morris Carolyn Smith-Morris is an Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. Her work focuses on chronic disease and the health impacts of culture change and acculturative stress in North America. She is engaged in several research programs among migrating Mexican workers, among poor African-Americans in Dallas, and for the Gila (pronounced Hee-la) River Indian Community of Southern Arizona, a tribe that suffers from the highest recorded rates of type 2 diabetes in the world. She also holds a research fellowship with the Foundation for Community Empowerment, serves on the Board of the Society for Medical Anthropology, and is a fellow in the Society for Applied Anthropology. She published Diabetes Among the Pima in 2006 and has several articles detailing her applied research on diabetes, reproduction, health care ethics, and end-of-life care. She can be contacted via e-mail at: [email protected], C. 2009. A painful lack of wounds. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 16, no. 3:223–224. [End Page... (shrink)

The aim of the article is threefold: to argue and motivate that unnecessary surgery is a worldwide phenomenon, that it exposes patients to unwarranted risks and that patients should actively participate in decision-making and take a shared responsibility to protect their interests. There is a firm belief that the enterprise of medicine is something of value – both intrinsically because being healthy is good and instrumentally since being healthy allows us to do what we wish to, to attain happiness (...) and to live valuable lives. However, this can only hold if treatment is justified in terms of accepted evidence-based criteria. Imperative for all forms of treatment, including costly and invasive investigations, this is particularly true for surgical interventions because no surgery is without risk. Surgery performed outside of the norms of accepted indications constitutes a grave form of assault. Medicine is a noble cause if we stick to the rules and help each other to do so. As professionals, our most fundamental regulation is by ourselves. (shrink)

Suicide is amongst the top ten causes of death for all age groups in most countries of the world. It is the second most important cause of death in the younger age group (15-19 yrs.) , second only to vehicular accidents. Attempted suicides are ten times the successful suicide figures, and 1-2% attempted suicides become successful suicides every year. Male sex, widowhood, single or divorced marital status, addiction to alcohol ordrugs, concomitant chronic physical or mental illness, past suicidal attempt, (...) adverse life events, staying in lodging homes or staying alone, or in areas with a changing population, all these conditions predispose people to suicides. The key factor probably is social isolation. An important WHO Study established that out of a total of 6003 suicides, 98% had a psychiatric disorder. Hence mental health professionals have an important role to play in the prevention and management of suicide. Moreover, social disintegration also increases suicides, as was witnessed in the Baltic States following collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, reducing social isolation, preventing social disintegration and treating mental disorders is the three pronged attack that must be the crux of any public health programme to reduce/prevent suicide. This requires an integrated effort on the part of mental health professionals (including crisis intervention and medication/psychotherapy), governmental measures to tackle poverty and unemployment, and social attempts to reorient value systems and prevent sudden disintegration of norms and mores. Suicide prevention and control is thus a movement which involves the state, professionals, NGOs, volunteers and an enlightened public. Further, the Global Burden of Diseases Study has projected a rise of more than 50% in mental disorders by the year 2020 (from 9.7% in 1990to 15% in 2020). And one third of this rise will be due to Major Depression. One of the prominent causes of preventable mortality is suicidal attempts made by patients of Major Depression. Therefore facilities to tackle this condition need to be set up globally on a warfooting by governments, NGOs and health care delivery systems, if morbidity and mortality of the world population has to be seriously controlled . The need, first of all, is to identify suicide prevention as public health policy, just as we think in terms of Malaria or Polio eradication, or have achieved smallpox eradication. (shrink)

BackgroundHigh levels of moral distress in nursing professionals, of which oncology nurses are particularly prone, can negatively impact patient care, job satisfaction, and retention.Aim“Positive Attitudes Striving to Rejuvenate You: PASTRY” was developed at a tertiary cancer center to reduce the burden of moral distress among oncology nurses.Research DesignA Quality Improvement (QI) initiative was conducted using a pre- and post-intervention design, to launch PASTRY and measure its impact on moral distress of the nursing unit, using Hamric’s Moral Distress Scale–Revised (MDS-R.) (...) This program consisted of monthly 60-minute sessions allowing nurses to address morally distressing events and themes, such as clinicians giving “false hope” to patients or families. The PASTRY program sessions were led by certified clinicians utilizing strategies of discussion and mind-body practices.ParticipantsClinical nurses working on an adult leukemia/lymphoma unit.Ethical considerationsThis was a QI initiative, participation was voluntary, MDS-R responses were collected anonymously, and the institution’s Ethics Committee oversaw PASTRY’s implementation.FindingsWhile improvement in moral distress findings were not statistically significant, the qualitative and quantitative findings demonstrated consistent themes. The PASTRY program received strong support from nurses and institutional leaders, lowered the nursing unit’s moral distress, led to enhanced camaraderie, and improved nurses’ coping skills.DiscussionMeasurement of moral distress is innately challenging due to its complexity. This study reinforces oncology nurses have measurable moral distress. Interventions should be implemented for a safe and healing environment to explore morally distressing clinical experiences. Poor communication among multidisciplinary team members is associated with moral distress among nurses. Programs like PASTRY may empower nurses to build support networks for change within themselves and institutions.ConclusionThis QI initiative shows further research on moral distress reduction should be conducted to verify findings for statistical significance and so that institutional programs, like PASTRY, can be created. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 497 interaction and interdependence. Our practice can be governed by that ontological hypothesis. Much of Timpanaro's ranting and raving and name calling rests upon his unhelpful conflation of the epistemological and the ontological and upon a false dichotomy between materialism and idealism that no longer is or ought to be the basic and important issue in Marxism. DONALDC. LEE University of New Mexico Causing, Perceiving and (...) Believing: An Examination of the Philosophy of C. J. Ducasse. By Peter H. Hare and Edward H. Madden. (Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel, 1975. Pp. vii + 211. $26.00) Hare and Madden have performed a service to the philosophical community in summarizing and evaluating the contributions to philosophy of C. J. Ducasse. They have distilled from ten books, scores of articles, and some unpublished manuscripts of Ducasse, analyses of causality, sensation, perception, substance, agency, belief, knowledge, mind, beauty, education, and religion that can fairly be regarded as the philosophy of Ducasse. They point out some inconsistencies in Ducasse's views, but they suggest emendations to overcome the difficulties-emendations that Hare and Madden have developed in their own writings, so that the reader is offered, in effect, a composite Ducasse-Hare-Madden system of philosophy. I agree with most of the authors' judgments regarding the defects of Ducasse's views, but I doubt that their proposed improvements succeed in making the overall vision coherent. In the first three chapters the authors explain Ducasse's theories of causality and agency and claim that his account of causality as a necessary but nonlogical connection was a significant advance over Hume. They consider Ducasse to have been wrong in limiting causality to events and in maintaining that it is directly observable. They argue that an effect is deducible from the "nature" of its cause, although not from the nontheoretical description of its cause. This proposed improvement on Ducasse and Hume seems to me either a mere gloss on Hume or a muddle. If Hare and Madden mean that scientific theories establish entailments between concepts such as pressure and volume or mass and acceleration, and that the explanatory and predictive success of such entailments serves as a criterion of causal processes, they are right. But what they have identified is not a relation of nonlogical necessity but rather two relations: a logical relation between two theoretical concepts, and a contingent relation between two classes of events that correspond to the theoretical concepts. If, on the other hand, they mean to agree with Aristotle and the scholastics that the nature of a thing is an entity or process inside it that compels it to behave as it does, then, like their ancient predecessors, they make causal explanation into a "dormative virtue" fallacy; for the nature of a thing is then identical with its causal powers, and the latter follow vacuously from the concept of its nature. They seem to ignore the fact that any conceptual relation between theoretical concepts is only a rough approximation to actual events. It is a logically necessary truth that EMF is proportional to current times resistance, but it is neither logically nor nonlogically necessary that a booster battery will start a recalcitrant car. In brief, theoretical relations are idealizations of real processes in nature. Hare and Madden claim that their conceptual connection analysis of causality blunts the edge of the "logical connection argument" that motives cannot be causes of actions. They fail to realize that the "logical connection argument" applies to the nontheoretical descriptions of motives and actions (there are no theories worth considering), while their own conceptual relation analysis applies only to theoretical descriptions of natural processes. The Hare-Madden emendation produces special difficulties when applied to Ducasse's account of human agency and mind-body interaction. Ducasse defended the dualist conception of voluntary action as bodily movement caused by mental volitions. The possibility of 498 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY such causal intereaction makes some sense on Ducasse's basically Humean view that causality can hold between any two kinds of event but not on the Hare-Madden view that cause and effect must be conceptually related. For we have no well-confirmed theories, nor is it likely that we ever will... (shrink)

ObjectiveSome people experience post-traumatic growth, entailing positive changes such as a greater appreciation of life following traumatic events. We examined PTG in the context of the negative consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, notably working from home and social distancing. We aimed to assess whether distinct sub-groups of individuals experiencing PTG could be identified by how they appraised and coped with the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodFor this cross-sectional study, we used convenience sampling. In total, 951 participants from the general population completed an (...) online questionnaire with items focusing on primary and secondary appraisal, positive reappraisal, rumination, and coping flexibility. For the latent profile analysis, we selected a sample of 392 individuals who had experienced moderate degrees of pandemic-related PTG, reporting at least two of the 10 positive changes in the PTG Inventory-Short Form.ResultsWe identified two distinct profiles among people experiencing PTG. The first was characterised by low levels of primary appraisal and stressfulness and higher levels of secondary appraisal, increased coping flexibility and greater use of positive reappraisal. The second was characterised by higher levels of stressfulness and primary appraisal and greater use of rumination.ConclusionThe two sub-groups evidently appraised and coped with the COVID-19 pandemic differently. Therefore, future research should account for these different profiles of people experiencing PTG. (shrink)

This work is a revision of the False Dilemma Fallacy (FDF). The formalized model (FM)of this fallacy has as its centerpiece a valid disjunctive syllogism, but the disjunctive premise is presumed to be false, thus making the argument unsound. Our revised model (FM2.0) focuses on the formal structure by comparing the given vs. the real argument, which is unsound because of its invalidity. This approach we believe is more pedagogically useful and a better explanation of the (...) fallacious nature of the FDF. It extends the identity of “formal fallacy” to the FDF. The abstract is formatted in two columns. The English abstract goes on this side. (shrink)

In his recent work, Dretske offers a new account of what it is for a mental state, in particular, a sensory experience, to be conscious. According to Dretske’sproposal, subject S’s experience of object O is conscious if and only if it makes S aware of O. This proposal is argued to be open to only two serious interpretations. The first takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it constitutes S’s awareness of (...) O, whereas the second takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it causes S’s awareness of O. It is argued that neither is a plausible way to understand the nature of state consciousness, because the constitutive interpretation implausibly denies the existence of unconscious veridical experiences, whereas the causal interpretation implausibly casts S’s veridical experience of O, rather than O or a certain external event involving O, as the relevant cause of S’s awareness of O. (shrink)

In his recent work, Dretske offers a new account of what it is for a mental state, in particular, a sensory experience, to be conscious. According to Dretske’sproposal, subject S’s experience of object O is conscious if and only if it makes S aware of O. This proposal is argued to be open to only two serious interpretations. The first takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it constitutes S’s awareness of (...) O, whereas the second takes it to mean that S’s experience of O is conscious if and only if it causes S’s awareness of O. It is argued that neither is a plausible way to understand the nature of state consciousness, because the constitutive interpretation implausibly denies the existence of unconscious veridical experiences, whereas the causal interpretation implausibly casts S’s veridical experience of O, rather than O or a certain external event involving O, as the relevant cause of S’s awareness of O. (shrink)

This provocative but persuasive book is essentially a radical attack upon the Humean conception of causality and the presentation and defense of a counter-theory, closer to everyday experience and pre-Humean traditional views. As formulated by empiricist philosophers, the Humean approach depends on two basic postulates. The philosophical analysis of any non-empirical concept must be a formal explication; any residue elements have to be accounted for in terms of their psychological origins. The world as experienced can be conceived adequately as a (...) logically independent system of things or flux of events, without the unwarranted assumption that individuals persist diachronically. As the grounds for undermining these assumptions, the authors develop a conception of causes as "powerful particulars," i.e., things which have both a nature and powers. So long as the nature remains unchanged the agent in question will continue to behave in this fashion with a natural necessity, stemming from the individual’s nature and specific powers. The opening chapter discusses the problem of conceptual and natural necessity—as distinct from logical necessity which alone is allowed by the Humean empiricists. Natural necessity is the mark of the relationship between real causes and their respective effects, whereas conceptual necessity characterizes the way our statements about such are themselves related. Later the irreducibility of natural necessity is emphasized and its differences from logical entailment spelled out. Chapter two takes up the subject of the "regularity theory and its allies." Characteristic of such are two claims: the empirical content of a causal-relationship statement is exhausted by the actual or hypothetical regularity between independent entities, and the necessity ordinarily attributed to causal production is an illusion, to be accounted for in various ways. Subsequent chapters are devoted to assaulting the pillars of the Humean notion either directly or indirectly through an illuminating and attractive account of their own theory of nature, causal powers, and natural necessity. The final chapter, entitled "Fields of Potential," indulges in speculation about the nature of ultimate entities on the basis of an extended generalization of the notion of the powerful individual, and concludes with a brief account of the historical antecedents of Faraday’s modern field theory and the metaphysical implications of a generalized field theory.—A.B.W. (shrink)

In programs of acoustic survey, the amount of data collected and the lack of automatic routines for their classification and interpretation can represent a serious obstacle to achieving quick results. To overcome these obstacles, we are proposing an ecosemiotic model of data mining, ecoacoustic event detection and identification, that uses a combination of the acoustic complexity indices and automatically extracts the ecoacoustic events of interest from the sound files. These events may be indicators of environmental functioning at the scale (...) of individual vocal species, the acoustic community, the sound marks, or the soundscape. The EEDI model is represented by three procedural steps: 1) selecting acoustic data according to environmental variables, 2) detecting the events by creating an ecoacoustic event space produced by plotting ACIft and its evenness, 3) identifying events according to the level of correlation between the acoustic signature of the detected events and an ad hoc library of previously identified events. The EEDI procedure can be extensively used in basic and applied research. In particular, EEDI may be used in long-term monitoring programs to assess the effect of climate change on individual vocal species behavior, population, and acoustic community dynamics. The EEDI model can be also used to investigate acoustic human intrusion in natural systems and the effect in urban areas. (shrink)

Context: Practice-based design research is becoming more widely recognized in academia, including at doctoral level, yet there are arguably limited options for dissemination beyond the traditional conference format of paper-based proceedings, possibly with an exhibition or “demonstrator” component that is often non-archival. Further, the opportunities afforded by the traditional-format paper presentations is at times at odds with practice-based methodologies being presented. Purpose: We provide a first-hand descriptive account of developing and running a new international conference with an experimental format that (...) aims to support more analogously the dissemination of practice-based design research. Method: Our approach herein is broadly interpretative, phenomenological and critically reflective in orientation, to analyze our own experiential insights from the conference conception, through to the event itself and post-conference reflections, alongside the reflections fed back by conference delegates. Results: We have found the roundtable format continues to function well for creating a discursive interactional context. However issues arose around the crucial nature of the session chair’s role in enabling rich and multi-voiced discussion and how presenters’, organizers’ and delegates’ voices were captured and documented, with implications for further developing the conference design. Looking forward, there are also questions raised about: balancing the stringency of a rigorous review process with provision of an encouraging platform for early-career researchers; and balancing the need for clear criteria and formatting standards with the “openness” of the submission template and formatting guidelines and/or writing. This includes designers who are new to research cultures. It should also appeal to those working in interdisciplinary research in collaboration with design practitioners (but who may not be practitioners themselves. The conference aims to foster and support a burgeoning “research through design” academic community and to provide a fitting dissemination platform for this community. We hope that the conference will encourage academic communities to give proper consideration to the concept of design as a knowledge-generating activity. Constructivist content: Knowledge about design research is generated from meaningful interaction between people and artifacts as part of the unfolding conference experience. The organizational features of the conference aim to support knowledge dissemination through dialogical relations between people and things in particular contexts of interaction. (shrink)

Introduction The goal of this project was to develop and validate a new tool to evaluate learners' knowledge and skills related to research ethics. Methods A core set of 50 questions from existing computer-based online teaching modules were identified, refined and supplemented to create a set of 74 multiple-choice, true/false and short answer questions. The questions were pilot-tested and item discrimination was calculated for each question. Poorly performing items were eliminated or refined. Two comparable assessment tools were created. These (...) assessment tools were administered as a pre-test and post-test to a cohort of 58 Indian junior health research investigators before and after exposure to a new course on research ethics. Half of the investigators were exposed to the course online, the other half in person. Item discrimination was calculated for each question and Cronbach's α for each assessment tool. A final version of the assessment tool that incorporated the best questions from the pre-/post-test phase was used to assess retention of research ethics knowledge and skills 3 months after course delivery. Results The final version of the REKASA includes 41 items and had a Cronbach's α of 0.837. Conclusion The results illustrate, in one sample of learners, the successful, systematic development and use of a knowledge and skills assessment tool in research ethics capable of not only measuring basic knowledge in research ethics and oversight but also assessing learners' ability to apply ethics knowledge to the analytical task of reasoning through research ethics cases, without reliance on essay or discussion-based examination. These promising preliminary findings should be confirmed with additional groups of learners. (shrink)

Individual and/or co-offenders fraudulent activities can have a devastating effect on a company’s reputation and credibility. Enron, Xerox, WorldCom, HIH Insurance and One.Tel are examples where stakeholders incurred substantial financial losses as a result of fraud and led to a loss of confidence in corporate dealings by the public in general. There are numerous theoretical approaches that attempt to explain how and why fraudulent acts occur, drawing on the fields of sociology, organisational, management and economic literature, but there is limited (...) empirical evidence published in accounting literature. This qualitative inductive study analyses perceptions and experiences of forensic accountants to gain insights into individual fraud and co-offending in order to determine whether the conceptual framework developed from literature accurately depicts the causes of fraud committed by individuals and groups in the twenty-first century. Findings from the study both support and extend the conceptual framework, demonstrating that strain and anomie can result in fraud, that deviant sub-groups recruit and coerce members by providing relief from strain, and that inadequate corporate governance mechanisms both contribute to fraud occurring, and provide the opportunity for fraudulent activities to be executed and often remain undetected. Additional factors emerging from this study were also identified as contributors to fraud, particularly relevant to the twenty-first century, and consequently, a refined conceptual framework is presented in the discussion and conclusion to the paper. (shrink)

The fifteen essays which comprise this book are unified by an unmistakable philosophical voice, and addressed to an interlocking set of concepts: cause, law, event, action, feeling, freedom, and intention. Collectively they trace the loops and bights of the Welt-Knotte, where the physical and the psychological orders tie. But the book is more than a collection of bright inter-referential papers by a clever man, and its existence is justified by something greater than the value of having them (...) bound conveniently together. For it can be read as a kind of journal metaphysique, with advances and reversals, where early theses can be retained only by dialectical modification, and intuitions retained at the cost of sacrificing intuitions, and a kind of relentless will-to-system can be perceived coming to self-consciousness through the medium of invited papers to the routine conferences and symposia of academic philosophical life. What we have in the end is thinking, rather than specimens of thought. (shrink)

We investigated the possible causes of perceptual switching in ambiguous figures. Ambiguous figures are a special class of visual stimuli that can give rise to at least two alternative interpretations. Because the figures themselves stay the same, these stimuli are particularly suitable to study the dynamic changes in our visual apparatus that enable us to see the world in different ways. Recent studies stress the importance of both low-level and high-level processes in switching. We show that these processes lead to (...) switching independently, and that, when they co-occur, they do not occur at exactly the same time.We take these results to indicate that perceptual switching is a radically multiply realizable process, in that various neurological states can instantiate it in a single individual from time to time. We reflect on the consequences of this conclusion for experiential realism, in particular the notion that embodiment misleads us in identifying psychological types. (shrink)

Patient safety has assumed a prominent role on the policy agenda since the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human was released in November 1999. The report maintained that medical error is the predominant mechanism by which patients in the United States and around the world are injured. This finding, along with the report’s recommendation for a “systems” approach to reducing medical error, provided an extremely important insight into the operation of our medical delivery system. Clearly, while advances in (...) medical technology, diagnostic techniques, and knowledge provide the foundation for saving lives, medical error has resulted in their loss. However, recognition that medical error is a primary cause of these avoidable patient injuries and deaths is a key one and may result in improvements within our system of health-care delivery as well as minimization of the emotional and financial toll that iatrogenic injury causes. (shrink)

Patient safety has assumed a prominent role on the policy agenda since the Institute of Medicine report To Err Is Human was released in November 1999. The report maintained that medical error is the predominant mechanism by which patients in the United States and around the world are injured. This finding, along with the report’s recommendation for a “systems” approach to reducing medical error, provided an extremely important insight into the operation of our medical delivery system. Clearly, while advances in (...) medical technology, diagnostic techniques, and knowledge provide the foundation for saving lives, medical error has resulted in their loss. However, recognition that medical error is a primary cause of these avoidable patient injuries and deaths is a key one and may result in improvements within our system of health-care delivery as well as minimization of the emotional and financial toll that iatrogenic injury causes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Bridge From Analysis to Action:Psychodynamic Analyses of Religion and Michael S. Hogue's American ImmanenceAJ Turner (bio)I. IntroductionThe purpose of this essay is to work constructively with Michael S. Hogue's groundbreaking American Immanence: Democracy for an Uncertain World to demonstrate how psychodynamic analyses of religion are essential theoretical allies in the fight for resilient democracy. The "revolution in mind"1 that psychodynamic approaches contribute, especially in their analyses of religion, (...) both complements and complicates socio-political theory as a whole. In the improvisational spirit of "yes-and," the goal here is not to identify and decry the failures and shortcomings of Hogue's theopolitical vision but rather to inspire the recovery of a sibling discourse—a kind of "rebirth of a forgotten alternative"2—that also draws deeply from the American immanental tradition in order to add psychodynamic depth to Hogue's timely and important analysis. Psychodynamic theories of religion shed light on how symbolic identifications, including and especially ultimate concerns, structure personal and collective experience. By engaging religion and theology sympathetically, constructively, and creatively, theorists such as Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Ernest Becker departed from the skepticism, reductionism, and dismissal that characterized psychoanalytic analyses of religion in the wake of Freud.3 Each of these figures, and especially Becker whose work will be a focus in this essay, are noteworthy interlocutors for extending Hogue's theopolitical theorizing of resilient democracy, particularly in how they drew unique inspiration from the American immanental tradition [End Page 44] in their social analyses. In this respect, they provide a more robust theorization of the psychosocial conditions of the associational ethos needed to connect Hogue's conception of resilient democracy with forms of agonistic organization and democratic activism. Briefly stated, psychodynamic approaches are a helpful bridge for connecting these proposals to strategies of organization, their impediments, and collective action.In this way, both psychodynamic analyses of religion and Hogue's theopolitical innovation insist that no revolutionary political change is possible, and certainly not of the kind or scale needed to counter our wickedly entangled global crises, without a deep engagement with theological imaginaries. They differ, however, in their theoretical aims. Whereas Hogue compellingly argues for the political upshot of a theology deriving from the American immanental tradition, psychodynamic analysts of religion focus on the function of ultimate concerns in individual and collective life. In other words, American Immanence rests on a methodology of analyzing the philosophical and theological assumptions that have contributed to our climate crises and then presenting clear and compelling articulation of an alternative paradigm meant to open up new ways of being. In contrast psychodynamic analyses leverage conceptual clarity of psychic reality for the fundamentally therapeutic aim of transformation. At their best, both approaches share what could be called an etiological orientation to ontological questions in order to provide liberative alternatives through rational understanding and clarification, but the terrain, and thus the problems they hope to mitigate in their analyses are focused differently. Extending the visual metaphor, they are different lenses highlighting different areas of the same landscape. Furthermore, it must be said that neither are sufficient in themselves, but the psychodynamic theorists of religion to be highlighted in this essay share deeply with Hogue's heading in American Immanence.II. A Problematic AssumptionIn emphasizing and attempting to explain4 the role of non-rational processes in the both individual and social processes of perception and organization of experience, psychodynamic theories confound a widely held and problematic assumption that the triumph of rational analysis is the hallmark for building the society to which we should aspire. Political theory in general, [End Page 45] especially as it has taken its cues from a rationalist legacy about the inherently liberating force of Reason, has been weighted toward an assumption that its task of exposing the mystifications of power would suffice in inspiring more "rational" and therefore necessarily equitable social organization. This speaks to the longstanding socio-political interest in "consciousness raising" tactics, which are often meant to dispel "false consciousness." It even comes across in the emphases of Deweyan pragmatists on education. Psychologists of all stripes point out that this approach... (shrink)

Nobody who reads this article is likely to need convincing that there are bad political arguments. But, however many of them are bad, unless there are also some good ones, we can do nothing by reason in politics, there is no possibility of settling disputes rationally or in any other way except by fighting and there could be no ground either why we fight for any one cause rather than any other or why we should fight rather than make (...) peace or vice versa. But surprisingly little has been said by philosophers about this important type of argument. However, this omission is less surprising and less harmful than it might appear at first sight because all thoroughgoing political arguments are, I think, at bottom arguments as to what ought to be done and therefore ethical arguments in a wide sense of the word, and philosophers have certainly said a good deal about ethical arguments. However, it is well worth while treating political arguments separately, especially in these very political days, and considering their particular character. By political arguments I mean, not the abstract arguments of books on political philosophy, but the everyday concrete political arguments of the platform, the press and the meal-time conversation. What is their logical nature in so far as they are not mere fallacies or unsupported assertions, and can the philosopher qua philosopher say anything that will help in such discussions and contribute towards the replacement of bad arguments by good, a most desirable consummation and one the achievement of which in all countries would certainly have prevented the present war? (shrink)

It was widely believed among post-classical thinkers that the classical Mutakallimūn held that the cause of dependence of an effect on a cause was its origination, or a combination of origination and contingency, or its contingency on condition of its origination. Some post-classical thinkers, led by al-Sayyid al-Sharif al-Jurjānī, went further by interpreting Abu’l-Hasan al-Ashʿarī’s denial of the persistence of accidents was a consequence of his view that origination was the cause of dependence. This is (...) because the origination view entailed that the world was no longer in need of the Creator after its origination, and thus, him and his followers sought to deflect this consequence by holding that accidents do not persist, and since the persistence of substances was dependent on those accidents, and accidents do not persist more than one moment, those substances remained in need of the Creator for those accidents after their origination. This article seeks to investigate this analysis of the Shaykh al-Ashʿarī’s view, alongside the leading scholars of his school. After examining the original sources of classical Ashʿarī thinkers, along with the Baṣran Mu’tazila, and the texts of Ibn Sina, it becomes clear that the Ashꜥarīs did not hold that accidents did not persist in order to deflect that purported consequence. Indeed, it becomes clear that they did not hold that origination was the cause of dependence, but rather, that it was contingency. As for the Mu’tazila, they are explicit that the cause of dependence is origination, and that is based on their view on the reality of the nonexistent. Since essences are real in their state of nonexistence, they are not in need of a cause; and everything that obtains for those essences after they come into exist are entailments of that essence; thus, they only stand in need of a cause in their origination, that is, going from nonexistence into existence. Indeed, they are also explicit that effects do not need the Creator after their origination, and they clarified this through a comparison with a builder and a building. Indeed, the classical Ashꜥarīs criticized them for this, just as Ibn Sina did in the Ishārāt wa’l-tanbīhāt, al-Najāt, and al-Shifā. Thus, those post-classical scholars generalized the statement that origination is the cause of dependence to all classical mutakallimūn, and then they interpreted Ashʿarī’s motivation behind the denial of the persistence of accidents in accordance with that. The truth, however, is that his view on accidents is based on contingency, and that is because a substance is possible of persistence and possible of non-persistence, and therefore, it stands in need of cause to determine its state in the subsequent moment. That determination must entail something additional to the substance itself, otherwise, the effect is redundant. That additional property must be an accident, and since it is impossible for an accident to subsist in an accident, it is not possible for an accident to persist, because it is not receptive to the property which entails persistence; meanwhile, it is possible for substances, because they can sustain accidents. (shrink)

This study has two goals. The first is to identify three desiderata required for a successful defense of a version of nonreductive physicalism: semantic externalism, token‐identity between mental and physical events, and nonrelational type‐individuation of physical states. In this context, the paper also presents a refutation of recent challenges to content‐externalism by those who attempt to resuscitate internalism by focusing on narrow content associated with the fundamental phenomenology, rather than the intentionality, of mental states. The second goal is to defend (...) the token‐identity thesis from Tyler Burge's argument to the effect that token‐identity is incompatible with semantic externalism. An account is also offered as to why Burge's argument, albeit fallacious, might seem persuasive under a certain interpretation of possible worlds. (shrink)

Miracles are extraordinary events that occur in the hands of those who claim to be prophets and which cannot be repeated by others. By these miracles, the prophets prove to society that the truths they convey are of divine origin. The miracles bestowed upon prophets vary according to the scope of the message they deliver and the interests and relevance of the societies with which they deal. Accordingly, Islamic scholars have classified miracles into three groups. The miraculous events that appeal (...) to people’s senses and lead them to the truths they convey by captivating their astonishment are called emotional miracles. Such miracles are events that occur without cause by overcoming the laws of nature, which are in the realm of causes, through the direct intervention of Allāh. On the other hand, spiritual miracles are truths that arouse the interlocutor’s interest in moral conduct and rational conclusions rather than in his sensory perceptions. Since these truths are attained through contemplation, they are not confined to a particular time and place, as in the case of emotional miracles. Some Kalām scholars have also considered the Prophets’ revelational knowledge about events that have occurred in the past or will occur in the future as miracles. They have studied these events that a person could not bear in the past or could not predict for the future under the title of "The news miracle" Among these three types of miracles, scholars have considered spiritual miracles superior to the others both in terms of the breadth of their influence and their continuity. That Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is the last of the prophets, and that the teachings he received through revelation remain valid until the Day of Judgment necessitates that some of the miracles bestowed upon him must be of a quality that attracts the attention of all people. For this reason, Islamic scholars have placed the permanent miracle of Prophet Muhammad in the category of spiritual miracles. Scholars agree that his greatest miracle that has astonished all humankind is the Qurʾān. The clearest proof of this are the verses in the Qurʾān that challenge the opponents to bring a similar one. Allāh commands the disbelievers first to bring a similitude of the Qurʾān (al-Isrāʾ 17:88), then the equivalent of ten surahs (Hūd 11:13), and finally any surah of the Qurʾān (al-Baqara 2:23). Thus, the deniers are made aware of their inability to meet this challenge under gradually mitigating circumstances. Although scholars agree on the Qurʾānic miracle’s reality, they have expressed different views on its nature and essence. Thus, some scholars have argued that the miracle of the Qurʾān does not arise from some properties special to it but from the direct intervention of Allāh in human who have the ability to bring something like it. Most Islamic scholars, on the other hand, pointed out that the Qurʾān has aspects that exceed human powers in various fields, and they explained the inability to reply in the same vein to the Qurʾān due to its uniquenesses. Accordingly, some scholars have argued that miracles are perceptible, but it is never possible to define them. Other scholars, however, viewed miracles as an identifiable phenomenon and stated that the Qurʾān is an unusual and unique book in terms of verses. In this article, the questions Why was the Quran sent down as a miraculous Kalam with an attribute not found in other divine books and in what way did the Qurʾān make people weak to have a similar of it? were scrutinized, thus, some fundamental questions regarding the nature and character of iʿdjāz al-Qurʾān are elucidated. Since the topic deals with history and literature, scanning sources and data analysis were mainly used as methods in the research. The results can be summerized as follows: Although the Prophet was supported by both emotional and mental miracles in proving the Prophetic case, his greatest miracle is the Quran. The miracle of the Qurʾān is different from the other miracles, based on both the challenging verses and the Prophet's explanations of the miracles. The reason for this difference lies in the fact that the miracle of the Qurʾān is based on reason, unlike the other miracles which are emotional. Most Islamic scholars who deal with the miracle of the Qurʾān emphasize the issues of rhetoric, verse, style, and content. At this point, they emphasized that the Qurʾān has a unique expression and content that cannot be surpassed. (shrink)

One of the traditional metaphysical assumptions that Heidegger's Being and Time challenges is that the disembodied 'theoretical' standpoint has priority over the embodied 'practical' standpoint. Heidegger argues that any act of theoretical reflection is derivative of pre-reflective social practices that we are "always already" familiar with. Some contemporary critics insist they are continuing this project by exploring aspects of our concrete practices that Heidegger's analysis allegedly overlooks, particularly by focusing on the role that the body plays in everyday life. In (...) this dissertation, I address these criticisms and suggest that they contribute to Heidegger's project only on the ontic level and in no way diminish the original contribution of his philosophy. Heidegger is not overly concerned with regional investigations into the various ways that human beings meaningfully encounter things in the world. Heidegger is concerned with the being of beings , with fundamental ontology, which asks the question: "How come meaning?" Or, put in another way, "What are the conditions for the possibility of any meaning, any intelligibility whatsoever?" ;For Heidegger, human existence as Dasein is, ultimately, neither a body-subject with emotions, perceptions, instincts, or social habits nor a self-enclosed mind. Rather, Dasein is more like a 'mass' term, referring to a shared, unfolding background of cultural relations: norms, customs, institutions, historical events, and equipment. This public background is already "there," prior to the appearance of the body, and it is structured temporally, constituting a horizon, "clearing" , or "space of free play" in terms of which things can show up as meaning something to me. I argue that it is only by means of this prior clearing of intelligibility that I can make sense of my embodied practices and that bodies can initially emerge-into-presence as the kind of things that they are. (shrink)

No part ot Plato's writings has been more debated than the three similes in Books VI.-VII. of the Republic, and still there is a diversity of opinion about their meaning. I believe that most of these difficulties arise from certain assumptions about their purpose which need revision. The current view applies the Cave to the Line, as Plato seems to direct, and this application, which is itself attended by considerable difficulties, leads to an assimilation of the two figures till they (...) seem to have much the same content and purpose. Again, as this makes the lower line appear to be the phenomenal world, it is thought that the simile of the sun foreshadows the theme of the Line by hinting at a connexion between the intelligible and the sensible which is made more explicit in the Line. Thus the group of similes seem mainly intended to show the dependence of Becoming upon Being. This paper will argue that such a view depends upon the misrepresentation of the symbolism adopted by Plato, that two antithetical groups of symbols are confused with one another, and that symbols are even identified with antitypes. Owing to these misinterpretations the Form of the Good has been mistaken for a material cause; both the Line and the Cave have been thought to reveal Plato as embarrassed by a dualism between sense and intellect, and the purpose of the Cave in particular, since the error is cumulative, has been completely obscured. This paper will attempt to substitute for current accounts another interpretation which will relate the three similes closely with the political arguments of Book VI., and with the Platonic education which is set forth in close connexion with them. (shrink)

No part ot Plato's writings has been more debated than the three similes in Books VI.-VII. of the Republic, and still there is a diversity of opinion about their meaning. I believe that most of these difficulties arise from certain assumptions about their purpose which need revision. The current view applies the Cave to the Line, as Plato seems to direct, and this application, which is itself attended by considerable difficulties, leads to an assimilation of the two figures till they (...) seem to have much the same content and purpose. Again, as this makes the lower line appear to be the phenomenal world, it is thought that the simile of the sun foreshadows the theme of the Line by hinting at a connexion between the intelligible and the sensible which is made more explicit in the Line. Thus the group of similes seem mainly intended to show the dependence of Becoming upon Being. This paper will argue that such a view depends upon the misrepresentation of the symbolism adopted by Plato, that two antithetical groups of symbols are confused with one another, and that symbols are even identified with antitypes. Owing to these misinterpretations the Form of the Good has been mistaken for a material cause; both the Line and the Cave have been thought to reveal Plato as embarrassed by a dualism between sense and intellect, and the purpose of the Cave in particular, since the error is cumulative, has been completely obscured. This paper will attempt to substitute for current accounts another interpretation which will relate the three similes closely with the political arguments of Book VI., and with the Platonic education which is set forth in close connexion with them. (shrink)

IntroductionThe objectives of this study are to assess and compare differences in the intensity, frequency, and overall severity of moral distress among a diverse group of healthcare professionals.MethodsParticipants from within Baylor Health Care System completed an online seven-point Likert scale (range, 0 to 6) moral distress survey containing nine core clinical scenarios and additional scenarios specific to each participant’s discipline. Higher scores reflected greater intensity and/or frequency of moral distress.ResultsMore than 2,700 healthcare professionals responded to the survey (response rate 18.14 (...) percent); survey respondents represented multiple healthcare disciplines across a variety of settings in a single healthcare system. Intensity of moral distress was high in all disciplines, although the causes of highest intensity varied by discipline. Mean moral distress intensity for the nine core scenarios was higher among physicians than nurses, but the mean moral distress frequency was higher among nurses. Taking into account both intensity and frequency, the difference in mean moral distress score was statistically significant among the various disciplines. Using post hoc analysis, differences were greatest between nurses and therapists.ConclusionsMoral distress has previously been described as a phenomenon predominantly among nursing professionals. This first-of-its-kind multidisciplinary study of moral distress suggests the phenomenon is significant across multiple professional healthcare disciplines. Healthcare professionals should be sensitive to situations that create moral distress for colleagues from other disciplines. Policy makers and administrators should explore options to lessen moral distress and professional burnout that frequently accompanies it. (shrink)

In On Not Expecting Too Much from Narrative, Lamarque (2004) challenges theories of narrative identity. For while narrativity might tell us something of interest about our selves, the requirements for this would be so strong that theories of narrative identity would not be able to meet them. In contrast, he identifies minimal conditions for narrativity, so that our identity could be of a narrative nature as well. But in that case, the concept of narrativity would be so weak that (...) it would hardly be able to tell us anything about ourselves. I first examine Lamarque's criticism of narrative concepts of identity. He shows that stories, understood in a minimal sense, are not found but told and that they establish a temporal relationship between at least two events. I then examine the concept of teleological explanations of action. Considering the problem of deviant causal chains that causalists are confronted with, they are at least a serious alternative to causal explanations of action. By doing that, I also attempt to render plausible the irreducibility of teleological explanations of action to causal ones. Subsequently, I outline some features of teleological explanations of action. Finally, I defend the idea that teleological explanations of action are essentially narrative explanations of action because they meet Lamarque's minimal conditions of narratives. I then make the case that these kinds of narratives are not trivial with respect to our personal identity but, on the contrary, are the prerequisite under which we can perceive ourselves as rational agents. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine some foundational issues at the intersection of the metaphysics of agency and the metaphysics of causation. We explore three broad issues concerning the metaphysics of causation and intentional agency. We first consider the best way to think about the relationship between exercising agency and causation. Specifically, is intentional agency best identified with a causal process or should we take intentional agency to be either the causal initiation of some outcome or the effect of a (...) class='Hi'>cause? Next, we consider whether it is best to understand causation as a productive relation or as mere difference-making. Finally, we consider where to locate the effective causes in agency. We consider three alternatives: events, substances, and powers manifesting in processes. In examining the alternatives, we present reasons for taking intentional agency to be a productive causal process involving constellations of manifesting reciprocal causal powers collectively generating an outcome. (shrink)

Background If trials of therapeutic interventions are to serve society's interests, they must be of high methodological quality and must satisfy moral commitments to human subjects. The authors set out to develop a clinical - trials compendium in which standards for the ethical treatment of human subjects are integrated with standards for research methods. Methods The authors rank-ordered the world's nations and chose the 31 with >700 active trials as of 24 July 2008. Governmental and other authoritative entities of the (...) 31 countries were searched, and 1004 English-language documents containing ethical and/or methodological standards for clinical trials were identified. The authors extracted standards from 144 of those: 50 designated as ‘core’, 39 addressing trials of invasive procedures and a 5% sample of the remainder. As the integrating framework for the standards we developed a coherent taxonomy encompassing all elements of a trial's stages. Findings Review of the 144 documents yielded nearly 15 000 discrete standards. After duplicates were removed, 5903 substantive standards remained, distributed in the taxonomy as follows: initiation, 1401 standards, 8 divisions; design, 1869 standards, 16 divisions; conduct, 1473 standards, 8 divisions; analysing and reporting results, 997 standards, four divisions; and post-trial standards, 168 standards, 5 divisions. Conclusions The overwhelming number of source documents and standards uncovered in this study was not anticipated beforehand and confirms the extraordinary complexity of the clinical trials enterprise. This taxonomy of multinational ethical and methodological standards may help trialists and overseers improve the quality of clinical trials, particularly given the globalisation of clinical research. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The main purpose of the study is to examine Kant’s first experience in creating a methodology for determining the holistic, spiritual nature of man, firstly, in terms of identifying the range of phenomena that should be included in the analysis of the spiritual essence of man, and secondly, this experience may be indicative for identifying dead ends in the research of spirituality of modern philosophers. _Theoretical__ basis._ The study is based on the methodology of philosophical anthropology formulated (...) by M. Scheler, which, on the one hand, integrates the achievements of philosophy of life, phenomenology, existentialism and philosophical hermeneutics, and on the other hand, is based on the premise of the initial direct unity of the opposition of mental and physiological processes of human life. The basis for further expansion of the theoretical framework is the experience of spiritual practices of the Ancient East and religious practices of the Christian Middle Ages. Particularly noteworthy is the experience of modern psychotherapeutic practices, which, for all their diversity, have their roots in the depths of primitive beliefs and mysteries of ancient civilisations, and the tips of their branches reaching to the ideas of modern transpersonal psychology. _Originality__._ Firstly, the author uses M. Scheler’s ideas about the spiritual nature of man and the unity of his essential forces: corporeality, senses, feelings, thinking, values of worldview principles and the Absolute to analyse Kant’s anthropological concept. Secondly, Kant’s position on the way of describing human nature reveals contradictions. These contradictions are caused, on the one hand, by the prevailing mechanistic picture of the world, and, on the other hand, by the philosopher’s intuitive assumptions that did not follow from the provisions of his dualistic position (the concepts of mind and soul as used in Kant’s work "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View"). Thirdly, the author identifies those fragments of the said work where Kant assumes the presence of corporeality, but does not clearly formulate its role in building the integral nature of the spiritual man. _Conclusions__._ Immanuel Kant was one of the first to raise the issue of the primary study of human nature in comparison with issues of ontology, epistemology, morality, etc. However, the philosopher failed to create a concept of holistic human nature, the essence of which would be its spiritual core. Kant based his methodology of studying human nature on the dualistic opposition of the essential forces of man. This methodology was conditioned by the dominant mechanistic picture of the world. Kant’s researches in the field of morality, aesthetics, and science were carried out in the cognitive-theoretical plane, so they were unable to reach a true synthesis of the essential forces of man by their methodology. Such a synthesis is possible on the basis of spiritual practice. The results of the study of the experience of the achievements and mistakes of the outstanding philosopher in the study of human nature open up the possibility of further refinement and development of philosophical and anthropological methodology in understanding the spiritual nature of man as a whole through comprehension of the mechanism of spiritual practice and, on this basis, understanding of the phenomenon of spirituality in all historical forms of its manifestation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Author, AuthorBernard KnoxThe title of this essay is not a reference to that enthusiastic but misguided shout from his friends in the audience at the St. James Theatre in 1895 that brought a reluctant Henry James to the stage at the end of his play Guy Domville, only to be greeted by whistles, shouts, and insults from the irate denizens of the gallery, one of whom had somewhat spoiled (...) the dramatic effect of the actor’s climactic line—“I am the last of the Domvilles”—by shouting: “And a bloody good thing y’are!” My title is the rubric of an infuriating competition that appears every week in the pages of the London Times Literary Supplement; it offers three quotations, all dealing more or less with the same subject, and defies the reader to identify the authors. Since the fiends who concoct these puzzles have carefully avoided passages likely to turn up in anthologies, having, in fact, ransacked their authors’ lesser-known works for texts innocent of such clues as proper names, dates, or allusions to historical events, the reader unwise enough to take a hand in the game has to rely on indications of the personality of the author.Not, obviously, the historical, biographical personality, but the literary personality: the characteristic attitudes and concerns, the rhythms, tones, and levels of discourse, the literary individuality that enables us to distinguish a paragraph of Jane Austen from one of Henry James, and either of them from one of Ernest Hemingway, or the epic blank verse of Milton from that of Keats or Tennyson. This literary identity is now the target of academic assaults from many quarters, of which I propose to single out two in particular—the Roland Barthes-Derrida denial of authors’ identity or even of their existence, and the New [End Page 76] Historicism, which confines that identity to the stringent limitations of the author’s time and place.The first aberration treats the author’s work as a “text,” material for the discovery of intertextuality, subtext, and—a word that I have not seen in print but that, if not yet born, is surely close to delivery from the womb of the goddess Terminologia—metatext, which, on the analogy of “metatheater,” would denote a text discussing its own textuality. In the deconstruction of the text the author disappears; Barthes in fact proclaimed the “death of the author.” But though such theories are usually thought of as French products of the Sixties and Seventies, their origins can be discerned in much earlier work done by Americans in the Forties, the years that saw the birth of that New Criticism which Norman Fruman recalls in his short history of our association, reasserting its basic principle: that “there should be a primary focus on literature as literature and not as something else.” I am myself a child—an aging child—of the New Criticism; the first article I ever published had a title that sounds like a parody of the typical New Critical title—“The Serpent and the Flame.” The editors of the American Journal of Philology, who reluctantly accepted the article after several unsuccessful attempts to get me to tone it down, felt constrained to add to the title: “Patterns of Imagery in the Second Book of the Aeneid.”But there was one aspect of the New Criticism that disturbed me: the influential idea, expounded by a formidable member of the Yale English department, William Wimsatt, called the Intentional Fallacy, which proclaimed that “the design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.” Though this pronouncement was hedged about with many limitations and provisos it still seemed to me to give rein to freewheeling interpretations that eased the acceptance of the radical hijacking of the author’s work by Derrida, Barthes, Lacan, and hoc genus omne.I was especially disturbed by this doctrine because, as a classical scholar, I had been very much concerned, as is every member of our discipline, with authorial intention at the basic level—the often vexed question not of what impression the author sought to make on the... (shrink)

It is a seemingly innocuous fact that people learn from the testimony of authorities. Children learn from parents, students learn from teachers, and laypeople learn from experts. What makes this appearance a little less innocent, however, is that some of these same people would have believed sources of testimony that are not authoritative, e.g., unreliable peers and charlatans. Since such hearers of testimony could form as many false beliefs as true ones, they appear to be unreliable consumers of testimony. (...) Therefore, we might be tempted to question whether such hearers really do learn from authorities on account of their apparent unreliability. The standard response to this conflict of intuitions (henceforth referred to as “Goldberg’s puzzle”) is to affirm the reliability of the consumers of testimony by excluding problematic speakers from the type of testimonial exchange in which the hearer is engaged. I will argue that the standard response is ad hoc because it does not provide a principled basis on which to identify the type of testimonial exchange in which the hearer is engaged. In order to improve the standard response, I will argue that conceiving of the relevant testimonial exchanges as achievements of joint agency requires holding fixed the practical identities of both hearer and speaker across the relevant worlds that are being used to evaluate the reliability of the testimonial exchange according to a standard possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals and that such a characterization of the modal space provides a principled basis for solving Goldberg’s puzzle. (shrink)

Attempts to ‘naturalize’ phenomenology challenge both traditional phenomenology and traditional approaches to cognitive science. They challenge Edmund Husserl’s rejection of naturalism and his attempt to establish phenomenology as a foundational transcendental discipline, and they challenge efforts to explain cognition through mainstream science. While appearing to be a retreat from the bold claims made for phenomenology, it is really its triumph. Naturalized phenomenology is spearheading a successful challenge to the heritage of Cartesian dualism. This converges with the reaction against Cartesian thought (...) within science itself. Descartes divided the universe between res cogitans, thinking substances, and res extensa, the mechanical world. The latter won with Newton and we have, in most of objective science since, literally lost our mind, hence our humanity. Despite Darwin, biologists remain children of Newton, and dream of a grand theory that is epistemologically complete and would allow lawful entailment of the evolution of the biosphere. This dream is no longer tenable. We now have to recognize that science and scientists are within and part of the world we are striving to comprehend, as proponents of endophysics have argued, and that physics, biology and mathematics have to be reconceived accordingly. Interpreting quantum mechanics from this perspective is shown to both illuminate conscious experience and reveal new paths for its further development. In biology we must now justify the use of the word “function”. As we shall see, we cannot prestate the ever new biological functions that arise and constitute the very phase space of evolution. Hence, we cannot mathematize the detailed becoming of the biosphere, nor write differential equations for functional variables we do not know ahead of time, nor integrate those equations, so no laws “entail” evolution. The dream of a grand theory fails. In place of entailing laws, a post-entailing law explanatory framework is proposed in which Actuals arise in evolution that constitute new boundary conditions that are enabling constraints that create new, typically unprestatable, Adjacent Possible opportunities for further evolution, in which new Actuals arise, in a persistent becoming. Evolution flows into a typically unprestatable succession of Adjacent Possibles. Given the concept of function, the concept of functional closure of an organism making a living in its world, becomes central. Implications for patterns in evolution include historical reconstruction, and statistical laws such as the distribution of extinction events, or species per genus, and the use of formal cause, not efficient cause, laws. (shrink)

This paper is about the differences between probabilities and beliefs and why reasoning should not always conform to probability laws. Probability is defined in terms of urn models from which probability laws can be derived. This means that probabilities are expressed in rational numbers, they suppose the existence of veridical representations and, when viewed as parts of a probability model, they are determined by a restricted set of variables. Moreover, probabilities are subjective, in that they apply to classes of events (...) that have been deemed (by someone) to be equivalent, rather than to unique events. Beliefs on the other hand are multifaceted, interconnected with all other beliefs, and inexpressible in their entirety. It will be argued that there are not sufficient rational numbers to characterise beliefs by probabilities and that the idea of a veridical set of beliefs is questionable. The concept of a complete probability model based on Fisher's notion of identifiable subsets is outlined. It is argued that to be complete a model must be known to be true. This can never be the case because whatever a person supposes to be true must be potentially modifiable in the light of new information. Thus to infer that an individual's probability estimate is biased it is necessary not only to show that the estimate differs from that given by a probability model, but also to assume that this model is complete, and completeness is not empirically verifiable. It follows that probability models and Bayes theorem are not necessarily appropriate standards for people's probability judgements. The quality of a probability model depends on how reasonable it is to treat some existing uncertainty as if it were equivalent to that in a particular urn model and this cannot be determined empirically. Bias can be demonstrated in estimates of proportions of finite populations such as in the false consensus effect. However the modification of beliefs by ad hoc methods like Tversky and Kahneman's heuristics can be justified, even though this results in biased judgements. This is because of pragmatic factors such as the cost of obtaining and taking account of additional information which are not included even in a complete probability model. Finally, an analogy is drawn between probability models and geometric figures. Both idealisations are useful but qualitatively inadequate characterisations of nature. A difference between the two is that the size of any error can be limited in the case of the geometric figure in a way that is not possible in a probability model. (shrink)