Contributed papers on concept of Avidyā and Mokṣa in Hindu philosophy presented at Seminar organized by Department of Advaita Vedanta, Rāṣṭrīyasaṃskr̥tavidyāpīṭham, Tirupati from December 31, 2005 to January 01, 2006).

On the concept of Avidyā in Indic philosophy.

Concept of "ignorance" (Avidyā) in Advaita Vedanta philosophy ; a study.

In Buddhist contexts, avidyā refers not only to a lack of knowledge but also (and primarily) to an active misapprehension of reality, a warped projection onto reality that reinforces our own dysfunction and vice. Ignorance is rarely innocent; it is not an isolated phenomenon of just-not-happening-to-know-something. It is maintained and reinforced through personal and social habits, including practices of personal and collective false projection, strategic ignoring, and convenient “forgetting.” This view of avidyā has striking similarities to philosophical analyses (...) of white ignorance, such as Charles Mills’, which understand white ignorance not in terms of a passive lack of knowledge but as an active refusal by whites to confront basic facts about our social world (Mills 2007, 16). I argue that Buddhist analyses of avidyā may help us understand the mechanisms of white ignorance and the practices for deconstructing it. (shrink)

The Advaita Vedānta notion of ātman/Brahman presents a serious philosophical challenge to this school-namely, it demands that they explain how all (reality) can be undivided, unchanging, and pure consciousness, yet appear to be everything but nondual, unchanging, and pure consciousness. The Advaita answer is avidyā, ajāna (ignorance). This answer tells us that Brahman does not really change; it is only ignorance that makes it appear to change. This answer has engendered as many questions as it has resolved, and it (...) is possible that they can be boiled down to the following: how can vidyā and avidyā be simultaneous and coterminous? After reviewing the Advaita responses to the debates regarding avidyā, which arose within Advaita and between Advaitins and their opponents, a traditional Advaita path will be followed by offering an analogy to illuminate this quandary. The strength of this contemporary analogy, based on holography, lies in its ability to illuminate the nature of Brahman as being without parts, without duality, without change; yet holography presents us with images that appear to change and be with parts. (shrink)

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman (...) as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana. (shrink)

‘말놀이’라고 번역한 ‘니룩따’는 발음의 유사성을 근거로 하여 어의를 해석하는 인도의 지적 전통으로, 불교 특히 대승불교에서는 이 지적 전통을 채용하여 새로운 사상을 주장하거나 자신의 정당성을 주장해 왔다. 이 논문은 이러한 전통 중 『반야경』에 나타난 ‘무명’(無明 avidyā)에 대한 말놀이에 대해 다루었다. 대승불교 경전에 속하는 『팔천송반야』와 『대품반야』의 산스크리트본에는 무명을 발음의 유사성, 보다 정확하게는 동일한 “√vid”어근을 취하지만 그 어근의 다른 뜻인 ‘존재하다’를 취하여 “avidyamāna”즉 존재하지 않는 것으로 풀이하고 있는 말놀이가 나타난다. 그렇지만 현장의 『대반야경』 중 『팔천송반야』와 『이만오천송반야』에 상응하는 버전의 한역 등에는 또 다른 방식의 (...) 해석 “존재하지 않는 것을 [존재하지 않는다]라고 알지 못하는” 전통적인 ‘무지’(ajñāna)의 해석도 나타난다. 필자는 이러한 말놀이를 살펴보기 위하여 『팔천송반야』와 『대품반야』의 다양한 버전들, 그리고 이 경전들에 대한 하리바드라와 아리야 비묵띠세나의 주석서를 참조하였다. 그 결과 『반야경』의 ‘무명’에 대한 말놀이가 ‘비존재’로부터 전통적인 해석에 일치하도록 ‘무지’로 점차 변화했을 것이라고 추정하였다. 그리고 최초의 ‘비존재’라는 말놀이는 『반야경』의 새로운 사상인 “공성”을 가지고 당시 주류 불교의 핵심 교리인 12연기를 설명하거나 더 나아가 대체할 수 있다는 것을 보여준 시도로 추측하였다. (shrink)

The Advaita Vedānta notion of ātman/Brahman presents serious philosophical challenge to this school—namely, it demands that they explain how all can be undivided, unchanging, and pure consciousness, yet appear to be everything but nondual, unchanging, and pure consciousness. The Advaita answer is avidyā, ajñāna. This answer tells us that Brahman does not really change; it is only ignorance that makes it appear to change. This answer has engendered as many questions as it has resolved, and it is possible that (...) they can be boiled down to the following: how can vidyā and avidyā be simultaneous and coterminous? After reviewing the Advaita responses to the debates regarding avidyā which arose within Advaita and between Advaitins and their opponents, traditional Advaita path will be followed by offering an analogy to illuminate this quandary. The strength of this contemporary analogy, based on holography, lies in its ability to illuminate the nature of Brahman as being without parts, without duality, without change; yet holography presents us with images that appear to change and be with parts. (shrink)

Concept of Avidyā in the Vedānta philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya; a study.

The concept of avidyā is one of the central categories in the Advaita of Śaṇkara and Maṇḍana. Shifting the focus from māyā, interpreted either as illusion or as the divine power, this concept brings ignorance to the forefront in describing duality and bondage. Although all Advaitins accept avidyā as a category, its scope and nature is interpreted in multiple ways. Key elements in Maṇḍana’s philosophy include the plurality of avidyā, individual selves as its substrate and the Brahman (...) as its field (viṣaya), and the distinction in avidyā between non-apprehension and misapprehension. A closer investigation shows that Maṇḍana is directly influenced by Bhartṛhari’s linguistic non-dualism in developing the concept of avidyā. This study also compares other key constituents such as vivartta and pariṇāma that are relevant to the analysis of avidyā. As the concept of counter-image (pratibimba) emerges as a distinct stream of Advaita subsequent to Maṇḍana, this study also compares the application of pratibimba in the writings of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana. (shrink)

Exhaustive study of philosophy of Self and Praṇa (breath) in Upanishads.

The Vaiśeṣika school is an important ancient system of Indian philosophy. According to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, cognition or jñāna is of two types—vidyā and avidyā (vidyā ca avidyā ca), and avidyā is of four types—saṃśaya (doubt), viparyaya (illusion), anadhyavasāya (non-ascertainment) and svapna (dream). Among these four kinds of avidyā, the third kind of non-veridical cognition (avidyā), named ‘anadhyavasāya’ (non-ascertainment/non-assertory cognition), is acknowledged alone by the Vaiśeṣika school. Apart from the Vaiśeṣika school, no other school of (...) Indian philosophy admits such a type of non-veridical cognition. Such a sort of non-veridical cognition is not mentioned even in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda. However, Praśastapāda discusses it in his Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, after mentioning it as a variety of non-veridical cognition. He has been followed in this respect by the commentators of Padārthadharmasaṃgraha in their respective commentaries. Following them, in this paper I am going to establish anadhyavasāya as a distinct type of non-veridical cognition. (shrink)

Ontology as presented in the Advaita works of Vācaspatimiśra, fl. 976-1000, Hindu philosopher.

電子テクノロジーが見逃してきた盲点を突き止める。 「蜘蛛の巣」を鍵言葉に、人類の想像力がいかに蜘蛛の巣状に連動し、それが従来の研究方法をいかに刷新するのか。また「蜘蛛の巣」というマトリックスに照らして現実を分析することがいかなる可能性を開くのか。電子 媒体を「蜘蛛の巣」Webとして捉えることで、そこに潜む危険とも裏腹の将来像を、特定の専門分野の枠組みを横断して探求する。.

This volume provides an exposition of the key concept of avidya maya as set forth by advaitins and as criticized by Visistadvaitins. the philosophical conflicts ...

The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his (...) work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. (shrink)

Research papers presented at a seminar organized by Shri Vallabhacharya Trust at Pune in 2004.

The concept of avidyā or ignorance is central to the Advaita Vedāntic position of Śȧnkara. The post-Śaṅkara Advaitins wrote sub-commentaries on the original texts of Śaṅkara with the intention of strengthening his views. Over the passage of time the views of these sub-commentators of Śaṅkara came to be regarded as representing the doctrine of Advaita particularly with regard to the concept of avidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, a scholar-monk of Holenarsipur, challenged the accepted tradition through the publication of his (...) work Mūlāvidyānirāsaḥ, particularly with regard to the avidyādoctrine. It was his contention that the post-Śaṅkara commentators brought their own innovations particularly on the nature of avidyā. This was the idea of mūlāvidyā or ‘root ignorance’, a positive entity which is the material cause of the phenomenal world. Saraswati argues that such an idea of mūlāvidyā is not to be found in the bhāṣyas (commentaries) of Śaṅkara and is foisted upon Śaṅkara. This paper attempts to show that although Śaṅkara may not have explicitly favoured such a view of mūlāvidyā, his lack of clarity on the nature of avidyā left enough scope for the post-Śaṅkara commentators to take such a position on avidyā. (shrink)

Contributed research papers presented at National Seminar on "Saptavidha-anupapatti", held during August 18-20, 1998, organized by Indian Council of Philosophical Research at Chennai, India.

Much of classical Hindu thought has centered on the question of self: what is it, how does it relate to various features of the world, and how may we benefit by realizing its depths? Attempting to gain a conceptual foothold on selfhood, Hindu thinkers commonly suggest that its distinctive feature is consciousness (caitanya). Well-worn metaphors compare the self to light as its awareness illumines the world of knowable objects. Consciousness becomes a touchstone to recognize the presence of a self. A (...) rock is insentient, void of consciousness, and purely an object. Selves, however, are loci of awareness and thus subjects. Some schools, most notably classical Sāṁkhya and Advaita Vedānta, take this approach to its furthest conclusion: consciousness is not only unique to the self, but is the fundamental feature of selfhood. Other putative features of the self—feelings, memories, moral responsibility, and importantly, agency (kartṛtva)—are taken to be the impositions of insentient matter (prakṛti) or symptoms of primordial illusion (avidyā). Against this position, Nyāya defends a more robust notion of selfhood, placing qualities like desire, aversion, volition, and moral responsibility alongside cognition as the self’s distinctive qualities. These various aspects of selfhood come together neatly when we consider agency. An agent performs intentional actions under her volition, which is triggered by her own cognitive and affective states. Her volitional acts further generate moral consequences which she must bear, and which are, in the Indian context, embodied in the form of karmic merit and demerit. For Nyāya, agency is, therefore, a special expression of the self’s different capacities and potentialities, which coherently binds them together. Nyāya’s view is an important contribution to Indian theories of self as it is a counterpoint to what we may call exclusively cognitive accounts of selfhood in other influential Hindu schools, as noted above. The first half of this paper will consider Nyāya’s conception of agency in relation to selfhood. The second half will discuss Nyāya’s arguments with other Hindu schools—specifically Sāṁkhya—in support of the thesis that the self must be an agent as well as a knower. (shrink)

Nathmal Tatia, one of the leading Jaina scholars of our time, provides us with the first systematic and in-depth study of the great problems dealt with in Jaina philosophy. It begins with the basic Jaina worldview of non-absolutism (anekanta-vada), and deals next with Jaina epistemology.Three major topics are then studied in great detail, with full reference to the Jaina scriptures. These are: the problem of avidya in the various Indian schools; the Jaina doctrine of karman; and Jaina yoga. This latter (...) includes an important study of Haribhadra's comparative studies in yoga. Tatia hashere given us a first-rate advanced level study of Jaina philosophy. (shrink)

Although there is such a thing as Indian thought, it seems to play no role in the way social sciences and philosophy are practiced in India or elsewhere. The problem is not only that we no longer employ terms such as atman, avidya, dharma to reflect on our experience; the terms that we do indeed use—sovereignty, secularism, rights, civil society and political society, corruption—seem to insulate our experience from our reflection. This paper will outline Gandhi’s framing of our predicament in (...) Hind Swaraj. It will then discuss three very different examples taken from our peculiar life with concepts that will also serve to clarify and illustrate the framework I am outlining. It will then very briefly discuss how Gandhi saw the Gita as showing him a way out of the predicament. (shrink)

A fundamental difference in Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) and the Post-Śaṅkarādvaitins’ (PSA) exegeses of Advaita Vedānta lies in the pedagogic method of adhyāropa-apavāda (deliberate attribution of characteristics to the attribute-less brahman, and its corresponding/complementary contradiction). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to negate avidyā (ignorance); other Upaniṣadic methods— lakṣaṇā and netivāda —are subsumed under it. For the PSA, on the other hand, adhyāropāpavāda plays a subsidiary, less consequential role in engendering gnosis; the primary role is that of mahāvākyas (...) (the ‘great’ Vedāntic statements). SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya—for their (purportedly incorrect) interpretation of the method; he contends that it has led to the lamentable reification of concepts in Advaita Vedānta, and ultimately undermined its basic tenets. In this article, I articulate SSS’ position. (shrink)

Hegel inverted the Tantric Buddhist, Bönpo and Stoic view of human spiritual and social evolution by presenting it as a progressive perfecting rather than as a progressive degeneration impelled by the gradual development of the basic human delusion called avidya (unawareness). Since he cancelled the crucial map /territory distinction, he had to explain change in nature as the negation of the immediately preceding state, and since he wanted spiritual and social evolution to be a process of perfecting, he had to (...) invent a negation that, rather than canceling former negations, or incorporating them and thus increasing fragmentation and delusion, incorporated them and thereby produced an increase of wholeness and truth: the Aufhebung or sublation, not found in any existing process—whether logical or in phenomenological—and existing only in Hegel’s imagination. The only existing negation that incorporates the preceding negation, rather than canceling or annulling it (as logical negation does), is the phenomenological negation occurring in Sartre’s bad faith, which Laing illustrated with a “spiral of pretenses,” and Hegel’s sublation is a misrepresentation of this phenomenological negation that he fancied to make his inverted view of spiritual, social and political evolution possible. In the Tantric Buddhist, Bönpo and Stoic view what increases is fragmentation and delusion. When these reach their logical extreme,they achieve their reductio ad absurdum in ecological crisis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:China and Contemporary Millenarianism—Something New under the SunBenjamin I. SchwartzOne of the most obvious remarks one can make about contemporary China is that China has no reason to be excited about contemporary Western millenarianism. If by "millenarianism" one refers to an apocalyptic transformation of the entire human condition based on the Christian calendar, then there is no reason for Chinese, Jews, and Moslems, who have their own historic visions, (...) to find any significance in the history of the last millennium. At the end of the first millennium or the beginning of the second, China was at a high point in its civilization. To the extent that apocalyptic tendencies could be found in either its high or its popular culture, these tendencies were the focus of Buddhism or religious Daoism. They were not tied to specific calendars, and in an Indian spirit they spoke in terms of "kalpas," which might last for hundreds of millions of years—or might occur next week.In addition, it should be noted—as has been pointed out by Professor Landes and others—that the notion that there was an all-consuming preoccupation with an impending apocalypse in the year A.D. 1000 is highly debatable. Among the more scholarly members of the clergy in medieval times there were already modes of thinking that, under the influence of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, were pointing in the direction of a non-apocalyptic scholastic philosophy.In all cultures down through the ages, an apocalyptic vision of deliverance has promised relief from the vast burden of human suffering and despair—a vision that would be recognized as such even by those who sought no apocalyptic solutions and who continued to believe that our this-worldly life still promised compensatory satisfactions, limited as these might be. They would not accept the Theravada/ Hinayana Buddhist belief that even what we call our individual pleasures are a function of our individual sufferings. According to that belief, our love of our children or our wives is poisoned by our acute awareness of the transient nature of their existence. Release from the world of samsara can be attained only by escaping the world of individuated samsara into the ineffable world of Nirvana.Turning to the book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament, we find that the author, who represents an amalgam of Greek and Hebrew wisdom, is not an apocalyptist and still hopes that we will garner certain satisfactions from our lives as individuals in this mundane existence. Yet his disappointment, suffering, and exasperation over human vanities and duplicities often correspond to the catalogue of sufferings in the Theravada scriptures. But, like the Theravada Buddhists, he believes that in this world of ignorance (avidya) there is also "nothing new under the sun." In the endless generations of individual human lives, every mode of human ignorance and suffering has certainly existed in the endless cycle of samsara. It is nevertheless true that in the total attention on every aspect of human life from the techno-economic side, [End Page 193] we find a totally new way of neutralizing the age-old causes of human suffering. Gautama Buddha regarded our ordinary individual pleasures as poisoned by suffering, by the realization that individual pleasures soon fade away. Yet Prozac seems to continue to work without producing anxiety. Here, indeed, we have something new under the sun!In fact, the new technological-economic millenarianism does indeed represent something different from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century technological and economic transformations that seemed to offer the possibility of a steady amelioration of the human condition. Nineteenth-century technological and economic meliorism could be related to older forms of what might be called "materialistic" improvement. Yet nineteenth-century materialistic progressivism continued to be linked to other ethical concerns not only by Christian beliefs but also by many of the secular ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe. There were entire ideologies of socialism, liberalism, anarchism, romanticism, nationalism, et cetera, which continued to be deeply distressed by the non-"materialistic," ethical consequences of techno-economic progress. Techno-economic progress has not, after all, prevented the Holocaust, the Gulag, and the horrors of two world wars. On the contrary, it has raised... (shrink)

The paper starts with some textual distinctions concerning the concept of God in the metaphysical framework of two classical schools of Hindu philosophy, Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Then the author focuses on the functional and pedagogical aspects of prayer as well as practical justification of “religious meditation” in both philosophical schools. A special attention is put on the practice called īśvarapraṇidhāna, recommended in Yoga school, which is interpreted by the author as a form of non-theistic devotion. The meaning of the central (...) object of this concentration, that is puruṣa-viśeṣa, is reconsidered in detail. The subject matter is discussed in the wider context of yogic self-discipline that enables a practitioner to overcome ignorance ( avidyā) and the narrowness of egotic perspective (asmitā), recognized in the Hindu darśanas as the root-cause of all suffering or never-fulfilled-satisfaction ( duḥkha). The non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism assumed by the adherents of Sāṃkhya-Yoga redefines the concept of “God” ( īśvara) as primarily an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for spiritual pedagogy. (shrink)

Chinese Buddhist thought is more than a case of “Indianization” or “Sinicization,” and even less, “Distortion.” Chinese Buddhist thought should be grasped, first, in its own terms and only then in terms of the possible influences or confluences that flowed into it. The present article will seek to look into the concept of “Suchness vasana” (perfumation by the Buddhist absolute, Suchness, upon avidya, ignorance) as used by the Huayan school in China. Then it will show how, in the elaboration of (...) this idea, Fazang, the key patriarch of the Huayan school, apparently drew on a mode of thought that is derived from the Yijing, the Book of Changes. It is in the nature of the present article that only the Chinese influence will be underlined and that the Indian contributions to the formation of a theory of a “dynamic Suchness” will only be briefly touched upon. Scholars have long noticed the Daoist influence of Chinese Buddhological thinking, especially within the Ch'an and the Hua-yen circles. However, too often scholars only suggest impressionistic parallels, between, say, the book Laozi and the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch or between Mencian humanism (“Every man can be Sage Yao and Shun”) and the idea that “Every man can be Buddha.” Such presentations of Chinese influence bypass the various problems involved in the long and thorny history of conflict, compromise, mutual self-discovery, and fertilization between the two cultural traditions. The present article will try to be much more concrete by documenting and analyzing the series of incidents that led to a datable innovation on Fazang's part. (shrink)

Abstract:Since scholars have interpreted the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara's views on deep sleep in a variety of ways, it is necessary to analyze the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara's commentariesW to determine what position they actually hold regarding the presence of ignorance (avidyā) in deep sleep. It is argued that the Upaniṣads hold that in deep sleep one experiences the pure bliss of Brahman without any kind of ignorance. Śaṅkara, in his commentaries, seems ambivalent about whether there is ignorance in deep sleep. (...) However, it is argued here that this ambivalence is only apparent. According to the present author's reconstruction, Śaṅkara consistently holds that ignorance exists in a latent form in deep sleep. Also the philosophical assumptions that compelled Śaṅkara to accept the presence of ignorance in deep sleep will be examined, even though the Upaniṣads explicitly hold the opposite view. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive exposition of Vedanta Desika`s Satadusani, a polemical classic of Visistadvaita Vedanta, devoted to the criticism of the doctrines of Advaita Vedanta. The thought-provoking arguments found in the Sixty-six Vedas of the original text are brought together, analysed and discussed in a systematic manner under eight broad headings: Pramanas Perception; Consciousness; Individual self; Brahman; Universe; Avidya; Sadhana and Mukti.In presenting the dialectics of Vedanta Desika in a vigorous and scholastic form the author deals with numerous issues (...) that the Vadas raise--epistemological, ontological, religious, and ethical. Thought the issues are many, each discussing a specific problem, they are ultimately directed to refute the central doctrine of Advaita, viz., that Brahman which is pure consciousness devoid of all determinations, constitutes the sole Reality and every thing else is illusory. While carefully tracing the fundamental differences between the two systems of Vedanta, he points out that the differences are mostly due to the difference in the stand-points they adopt.Faithfully conforming to the original in letter and spirit, this work will serve as a useful introduction to the study of the Sribhasya of Ramanuja. A distincy contribution to the study of classical Hindu thought, this book should be of interest to students of Philosophy in general and Vedanta in particular. (shrink)

The nature of Self is ever-blissful, yet we feel constant pains and sufferings in the world. Each one of us is forced to face the worldly happenings in every station of our life. These sufferings cannot end without going to their root cause and finding a solution for it. The cause of these sufferings, as put by most of the schools of Indian Philosophy, is ignorance about the nature of Self that results in bondage. All the schools of Indian Philosophy, (...) except the Cārvāka, hold that ignorance is the cause of bondage and knowledge begets liberation. Realization of eternal peace or bliss is the goal of almost every school of Indian Philosophy. Here, we must know that Ānanda is of three types—Viṣayānanda, Vidyānanda and Brahmānanda. Viṣayānanda is momentary pleasure, which arises out of the contact of the mind with external objects. It has a difference in degrees. Vidyānanda is the pleasure that we derive from the feeling that “I have achieved all that was to be achieved”. It is still of the form of a mental mode. Brahmānanda is eternal bliss, which is discovered when avidyā is annihilated by akhandākāra mental mode. It is beyond mind and its modifications. The views of the Bhagavadgītā, Upaniṣad, and the elementary texts written by the proponents of the philosophy of non-dualism expound that the way to achieve the state of bliss is by inculcating the attitude of absolute detachment which, when achieved, makes a short work of our ignorance about Brahman. The paper tries to discuss all these issues and the Bliss aspect of Brahman with relevant references. It would be a success if it clarifies the different aspects of Ānanda and creates genuine interest in the researchers to further study the references for deeper understanding of bliss aspect of Brahman. (shrink)

What is the meaning of Shiva dancing on a dwarf named Avidya? Why does Vishnu sleep upon an endless snake? To what did the Buddha awaken? What do we mean by soul? The practice of Yoga has become quite common and popular in the West; however, the stories of Yoga are still strange to Western ears. What do these ancient symbols mean, what are they trying to teach us, and how should we incorporate the knowledge skillfully into our Western lifestyle? (...) By looking at the myths of Yoga along with the stories that have influenced Western culture, we are presented with opportunities to select the best of both worlds, and create new maps to help guide us through the uncertainties of modern living. Stories are fun! Important stories guide us and educate us; they create mental models which work at an unconscious level to help us navigate through our modern society and govern our reactions to the ups-and-downs of life; they provide meaning and purpose for our life; and our stories entertain and entrance us. In this book, Bernie Clark looks at the spiritual stories found in the West that create a base map for our lives and then looks at the stories found in the East to see how they could improve our base maps. The stories offered are mix of light-hearted and enjoyable, and deep and profound. The importance of stories East and West are illustrated through the model proposed by the great 20th century mythologist, Joseph Campbell: myths, or stories, serve four great functions - the mystical, the cosmological, the sociological and the psychological function. The stories chosen illustrate these four functions of mythology and show how we can take these stories into ourselves to create a deeper experience of life. "You may find that, with a proper introduction, mythology will catch you." Joseph Campbell: The Power of Myth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 151-154 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Happiness Project: Transforming the Three Poisons that Cause the Suffering We Inflict on Ourselves and Others The Happiness Project: Transforming the Three Poisons that Cause the Suffering We Inflict on Ourselves and Others. By Ron Leifer, M.D. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1997.313 pp. This book focuses mostly on Buddhism and psychotherapy, but it ranges widely and (...) includes many reflections on Christianity. Today there are many good books that compare Buddhism with Western psychology, but this one is not to be missed by anyone interested in the topic. Leifer (a former colleague and friend of Ernest Becker, who wrote TheDenial ofDeath) is obviously a very experienced psychiatrist, with deep knowledge of psychoanalytic theory to supplement his many years of practice [End Page 151] as a therapist. This book is many things: a primer on demythologized Buddhism; a superior "self-help" book; a history of psychotherapy, including a critique of its modern medicalization; a speculative account of the evolution of human consciousness; and, not least, the most insightful interpretations of the Job, Oedipus, and Eden myths that I have encountered. The prose style is lucid, and only space limitations keep me from quoting it at length.The title turns out to be ironic, since our Happiness Projects are the main source of our unhappiness. Our selfish strivings for happiness are, paradoxically, the main cause of the suffering we inflict on ourselves and others.What we "fail to see" (avidya)is not some great mysterious wisdom. "The core of the esoteric knowledge we seek consists of secrets we hide from ourselves. We hide from them because they are not what we want them to be. The world is not what we want it to be. Life is not what we want it to be. Others are not what we want them to be. We are not ourselves what we want to be. We hide from these truths because they mystify and terrify us" (12). The basic "secret" of happiness is that the three poisons--greed, ill will, and ignorance--are the source of our pain and suffering, by creating rebounding karmic ripples. The ego is a trickster who is continually the victim of his own trickery. True happiness can only be the product of an inner transformation that changes our habitual patterns of thought and action, enabling us to "relax into existence." Leifer's psychologized Buddhism is a therapeutic path cleansed of the mystical and paranormal; there is no place here for psychic powers or any transcendental salvation (nirvana is not discussed). The focus throughout is on how we are bedeviled by our own desires.The book is organized into four main parts. The first offers Leifer's understanding of the first two Buddhist truths. The second part, "Western Views of Suffering," includes profound interpretations of Job and Oedipus Rex. Job's suffering illustrates the first truth, that life is suffering, and his patience is virtuous, even heroic, in its refusal to demand that life be different than it is--an endurance that allows him to avoid making life worse: "Patience is the willingness to suffer without aggression" (131).The key to the Oedipus story is in his answer to the Sphinx's riddle: humans are the creatures who walk on four legs as infants, on two legs as mature adults, and then on three legs (with a cane) in old age. The riddle is a metaphor for the truths of our impermanence, old age and death. But Oedipus cannot accept it. "From a Buddhist point of view, the story of Oedipus is a metaphor for neurotic mind. Oedipus was the victim of his own grasping ego--of his desires and aggressions. His fate was sealed by his own efforts to escape it. The source of Oedipus' pain and tragedy were his own ignorance, passion, and aggression: the three poisons" (135). His desire for Mom is better understood as a symbol of human desire generally: our refusal to grow up... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Affective Account of MisknowingRoshni PatelIt is maintained that all beings and (their) qualitiesAre the fuel for the fire of awareness.Having been incinerated by brilliantTrue analysis, they are (all) pacified.—Ratnāvalī (RV)1.971In Nāgārjuna's formulation, ignorance about the nature of existents is scorching and thereby needs the alleviation that true analysis offers. This article explores what ignorance feels like from the subjective side of a knower in the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition (...) through an analysis of epistemic affect. I borrow two affective concepts—"epistemic emotion" and "epistemic feeling"—from theorists in Anglo-American analytic epistemology to discuss affectively charged misknowing.2 In this literature, epistemic emotions are affective experiences that participate in a knower's epistemic activity in positive or negative ways, but are not necessary for that activity to proceed. In contrast, epistemic feelings are affectively qualitative experiences that are integral to a knower's activity. With a focus on texts by Nāgārjuna, I present fear as a paradoxical epistemic emotion that correlates with a similarly pathogenic and instigative function in Buddhist moral psychology. I then present determinacy as a more subtly operating epistemic feeling in reificatory ignorance. In addition to expanding epistemologically oriented discussions within Buddhist philosophy, this article also contributes to scholarly discussion of epistemic affect by introducing determinacy as a new epistemic feeling. [End Page 44]Diffuse and Complex IgnoranceThe central role of ignorance in formulating the problem of suffering and its cessation implies that in many ways all of Buddhism is interested in how we know and understand. This centrality is evident in the Avijja Sutta when the Buddha states:Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up.(Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 45.1)Here we see that avijjā, or ignorance, impedes the path of removing suffering. Similarly, in the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is at the start of the chain conditioning the other links that culminate in suffering (SN 12.2). Nāgārjuna also positions ignorance as a potential gatekeeper when he says that ignorance (ajñāna) causes some people to be intolerant of the wisdom of the Mahāyāna path taught by the Buddhas (RV 4.83).3 While we have ample exposition on the role of ignorance in various causal chains, what remains elusive is how to recognize our own ignorance as such in the experiential folds of seeing, feeling, and knowing. This is especially the case in the early works of the critical project of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") philosophy by Nāgārjuna. The bulk of these works presents arguments against any ignorant metaphysics that essentializes existents in efforts to claim epistemic access to an objective ultimate reality. This article argues that through a certain way of reading Madhyamaka philosophical texts, we find helpful information for recognizing what ignorance feels like. I develop the phenomenology of epistemic emotions and feelings that coincide with the ignorant practices centrally targeted by Madhyamaka critical analysis.The encompassing scope of ignorance motivates us to conceive of it as entangled with a range of elements, including the affective components of knowing. While the terms avijjā or avidyā, are most often translated as "ignorance" this term can be problematically imprecise in philosophical contexts. In the subfield of ignorance studies within current Western philosophy, ignorance is often classified according to the object of which a subject lacks knowledge. By this paradigm, ignorance can be (1) factual in [End Page 45] the case of not knowing a particular fact, (2) erotetic when a subject does not know the answer to a question, or (3) practical when a subject does... (shrink)

The Buddhist philosophy of causality is primarily a theory (naya) of the human world. Its methodology, however, is objective and critical. It rejects the weight of mere authority or tradition, relies upon experience and reason, and emphasizes the critical examination and verification of all opinions. Although the Buddhist conception of knowledge and truth has a strong empirical and pragmatic bias (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.1), its conception of experience does not exclude introspection, rational intuition or mystical intuition (cf. Nyāya‐bindu 1.7–11). Although its (...) conception of reason creates a logical gulf between reason and experience, the gulf is bridged by a transcendental illusion (avidyā). Its employment of reason is highly analytical and it seeks to discover the ultimate elements constituting the structures of objects and experience. The constituent elements as the locus of causation are regarded as more real than their composite structures – dharma, dhātu or kṣana as contrasted with saṅghāta or santāna. At the same time, it raises dialectical questions and seriously considers the possibility of the empirical world being merely a working illusion. It discounts the apparent stability of objects, stressing their transience, finally defined as momentariness (see, for example, Ratnakīrti's Kṣaṇa‐bhaṅgasiddhi). It rejects the category of substance for that of process. Causality is thus regarded not as a dynamic interaction between substances, but as a functional, many‐one relationship of order characterized by invariance and uniformity within any given type of process. (shrink)

The specificity of tantric soteriology consists of a combination of three basic principles - unity, salvation, and bliss. This article explores the principle of salvation. Spiritual liberation implies the final overcoming of obstacles hindering the new worldview. Unlike the principle of unity, the principle of salvation focuses on difference, not on identity, drawing a sharp line between the desired state of liberation and the present state of dependence. The main obstacles to spiritual liberation are expressed in the well-known triad “ (...) class='Hi'>avidyā - karma - saṃsāra”. The principle of salvation appears in Tantrism in two interrelated forms, the ascetic and śaktic ones. Both of them agree with each other in rejection of spiritual ignorance. Spiritual ignorance is the main “negative goal”; without deliverance from it there is no freedom. The state of ignorance is existential one and endowed with powerful protective “forces”. The principle of salvation implies the deliverance not only from everything that is usually considered negative, but also of “positive” things. In the śaktic mode of the principle of salvation, it is assumed that an incorrect view of reality is eliminated by a correct view of it. Due to the fact that, according to the tantric adepts, the energies of the divine Śakti act in the world, the understanding of this fact leads the adept to stop perceiving himself as a dependent being even in the midst of an infinite variety of processes and events of the world. Life is then perceived as an unconditioned, spontaneous “divine play”, a stream of divine pleasure. Ascetic form can be reduced to an ontological interpretation of the principle of salvation, and śaktic form to a cognitive one. (shrink)

This article attempts to examine the portrayal of the character of Arthur Fleck in Todd Phillips’s Joker (2019). In the initial part of the film, Arthur exhibits signs that reveal he is headed towards committing a violent crime. Arthur displays signs of psychopathy and a lack of empathy. This article links criminal behaviour analysis to the Bible of the Arya Samaj, an Indian text, to find out how ancient Indian literature’s empirical theories, which are intertwined with philosophical and religious content, (...) shed light on criminal behaviour. The primary purpose of this article is to analyse the behavioural pattern in the character of Fleck and establish links to Dayanand Saraswati’s Satyarth Prakash, which discusses different types of Avidyas, a key concept in Indian philosophy that can be translated as ignorance or unwisdom, which is seen as a fundamental cause of suffering and bondage. It is certainly a significant factor in a person’s personality and behaviour. The major aim of this character analysis is not only to establish the link between Indian ancient texts and criminological behavioural patterns but also to reconceptualize evil through the lenses of Vedic hermeneutics. Vedic hermeneutics is the study of interpreting and understanding the ancient Vedic texts of Hinduism, where an important aspect is the recognition of different levels of meaning within the texts. (shrink)

Self-knowledge, at first glance, seems to be naturally and easily accessible to each of us. We commonly believe that we need much less effort to understand ourselves than to understand the world. The authoress of the paper uncovers the fallacy of this popular view referring to the fundamental conceptions and philosophical ideas of the classical Yoga. She tries to demystify our deceptive self-understanding explaining the definitions of ignorance (avidya), I-am-ness (asmita), desire (raga), aversion (dvesha) and fear of death (abhinivesha) given (...) by the author of the oldest Yoga treatise. Besides, the paper discusses briefly how we can make use of our limited, incorrect self-knowledge as far as we are aware that it needs to be transcended. In the final part of the paper, the issue of self-discipline consisting basically in cultivation of detachment and the practice of meditation is addressed. (shrink)

The Advaita literature prior to the time of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara is scarce. Relying on the citations of proponents and their opponents, the picture we glean of this early monism differs in many aspects from that of Śaṅkara. While Bhavya’s criticism of this monistic thought has received scholarly attention, the chapter Puruṣavāda in Dvādaśāranayacakra has rarely been studied. Broadly, this conversation will help ground classical Advaita in light of the contemporary discourse on naturalism. In particular, this examination will help contextualize (...) the early Advaita that lacks clear imprint of Mahayana Buddhism. The doctrine of Puruṣa, central to this paper, sidelines the role of avidyā or ignorance, and provides a realistic picture of the world. I have relied on the commentary Vṛtti upon the Vākyapadīya as has been substantially cited in DNC in order to advance the arguments. As a consequence, the examination on Puruṣa also paves the path for advancing arguments on linguistic monism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to provide a sketch on the way Nāgārjuna deals with the idea of 'relation'. The concept of 'relation' as expressed in the Pāli sources is here theoretically systematized according to three patterns: 1. logical, 2. strictly subordinative existential, 3. non-strictly subordinative existential. After having discussed Nāgārjuna's acceptance and treatment of these three patterns, particular attention is paid to the non-strictly subordinative existential relation. This kind of relation is meant to describe the way the (...) factors of the conditioned co-origination are linked to each other and is exemplified by Nāgārjuna by means of the father-son bond. A possible way to explain the conditioned co-origination doctrine in the light of the father-son example is here suggested by having resource to the 'Cambridge change' theory. Even if in the Pāli Canon the non-strictly subordinative existential pattern is said to apply to all the other factors of the conditioned co-origination, there is no direct evidence that it concerns also the avidyā-saṃskāras link. It will be shown how Nāgārjuna, by applying it to the avidyā-saṃskāras link, seems to introduce a new perspective in the conditioned co-origination theory. RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é proporcionar um esboço da maneira na qual Nāgārjuna aborda a ideia de 'relação'. O conceito de 'relação' que encontramos nas fontes pāli é aqui sistematizado teoricamente conforme três padrões: 1. lógico, 2. existencial estritamente subordinativo, 3. existencial não estritamente subordinativo. Após ter discutido a recepção e o tratamento nagarjunianos desses três padrões, este estudo dedica atenção especial à relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa. Esse tipo de relação visa descrever a maneira na qual os fatores da cooriginação condicionada estão ligados entre eles, e é tipificada por Nāgārjuna pelo exemplo da ligação pai-filho. Para explicar a doutrina da cooriginação condicionada à luz do exemplo pai-filho, um modo possível aqui sugerido é por meio do recurso à teoria do 'Cambridge change'. Embora no cânone pāli se diga que o modelo de relação existencial não estritamente subordinativa se aplique a todos os outros fatores da cooriginação condicionada, não há nenhuma evidência direta de que ele concerna também à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras. Será mostrado como Nāgārjuna, ao aplicar esse modelo à ligação avidyā-saṃskāras, pareça introduzir uma nova perspectiva na teoria da cooriginação condicionada. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of ConsciousnessChakravarthi Ram-PrasadStudies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness. By Sukharanjan Saha. Kolkata: Jadavpur University, 2004. Pp. 231.Studies in Advaita Vedanta: Towards an Advaita Theory of Consciousness, by Sukhar-anjan Saha, is a collection of papers each of which has something to say about consciousness in Advaita, although some of the papers have a rather tenuous connection to (...) this theme. Saha brings to bear a lifetime of study of Advaita and its philosophical contexts in these essays. The one notable lacuna in his approach is the tendency to ignore virtually all contemporary literature on Advaita, and to concentrate almost entirely on the original Sanskrit texts themselves—although he is clearly at home in a variety of modern philosophical techniques. His views are, in themselves, interesting and carefully spelled out.In "The Many Faces of the 'I,' " Saha draws on well-known uses of aham in Śaṅkara, Vācaspati, and Padmapāda to draw the larger conclusion that Advaita is willing to allow for multiple, context-variant senses of 'I,' in contrast to both a Naiyāyika like Gadhādhara and Western thinkers like Husserl."Advaita Analysis of Suffering" is an elegant and surprising essay. Much of it appears to be a fairly general survey of the manner in which different Hindu and Buddhist thinkers identify a positive cognitive error in understanding reality—avidyā—as the cause of suffering. But Saha notes that the classical consensus on suffering is not an empirical statement; there are ordinary success stories, after all. He then ingeniously uses this fact to show that suffering is something structural to existence. Śaṅkara's example of someone who feels "I am fair-complexioned" is a smug indication of the suffering brought to bear on others who are not, in a society that favors fair complexion. Suffering, Saha argues, is socially relative; it relates to value structures more than mere physical discomfort. If all were of the highest or lowest varna, there would be neither pride nor striving, neither bragging nor lamenting. The metaphysical discussion on suffering, it turns out, is really a commentary on Hindu society.Saha heroically—in the light of modern, especially Western scholarship, which sees Śaṅkara as an arch-conservative proponent of brahminical values—tends to see the Advaitin as a social reformer. In the essay above, he sees ś an.kara as teaching precisely the social lesson against discrimination when he talks of suffering. Saha returns to this theme in "Śaṅkara and Varna Distinctions in Hinduism." He puts forward the argument that since Śaṅkara held that all social distinctions were not ultimate (pāramārthika), and since class/varna distinctions are social ones while liberating knowledge is ultimate, varna is irrelevant to liberation. How those traditionally excluded from brahminical philosophy will respond to this generosity is another matter. [End Page 107]In "Inner Sense and Higher Order Consciousness," Saha usefully explains how Nyāya takes an awareness of awareness to be a matter of inner sense, while Advaita denies this. It is sometimes hard to follow him through the essay, as it is not always clear what is being argued. But the contours of the standard Nyāya and Advaita positions on putative higher-order consciousness are laid out competently. The Nyāya position is clear enough, in that the higher-order awareness is an inner perception, with the mind playing the role of an 'inner' organ for the self. So the self becomes conscious of an object through the mind, and that act of consciousness itself becomes an object of the mind; in the latter instance, the mind functions to generate a higher-order consciousness, taking the first mental state as its object. This is relatively clear, but puts a great burden on Nyāya to give a cogent theory of mind, such that the idea of the mind as an inner sense organ becomes persuasive. But this challenge lies beyond the scope of Saha's essay.Gradually, Saha's argument emerges. Advaita takes the mind to be separate from consciousness, which is the untouched ātman. So, there may well be mental... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācarya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and TranslationDouglas L. BergerThe Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācarya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and Translation. Translated by John Grimes. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004. Pp. xii + 292.The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi or Crown Jewel of Discrimination has for centuries been celebrated as one of the most effective prakaraṇa grantha or independent pedagogical [End Page 616] treatises in the literature of Advaita, the nondualistic school of (...) Vedānta, owing to its straightforward dialogical style and lucid presentation of bedrock theories of the school. It has been ascribed, along with literally hundreds of other works, to the preeminent philosophical commentator in Advaita's illustrious history, Śaṅkara (ca. 650-700 C.E.). Modern lndological scholarship, however, has contested both of these grounds for its fame, calling into question its consistency with the theoretical framework laid down by Śaṅkara as well as its traditional attribution to the hand of the medieval Kerela master.In The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śahkarācārya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and Translation, his recent translation of The Crown Jewel—the tenth made into English—John Grimes sets out to defend the integrity of tradition against modern criticism. Grimes, whose incisive scholarship has given us a number of important works on Advaita such as An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language and Problems and Perspectives in Religious Discourse: Advaita Vedanta Implications, as well as A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy, applies his considerable Sanskrit and Advaita acumen to The Crown Jewel in order to achieve a twofold goal. In the Preface he vows to contribute a readable translation that is attentive to the religious sensibilities and goals of the Vivekac&umacrḍāmaṇi to guide the reader to ultimate wisdom and liberation but also to offer a rendition that speaks to contemporary audiences in an inclusive way, opening the possibility of knowledge of purified Selfhood to male and female readers alike (pp. vii-ix). At the same time, given the length to which he goes concerning this matter in his extensive Introduction, Grimes proves himself keen to show that, despite modern objections and reservations, "a strong case can be made that the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi is a genuine work of Śaṅkara's and that it differs in certain respects from his other works in that it addresses itself to a different audience and has a different emphasis and purpose" (p. 13). What is offered to the modern reader in this translation, then, is a defense of the traditional authorial and authoritative status of this popular Advaita treatise.Grimes' presentation falls into two parts. The first is a fifty-page Introduction that includes the life and teachings of Śaṅkara, a rundown on the basic doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, and reflections on the various approaches to the study of author and school. Much of this Introduction is occupied with the question of whether the historical Śaṅkara actually wrote the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, in a discussion that engages the criteria for reliably attributing a work to him set down by Paul Hacker a half century ago. Here, Grimes immerses himself in a debate in which Hacker came down on the side of Śaṅkara having written the work, while Daniel lngalls and Sengaku Mayeda, following Hacker's own criteria, have rejected this conclusion. Grimes point by point traverses Hacker's criteria of authorship, particularly Hacker's analysis of how Śaṅkara defines basic terms such as avidyā, anirvacanīya, prāgabhāva, and other related concepts in works such his commentary on the Brahmasūtra compared to how these are defined in The Crown Jewel. Grimes concludes minimally that "there is still a likelihood that Śaṅkara is the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi" (p. 23).The second half of the work is the translation itself, which includes the voluminous Sanskrit text in romanized form, Grimes' verse-by-verse rendition, and explications [End Page 617] on the meaning of each verse complete with relevant textual references to the Upaniṣads and a lexicon of important Sanskrit terms.With regard to Grimes' contribution to the intriguing ongoing... (shrink)

The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, (...) but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita). (shrink)