In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionWilliam J. ConnellOne of the more unusual works in the corpus of the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla is the Oratio in principio sui studii, on the relation between Latin letters and the Christian faith. The speech was written and delivered in October 1455, toward the end of Valla’s life, as a lecture to inaugurate the academic year at the University of Rome where he had held the chair in (...) rhetoric since 1450. It was traditional at Rome to hold such an address each year not only to encourage the assembled students and faculty in their studies but also to thank the papacy for its support of the university, the Studium Urbis. For this reason Valla’s speech ends with customary words praising Pope Calixtus III for having increased the stipends of the lecturers in the university, even though, notwithstanding some remarkable kindnesses to Valla himself, Calixtus’s reputation was not that of a friend to scholarship. Valla’s Schoolyear Inaugural was not lengthy: it can only have lasted fifteen minutes. Nor is there indication that anyone was displeased with it. In fact, that is precisely what is oddest about the Inaugural, for throughout his career Valla had shown himself to be the sort of person who seized on such occasions to make polemical arguments. We read the speech—and it is possible that his audience also listened to it this way—expecting with each step that Valla will let fly a critical or unorthodox statement, but that never happens. 1Beginning with his earliest formal work, a comparison of Cicero and Quintilian written in 1428 and now lost, in which the humanist argued against Cicero on behalf of Quintilian, Valla seemed to delight in challenging established authorities. 2 His next important work, an attack on Bartolus of [End Page 1] Sassoferrato and the scholastic method of contemporary jurists, resulted in his forced departure from the University of Pavia. 3 A continuing combativeness is illustrated in subsequent writings, reaching an apogee in the work on the Donation. Even when Valla was developing another writer’s idea, he had a consistent way of pushing the argument to a daring extreme. This, as Riccardo Fubini argues below, is what Valla did in the De donatione, a work Fubini suggests relied more heavily on Nicholas of Cusa’s De concordantia catholica than hitherto realized, but written to promote an agenda far more radical than that of Cusanus. One of the surest indications of Valla’s brilliance as a polemicist is the fact that seventy years after his death humanists of the caliber of Agostino Steuco, the subject of Ronald K. Delph’s essay in this number, were still eager to take up cudgels against him.Valla paid a price for initiating so many disputes. In 1444, when he was called before the Inquisition in Naples after the attack on the Donation of Constantine, Valla was made to answer charges against not only that work, but also against the De vero bono for its Epicureanism, the De libero arbitrio for its determinism, the De professione religiosorum for its criticism of religious orders, and the Repastinatio totius dialectice et philosophie for various unorthodox statements, especially concerning the Trinity. This last work was the humanist’s most ambitious project, and he seems to have been aware of its explosive quality, since he alluded to a “peril to his life” should it be published. 4The 1455 Schoolyear Inaugural shows no trace of the risks that Valla took in his other writings, of his polemical temperament, or of his past disagreements with the Church. With style and vigor the speech argues that the Church deserves great thanks and praise for having ensured the survival [End Page 2] of Latin letters after the collapse of the Empire. This may seem a notable change of heart in the author who had written the oration On the Falsely Believed and Forged Donation of Constantin—a text which always seems to be lurking in the background of the Inaugural but which finds no explicit reference there. Given the proximity of Valla’s argument to the well-worn medieval theme of the translatio studii, his argument could hardly have been... (shrink)

This article sheds light on a relatively unexplored aspect of the Northern Territories dispute by examining the views of residents in Nemuro -- the symbolic frontline in Japan’s Northern Territories Reversion Movement (NTRM). The NTRM began in this northern periphery as a movement of divergent attitudes but was soon coopted by the Japanese government for political reasons. Local opposition to the government’s four island en bloc policy existed in some quarters but was largely kept in check by state largesse. However, (...) as a result of demographic and socioeconomic changes, dissent is slowly emerging in Nemuro. There are signs of an emerging disjuncture between national policy and local aspirations. This disjuncture has both theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, this paper is congruent with politico-institutional arguments emphasizing the impact of the regulatory regime in shaping civil society organizations. From a policy perspective, public opinion in Nemuro indicates a potential avenue for compromise in Tokyo’s negotiating strategy, although pressure for change is unlikely to emerge from the bureaucratized NTRM. (shrink)

The paper argues that one of the reasons the suppression of scientific dissent during the Covid pandemic has been so severe was because the dominant scientific Covid narrative has been turned into a political myth, i.e. a narrative mobilizing groups in support of key moral values. Taking the example of Covid vaccination, I show the key values with which it became linked in Czechia. Questioning vaccination came to be seen as endangering these values, which made scientific dissent appear (...) as particularly dangerous. I further analyse how this schematic discourse dealt with “free-vax” scientists, who were not against Covid vaccination as such but only against its blanket application. I show that their discreditation was mainly carried out by various fact-checking NGOs or social media influencers, who attempted to delegitimize them not by scientific arguments but rather by associating them with more dubious groups of social actors, or labelling their views as “disinformation”. This discrediting strategy was largely successful, but it also had some undesirable social and political backfire effects, in that it pushed some of the free-vaxxers out of the liberal democratic mainstream and forced them to seek alliance with more anti-systemic segments of the population in attempts at political resistance. (shrink)

A democratic society does not embody a permanent and internally consistent set of values but attempts to accommodate disagreement between incommensurable values. One of the purposes of the law is to manage such disagreement by ensuring that disputes are settled in a way that advances the interests of stability without foreclosing options. In this respect the function of the formal dissenting judgment has been neglected in the English literature. By contrast there is a rich US literature which reveals an (...) ambivalent attitude to the practice of dissent. The article discusses the nature of the disagreements that are predominant in dissenting judgments. It claims that the practise of dissent follows the development of democracy and that the majority of dissents in courts of last resort raise legitimate disagreement about fundamental incommensurable values. These concern disagreements between deontological and consequentialist values, between different conceptions of the legislative powers of the judiciary and between principle and pragmatism. Because the outcome of an appeal is contingent, the dissent may be as important as the majority in identifying the choices to be made and signalling the principles that are immanent in the law. The legal and political basis of the right to publish a dissent is discussed and arguments for and against the publication of dissents considered with the conclusion that constraints on the right to dissent would be self-defeating. (shrink)

This collection of essays examines the ways in which disputes and controversies about the application of scientific knowledge are resolved. Four concrete examples of public controversy are considered in detail: the efficacy of Laetrile, the classification of homosexuality as a disease, the setting of safety standards in the workplace, and the utility of nuclear energy as a source of power. The essays in this volume show that debates about these cases are not confined to matters of empirical fact. Rather, (...) as is seen with most scientific and technical controversies, they focus on and are structured by complex ethical, economic, and political interests. Drs. Engelhardt and Caplan have brought together a distinguished group of scholars from the sciences and humanities, who sketch a theory of scientific controversy and attempt to provide recommendations about the ways in which both scientists and the public ought to seek more informed resolutions of highly contentious issues in science and technology. Scientific Controversies is offered as a contribution to the better understanding of the roles of both science and nonscientific interests in disputes and controversies pertaining to science and technology. (shrink)

Background Contemporary societies are rife with moral disagreement, resulting in recalcitrant disputes on matters of public policy. In the context of ongoing bioethical controversies, are uncompromising attitudes rooted in beliefs about the nature of moral truth?Methods To answer this question, we conducted both exploratory and confirmatory studies, with both a convenience and a nationally representative sample (total N = 1501), investigating the link between people’s beliefs about moral truth (their metaethics) and their beliefs about moral value (their normative ethics).Results (...) Across various bioethical issues (e.g., medically-assisted death, vaccine hesitancy, surrogacy, mandatory organ conscription, or genetically modified crops), consequentialist attitudes were associated with weaker beliefs in an objective moral truth. This association was not explained by domain-general reflectivity, theism, personality, normative uncertainty, or subjective knowledge.Conclusions We find a robust link between the way people characterize prescriptive disagreements and their sensibility to consequences. In addition, both societal consensus and personal conviction contribute to objectivist beliefs, but these effects appear to be asymmetric, i.e., stronger for opposition than for approval. (shrink)

This paper reports the first case in which a linguist served as an expert witness in Hong Kong, a former British colony that has operated as a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1997. The dispute was on the meaning of the political slogan “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times”, which was widely adopted during the 2019–2020 protests. The keywords “liberate” and “revolution” are smoking gun evidence for the prosecution in a large cluster of (...) cases that involve sedition law and national security offences. Section I of the paper provides background information about a case the author was involved in, which was concerned with whether the slogan was seditious. Section II describes the analysis conducted, which concludes that the slogan as a whole refers to a need to rectify a problem and to return to the original, a more desirable state of affairs for Hong Kong, without specifying what problem there is and what the desirable state of affairs looks like. Section III highlights some critical issues in the analysis, discussing challenges faced and ethical questions for the expert witness. Section IV is a postscript that briefly describes the outcome of the case. (shrink)

Dissent has its own special place in art education. It has two stereotypical, polarized faces. The first is a classical institution modelled on Italian and French academies. As official places, they aimed at elevating art to the rank of science and making it an expression and instrument of power. The opposite image of the school is an oasis of intellectual freedom, a space for inventiveness, a place for applying unusual teaching methods and organizing the academic community. The most famous (...) examples are avant-garde acctivities. This historical division is unreliable in fact. Dissent or even rebellion can be an instrument of morality and principles that could be followed. Quite unexpectedly, a peculiar anarchism can be found in the first art academy run by the Carracci. The name ‘academy’ popularized among the Italian humanists and Marsilio Ficinno, drew attention to the informal nature of scientific associations, opposing the fossilized formula of the university existing since the Middle Ages. It is surprising then that Joseph Beuys just created the Free International University. The very name of school and its understanding indicate a significant dichotomy not only in art education, but also in art theory. The point is not that the model of education has simply loosened over time. The above-mentioned facts reflect great disputes about the essence of art, about its relationship with science, everyday life, and practical application. An analysis of specific programs will allow us to see the sense of the mutual connections between rebellion and principles in modernizing artistic education. (shrink)

A MAJOR THESIS OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY is that its theory of justice, which incorporates strong rights to negative liberty, must be prior to and independent of a theory of the good. This priority is necessary, according to liberal theorists, in view of the requirement that any adequate theory accommodate a plurality of contending views of the good, no one of which is capable of eliciting public assent to it. Recent critics of liberalism have disputed this thesis, maintaining instead that (...) there is indeed an objective good, rather than a plurality of contending goods, which at least seriously compromises and possibly undermines the negative liberty with which liberals traditionally associated their theories. Variously called communitarians, virtue theorists, or republicans, these critics have presented an important challenge to contemporary liberalism whether of the individualist or welfare state variety. (shrink)

J. L. Austin was one of the more influential British philosophers of his time, due to his rigorous thought, extraordinary personality, and innovative philosophical method. According to John Searle, he was both passionately loved and hated by his contemporaries. Like Socrates, he seemed to destroy all philosophical orthodoxy without presenting an alternative, equally comforting, orthodoxy. -/- Austin is best known for two major contributions to contemporary philosophy: first, his ‘linguistic phenomenology’, a peculiar method of philosophical analysis of the concepts and (...) ways of expression of everyday language; and second, speech act theory, the idea that every use of language carries a performative dimension (in the well-known slogan, “to say something is to do something”). Speech act theory has had consequences and import in research fields as diverse as philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of law, linguistics, artificial intelligence and feminist philosophy. -/- This article describes Austin’s linguistic method and his speech act theory, and it describes the original contributions he made to epistemology and philosophy of action. It closes by focusing on two main developments of speech act theory─the dispute between conventionalism and intentionalism, and the debate on free speech, pornography, and censorship. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY BEGINS IN WONDER--so says Socrates in the Theaetetus-- but where does it end? The Theaetetus itself ends in such a puzzling way as to be the cause of apparently interminable dispute. Although its theme is the nature of knowledge, neither Socrates nor his interlocutors ever present a definition that gains unanimous approval. The definitions of knowledge as perception, as true opinion and as true opinion with an account are all rejected. This fact has understandably inclined most interpreters to maintain (...) that the dialogue fails to reach its explicit goal. Nevertheless, Socrates' attitude about the apparent failure of his conversation with Theaetetus is markedly distinct from his express attitude in those early dialogues with which the Theaetetus is often compared. Whereas early dialogues conclude with self-deprecation and exhortation to continue the quest, the Theaetetus concludes in satisfaction, indifferent to the possibility of further study. As midwife Socrates has successfully delivered Theaetetus of his phantom offspring; beyond that he can do no more. Thus the apparently negative conclusions of the dialogue are at least not negatively intoned, and readers can barely avoid the suspicion of having missed something. One response is to argue that an authorized definition of knowledge can be found by a careful reexamination of the very arguments Socrates rejects. But the fact that our suspicion is aroused by a dramatic consideration commends a search for resolution through the drama, however that might happen to bear on the problem of knowledge. (shrink)

According to Miranda Fricker, a hermeneutical injustice occurs when there is a deficit in our shared tools of social interpretation, such that marginalized social groups are at a disadvantage in making sense of their distinctive and important experiences. Critics have claimed that Fricker's account ignores or precludes a phenomenon I call hermeneutical dissent, where marginalized groups have produced their own interpretive tools for making sense of those experiences. I clarify the nature of hermeneutical injustice to make room for hermeneutical (...) dissent, clearing up the structure of the collective hermeneutical resource and the fundamental harm of hermeneutical injustice. I then provide a more nuanced account of the hermeneutical resources in play in instances of hermeneutical injustice, enabling six species of the injustice to be distinguished. Finally, I reflect on the corrective virtue of hermeneutical justice in light of hermeneutical dissent. (shrink)

Disturbed by these acrimonious arguments, the authors - former colleagues and university-press board members - embarked on an ambitious project to reexamine a number of major literary and philosophical works dealing with the liberal arts and education. With their discussions ranging from Plato to Rousseau, from Cicero to Vico, from Erasmus to Matthew Arnold, Sousa and Weinsheimer offer not a history of education philosophy but an examination of the present.

Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan JOHN DEIGH HOBBES'S ETHICS teaches the ways of self-preservation. Its lessons are arranged in a system of rules that Hobbes understood to be the laws of nature. These two themes, self-preservation and natural law, have inspired opposing inter- pretations of Hobbes's text. The historically dominant and still prevailing interpretation, which develops the former theme, is that Hobbes's ethics is a form of egoism. A later and less popular interpretation, which develops the latter theme, is (...) that his ethics is a system of absolutes, "a strict deontology. ''1 These two interpretations represent a dispute between what I will call ortho- doxy and dissent in Hobbes scholarship. The dispute chiefly turns on two questions: What is the basis of Hobbes's ethics? and How stringent are the rules it comprises?' Orthodoxy takes Hobbes's ethics to be based on his moral psychology, specifically, his theory of motivation. That theory, on the orthodox reading, is thoroughly egocentric. It holds that all voluntary action springs from self- interest.3 Hence, on this reading, one can attribute to Hobbes the view that a I am grateful to Ed Curley, Bernard Gert, Richard Kraut, Connie Rosati, and Ira Singer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. ' A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," Philosophy a 3 : 406-24, esp. 408. ' One can find the orthodox interpretation in Henry Sidgwick's Outline of the History.. (shrink)

Dissent and Philosophy in the Middle Ages offers scholars of Dante's Divine Comedy an integral understanding of the political, philosophical, and religious context of the medieval masterwork. First penned in French by Ernest L. Fortin, one of America's foremost thinkers in the fields of philosophy and theology, Dissidence et philosophie au moyen-âge brings to light the complexity of Dante's thought and art, and its relation to the central themes of Western civilization. Available in English for the first time through (...) this superb translation by Marc A. LePain, Dissent and Philosophy will make a supremely important contribution to the discussion of Dante as poet, theologian, and philosopher. (shrink)

Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's Leviathan JOHN DEIGH HOBBES'S ETHICS teaches the ways of self-preservation. Its lessons are arranged in a system of rules that Hobbes understood to be the laws of nature. These two themes, self-preservation and natural law, have inspired opposing inter- pretations of Hobbes's text. The historically dominant and still prevailing interpretation, which develops the former theme, is that Hobbes's ethics is a form of egoism. A later and less popular interpretation, which develops the latter theme, is (...) that his ethics is a system of absolutes, "a strict deontology. ''1 These two interpretations represent a dispute between what I will call ortho- doxy and dissent in Hobbes scholarship. The dispute chiefly turns on two questions: What is the basis of Hobbes's ethics? and How stringent are the rules it comprises?' Orthodoxy takes Hobbes's ethics to be based on his moral psychology, specifically, his theory of motivation. That theory, on the orthodox reading, is thoroughly egocentric. It holds that all voluntary action springs from self- interest.3 Hence, on this reading, one can attribute to Hobbes the view that a I am grateful to Ed Curley, Bernard Gert, Richard Kraut, Connie Rosati, and Ira Singer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. ' A. E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," Philosophy a 3 : 406-24, esp. 408. ' One can find the orthodox interpretation in Henry Sidgwick's Outline of the History... (shrink)

The article discusses the status and role of politics — in its various facets — in the pragmatic sociology of critique. We focus on a number of different dimensions of politics — politics-as-justification, politics-as-distribution, politics-as-constitution, and politics-as-defiance — that can said to be of importance for a pragmatic sociology of critique, but that have not all been taken up equally in this approach. We situate pragmatic sociology in a tradition of thought that views politics as emerging in the settlement of (...) disputes over differences without resorting to violence. However, we argue that pragmatic sociology tends to ignore questions of the constitution of politics, and suggest that one way of bringing the foundational aspect upfront is by conceptualizing and studying defiance, including forms of explicit (dissent) and implicit critique (resistance) of the existing order. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the role of conscience in medical practice. If the conscientious practice of individual practitioners cannot be defended or is incoherent or unreasonable on its own merits, then there is little reason to support conscience protection and to argue about its place in the current medical landscape. If this is the case, conscience protection should be abandoned. To the contrary, I argue that conscience protection should not be abandoned. My argument takes the form of an analysis (...) of an essential feature of the conscience dissenter’s argument, the role of disagreement within “the medical profession.” Conscience dissenters make certain assumptions within their arguments about the profession, disagreements within the professions, and how such disagreement should be adjudicated. If it is the case that these assumptions are accurate reflections of the current medical landscape, then the advocate of conscience protection has one less leg to stand on. I aim to show that this is not the case and that the assumptions of the conscience dissenter are not only mistaken but are mistakes of significant magnitude, so significant as to raise serious questions about the merit of their position. If the argument in this paper is sound, then, at the very least, the conversation over conscience protection in medicine, in particular, and health care, in general, must continue. (shrink)

Dissent and Philosophy in the Middle Ages offers scholars of Dante's Divine Comedy an integral understanding of the political, philosophical, and religious context of the medieval masterwork. First penned in French by Ernest L. Fortin, one of America's foremost thinkers in the fields of philosophy and theology, Dissidence et philosophie au moyen-%ge brings to light the complexity of Dante's thought and art, and its relation to the central themes of Western civilization. Available in English for the first time through (...) this superb translation by Marc A. LePain, Dissent and Philosophy will make a supremely important contribution to the discussion of Dante as poet, theologian, and philosopher. (shrink)

This article examines environmental communication from within an enquiry perspective. It is argued that dissent is a vital part of any enquiry into environmental issues. Aspects of Charles S. Peirce's semiotic logic are introduced and discussed with reference to environmental communication and dissent. Environmental problems are shown to be at root disconnections between the sign use of humans and the sign use of an environment. Such disconnections arise when dissenting voices from an environment are ignored, misinterpreted, or suppressed. (...) It is concluded that a semiotic approach to environmental communication offers a valuable insight into how dissent functions to resolve environmental disconnections. (shrink)

Philosophy: Dissent and Nonconformity forms part of the Doctrine and Devotion trilogy. The book represents the first attempt to tell the story of those who taught and wrote philosophy outside the Anglican-Oxbridge Academy. Dr. Sell investigates the place give to philosophy in Dissenting academies and Nonconformist colleges between 1689 and 1920. During this time there were over one hundred such academies and colleges and he examines each of them in turn. The beliefs and views held by the philosophers are (...) also examined in detail. This is both an important and an engaging book on a fascinating subject, and will appeal to those interested in nonconformist history and the history of philosophy in academic institutions. (shrink)

The author analyses the role of dissent and anarchic thinking in modern legal culture. Such notions traditionally convey opposition to established authority and are essential for all free and open societies. In fact, the right to dissent and practising anarchic beliefs exist insofar as a true right of confrontation is guaranteed by the legal system. In this perpective, the author suggests some correspondences between dialogic thinking, that Peirce says allows all ideas to grow semiotically, and the development of (...) the role of dissent in the legal culture. Generally speaking, the question concerns the well‐known Peircean dichotomy between chance/spontaneity and lawfulness. This thesis is exemplified in detail looking at the history of US law, at its outset the direct consequence of a legal counter‐cultural movement against British common law. Moreover, the possibility of dissent is written into the United States constitution. At least three modes of dissent are built into American law as legal counter activities: (1) voices of nondominant religions, (2) dissent within the legal system, e.g., dialogue among and within the courts, (3) challenging the legal system sanctioned by the right to civil disobedience and by other forms of reaction against an oppressive government. (shrink)

Requests by patients or their families for treatment which the patient's physician considers to be "inappropriate" are becoming more frequent than refusals of treatment which the physician considers appropriate. Such requests are often based on the patient's religious beliefs about the attributes of God (sovereignty, omnipotence), the attributes of persons (sanctity of life), or the individual's personal relationship with God (communication, commands, etc). We present four such cases and discuss some of the basic religious tenets of the three Abrahamic faith (...) traditions as they relate to such requests. We suggest that religious reasons for requesting "inappropriate" treatment are "special" and deserve serious consideration. We offer guidance to assist clinicians and clinical ethicists as they attempt to resolve these conflicts, emphasising the importance of understanding the religious beliefs of the patient/surrogate and suggesting the assistance of a religious interpreter. We suggest open discussion with patients and families of both the clinical situation and the theological basis for these requests. We also suggest that clinicians use additional religious doctrines or principles from patients' own traditions to balance the reasons behind the requests. We conclude that most persistent requests for "inappropriate" treatment should be honoured. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophy, Dissent, and Nonconformity, 1689–1920Bruce KuklickAlan P. F. Sell. Philosophy, Dissent, and Nonconformity, 1689–1920. Cambridge: James Clark & Co., 2004. Pp. 296. Cloth, £50.00This is a competent, clearly written, and authoritative exploration of its topic, in some respects a labor of love, for the author is both a pastor and a student of theology. Sell comprehensively examines the proliferation of dissenting academies and nonconformist colleges of (...) England and Wales, with some excursions into the Scottish scene, from the Toleration Act of 1689 through the early twentieth century. For the 230 years of this study, a great variety of schools, many of which had only a brief moment of existence, and most of which were barely funded, offered training for the ministers of over a dozen protestant denominations in Britain. Often one man provided instruction in subjects as diverse as mathematics, science, and literature—as well as religious fields.Sell does not focus on ministerial training or even theology, but the way in which the nonconforming religious élite expounded on and was taught philosophy. Thus, one sees how a diverse group that surely had sectarian needs in mind was also interested in grasping how thinkers outside its belief system approached basic problems of human existence. Over time Descartes and other continental rationalists, Locke and the Cambridge Platonists, Kant and Hegel, and the nineteenth-century British idealists were taught by the dissenting professoriate. In summarizing its interpretation, Sell presents a history of modern Anglo-European philosophy as it was refracted in the minds of (some) English-speaking Protestants. Their emphases are not unexpected: empiricism is somewhat devalued, and rationalistic and a priori modes of thinking perhaps inflated. The ethical implications of epistemology and metaphysics are most carefully explicated, and what is taken to be most strategic for [End Page 211] Reformed theology is underscored. Overall, if one is tempted to generalize (as Sell himself does not), the positions reached are credible and not out of line with the philosophical cutting edge of each era.For the most part the dissenters were not themselves creative philosophers of the first rank, but Sell rightly puts forward (206) a short list of thinkers at these schools who have genuine claims to merit, and my own very short list would include Richard Price, James Martineau, and Robert Mackintosh.The author uses diverse strategies to give readers a sense of the effort of these mostly forgotten men. To some extent the book is a biographical compendium, with brief sections on individual or paired thinkers. But Sell also offers coverage by denomination, and he adds a series of discussions by topics—on an assortment of recurring dilemmas in moral philosophy and on apologetics. A final and most useful feature of the book is a trio of indices, in addition to the very full notes and a complete bibliography, mainly of the writings of the many authors cited. Two of the indices are standard, but helpful, lists of persons and topics; the third one is a compendium of all the academies Sell treats, as well as their denominational affiliation, and the duration of their existences.Philosophy, Dissent, and Nonconformity has the defects of its virtues. It is encyclopedic in nature, available for reference but unlikely to be read as a synthetic book, except by devotees of a certain kind of historical philosophical theology. The author also presumes his readers are unlikely to tackle the volume unless they have a prior attraction. That is, the book is written without much contextual explication, and attention to the needs of the non-specialist certainly would have made the volume of wider interest. The work is still relatively brief, under 300 pages, and because of its character, I would have liked to have seen a series of maps that pinpointed the whereabouts of the dissenting schools, giving the reader a visual sense of when and where they arose and declined among particular denominations, and that informed us of what the relations were among the successive professors who defined the learning.Bruce KuklickUniversity of PennsylvaniaCopyright © 2005 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

For many decades now it has been maintained that Indian civilization has shown an adsence of dissent and protest. This has become so axiomatic on the Indian past that those who have occasionally questioned it have been labelled as anti-Indian. Such a view stems from a nationalistic over-simplification of Indian society as a vision of harmonious social relations in a land of plenty. Superimposed on this were the preconceptions of idealist philosophy that dissent required materialistic underpinnings, and philosophical (...) themes of materialism in Indian thought have generally received short shrift from contemporary commentators. It is only in recent years that some attempts are being made to suggest that neither materialist philosophy nor dissent were wholly marginal to Indian society. It still remains fashionable in some circles to deny the opposition between forms of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the ideological traditions of the past, arguing that Indian religions were not based on dogma. Yet the history of groups identified as having a community of religious beliefs, rituals and behaviour, among Buddhists, Jainas, Vaisnavas, Saivas and Tantrics, is strewn with sectarian dogmatism which found expression not only in inter-religious but also in inter-sectarian rivalries, sometimes of a violent kind. (shrink)

Let me begin with a reminder of the crude but intuitive distinction from which the relativistic impulse springs. Any of the following claims would be likely to find both supporters and dissenters: That snails are delicious That cockroaches are disgusting That marital infidelity is alright provided nobody gets hurt That a Pacific sunset trumps any Impressionist canvas and perhaps That Philosophy is pointless if it is not widely intelligible That the belief that there is life elsewhere in the universe is (...) justified That death is nothing to fear Disputes about such claims may or may not involve quite strongly held convictions and attitudes. Sometimes they may be tractable disputes: there may be some other matter about which one of the disputing parties is mistaken or ignorant, where such a mistake or ignorance can perhaps be easily remedied, with the result of a change of heart about the original claim; or there may be a type of experience of which one of the disputing parties is innocent, and such that the effect of initiation into that experience is, once again, a change of view. (shrink)

Why do American ghettos persist? Decades after Moynihan’s report on the black family and the Kerner Commission’s investigations of urban disorders, deeply disadvantaged black communities remain a disturbing reality. Scholars and commentators today often identify some factor―such as single motherhood, joblessness, or violent street crime―as the key to solving the problem and recommend policies accordingly. But, Tommie Shelby argues, these attempts to “fix” ghettos or “help” their poor inhabitants ignore fundamental questions of justice and fail to see the urban poor (...) as moral agents responding to injustice. (shrink)

Organisms can be treated as optimizers when there is consensus among their genes about what is best to be done, but genomic consensus is often lacking, especially in interactions among kin because kin share some genes but not others. Grafen adopts a majoritarian perspective in which an individual’s interests are identified with the interests of the largest coreplicon of its genome, but genomic imprinting and recombination factionalize the genome so that no faction may predominate in some interactions among kin. Once (...) intragenomic conflicts are recognized, the individual organism can be conceptualized as an arbiter among competing interests within a collective. Organismal adaptation can be recognized without phenotypes being optimized. (shrink)

When the Federal Communications Commission considered revamping its policies, many political activists argued that media conglomerates had failed to meet their duties to protect freedom of speech. Moveon's dispute with CBS over its proposed Superbowl advertisement and Michael Moore's quarrel over distribution of his documentary, Fahrenheit 911, are cases in point. In matters of pure entertainment, the public expect companies to avoid offensive programming. The press, on the other hand, may well be forced to offend some audience members in order (...) to create a viable forum for political dissent. As journalism and entertainment are increasingly inter-linked, an in depth moral analysis of the media corporation and its obligations becomes increasingly important. I explore Kantian, Utilitarian, and Rawlsian analyses of corporate obligation in the aforementioned cases. I then examine whether or not these results suggest anything more generally about the sorts of mission statements and ethical policies that ought to be endorsed by media conglomerates and whether non-business institutions also require changes. Ultimately, I suggest that at a minimum, media institutions should view the duty to promote the representation of diverse views in a democracy as an imperfect moral and civic duty rather than making programming decisions solely by reference to profit. Ideally, greater access to media access should not be increased for the most powerful unless doing so at the same time increases free speech opportunities for those who currently have the least access. (shrink)

Plato in the Laws proposes a simulation of nearly ideal conditions regarding the experts’ persuasion and observes that even in these circumstances some citizens will not agree with the epistemic authorities. In this paper, such situations are labelled as exhibiting persistent dissent. Plato maintains that persistent dissenters lack the virtue of sōphrosynē, but its meaning is notoriously difficult to decipher. This paper offers to examine the role of sōphrosynē in tackling persistent dissent in light of Plato’s reflections on (...) civic participation. This angle will not only uncover the epistemic aspect of sōphrosynē that lays the groundwork for persuasion, but it will also give a less optimistic assessment of the civic theory of the Laws, whilst simultaneously widening our own understanding of the range of disagreements between the experts and the non-experts and the difficulties in removing them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Reason and Religion”: The Science of AnglicanismRaymond D. TumblesonThis essay explores a rhetoric of “reason” in Anglican anti-Catholic polemics during the short and turbulent reign of James II. This reign witnessed an intense propaganda battle between Catholic and Anglican pamphleteers because the former for the first time in over a century were permitted openly to put their case, and in response the latter defended their doctrine and status as (...) the established church with a new urgency. For the first time, the possibility, feared by English Protestants and hoped for by Catholics, that given encouragement many people would convert to Catholicism, “the most conspicuous deviant element in society,” seemed credible, although, unsurprisingly given the brevity of James’s rule, both hope and fear proved groundless. 1 In addition to reiterated claims to have scripture and antiquity on their side, apologists for the Church of England offered a third and clinching argument against Catholicism—that reason itself was with them. They saw no contradiction between what Richard Sherlock calls a “scripture-based argumentative framework” and “the priority of natural reason.” 2 In A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion Edward Stillingfleet developed what would become the predominant Anglican theological case against Catholicism twenty years later, when he endorsed “the judgement of Sense” as the means to a “certainty “ independent of the Papal “Infallibility “ that “Destroy[s] the obligation to Faith which ariseth from the rational evidence of Christian Doctrine.” 3 Far from mutually [End Page 131] exclusive, Protestantism and reason seemed naturally complementary, even identical, to Anglican polemicists: only Popery, in its superstition, idolatry, and implicit faith, was antagonistic to reason. As Richard W. F. Kroll observes, the “defense of contingency, premised on a skeptical empiricism, becomes not the chief discourse of dissent but, again, its opposite: the language of the most visible institutions returned to power after the Restoration.” 4 Reason and the Anglican monopoly of worship are consistently identified by Anglican apologists of the 1680s, and Popery threatens both.What Terry Eagleton has called “the Enlightenment dream of a world entirely transparent to reason, free of the prejudice, superstition and ob-scurantism of the ancien regime” has unacknowledged antecedents in Protestant polemics against “the prejudice, superstition and obscurantism” of Catholicism. 5 This essay examines the differences between the polemical literatures of the reigns of Charles II and James II, the ways in which “reason” becomes an important force against Catholicism, and the method in which this usage entangles anti-Catholicism in the construction of modern science. In 1685, the year of James’s coronation, John Williams argued that religious services ought to be conducted “in a Tongue understood of the people,” recommending that “we consult the reason of the thing.” 6 In attacking Catholicism, Anglican theologians redefined religion itself as based more on reason than on faith, because Papists could lay equal claim to faith, but only the Church of England possessed reason as they defined it. Stillingfleet’s theological career is paradigmatic for Restoration Angli-canism’s enlistment of reason in sectarian disputes: his Originae Sacrae (1662) defends Christianity as rational, then in 1665 A Rational Account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion narrows religious rationality to exclude Catholicism; in the wake of the Exclusion Crisis, the 1681 The Unreasonableness of Separation chides Dissenters for being “unreasonable” because they do not conform to the Church of England; and finally in 1687 The Doctrine of the Trinity and Transubstantiation Compared, as to Scripture, Reason, and Tradition returns to the subject of A Rational Account, tightening its six hundred learned pages into colloquial propaganda aimed at lay readers. 7 In the clear light of reason, where the only static—in Michel [End Page 132] Serres’s sense—is corruption, disagreement (with Anglicanism) becomes impossible. 8This paper examines sectarian polemics in order to approach the relation between science, the paradigmatic modern intellectual structure, and theology, the paradigmatic premodern intellectual sructure, from an unaccustomed angle. The immense wave of propagandistic Anglican theologizing under James II establishes the superiority of the Church of England to Rome by re-borrowing the methods and conventions of rationality which scientific experimentalism itself had originally derived from theology. 9 In these tracts... (shrink)

Democracy has been a flawed hegemony since the fall of communism. Its flexibility, its commitment to equality of representation, and its recognition of the legitimacy of opposition politics are all positive features for political institutions. But democracy has many deficiencies: it is all too easily held hostage by powerful interests; it often fails to advance social justice; and it does not cope well with a number of features of the political landscape, such as political identities, boundary disputes, and environmental (...) crises. Although democracy is valuable it fits uneasily with other political values and is in many respects less than equal to the demands it confronts. In this volume prominent political theorists and social scientists present original discussions of such central issues. Democracy's Values deals with the nature and value of democracy, particularly the tensions between it and such goods as justice, equality, efficiency, and freedom. (shrink)

Background: Patients in different countries have different attitudes toward self‐determination and medical information. Little is known how much respect Japanese patients feel should be given for their wishes about medical care and for medical information, and what choices they would make in the face of disagreement. Methods: Ambulatory patients in six clinics of internal medicine at a university hospital were surveyed using a self‐administered questionnaire. Results: A total of 307 patients participated in our survey. Of the respondents, 47% would accept (...) recommendations made by physicians, even if such recommendations were against their wishes; 25% would try to persuade their physician to change their recommendations; and 14% would leave their physician to find a new one. Seventy‐six percent of the respondents thought that physicians should routinely ask patients if they would want to know about a diagnosis of cancer, while 5% disagreed; 59% responded that physicians should inform them of the actual diagnosis, even against the request of their family not to do so, while 24% would want their physician to abide by their family's request and 14% could not decide. One‐third of the respondents who initially said they would want to know the truth would yield to the desires of the family in a case of disagreement. Interpretations: In the face of disagreement regarding medical care and disclosure, Japanese patients tend to respond in a diverse and unpredictable manner. Medical professionals should thus be prudent and ask their patients explicitly what they want regarding medical care and information. (shrink)

Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) turns on a reading of the productive imagination in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). In siding with the imagination, Heidegger declares his dissent from the neo-Kantianism of his contemporaries. Yet, when Heidegger subsequently elaborates his philosophy of art in the 1930s, he is dismissive of the imagination altogether. His earlier partisanship was qualified. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger treats the productive imagination of Kant’s (...) critical period as still a step short of Heidegger’s own problem of the time of finite human beings. German Idealism’s step past Kant is, for Heidegger, a step beyond, but in the wrong direction. The aesthetics of German Idealism builds on the unification of experience and conceptuality wrought by the productive imagination in its transcendental use, thereby inscribing in the work of art a neglect of finitude that Heidegger will dispute. If what Heidegger holds against the imagination is its transcendental use, the fully empirical concept of the imagination in Kant’s precritical writings invites reassessment in light of an engagement with finitude. I will show it has particular promise for rehabilitating the imagination in a Heideggerian philosophy of art. (shrink)

This article addressed the issue of how the author of the Gospel according to John portrayed dissent, in particular, how the author had his protagonists respond to the experience of rejection by those typically designated as ‘the Jews’. Research thus far has usually focused on the identity of the dissenters but rarely on the way dissent was handled. This article’s aim was to examine the range of responses to dissent. It employed a sequential reading of the text (...) to identify the various responses and then brought these findings into comparison with the way dissent was handled in related documents of the time, Matthew and Hebrews. It found that responses included not only argument and blame, including threat of divine wrath but also, beyond these, ad hominem allegations that those who dissent were inherently bad or beholden to the devil or had not been predestined or chosen by God to respond. Such categories were, however, not absolute, because the author assumed that people could choose to respond positively and so move from one apparently fixed and predetermined category to another. They served a rhetorical function. A further ploy was to reduce Israel’s tradition to witness and foreshadowing within the tension of asserting both continuity and discontinuity. Contribution: The article concluded that such strategies served in part to comfort and reassure hearers engaged in the process of grief at rejection. As such they warranted critical reflection. (shrink)

An often overlooked tension in liberal theory turns on its commitment to procedural accounts of legitimacy on the one hand, and to the robust protection of the right of citizens to dissent on the other. To the extent that one evaluates legitimate decision-making on the basis of the procedures that bear on it, determining how extra-procedural expressions of dissent fit into the picture becomes a complex undertaking. This is especially true if one accepts that protecting extra-procedural expressions of (...) dissent is itself foundational to the overall legitimacy of the state. My aim in this paper is to explore some of the implications that follow from this tension. The paper proceeds in two parts. In the first part, I review the political grounds that support a protection on dissent. By drawing on its republican foundations, I argue that the functional role that the right to dissent serves in complex political communities is intimately connected to concerns over legitimacy. I claim that for the right to perform its function successfully, protections must be placed on both procedural and extra-procedural forms of dissent. The second part of the paper issues a direct challenge to procedural accounts of legitimacy. If a protection on citizen dissent is vital to legitimating government action, and if that protection necessarily extends to both procedural and extra-procedural forms of dissent, it follows that legitimacy cannot be captured by procedure alone—even procedures that secure the fair and equal participation by all affected parties. (shrink)

The article is a philosophical response to the oped of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas Krieg und Empörung, published by him in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in April 2022. The oped demonstrates the philosopher’s view on ideological disputes and political debates or “indignation” (Empörung) in public sphere in both Germany and the EU concerning an attempt to develop a unanimous policy to help Ukraine with weapons against Russia’s military aggression. The authors presume that Habermas published the accountable message of a (...) responsible citizen that means it should be also taken as based on his theoretical achievements. The article consists of two parts. The first part sets out the main arguments of the philosopher’s newspaper article, which ends with a recommendation of compromise and partnership negotiations with the aggressor de facto due to the losses of Ukraine. The second part is an attempt by the authors to clarify the main preconditions and premises of Habermas’s communicative philosophy, which demonstrate the fundamental limitation of its explanatory power for this type of radical dissent, which is war. First of all, the authors suggest, it is the idea of pacification in interethnic relations, which forms the intellectual mood after World War II and finds its philosophical expression in the discovery of a priori foundations of understanding (Apel, Habermas) and ideas of developing formal pragmatics of communication. Attention to the latter allows the authors to demonstrate how consistent analysis of a priori (counterfactual) conditions of communication is considered by Habermas primarily in the historical perspective of positive dimensions of social integration - democratic equality, freedom, justice for participants of communicative interaction. The article concludes with a detailed analysis of the significance of the concept “lifeworld” as one of the central concepts within communicative theory and an analogue of “form of life” and “culture”. The authors argue the idea of perspective creating a common lifeworld for all in the processes of communication is fundamental to the works of the philosopher. The article concludes that the regulative idea of the single world as a basic ontological assumption of communicative theory does limit its explanatory capacity in terms of a war situation as a clash of different cultural worlds. (shrink)

Many of our deepest disagreements turn on matters of definition. Philosophers discuss the definitions of knowledge, art, truth, and freedom, and social and political questions about personhood, health and disease, marriage and gender are also commonly thought of as turning in part on definitions. This book contributes to our understanding of how we engage with questions and disagreements of this kind. It argues that disputes about matters of definition are not just about the meanings of words or our concepts, (...) and they do not typically involve change of meaning. Instead, it develops a conception of definition on which engaging in an investigation or a discussion helps determine the meanings of our words without changing them; what is determined is the meaning our words had all along. This temporal externalist view—that what happens at the end of our investigation or discussion can play a role in determining what we meant and thought throughout—puts us in a position to see why typical ways we engage with questions of definition make sense, and are not confused or in need of revision. The book develops this style of view in unprecedented detail and shows how it helps make sense not only of definitional disputes, but also of disagreements about matters of taste (such as discussions of whether a particular food is delicious, or a certain film is funny.) Its defencse of temporal externalism includes powerful new criticisms of competing philosophical views about verbal dispute, metalinguistic negotiation, inconsistent concepts, conceptual engineering, and relativism. (shrink)

Most literature about vaccine hesitancy has been focused on parental attitudes. Less attention has been devoted to both scientists and experts who raise criticism about immunization policies and intervene in the public debate. This consideration aims to balance the current emphasis in the literature on parents’ attitudes about vaccination, offering a complementary angle to reframe and widen the controversy. Focusing on scientists and experts, an unattended complex picture of multiple attitudes towards vaccines and vaccinations has been discovered through a qualitative (...) content analysis of texts related to the harsh public debate, held between March 2017 and November 2018, triggered by the legislative proposal of making ten vaccinations mandatory for children. Unlike oversemplications that misleading dichotomies reproduce, the analysis reveals nine different positions along the continuum of immunisation attitudes, ranging from radical acceptance of vaccinations to radical rejection, which constitute a fuzzy set. Consequently, a twofold reality emerges: on the surface, the conflict seems between pro-vaxxers versus hesitant, pro-choice and anti-vaxxers; beneath it is amid standardized versus a varieties of contextual and personalised approaches to health. (shrink)