The popularity of Thomas Piketty’s research on wealth inequality has drawn attention to a curious question: why was widening wealth inequality largely neglected by mainstream economists in recent decades? To explore and explain that neglect, I draw on the writing of the early neoclassical economist John Bates Clark, who introduced the notion of the marginal productivity of income distribution at the end of the nineteenth century. I then turn to Piketty’s Capital in order to analyze the salience of marginal productivity (...) theories of income today. I suggest that most of the criticism and praise for Piketty’s research is focused on data that are accessible and measurable, obscuring attention to questions over whether current methods for measuring economic capital are defensible or not. My overarching aim is to explore how “absent” data in economics as a whole help to reinforce blind spots within mainstream economic theory. (shrink)

This paper compares and contrasts the basic income proposal with the alternative policy proposal of the state acting as employer of last resort. Two versions of the UBI proposal are distinguished: one is hard to differentiate from expanded welfare state provision. Van Parijs’s proposal is radical enough to qualify as major egalitarian revision to capitalism. However, while it removes from a capitalist class the power to determine the terms on which others labour, it leaves this class in place and able (...) to exert other powers that distort the macro-economy. These include pecuniary emulation, demand pull inflation, and political resistance to full employment so that the rentier class does not have to contend with entrepreneurs *and* the working class over the distribution of the productive surplus. The state as employer of last resort proposal addresses these deeper issues while also claiming that inflationary pressure will undermine the UBI alternative. (shrink)

‘Rentier capitalism’ is the term increasingly used to describe economies dominated by rentiers, rents, and rent-generating assets. A growing body of scholarship considers how the ownership of such assets by individuals and households is reshaping patterns of class and inequality and accordingly requires the reconceptualisation of the latter phenomena. The significance of company-owned assets and corporate rents for class, inequality and their conceptualisation has not been considered, however. This article offers an exploratory investigation along these lines, highlighting the importance (...) of employees’ working relationship to company-owned, rent-generating assets for their class position. The article further reflects on how developments in this regard might be approached from the perspective of Marx’s writing on value, labour and class, and the challenges that those developments potentially pose to Marxian concepts. (shrink)

Syria’s descent into conflict is receiving growing scholarly attention. On their own, the sectarian and geopolitical interpretations of the Syrian conflict provide us with little understanding of the roots of the conflict. Recent studies have started to unpack the political economic and socioeconomics aspects of the conflict, highlighting issues such as the economic reforms in the 2000s, rising inequality, and climate change. This article aims to contribute to this growing literature by placing these issues in a broader analysis of Syria’s (...) political and economic institutions. It argues that the movement of 2011 should be seen as an unorganized protest movement driven by the consolidation and institutionalization of multisectarian elite rule through the economic reform process that started in the 2000s, following the expiration of the “developmental rentier fix” that had ensured authoritarian stability in Syria in earlier decades. (shrink)

Alfred Stepan’s “twin-tolerations” thesis (2000) is a model for explaining different ways that religious and political authority come to be reconciled. In this paper, we investigate some obstacles and challenges to realizing a reconciliation between religious and political authority in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that might result in a transition away from a theocratic monarchy to a more consultative form of political authority. Whereas most analyses of religion and politics in KSA focus on geopolitics, the rentier state (...) model, or economic and military aid from the United States, we also consider local factors that emphasize the agency of political and non-political actors within KSA, focusing in particular on education policy and how this policy is a barrier to political reform. Our position is not meant to replace the standard models, but rather to supplement them by offering a multi-variable perspective on the challenges and prospects for meaningful political reform in KSA. (shrink)

The current crisis is one outcome of the financialisation of contemporary capitalism. It arose in the USA because of the enormous expansion of mortgage-lending, including to the poorest layers of the working class. It became general because of the trading of debt by financial institutions. These phenomena are integral to financialisation. During the last three decades, large enterprises have turned to open markets to obtain finance, forcing banks to seek alternative sources of profit. One avenue has been provision of financial (...) services to individual workers. This trend has been facilitated by the retreat of public provision from housing, pensions, education, and so on. A further avenue has been to adopt investment-banking practices in open financial markets. The extraction of financial profits directly out of personal income constitutes financial expropriation. Combined with investment-banking, it has catalysed the current gigantic crisis. More broadly, financialisation has sustained the emergence of new layers of rentiers, defined primarily through their relation to the financial system rather than ownership of loanable capital. Finally, financialisation has posed important questions regarding finance-capital and imperialism. (shrink)

This paper explores what it takes for research laboratories to produce valuable knowledge in academic institutions marked by the coexistence of multiple evaluative frameworks. Drawing upon ethnographic fieldwork carried out in two UK-based epigenetics research laboratories, I examine the set of practices through which research groups intertwine knowledge production with the making of scientific, health, and wealth value. This includes building and maintaining a portfolio of valuable resources, such as expertise, scientific credibility, or data, and turning these resources into assets (...) by carefully organizing and managing their value. Laboratories then put these assets to productive use within and outside their labs toward the creation or extraction of value. I identify two models for producing value within academic science: a commodity-based model whereby laboratories mobilize their assets to produce results, which can be converted into publications for the accumulation of credibility capital, and a rentier model of accumulation whereby laboratories own valuable assets, which they rent out to others outside their lab against revenue. Following recent developments in Science and Technology Studies on value production in the bioeconomy, I argue that the concepts of asset and rent are essential analytical tools for getting to grips with the origins of value within academic science. (shrink)

Finance orthodoxy views finance capital as privately supplied, inherently scarce, and limited to assets accumulated by rentiers and held in financial institutions to be “intermediated” between virtuous savers and needful end users. But this “intermediated scarce private capital” orthodoxy is false and profoundly antagonistic to both democracy and productive investment. This article offers a more accurate portrayal that captures the critical role the public plays in generating and allocating its own full faith and credit in monetized form. The financial system (...) then looks like a franchise arrangement in which the public is franchiser and the institutions dispensing its full faith and credit are its franchisees. A post-capital-scarcity account of publicly underwritten finance explicitly recognizes both the propriety and the necessity of the public’s taking an active role in modulating and allocating its credit aggregates across the economy it constitutes. (shrink)

This study investigates potential differences in attitudes towards corporate social responsibility between Saudis and Muslims from other predominately Islamic countries. We propose that Saudi Arabia’s unique rentier-state welfare and higher education systems account for these distinctions. In evaluating our propositions, we replicate Brammer et al. :229–243, 2007) survey on attitudes towards CSR using a sample of Saudi undergraduate and graduate business students and compare the results against data from subjects in other majority Muslim countries. In addition, this work examines (...) possible differences within the Saudi sample with respect to sex and academic level. Our results indicate that our Saudi subjects maintain higher expectations for corporations’ social responsibility within their supply chain than the Brammer et al.’s sample. In contrast, Muslims in the Brammer et al.’s sample hold higher expectations for corporations in supporting societal development and poverty alleviation in comparison to the Saudi sample. We also find within the Saudi sample that females and subjects at higher academic levels are more inclined to hold corporations responsible for social issues related to CSR than males and subjects in lower academic levels. We examine these findings, explore their implications, and propose areas for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 1, April 1994, pp. 143-149 David Hume and Public Debt: Crying Wolf? JOHN CHRISTIAN LAURSEN and GREG COOLIDGE David Hume's views on public credit have not only received prominent attention in the literature on his political thought, but have even been the subject of attention in The Wall Street Journal.1 Most of the attention has centered on Hume's essay "Of Public Credit" of 1752, (...) and treats it only as an expression of ideas, without relating it to the historical facts. This note lays out Hume's views on this matter throughout his lifetime, and juxtaposes them with figures for the actual public debt, carrying the story down to the twentieth century. Public debt as we know it only goes back about 300 years. The British government in the 1690s was the first modern government to establish enough genuine credit that private citizens would loan it money without having to be compelled.2 At the turn of the century, in the year 1700, the British public debt amounted to 14.2 million pounds sterling.3 As early as 1741, Hume was already worrying about the public debt in the essay "Of Liberty and Despotism" (later changed to "Of Civil Liberty"). In the last paragraph of that essay, he wrote of the "degeneracy" brought about by public debt, suggested that debt-service "taxes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, and all the property of the state be brought into the hands of" the government. If it is not curbed, we may come to "curse our very liberty," he wrote.4 That year, the national debt totaled 48.8 million pounds (45.2 million in 1701 pounds5). John Christian Laursen and Greg Coolidge are at the Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521 USA. Laursen e-mail: [email protected]. 144 John Christian Laursen and Greg Coolidge Hume's essay of 1752, "Of Public Credit, " was devoted entirely to criticism of the public debt (Essays, 349-365). His thoughts on public credit at this time can be summed up in this ominous warning: It must, indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation. (Essays, 360-361) Hume acknowledged that the use of public credit could benefit the economy in some ways: more men with large stocks and incomes, may naturally be supposed to continue in trade, where there are public debts; and this, it must be owned, is of some advantage to commerce, by diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging industry. (Essays, 354) But the many disadvantages would outweigh such advantages (Essays, 354355 ): 1) "It is certain, that national debts cause a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital," making the head too large for the body. 2) Public stocks "banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state." 3) The taxes levied to pay the interest oppress the poorer people. 4) "As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our industry." 5) Public credit encourages an idle and useless rentier class. All of this pales, however, in comparison to the political consequences. From the point of view of the body politic, public credit was a threat to the security of the state. It would die a natural or a violent death. In wartime, or some national emergency, the funds necessary for the functioning of the economy would be diverted to other purposes. The economy, now dependent on credit, would crumble. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the natural death of public credit. (Essays, 363) Hume Studies David Hume and Public Debt: Crying Wolf? 145 Another scenario would occur if the government became too indebted to intervene in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Our children, weary of the struggle, and fettered with encumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbors oppressed and conquered ; till, at last, they themselves... (shrink)

When E. M. Forster published the novel Howards End in 1910, it was at the height of ‘the inheritance society’, and the gulf between rich and poor was great and problematic; a fact that Forster was very well aware of. Yet in spite of this, the main character in Howards End, Margaret Schlegel, is a financially independent rentier living off of the wealth of her ancestors, and her wealth increases when she is named the ‘spiritual heir’ of Ruth Wilcox (...) and thus inherits the house of Howards End. In this study, I argue that Forster shifts the focus from inherited money to inherited values in order to pardon a society of great inequality. Drawing on an aristocratic principle, Forster thus deals with inheritance as an inalienable and spiritual subject rather than as a legal and economic one. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XX, Number 1, April 1994, pp. 143-149 David Hume and Public Debt: Crying Wolf? JOHN CHRISTIAN LAURSEN and GREG COOLIDGE David Hume's views on public credit have not only received prominent attention in the literature on his political thought, but have even been the subject of attention in The Wall Street Journal.1 Most of the attention has centered on Hume's essay "Of Public Credit" of 1752, (...) and treats it only as an expression of ideas, without relating it to the historical facts. This note lays out Hume's views on this matter throughout his lifetime, and juxtaposes them with figures for the actual public debt, carrying the story down to the twentieth century. Public debt as we know it only goes back about 300 years. The British government in the 1690s was the first modern government to establish enough genuine credit that private citizens would loan it money without having to be compelled.2 At the turn of the century, in the year 1700, the British public debt amounted to 14.2 million pounds sterling.3 As early as 1741, Hume was already worrying about the public debt in the essay "Of Liberty and Despotism" (later changed to "Of Civil Liberty"). In the last paragraph of that essay, he wrote of the "degeneracy" brought about by public debt, suggested that debt-service "taxes may, in time, become altogether intolerable, and all the property of the state be brought into the hands of" the government. If it is not curbed, we may come to "curse our very liberty," he wrote.4 That year, the national debt totaled 48.8 million pounds (45.2 million in 1701 pounds5). John Christian Laursen and Greg Coolidge are at the Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA 92521 USA. Laursen e-mail: [email protected]. 144 John Christian Laursen and Greg Coolidge Hume's essay of 1752, "Of Public Credit, " was devoted entirely to criticism of the public debt (Essays, 349-365). His thoughts on public credit at this time can be summed up in this ominous warning: It must, indeed, be one of these two events; either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation. (Essays, 360-361) Hume acknowledged that the use of public credit could benefit the economy in some ways: more men with large stocks and incomes, may naturally be supposed to continue in trade, where there are public debts; and this, it must be owned, is of some advantage to commerce, by diminishing its profits, promoting circulation, and encouraging industry. (Essays, 354) But the many disadvantages would outweigh such advantages (Essays, 354355 ): 1) "It is certain, that national debts cause a mighty confluence of people and riches to the capital," making the head too large for the body. 2) Public stocks "banish gold and silver from the most considerable commerce of the state." 3) The taxes levied to pay the interest oppress the poorer people. 4) "As foreigners possess a great share of our national funds, they render the public, in a manner, tributary to them, and may in time occasion the transport of our people and our industry." 5) Public credit encourages an idle and useless rentier class. All of this pales, however, in comparison to the political consequences. From the point of view of the body politic, public credit was a threat to the security of the state. It would die a natural or a violent death. In wartime, or some national emergency, the funds necessary for the functioning of the economy would be diverted to other purposes. The economy, now dependent on credit, would crumble. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins. And this, I think, may be called the natural death of public credit. (Essays, 363) Hume Studies David Hume and Public Debt: Crying Wolf? 145 Another scenario would occur if the government became too indebted to intervene in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. Our children, weary of the struggle, and fettered with encumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbors oppressed and conquered ; till, at last, they themselves... (shrink)

La conjoncture historique qui a vu naître le capitalisme cognitif trouve son origine dans une transformation radicale du rapport capital/travail. À la suite de cette transformation, l'ensemble des normes fordistes-industrielles qui ont structuré l'organisation sociale de la production, la valorisation du capital ainsi que la répartition du revenu entre salaire, rente et profit, en sont sorties profondément modifiées. C'est pourquoi, dans cette majeure, nous avons tenté d'établir un état des lieux de l'avancement de la recherche autour de questions cruciales, celles (...) en particulier qui nous mènent à nous interroger sur les relations entre la montée de la dimension cognitive et immatérielle du travail, d'une part, et l'essor d'une économie de rente, d'autre part. Le développement du capitalisme cognitif est en fait allé de pair avec un puissant processus de financiarisation de l'économie ; il s'est aussi, plus généralement, accompagné d'une multiplication des formes de la rente. Cette évolution du capitalisme contemporain est souvent interprétée à travers une grille de lecture de type néo-ricardien qui tend à opposer le ' bon ' capitalisme productif de l'âge d'or du fordisme au ' mauvais ' capitalisme rentier de ' l'actuel régime de croissance financiarisé '. Selon cette approche, c'est notamment le pouvoir de la finance qui, en établissant de nouvelles règles de gouvernance des firmes, aurait été le facteur premier de la crise de la régulation fordiste du rapport salarial et de la fin des politiques de plein-emploi. Aussi dans ce numéro l'idée est-elle de prendre à contre-pied ce schéma d'analyse en partant du rôle moteur des transformations de l'organisation sociale du travail, pour comprendre, à la lumière de la thèse du capitalisme cognitif, l'essor de la finance et le retour en force de la rente. Nous essaierons aussi d'identifier sur cette base les processus de recomposition sociale susceptibles d'entraver la logique de la rente et d'impulser un processus de réappropriation du commun. (shrink)

L’histoire économique nous enseigne que si le progrès technique ne profite pas à tous les travailleurs lorsqu’il apparaît, à long terme il est le facteur principal de la hausse extraordinaire des salaires et du niveau de vie que l’économie mondiale a connue depuis la révolution industrielle. Pourtant, les progrès de la robotique pourraient bien remettre en question cet optimisme et donner raison aux Cassandre qui prophétisaient la fin du travail. En effet, le champ de ces technologies ne cesse de progresser, (...) au point où la totalité des tâches effectuées par les humains serait robotisable. Si c’est le cas, l’économie et la société en seraient profondément transformées. On considère six scénarios. Dans trois d’entre eux, une classe humaine quasi-oisive se maintient grâce à des transferts prélevés sur la production effectuée par les robots. Ces transferts peuvent s’effectuer à travers l’État-Providence, le clientélisme d’une oligarchie possédant les robots, ou le maintien néo-fordiste d’emplois tertiaires dont la fonction essentielle serait le versement d’un salaire qui permettrait le maintien du pouvoir d’achat. En l’absence de mécanismes redistributifs, on envisage trois autres scénarios. Selon le scénario des rentiers, une classe de propriétaires de robots émerge, suffisamment nombreuse pour s'opposer politiquement à des transferts redistributifs. Selon le scénario malthusien, le salaire tombe au niveau du salaire de subsistance et la population humaine diminue, ne laissant subsister qu’une classe de rentiers vivant de la possession de robots. Selon le scénario virtuel, le salaire de subsistance lui-même baisse considérablement sous l’effet des nouvelles technologies : la population se maintient en dépit des baisses de salaire. (shrink)

In a larger context of an egalitarian project which aims to reformulate capitalism a job guarantee program in the form of a State as an Employer of Last Resort is considered superior to Unconditional Basic Income by many, namely Alan Thomas. This article claims that most of the arguments used to assert the superiority of SELR fail their objective, for the following reasons: first, SELR falls short in its reformulation of capitalism because neither SELR nor UBI alone can euthanize the (...) rentier class. Second, most accounts are based on a flawed assumption that UBI leads to rampage inflation. Third, if macroeconomic considerations are not enough to justify implementing SELR over UBI, then insisting on the superiority of SELR can only stem from two types of moral reasons: on one hand from a perfectionist view of empowering the worst-off through labor and on the other from demands and obligations of reciprocity. We argue that these two moral-based reasons fall short of providing a justification for the superiority of SELR over UBI. We conclude our paper defending the possibility of conciliating the two policies. (shrink)

Marshall's asset equilibrium model provides a way of explaining the identity of entrepreneurs. Keynes adopted this model but transformed it when he emphasized the short-period and volatile character of long-term expectations. This entails a view of entrepreneur identity in which radical uncertainty plays a central role. This in turn deepens the post Keynesian view of uncertainty as ontological in that entrepreneurs' survival plays into their behavior. This paper explores this role-based view of individual identity and uses the analysis to comment (...) on Keynes’s ideas for the socialization of investment and euthanasia of the rentier in the last chapter of The general theory. (shrink)

Les historiens de la philosophie s'intéressent beaucoup à la logique mais assez peu, au total, à la logistique. Primum vivere, deinde philosophari, dit la sentence latine : 'D'abord vivre, ensuite philosopher.' Certes, mais pour vivre, encore faut-il avoir de quoi vivre. Les philosophes, de quoi vivaient-ils? Étaient-ils riches ou pauvres? Vivaient-ils de leurs écrits? Comment négociaient-ils leurs droits d'auteur? Étaient-ils rentiers, héritiers ou bien étaient-ils obligés de travailler à côté? Étaient-ils pingres ou généreux avec les autres? Et comment ont-ils pensé (...) l'argent dans leurs textes théoriques? Que penser enfin de certaines tendances contemporaines du 'business de la pensée' chez les intellectuels? C'est à ce questions, et à quelques autres, que ce livre entend fournir des éléments de réponse en proposant à travers une galerie de portraits qui va de Platon à Sartre jusqu'aux philosophes actuels une réflexion sur la vie matérielle des penseurs."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article examines the political economy of French imperialism from a critical Marxist perspective. It demonstrates how France has maintained a major role on the international scene, especially militarily, despite experiencing a relative decline in world economic power since the 1990s. In this regard, three features have marked the French imperial project: the core role of state institutions and corporate elites in making French capitalism, and the protracted closeness of the state-capital nexus; the strength of militarism in economic, political, and (...) social realms; and the consolidation of rentier interests not only in the corporate power bloc, but also at a political level. Over the past century, these three dynamics have underpinned and reinforced a particular project of empire in France – one that bears relevance to current debates on globalisation and the ‘new imperialism’. By examining these issues, this paper seeks to further develop the Marxist theory of international political economy. (shrink)

Le tome 2 du Traité des vertus, intitulé Les Vertus et l'Amour, est consacré à la description des " vertus ", depuis celle du commencement jusqu'à celle de la terminaison, en passant par celles de la continuation et de la conservation. Il distingue en outre deux plans tout à fait hétérogènes : celui des vertus de l'intervalle, que l'homme peut " posséder " et " garder ", mais qui, à peine acquises, tournent en mécanique vertueuse, radotage, complaisance pharisienne et hypocrisie (...) ; et les vertus de pointe que l'homme ne possède jamais, qu'il effleure seulement, d'une tangence impondérable, le temps d'une étincelle et d'une " apparition disparaissante ". Vaut-il mieux être au premier sens, un rentier de la vertu et un vertueux gredin, ou, au sens métempirique, le saint ou le héros d'un instant? L'amour résout peut-être, dans une certaine mesure, cette alternative, qui est aussi celle du bonheur et de la joie. (shrink)

Using a case study of Alberta, Canada, this paper demonstrates how a geographic critique of fossil capitalism helps elucidate the tensions shaping tar sands development. Conflicts over pipelines and Indigenous territorial claims are challenging development trajectories, as tar sands companies need to expand access to markets in order to expand production. While these conflicts are now well recognised, there are also broader dynamics shaping development. States face a rentier’s dilemma, relying on capital investments to realise resource value. Political responses (...) to the emerging climate crisis undercut the profitability of hydrocarbon extraction. The automation of production undermines the industrial compromise between hydrocarbon labour and capital. Ultimately, the crises of fossil capitalism require a radical transformation within or beyond capital relations. To mobilise against the tar sands, organisers must recognise the tensions underpinning it, developing strategies that address ecological concerns and the economic plight of those dispossessed and abandoned by carbon extraction. (shrink)

By a "developed" economy, people roughly mean ones with a high, persistently-growing per-captia income which is not simply based on resource extraction (i.e., oil) or remittances or rentierism — an industrial (or, if there is such a thing, post-industrial) economy which makes most of its participants reasonably and increasingly prosperous. While there are of course differences among them --- the United States is not New Zealand, which is not Belgium, which is not Finland, which is not Japan --- they are (...) all more similar to each other than they are to the vast variety of "undeveloped", "under-developed", or (most optimistically) "developing" economies across the world. (Some people refer to the developed countries as "the North" and the others as "the South"; this drives me up the wall, if only from looking at where China and Australia are on the map.) Economies in the first category tend to stay there; so, sadly, do countries in the second. Development economics is the sub-discipline of economics which attempts to study how economies which have not attained this happy condition can be made to do so, and the factors which hold others back. (shrink)

Difference is not an epiphenomenon of socio-spatial relations, but a genuine worldmaking driving-force, provided that it is the handling of difference that paves the way to specific interactions that end up shaping society and, ultimately, space. There exists not merely ‘a world of difference’ but a world because, and out of, differences. This article offers a neo-Hegelian analysis of the spatial basis of politico-economic and ethnic-social differences, making use of the striking example of anti-difference violence suffered by indigenous peoples under (...) the hegemony of financial-rentier capitalism. There are two main pillars of socio-spatial difference, ethnicity and class, which co-determine each other and eventually result in hybrid, ethnoclass differences held by all humans and according to their specific and general circumstances. The socio-spatial trajectory of the Guarani-Kaiowa indigenous nation, in the center of Brazil, is emblematic of the dialectical basis of ethnoclass differences, and also of the political potentiality of difference. (shrink)