Goethe's objections to Newton's theory of light and colours are better than often acknowledged. You can accept the most important elements of these objections without disagreeing with Newton about light and colours. As I will argue, Goethe exposed a crucial weakness of Newton's methodological self-assessment. Newton believed that with the help of his prism experiments, he could prove that sunlight was composed of variously coloured rays of light. Goethe showed that this step from observation to theory is more problematic than (...) Newton wanted to admit. By insisting that the step to theory is not forced upon us by the phenomena, Goethe revealed our own free, creative contribution to theory construction. And Goethe's insight is surprisingly significant, because he correctly claimed that all of the results of Newton's prism experiments fit a theoretical alternative equally well. If this is correct, then by suggesting an alternative to a well-established physical theory, Goethe developed the problem of underdete... (shrink)

The book is an introductory exposition of the development of the physical and astronomical notions of the universe. It covers the period from Greek antiquity to the Copernican revolution and the Renaissance, half of the text being devoted to medieval science within both the Aristotelian and the Archimedean traditions. The book is intended for a general audience interested in intellectual and scientific developments, but should also be useful as a guide to further studies. Thus it has an extensive bibliography classifying (...) much of the secondary literature on the subject, and also a sixty page 'dictionary' of all the scientists and philosophers mentioned in the text. This contains references to printed editions of the sources and to a selection of books and periodicals. (shrink)

Theory of illness causation is an important issue in all biomedical sciences, and solid etiological explanations are needed in order to develop therapeutic approaches in medicine and preventive interventions in public health. Until now, the literature about the theoretical underpinnings of illness causation research has been scarce and fragmented, and lacking a convenient summary. This interdisciplinary book provides a convenient and accessible distillation of the current status of research into this developing field, and adds a personal flavor to the discussion (...) by proposing the etiological stance as a comprehensive approach to identify modifiable causes of illness. (shrink)

In this article the authors focus on the emergence, or disappearance, of notions of responsibility in social dynamic processes. Hence, the starting point in this article is concrete behavior within organisational settings. This article presents a systematic overview of mechanisms related to acting upon a sense of moral responsibility. Some of these mechanisms are based on individual characteristics, others are embedded in the social context wherein responsible behaviour emerges or disappears. In this article, various mechanisms are identified and labelled in (...) order to analyse what types of processes are behind the mechanisms. In this way, the article yields important understandings for the conscious use of these mechanisms to strengthen responsible behavior within organisations. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In Word and Object, he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy – particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). Conclusion: We can have well-defined notions of synonymy and analyticity even if we embrace Quine's holism, naturalism, behaviorism, and radical translation. Quine's meaning skepticism is to be repudiated on Quinean grounds. (shrink)

Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do. If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an (...) ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. My reasoning against ideal utilitarianism will parallel Putnam's famous argument against the brains in a vat. Putnam argues that an envatted brain cannot describe its own situation because its words do not refer to brains and vats; I argue that an ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. (shrink)

Quine claims that holism (i.e., the Quine-Duhem thesis) prevents us from defining synonymy and analyticity (section 2). In "Word and Object," he dismisses a notion of synonymy which works well even if holism is true. The notion goes back to a proposal from Grice and Strawson and runs thus: R and S are synonymous iff for all sentences T we have that the logical conjunction of R and T is stimulus-synonymous to that of S and T. Whereas Grice and Strawson (...) did not attempt to defend this definition, I try to show that it indeed gives us a satisfactory account of synonymy. Contrary to Quine, the notion is tighter than stimulus-synonymy -- particularly when applied to sentences with less than critical semantic mass (section 3). Now according to Quine, analyticity could be defined in terms of synonymy, if synonymy were to make sense: A sentence is analytic iff synonymous to self-conditionals. This leads us to the following notion of analyticity: S is analytic iff, for all sentences T, the logical conjunction of S and T is stimulus-synonymous to T; an analytic sentence does not change the semantic mass of any theory to which it may be conjoined (section 4). This notion is tighter than Quine's stimulus-analyticity; unlike stimulus-analyticity, it does not apply to those sentences from the very center of our theories which can be assented to come what may, even though they are not synthetic in the intuitive sense (section 5). (shrink)

Two decades after the publication of Clifford and Marcus' volume Writing Culture, this collection provides a fresh and diverse reassessment of the debates that ...

It is shown that the method of operationaldefinition of theoretical terms applied inphysics may well support constructivist ideasin cognitive sciences when extended toobservational terms. This leads to unexpectedresults for the notion of reality, inductionand for the problem why mathematics is sosuccessful in physics.A theory of cognitive operators is proposedwhich are implemented somewhere in our brainand which transform certain states of oursensory apparatus into what we call perceptionsin the same sense as measurement devicestransform the interaction with the object intomeasurement results. Then, (...) perceivedregularities, as well as the laws of nature wewould derive from them can be seen asinvariants of the cognitive operators concernedand are by this human specific constructsrather than ontologically independent elements.. So, reality in so far it isrepresented by the laws of nature has no longeran independent ontological status. This isopposed to Campbell's `natural selectionepistemology'. From this it is shown that thereholds an incompleteness theorem for physicallaws similar to Gödels incompletenesstheorem for mathematical axioms, i.e., there isno definitive or object `theory of everything'.This constructivist approaches to cognitionwill allow a coherent and consistent model ofboth cognitive and organic evolution. Whereasthe classical view sees the two evolutionrather dichotomously. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that Ted Poston's theory of explanatory coherentism is well-suited as a tool for causal explanation in the health sciences, particularly in epidemiology. Coherence has not only played a role in epidemiology for more than half a century as one of Hill's viewpoints, it can also provide background theory for the development of explanatory systems by integrating epidemiologic evidence with a diversity of other error-independent data. I propose that computational formalization of Hill's viewpoints in an explanatory (...) coherentist framework would provide an excellent starting point for a formal epistemological (knowledge-theoretical) project designed to improve causal explanation in the health sciences. As an example, I briefly introduce Paul Thagard's ECHO system and offer my responses to possible objections to my proposal. (shrink)

Strategische Kommunikation zielt mit ihren kontingenten Wirklichkeitsbeschreibungen seit jeher auf gesellschaftliche Wahrheitsmodelle. Wie häufig gesellschaftliche Wahrheitsmodelle auf strategische Kommunikationsbemühungen zurückgehen, auf Unwahrhaftigkeit beruhen und damit zumindest zeitweise zu strategischen Wahrheiten werden, zeigen eindrucksvoll zwischenzeitlich geglaubte Wahrheiten, die sich als Lüge entpuppt haben: von Walter Ulbrichts "Niemand hat die Absicht, eine Mauer zu errichten" über Hitlers Tagebücher bis hin zu den Massenvernichtungswaffen im Irak. Die erfolgreichen Kampagnen der Brexiteers und von Donald Trump 2016 haben diesem Thema zu neuer und bislang ungeahnter (...) Aufmerksamkeit verholfen. Während die Themen Desinformation und postfaktische Gesellschaft die Journalismus-, politische Kommunikations- und Medienethikforschung aktuell zu dominieren scheinen, ist das Schweigen der deutschsprachigen und internationalen PR- und Organisationskommunikationsforschung auffällig. Dies ist umso bemerkenswerter, weil die PR-Wissenschaft in der Vergangenheit immer wieder versucht hat, ihren Gegenstand zu schärfen, indem sie sich am Begriff der Propaganda abgearbeitet hat. Daraus müsste eigentlich eine Affinität für das Thema Desinformation resultieren. Aber genau das Gegenteil ist offensichtlich der Fall: Hat sich die PR-Wissenschaft gerade deshalb nicht mit Desinformation beschäftigt, weil sie sich so dezidiert von Propaganda und darin eingeschlossenen desinformierenden und manipulativen Techniken abgrenzen will? Was sind die Gründe hierfür? Glauben wir, bereits alles zum Thema gesagt zu haben? Liegt dies daran, dass sich die PR- und Organisationskommunikationsforschung seit jeher vor allem für Unternehmen und weniger für politische und Non-Profit-Organisationen interessiert? Oder fühlen wir uns hier schlicht und ergreifend nicht zuständig? Es scheint offenkundig höchste Zeit zu sein, sich wieder eingehend mit Fragen der Desinformation aus der Perspektive der strategischen Kommunikationsforschung zu befassen. Die Beiträge des Tagungsbandes fokussieren hierzu auf neue theoretische Perspektiven, normative Bewertungen und empirische Befunde. (shrink)

Models of illness causation play a crucial role in medicine and public health. In their recent paper on this topic, Michael Kelly, Rachel Kelly, and Federica Russo state that the integration of social, biological, and behavioral causes in one and the same etiologic mechanism remains to be clarified. In particular, they think that current models of illness causation do not appreciate "the truly integrated nature of bio-social-behavioral pathogenesis". In brief, Kelly, Kelly, and Russo suggest that two levels of explanation are (...) at work in medicine and public health, biological and social; that integration is difficult because of resistance to including social determinants of disease in both the... (shrink)

The intention of the article is to offer stakeholders affected by mergers a criterion from which moral arguments may be generated for the organization of each individual case. The criterion: "Any operation causing legitimate interests to suffer vital infringement should be avoided in a merger process." A vital infringement of these interests is assumed when the merger undermines unique positive opportunities or considerable impairment in the future, impossible to overcome for the person affected without an unacceptable level of difficulty. Therefore, (...) we mainly concentrate on implicit contracts – which should be based on the principle pacta sunt servanda as well. These contracts are mandatory to run an economy that produces increasingly more knowledge-based goods. (shrink)

Bradford Hill (1965) highlighted nine aspects of the complex evidential situation a medical researcher faces when determining whether a causal relation exists between a disease and various conditions associated with it. These aspects are widely cited in the literature on epidemiological inference as justifying an inference to a causal claim, but the epistemological basis of the Hill aspects is not understood. We offer an explanatory coherentist interpretation, explicated by Thagard's ECHO model of explanatory coherence. The ECHO model captures the complexity (...) of epidemiological inference and provides a tractable model for inferring disease causation. We apply this model to three cases: the inference of a causal connection between the Zika virus and birth defects, the classic inference that smoking causes cancer, and John Snow’s inference about the cause of cholera. (shrink)

Seeing that socio-legal theory has produced a number of compelling grand theories about law’s development as a body of knowledge, this contribution analyzes legal evolution on the micro-level of decision-making in concrete cases. To that end, law finding is reconstructed as a three stage process of reason-based rule-construction. Legal evolution is argued to stem from the argumentative jumps that are made in this process in order to use what is initially drawn from the body of legal knowledge in new cases. (...) These jumps are justified by additional reasoning that plays a crucial role in that it brings new information to the law finding process. It is explained how this new information gets incorporated in the body of knowledge as a result of discursive maneuvers of legal practitioners. (shrink)

In relation to the Kantian theory that moral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores how moral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground of moral judgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of the moral imaginary is (...) argued to stem from a divided mind. It allows moral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses to moral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres. (shrink)

In relation to the (neo-)Kantian theory that moral judgments are imaginarily grounded, this contribution explores how moral agents experience and make use of this imaginary groundedness. Drawing from a strand of aesthetics that conceives of imagination as make-believe, the imaginary ground of moral judgment is theorized to stem from the interaction between active participants who pretend that their claims are grounded, and passive participants who are invited to go along. Based on this reconstruction, the experience of the moral imaginary is (...) argued to stem from a divided mind. It allows moral agents to be partly devoted to the mental and communicative attitude fitting the fictional world of groundedness, and partly to generating personal responses to moral claims. Using the experience of artistic fiction as an example, the actual experience of morality’s imaginary ground is finally located in the interplay between those two spheres. (shrink)

Constitutionalism is a typically modernist project in that it seeks to dictate social order by means of institutional design. This project, however, fails in two ways. Empirically, constitutionalism is confronted with the fact that constitutions have limited control over their social environment. Epistemologically, constitutionalism has great difficulty in finding a convincing foundational relation between abstract constitutional provisions and constitutional norms for concrete situations. On the basis of this poor record, it is hard to comprehend how constitutionalism remains such an influential (...) factor in our polity. This article tries to explain our adherence to the philosophy of constitutional ordering by analysing its function in constitutional discourse. (shrink)

The search for causes of perinatal brain damage needs a solid theoretical foundation. Current theory apparently does not offer a unanimously accepted view of what constitutes a cause, and how it can be identified. We discuss nine potential theoretical misconceptions: (1) too narrow a view of what is a cause (causal production vs. facilitation), (2) extrapolating from possibility to fact (potential vs. factual causation), (3) if X, then invariably Y (determinism vs. probabilism), (4) co-occurrence in individuals vs. association in populations, (...) (5) one cause is all that is needed (single cause attribution vs. multicausal constellations), (6) drawing causal inferences from very small numbers of observations (the tendency to generalize), (7) unstated causal inferences, (8) ignoring heterogeneity, and (9) failing to consider alternative explanations for what is observed. We hope that our critical discussion will contribute to fruitful research and help reduce the burden of perinatal brain damage. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGDie Kirche sieht sich in der Zuständigkeit für die Verwaltung des Transzendenten. Gestützt auf die Genesis erhebt sie aber auch den Erklärungsanspruch für die Entstehung der irdischen Welt. Jedoch weicht sie hier mehr und mehr der naturwissenschaftlichen Konkurrenz. Selbst die Evolutionstheorie wird heute nicht mehr rundweg abgelehnt. Die Neubewertung des Realitäts-begriffs und der Naturgesetze durch die evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie zeigt jedoch, dass auch der Erklärungsanspruch empirischer Weltbilder überdacht werden muss, was nicht ohne Einfluss auf das Verhältnis zu den religiösen Weltbildern bleibt.Viel (...) gravierender jedoch kann die Tendenz werden, dass sich die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Religion und Wissenschaften immer mehr von den Naturwissenschaften zu den Sozialwissenschaften verlagert. Probleme der physischen Naturbeherrschung sind heute sehr viel weiter gehend gelöst als die Probleme der sozialen Umwelt. Schon heute ist das zentrale Paradigma der Menschheit die Bewältigung sozialer Probleme. Die Beherrschung des Klimas zum Beispiel, von der Sache her ein physisches Problem, wird mehr und mehr zum sozialen Problem. Wollen die Kirchen hier als gestaltende Kraft mithalten, müssen sie sich von der auf die Bibel gestützten Angebotsorientierung fortentwickeln zu der Nachfrageorientierung politischer Parteien und anderer Sozialorganisationen. Das könnte sich zur Bedrohung der theologischen Bedeutung der Kirchen entwickeln. SUMMARYThe church sees itself as the general administrator of the transcendent. But at the same time, based on the genesis, it claims as well the competence to explain the creation of the physical world. Here, however, it recoils more and more from the natural sciences. Even the idea of biological evolution is no longer flatly rejected. However, the reinterpretation of the natural laws and the notion of reality within the framework of the evolutionary epistemology show that the explanatory power of the natural sciences is no longer unquestionable. This, no doubt, has consequences for the relationship of natural and transcendental sciences.Of far more impact, however, can be the trend that the dispute between religion and sciences is shifting from the nature sciences towards the social sciences. Problems we have with our natural environment and to be solved by nature sciences are replaced more and more by problems we have with our social environment and to be solved by the social sciences. Already nowadays the central paradigm of mankind is the solution of social problems. Mastering the climate, for example, though primarily a physical problem becomes more and more a social subject. If the churches want to keep up here they have to shift from the supply orientation as provided by the bible towards the demand orientation presented by political and other social organisations. This could begin to threaten the theological importance of the churches. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to survey the correspondence between bounded arithmetic and propositional proof systems. In addition, it also contains some new results which have appeared as an extended abstract in the proceedings of the conference TAMC 2008 [11].Bounded arithmetic is closely related to propositional proof systems; this relation has found many fruitful applications. The aim of this paper is to explain and develop the general correspondence between propositional proof systems and arithmetic theories, as introduced by Krajíček and (...) Pudlák [46]. Instead of focusing on the relation between particular proof systems and theories, we favour a general axiomatic approach to this correspondence. In the course of the development we particularly highlight the role played by logical closure properties of propositional proof systems, thereby obtaining a characterization of extensions of EF in terms of a simple combination of these closure properties (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 14-37.