Summary Recent research has highlighted the risk of HIV infection for married teenage women compared with their unmarried counterparts (Clark, 2004). This study assesses whether a relationship exists, for women who have completed their adolescence (age 20–29 years), between HIV status with age at first marriage and the length of time between first sex and first marriage. Multivariate analysis utilizing the nationally representative 2004 Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey shows that late-marrying women and those with a longer (...) period of pre-marital sex have the highest risk of HIV. Although women in urban areas overall marry later than their rural counterparts, the positive relationship between age at marriage and HIV risk is stronger in rural areas. The higher wealth status and greater number of lifetime sexual partners of late-marrying women contribute to their higher HIV risk. Given that the age at first marriage and the gap between first marriage and first sex have increased in recent years, focusing preventive efforts on late-marrying women will be of much importance in reducing HIV prevalence among females. (shrink)

It is estimated that 15% of the world’s population experiences some form of disability. Disability itself is a hurdle in living and surviving. The vulnerable is always a victim of the situation. Discrimination in accessing human rights is experienced very commonly and again the condition of physically challenged women is worst. In India, still, a girl child is looked upon as unwanted and if she is disabled then is more avoided and neglected. Divyaang women and girls face double standards, which (...) lead to gender-based violence, sexual harassment, injustice, exploitation, and abuse. They face inequalities in education, health care, employment as a means of livelihood and social, civic opportunities and community participation, social stigma, lack of housing, and lack of spouse. This paper aims at knowing the marital status of disabled women/girls. Whether the disabled men accept Divyaang women/girls as wives, and how their husbands, children, and in-laws treat Divyaang women/girls is also an aim of the paper. (shrink)

Clare Chambers argues that marriage violates both equality and liberty and should not be trecognized by the state. She shows how feminist and liberal principles require creation of a marriage-free state: one in which private marriages, whether religious or secular, would have no legal status.

Though its actual nature and content remain debatable, the importance of love in human relations is indubitable. This paper attempts an exploration of the phenomenon of love in the institution of marriage in Esan traditional culture. It questions the reality or ontology of love or its epistemic content within the said culture. In other words, the question is, is there love in the Esan traditional marriage system? If there is none, then it is an ontological issue. And if (...) there is, with what epistemological framework can it be accessed? To this end, the paper employs what could be regarded as a working definition of love which could include notions such as commitment, care, intimacy, and self-giving. With this understanding, the paper interrogates the doctrine of love among the Esan people and sets out how gender is implicated in the conception of love and marriage in traditional Esan society. (shrink)

: Gay marriage highlights a contradiction in American national identity: if gay marriage is supported, the normative status of the heterosexual nuclear family is undermined, while if not, the civil rights of homosexuals are undermined. This essay discusses the feminist dilemma of whether to support gay marriage to promote these individual civil rights or whether to critique marriage as a part of the patriarchal system that oppresses women.

Gay marriage highlights a contradiction in American national identity: if gay marriage is supported, the normative status of the heterosexual nuclear family is undermined, while if not, the civil rights of homosexuals are undermined. This essay discusses the feminist dilemma of whether to support gay marriage to promote these individual civil rights or whether to critique marriage as a part of the patriarchal system that oppresses women.

Citizenship and marriage are legal statuses that generate numerous privileges and responsibilities. Legal doctrine and argument have analogized these statuses in passing: consider, for example, Ted Olson’s statement in the Hollingsworth v. Perry oral argument that denying the label “marriage” to gay unions “is like you were to say you can vote, you can travel, but you may not be a citizen.” However, the parallel between citizenship and marriage has rarely been investigated in depth. This paper investigates (...) the marriage-citizenship parallel with a particular focus on three questions prompted by recent developments in law and policy: -/- 1) Should we provide second-best statuses? Some couples — in particular gay and lesbian couples — have been offered permanent statuses, like civil unions, that bear legal privileges but fall short of full marriage equality. In contrast, similar differentiations within citizenship are generally resisted. The history of citizenship may presage the increasing unacceptability of differentiations within status in the gay marriage context. Meanwhile, the history of marriage equality efforts may help present-day citizenship advocates choose legal strategies. -/- 2) Should statuses be a gateway to rights? Some early gay rights advocates unsuccessfully argued that advocates should challenge the primacy of marriage, rather than seek access to the institution. Advocates attempting to expand the rights of current noncitizens face similar choices: should they seek to give current noncitizens greater access to citizenship, or challenge the reservation of important rights to citizens? -/- 3) Can status relationships be plural? Many critics of dual and multiple citizenship argued that allegiance to multiple states was immoral, unadministrable, or both. More recently, polygamous marriage has become a topic of legal and political discourse, first as a foil in anti-gay marriage arguments and later as a political possibility in its own right. I consider whether polygamous marriage advocates can profitably draw on arguments for multiple citizenship, and how multiple-citizenship advocates should responsibly respond to the analogy with polygamy. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether there a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the "marriage" business by leveling down to a universal civil union or "registered domestic partnership" status. Removing the symbolism of the term "marriage" from political conflict, privatizing it in the same way as religion, would have the advantage of both consistency and political reconciliation. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both (...) legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. One potentially surprising conclusion of this inquiry is that far from creating strong reasons for tolerating these practices, religious or cultural reasons for valuing incest (as well as polygamy) actually seem to count against tolerating them. The reason is that from a liberal perspective, tolerating polygamy and incest involves the assumption that it is possible to disassociate polygamy and incest simpliciter from abusive practices associated with them, including environments where children are raised to devalue their own sexual (and other) autonomy. However, the presence of comprehensive doctrines which include polygyny or incest as part of a good life actually makes it harder to justify disassociating polygamy and incest themselves from the likely abuse and coercion practiced by those who would value polygyny or incest. (shrink)

Many theorists have recently observed that the response to the same-sex marriage controversy most congruent with basic liberal principles is neither the retention of the institution of marriage in its present form, nor its extension so as to include same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones, but rather the ‘dis-establishment’ of marriage. Less commonly observed, however, is the fact that there are two competing models for how the state might effect a regime of disestablished marriage. On the (...) one hand, there is a ‘deflationary’ approach, on which the state ceases to confer marital status, but does remain in the status-conferring business. On this approach, the state would still bestow a certain ‘thinner’, more ‘neutral’ legal status – as it does when it creates civil unions, for instance. Call this the ‘Status Model’ of disestablished marriage. On the other hand, there is an ‘eliminativist’ approach, on which the state ceases to confer any sort of status at all – not even the thin or neutral status of ‘civilly-unioned’. There simply are no registered domestic partnerships. What there is, is contract law, and individuals entering into contracts for life-partnership – contractual arrangements which might assume any of a wide variety of forms. Call this the ‘Contract Model’ of disestablished marriage. In this paper, I explore the merits of these competing models. After briefly discussing what it means to speak of ‘disestablishing marriage’, and examining the case for disestablishment, I proceed to consider the advantages and disadvantages of each model. My tentative conclusion is that the Contract Model is the one that best instantiates cardinal liberal virtues. (shrink)

This paper is the first to critically analyse how the newly enacted Chinese Civil Code addresses gender equality in the intersection of family and commercial contracting. It proposes ‘marriage transmitted debt’ (MTD) in China as a new concept as opposed to ‘sexually transmitted debt’ (STD) documented in English and Australian jurisprudence. MTD refers to the debt incurred by one spouse but transmitted to the other spouse due to the status of the marriage. Supported by empirical statistics, it (...) shows that while the statutory language of MTD regulation in China is neutral, wives are still disadvantaged. Although this has been partly addressed by shifting the onus of proof to creditors, the meaning of debt incurred for the daily life of a family or the joint life of the couple in the Code needs further judicial development. The Code is the beginning of a solution rather than the end to achieving gender equality in China. (shrink)

This paper sets out the case for abolishing state-recognized marriage and replacing it with piecemeal regulation of personal relationships. It starts by analysing feminist objections to traditional marriage, and argues that the various feminist critiques can best be reconciled and answered by the abolition of state-recognized marriage. The paper then considers the ideal form of state regulation of personal relationships. Contra other recent proposals, equality and liberty are not best served by the creation of a new holistic (...) status, such as civil union, nor by leaving regulation to private contracts. Instead, the state should develop piecemeal regulations that apply universally. (shrink)

Oregon State University, USA, andrew.valls{at}oregonstate.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> In this article, we draw an analogy between the regulation of market language (including official definitions of `organic', `ice cream', and `diamond') and the regulation of the social and legal label `marriage'. Many of the issues raised in the debate over same-sex marriage are less about access to material benefits than about the social and cultural meaning of `marriage'. After reviewing the issues (...) in this debate, we present an analysis of the regulation of language in the marketplace. We discuss the considerations that shape how the state regulates language in the marketplace, if it regulates it at all. Using this framework to analyze the issue of same-sex marriage allows us to identify the costs and benefits of different proposals with regard to marriage, and allows us to distinguish issues that are often conflated. Contrary to its opponents, we argue that making marriage available to same-sex couples does not violate the meaning of `marriage' or destroy marriage, because such a change is similar to many other changes in which words and labels are extended to include new `goods'. This alters the meaning, but does not destroy it, and it does not preclude the possibility of further linguistic innovation to maintain a distinction. Contrary to proponents of same-sex marriage, however, we argue that extending marriage to same-sex couples is not cost-free. There are costs and benefits of any policy on this issue — costs and benefits related to information and status, as well as material resources. Hence, while we agree with advocates of same-sex marriage, we argue that their position involves trade-offs and costs that they sometimes fail to recognize. Key Words: gay marriage • marriage • language regulation. (shrink)

This article explores the influence of marriage on the health choices and status of 30 British Asian mothers in Leicester, UK. While marriage was firmly on the agenda of earlier research on health, it is no longer seen as important due to changes in family formations. Studies that do exist are mainly quantitative in focus. While these are useful, they fail to thoroughly explore women’s social circumstances and also tend to over-generalize, often under-representing ethnic minority women within (...) their research. Taking a qualitative approach and focusing on women from an ethnic minority group, this article aims to explore the influence of marriage and social context on women’s health. The article will show that for many women marriage still matters regarding their health; its effects are diverse, socially embedded and change over time. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the relationship between marriage and equality in Giambattista Vico. In his writings Vico gives the notion of marriage a unique importance, not framed on any oversized notion of nature or natural law but on the political fight for the right to marry (a quest for full citizenship status). The right to marry is linked with complex dynamics of human equality, and to a notion of human nature shaped by belief-dependent institutions.

A familiar theme in Greek myth is that of the deadly gift that passes between a man and a woman. Analysis of exchanges between men and women reveals the gendered nature of exchange in ancient Greek mythic thinking. Using the anthropological categories of male and female wealth , it is possible to arrive at an understanding of the protocols of exchange as they relate to men and especially to women. These protocols, which are based in part on the distinction between (...) metals and other durable goods as "male" and textiles as "female," are closely related to the gendered division of labor. Anxiety about women as exchangers derives in part from their status as objects exchanged in marriage , and partly from a misogynist and pessimistic strand of Greek thought that discounts any female economic contribution to the oikos. Indeed, the majority of destructive exchanges take place within the context of marital crisis. While some texts, beginning with the Odyssey, show the positive side of women's economic role, tragedy tends to follow the Hesiodic distrust of women as exchange partners. Passages from the Agamemnon and the Trachiniai are analyzed to show how in situations of perverted reciprocity brought about by marital discord, even women's traditional gifts of textiles may become deadly. (shrink)

This paper argues that the four most plausible arguments compatible with public reason for an outright legal ban on all forms of polygamy are unvictorious. I consider the types of arguments political liberals would have to insist on, and precisely how strongly, in order for a general prohibition against polygamy to be justified, while also considering what general attitude towards "marriage" and legal recognition of the right to marry are most consistent with political liberalism. I argue that a liberal (...) state should get out of the "marriage business" by leveling down to a universal status of "civil union" neutral as to the gender and affective purpose of domestic partnerships. I then refute what I regard as the four most plausible rational objections to offering this civil union status to multi-member domestic partnerships. The most common objection to polygamy is on grounds of gender equality, more specifically, female equality. But advancing this argument forcefully often involves neglecting the tendency of political liberalism (by whatever name it goes in contemporary, complex, multicultural societies) to tolerate a certain amount of inequality in private, within the bounds of robust and meaningful freedoms of choice and exit. Properly understood, polygamy involves no inherent statement about the essential inferiority of women, and certainly not more than many other existing practices and institutions (including many expressions of the main monotheistic religions) which political liberals regard as tolerable, even reasonable. Arguments from the welfare of children, fairness in the spousal market, and the abuse of family subsidies are also considered and found insufficient for excluding polygamy. (shrink)

Little is known about the lives of the never married. Demographic data show that rates of nonmarriage have increased significantly across racial and ethnic groups. Among women, African Americans have the highest rates of nonmarriage, followed by Asian Americans and European Americans. This research used in-depth interviews with native- and foreign-born Chinese American and Japanese American never married women to explore why these women are delaying or rejecting heterosexual marriage. Respondents were asked a series of open- and closed-ended questions (...) about their attitudes, experiences, and decisions concerning marriage and family life. Questions also focused on how their family backgrounds and occupational plans affected their decisions to marry. Preliminary findings reveal that Chinese American and Japanese American women express a number of reasons for being never married. The four most consistent factors were their parents' marriages, their status as the eldest or only daughter, their educational goals, and the perceived lack of suitors. (shrink)

Shiʿi jurists have three different theories with regard to gestational surrogacy and who should be recognized as the mother of the newborn: (1) the surrogate mother (2) or the ovum provider (biological mother) (3) or both of them. The religious law (al-Aḥkam al-sharʿi) regarding the title of ‘mother’ and issues such as inheritance, will (Waṣiya), marriage, and custody have been discussed by Shiʿi jurists but no exact definition of this term has been provided by them. Because the fertilized ovum (...) is considered the origin of humans and the formation of an embryo also determines the kinship of the newborn, the mother of the child is the woman that fetus created by her ovum. It is this woman who has all the rights and responsibilities of a mother; even if the surrogate mother is considered the mother of the child, she has no rights over the child nor does she have any duties towards him/her. (shrink)

A recent case in the Northern Territory of Australia has raised the issues of intra-racial rape and the legal recognition of traditional marriages between Indigenous people. The defendant in the Jamilmira case was charged with statutory rape of a 15-year-old girl. He argued that the girl’s status as his promised wife should lead to mitigation of his sentence. Members of the Northern Territory judiciary and others in the community were divided in their response to his claim. Ultimately the case (...) led to reform of the law in relation to the recognition of traditional marriage, a response which outraged some members of the Indigenous community. In this article I examine the various representations of culture and individuals that were utilised by ‘the law’ and how these representations informed the legal response. In the process I question the limits of my own role as a ‘white middle-class feminist’ in the context of explorations of law and culture. Is there a space to become involved in these debates without being complicit in fostering racism and prejudice and without reverting to stereotypes and cultural arrogance? (shrink)

Das jüdische Eherecht ist eines der religiösen Rechtsfelder, die Rabbiner in ihrer Praxis am meisten beschäftigen. Im Staat Israel ist das jüdische Familienrecht bis heute für die Regelung von Eheschließung und Scheidung zwischen Juden relevant. Das Buch führt in das Jüdische Recht insgesamt und in seine Entwicklung in den verschiedenen Strömungen des Judentums ein. Es folgt ein Überblick über Brautwerbung, Verlobung, Details der Eheschließung wie Zeugenregeln und Festsetzung des Trautermins sowie Eheverbote. Dabei werden die Themen Jüdischer Status, Mischehe und (...) Übertritt zum Judentum ebenso behandelt wie die Entwicklung von der Polygamie zur Monogamie und die Leviratsehe. Welche besonderen Regeln gelten für Angehörige der Priesterkaste? Was beinhaltet der Ehevertrag, die Ketubba? Warum wird bei der Trauung ein Glas zerbrochen, was hat es mit dem Ehering auf sich und mit den Segensprüchen während der Eheschließung? Welche ehelichen Pflichten bestehen nach erfolgter Eheschließung, und können gleichgeschlechtliche Paare heiraten? Auch die Auflösung der Ehe durch Scheidung wird eingehend behandelt, Abfassung und Wortlaut des Scheidebriefes sowie die rechtlichen Folgen einer Scheidung werden erläutert. Das Buch richtet sich insbesondere an Rabbiner in der Gemeindepraxis, an Experten des kanonischen und kirchlichen Rechts und an Juristen, die sich mit vergleichendem Familienrecht beschäftigen. Auch Theologen und Judaisten lesen das Buch mit Gewinn. (shrink)

In Feminism and the Power of Law Carol Smart argued that feminists should use non-legal strategies rather than looking to law to bring about women’s liberation. This article seeks to demonstrate that, as far as marriage is concerned, she was right. Statistics and contemporary commentary show how marriage, once the ultimate and only acceptable status for women, has declined in social significance to such an extent that today it is a mere lifestyle choice. This is due to (...) many factors, including the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1960s, improved education and job opportunities for women, and divorce law reform, but the catalyst for change was the feminist critique that called for the abandonment (rather than the reform) of the institution and made the unmarried state possible for women. I conclude that this loss of significance has been more beneficial to British women in terms of the possibility of ‘liberation’ than appeals for legal change and recognition, and that we should continue to be wary of looking to law to solve women’s problems. (shrink)

This research is a needs analysis to develop a marriage education program to be held in the TRNC. The aim of the research is to compare the views of married and divorced individuals about marriage education and to determine their needs for marriage education. For this purpose, it has been determined in which subjects they see themselves as sufficient or inadequate, in which subjects they are willing to participate in the training and in which subjects they are (...) unwilling. In this study, embedded design, one of the mixed research methods in which qualitative and quantitative methods are used together, was used. The dominant dimension of this study is the qualitative research method, and the supporting dimension is the quantitative research method. In the qualitative aspect of the research, the sample group was studied with 16 married and divorced participants living in the TRNC. In the quantitative dimension, a total of 385 married or divorced participants were consulted using the sample calculation of unknown universe. The findings are as follows; In both quantitative and qualitative dimensions, the majority of the participants think that if marriage education is given, they can have a healthier and happier marriage. Married and divorced individuals, effective communication, ways of conflict resolution, respect for differences in understanding in raising children, the causes and consequences of cheating, the importance and functions of the family, expectations from marriage and spouse, the processes experienced by new couples, attitudes and behaviors that may adversely affect marriage, power balance and marital status. They stated that they wanted to receive training on adjustment, relations with families in marriage, marriage and business life, anger control, coping with violence and prevention, spending habits and its effects on marriage, effects of financial difficulties on marriage, sexual life and problems in marriage. A training program will be developed for these determined subjects and will be applied to 20 participants in a semi-experimental model through the TRNC Ministry of National Education. The marriage psycho-education program to be prepared will be developed on the basis of a cognitive behavioral approach. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory predicts that humans should avoid incest because of the negative effects incest has on individual reproduction: production of defective offspring. Selection for the avoidance of close-kin mating has apparently resulted in a psychological mechanism that promotes voluntary incest avoidance. Most human societies are thought to have rules regulating incest. If incest is avoided, why are social rules constructed to regulate it? This target article suggests that incest rules do not exist primarily to regulate close-kin mating but to regulate (...) inbreeding between more distant kin and sexual relations between affinal relatives. Three evolutionary hypotheses about cousin marriage and affinal kin mating follow from this suggestion: Rules regulating mating between affinal kin are means of paternity protection. Cousin marriage is regulated because, if it occurs, it can concentrate wealth and power within families to the detriment of the powerful positions of rulers in stratified societies and the relatively equal social statuses of most men in egalitarian societies. Tests using the comparative method on a worldwide sample of 129 societies supported the three hypotheses. Two alternative anthropological hypotheses failed to be supported. (shrink)

Late last year the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law definition of marriage and the statutory marriage formula was unconstitutional as it violated the rights of such couples to equality. The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to enact new legislation to correct the defects, failing which certain words would be read into the legislation to accommodate same-sex marriage. A single judge (...) dissented on the issue of remedy, finding that the Court should have developed the common law to include same-sex couples within the definition of marriage and read the necessary wording into the legislation with immediate effect. The decision is the culmination of a legal struggle by gays and lesbians for recognition of their relationships and the protection of their rights. While the scope of the right to marry may have been extended, the rights of domestic partners lag behind, often to the detriment of women in these relationships. (shrink)

What role should the state have in recognizing and regulating marriage? Until recently, liberal political theorists paid little attention to this question. Yet the challenges that the public–private boundary-crossing institution of marriage poses to liberalism are substantial. Tensions in contemporary debates suggest that these challenges remain unaddressed and thus, invite attempts to formulate a coherent and compelling model of the relationship between marriage and the liberal state. This article responds to this invitation. Marriage has long been (...) a concern of at least some liberal thinkers. Typically they focused on the dual character of marriage, or its role in producing gender inequality. While these critical insights are essential to any adequate account of marriage and the state, they are only part of the picture. To grasp the sources of confusion and silences in contemporary debates, and formulate a robust liberal model of marriage and the state, we must examine the functions — intended and effective — of public recognition of marriage. This examination highlights the relevance to the marriage-state relationship of familiar liberal approaches to negotiating the religion-state relationship. Drawing on these approaches and liberal feminist thought, I sketch a model of marriage and the state that aims to expand the area of protected freedom without sacrificing equality, fairness or marriage. Under the model I propose, marriage would be disestablished. The state would neither confer marital status, nor use 'marriage' as a category for dispersing benefits. Legitimate public welfare goals currently treated through marriage would be addressed through an intimate caregiving union status. (shrink)

On November 4, 2008 California voters passed Proposition 8, and accordingly same-sex marriage was banned under the state constitution. Proposition 8 is now being considered by the Supreme Court. The proposition has sparked national debate about the nature of the relationship between the state and citizens’ sexuality and corresponding rights; calling into question the practice of allocating rights and privileges on the basis of sexuality and family form. Proponents of the proposition, who can be classified as predominantly socially conservative, (...) want to maintain the status and privileges of marriage for heterosexuals; arguing that allowing same-sex marriage threatens the legitimacy, sanctity and strength of traditional heterosexual marriage . This article examines the extent to which three Californian pro-same-sex marriage organizations (Equality California, Join the Impact, and the Courage Campaign) have challenged and/or appropriated social conservative and neoliberal discourses in their effort to gain access to the rights and privileges that are currently administered through marriage. (shrink)

Based on interviews with a random sample of white women who are in a second marriage, this article examines changes in women's marital power across marriage, divorce, and remarriage. In some marriages, women's market work is not considered a resource and hence does not have a positive effect on marital power, particularly when husbands are employed in low-status occupations. Conversely, women who are domestically oriented do not necessarily suffer a loss of power. Hochschild's concept of “economy of (...) gratitude” illuminates the way that marital power is affected by the meanings couples assign to women's paid and unpaid labor. Furthermore, women's previous market work and marital and divorce experiences affect the meaning of their paid and unpaid labor upon remarriage, as well as their desire for each. (shrink)

abstract In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex‐same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the ‘marriage’ business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from (...) the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first‐degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

After four decades of China’s family planning policy, the shrinking family size and increasing life expectancy pose special challenges for the one-child generation in terms of providing care for aging parents. The current study explored young adults’ responses to such pressure by examining their concerns about elder care, attitudes toward nursing homes, and living arrangement after marriage in a sample of 473 Chinese working young adults from six cities in China. Results showed that although most of the young adults (...) reported to have thought about the issue of parents’ elder care, the majority did not worry a lot about it. Only children expressed similar levels of worrying as those with siblings did. However, educational level, rather than sibling status, was systematically related to concerns about parents’ elder care and attitudes toward nursing homes. People with higher education tended to worry less about elder care, and were less likely to consider placing parents in nursing homes as a violation of filial piety. Analyses of the married sub-sample revealed that only children were more likely to co-reside with parents after marriage than those with siblings. And the main reason for co-residence was that the younger generation needed their parents’ help for childcare, rather than to better take care of their parents. Implications for parents’ elder care among Chinese only children were discussed. (shrink)

This study focuses on the spatialization and institutionalization of social networks of Russian women who migrated to Turkey via marriage in the last 30 years. Specifically, it investigates how and why their social networks have been changing at the local and transnational levels. We conducted in-depth interviews with 56 women between 2014−2021. Our extensive analysis indicates that despite their newly established status via marriages, the Russian women have weak ties with the locals regardless of the migration period, preferring (...) mostly to engage with other Russian women in Turkey. Even if the different migrant associations established by Russian migrants in Turkey do not actually aim this, they create an effect that increases the social distance with the host society and serves to strengthen the connection between the migrants. Also, unlike pioneer migrants, newer marriage migrants have established strong transnational ties with others living overseas, regardless of their gender or ethnic identity. Further, this study reveals that the migrant women's subjectivity, their spouses’ benefit-oriented negotiation styles, and the state's diaspora policy all shape the women's social networks at different levels. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether the legalization of sex-same marriage implies a right to incestuous marriage. I begin by suggesting that the liberal state get out of the 'marriage' business by leveling down to a universal civil union status. The question is then whether incestuous unions should be both legal and eligible for this status. I argue that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the (...) permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. The objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention in their own right. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

In reply to Jeremy Garrett's criticism of my paper in the July 2009 issue of Public Affairs Quarterly, I, first, clarify my view of the proper status of same-sex marriage in a liberal society. I, second, defend my claim that moral disapprobation of homosexuality may be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying same-sex couples the benefits and protections of the marriage license. Finally, I criticize the view that, as long as marriage is viewed as a contract (...) to be entered into by competent parties, it is not legitimate for the state to provide material and legal support only to contracts in which the parties are opposite-sex couples. (shrink)

If a state with liberal political and justificatory commitments extends benefits of various kinds to persons forming families, what qualifications may such a state place on the right to access to those benefits? I will make two assumptions for the purposes of this paper. The first is the political and justificatory terrain of some form of political or otherwise non-perfectionist liberalism. The assumption is that we are considering the resources and limitations of a community of persons who accept moral pluralism (...) (if not a specific doctrine like the "burdens of judgment"), some priority for individual freedom, and the obligation to justify public coercion and exclusion in terms accessible and fair to all members of morally and culturally diverse society. The second is that it is justified for a liberal state to recognize some forms of domestic partnerships or families in the first place and extend further benefits to them such as tax credits or laws extending (or facilitating the extension of) medical or social insurance. It is, of course, possible to imagine the argument that the liberal state gets out of the marriage business by getting out of it entirely - by extending no recognition or positive rights to families whatsoever beyond negative non-interference rights. I am interested in the dilemma of a society broadly like existing liberal ones which is committed both to subsidizing families and also to justificatory neutrality (expressed in American constitutional legal terms as the requirement of providing a "rational basis" for unequal treatment). Given these assumptions, I believe that the most justifiable policy on liberal grounds is not the institution of "marriage" increasingly open to new constituent relationships but rather a status of "registered domestic partnership" which fulfills the social and moral aims behind subsidizing the family but is entirely neutral not only to the gender or even to the numbers of the partners, but also to the affective and emotional content of domestic life and the purposes behind contracting domestic partnerships. So is there a right to polygamy and incestuous marriage? There is not a specific right to either and thus there is no a priori reason why some restrictions or even prohibitions on them might not be justified, but the same is true for every specific act where a general right to the freedom exists. I argue in this paper, however, that the arguments compatible with public reason for prohibiting them outright, or even for excluding them from the permissible types of legally registered partnerships, are quite weak. I argue that objections to polygamy from (1) female autonomy, (2) damage to children, (3) fairness in the marital market, and (4) the unfair burdening of society are serious and worth refuting, but do not establish a victorious case against multi-member relationships. As to incest, there are two separate questions. The first is whether the new institution of "registered domestic partnerships" should be open to them. The answer to that, given the state's lack of interest in citizens' reasons for forming partnerships and in what they do whilst being registered in one, is clearly "yes." The second is whether, entirely separate from the issue of legal recognition of domestic partnership, the state has a legitimate rational interest in deterring, preventing or punishing consanguineous sexual relations between close blood relations (first-degree incest). Here, the objections to allowing such relations are those from (1) child abuse; (2) unfair burdening of society; and (3) the creation of bad lives. I argue that while rape and other forms of child abuse would be no more legal or tolerated than they are now, the concern about any form of weakening a society's legal and political resources to combat such abuses does indeed register on the justificatory scale, but does not prove that such first-degree incestuous sexual relations are inherently bad enough to warrant intervention. I then argue that the concern about unfairly burdening society with unhealthy persons is not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, but nor is it strong enough to justify an outright prohibition. Finally, I argue that a concern to dissuade persons from creating certain kinds of lives (children with extreme birth defects) is also not as dangerously totalitarian as we might initially fear, and in fact goes further towards explaining why we might have a legitimate interest in intervening. Nonetheless, I argue that the criminalization of such acts only make sense when they are indicators of other offenses, namely negligence or abuse, and it thus seems that the act of consanguineous reproduction is itself insufficient. (shrink)

The present research examined how a preference for influencing the mate choice of one’s offspring is associated with opposition to out-group mating among parents from three ethnic groups in the Mexican state of Oaxaca: mestizos (people of mixed descent, n = 103), indigenous Mixtecs (n = 65), and blacks (n = 35). Nearly all of the men in this study were farmworkers or fishermen. Overall, the level of preferred parental influence on mate choice was higher than in Western populations, but (...) lower than in Asian populations. Only among the Mixtecs were fathers more in favor of parental influence on the mate choice of children than mothers were. As predicted, opposition to out-group mating was an important predictor of preferred parental influence on mate choice, more so among fathers than among mothers, especially in the mestizo group—the group with the highest status. In addition, women, and especially mestizo women, expressed more opposition to out-group mating than men did. (shrink)

Difficulties in the moral assessment of embryo transfer and adoption include distinguishing it from illicit procedures like IVF and cryopreservation, determining the moral status of the human embryo, and reconciling embryo transfer and adoption with the procreative and unitive aspects of marriage. Many scholars who support embryo transfer and adoption limit their discussion to heterologous embryo transfer, the transfer of a genetically unrelated embryo into the uterus of a married woman. In this paper, the author focuses on homologous (...) embryo transfer, the transfer of a genetically related embryo, as a viable option for married couples. It is the responsibility of the genetic mother to implant her embryos regardless of how they were created. When this option is not feasible, heterologous embryo transfer is possible in limited circumstances. (shrink)

Kierkegaard defended romantic motives for marriage at a time in European culture when marriages were still usually arranged for family convenience, status, and social position. The Judge's underappreciated first letter in Either/Or II views romantic love as a bildungs-process that can lead towards neighbor-love, mediating the sharp contrasts that are stressed in his later signed Works of Love.

The concubines, with whom the sultans lived a family life, were classified according to a certain hierarchy in the Harem. The first wives of the sultan and those who gave birth were called Kadınefendi. The other wives with a lower status than the Kadınefendi wives were called Ikbal Hanımefendi. According to Islamic law, marriage with a concubine is not like a marriage with a free woman. If a marriage is desired, the concubine must be freed. Until (...) the 19th century, sultans did not marry their concubines for a few exceptions. In the 19th century, the legal status of concubines in the Ottoman Empire became controversial. The countries of origine changed when the Ottoman Empire was unable to conquer new territory. Consequently, the enslavement procedure of prisoners of war disappeared. Instead, Caucasian immigrants, who had to leave their homeland mainly due to the Russian attacks, gave their daughters to the Ottoman palace so that they would not suffer misery and could reach important positions in the future. Among these were orphans from poor families as well as those from noble Caucasian dynasties. Even though the young women in the palace were called concubines, at least some of them were free/Muslim persons. This meant, that they could not be enslaved according to Islamic law. Although there was no problem for those who served in the palace, a remarkable situation emerged for the would-be spouses of the sultan. Could a woman from a free and Muslim family be the sultan's wife without a marriage bond? Was the limitation of the Kadınefendi numbers to four (in times of Sultan Abdülaziz) due to the Islamic law principle, that a man could marry maximum four wives? Was there a marriage ceremony (nikāh) for Kadınefendi wives? What was the situation of the Ikbal? Satisfactory answers to these questions have not been given yet. However, there are no official records it was claimed that lately sultans married especially their concubines who were Abkhaz descendants and included them among their wives in this way, because they were free and Muslims. Thus, the matter whether Sultan Abdülhamid II's wives were concubines or wedded became the subject of some research today. Memoires claim that almost all of Sultan Abdülhamid's wives were free and of Muslim origin. According to this, it was said that the wives of Sultan Abdülhamid could not have the status of the concubine and that their relationship should have been by marriage. On the other hand, considering that a maximum of four women can be married according to Islamic law, the marriage of the Sultan, who had thirteen wives, raised juristic questions. This problem was most clearly seen in the inheritance case filed by his heirs after the death of Sultan Abdülhamid. In this case, where it was claimed that Sultan Abdülhamid was married to nine wives, no objection was made to that claim. In this study, information about the wives of Sultan Abdülhamid and their legal status was tried to be determined through the documents related to their salaries during the 2nd Constitutional Era. Besides, the issue of nine wedded women, which emerged in the case of Sultan Abdülhamid's inheritance, was evaluated in terms of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). Sultan Abdülhamid was never accused of marriages contrary to Islamic law by his opponents during and after his reign. From this point of view, it can be said that there was no situation contrary to Islamic law regarding the Sultan's harem at that time. This might be due to three possibilities: Firstly, some wives have concealed the truth in the court, which is the weakest possibility according to the data obtained. Secondly, the talaq (divorcement) was hidden by Sultan Abdülhamid and his wives were not aware of it. This possibility has been found to be problematic when evaluated in terms of Hanafi fiqh. Thirdly, the practice of al-nikāh al-tanazzuhī (marriage performed in order to avoid from fornication). Considering the correspondence between the state departments in the period starting with the 2nd Constitutional Monarchy and until the Republic, it is clear that the Kadınefendis were regarded as married wives (their number was limited to four), while the Ikbals were regarded as concubines. From this point of view, it is thought that the most plausible possibility is that the Ikbals were regarded as concubines and their marriages were al-nikāh al-tanazzuhī. (shrink)

In Wilkinson v. Kitzinger, the petitioner (Susan Wilkinson) sought a declaration of her marital status, following her marriage to Celia Kitzinger in British Columbia, Canada in August 2003. The High Court refused the application, finding that their valid Canadian marriage is, in United Kingdom law, a civil partnership. In this note, I focus on Sir Mark Potter’s adjudication of the human rights issues under Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (E.C.H.R.), highlighting (...) his restatement of the ideology of the ‹traditional’ family as natural, normative and desirable. I argue that this case shows that the exclusion of same sex couples from marriage is a feminist issue, because denying same sex couples access to marriage works to sediment patriarchal ideas and re-inscribe gender roles within the family. (shrink)

The article tries to stress the historical nature of the issue about the “legitimacy of Chinese philosophy.” It argues that we are facing an era in which the question will no longer be whether the thoughts of traditional Chinese masters can be comfortably adopted by a foreign “family”; instead, it will be whether we can make the marriage of Chinese traditional thoughts and Western philosophy a constructive process through which philosophy, whether Chinese or Western, can be rejuvenated with renewed (...) legitimacy under the title originally coined by the Greeks, namely the love of wisdom. (shrink)

Following the U.K. Labour government commitment to marriage in the 1998 Green Paper ‘Supporting Families’, Barlow and Duncan produced a robust critique calling for ‘realism’ in recognising that many couples are now choosing not to marry, that too many do not make informed decisions as to whether to marry or not and that, on the basis of their survey, over 40% of respondents believed that some form of family law protection would be available to them, despite their lack of (...) marital status. When added to a concern that economically vulnerable cohabiting women do not receive adequate protection in property law, it seemed all too obvious that the government commitment to marriage should be challenged. In fact, government policy does seem to have shifted somewhat when, partly as a tactical manoeuvre to help the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and specifically recognising concerns with the needs of economically vulnerable parties, the issue was referred to the Law Commission for England and Wales. This places the ‘realism’ arguments firmly within the reform agenda. However, this article argues that there is a need to look more closely at the arguments used by the ‘realists’, in particular at the evocation of the figure of Mrs. Burns. The more contemporary case of Oxley v. Hiscock is used to both raise questions about the socio-economic profiles of cohabitants, as well to question the presentation of property law as failing women (and family law as offering the protection they need). I argue that feminists should take a cautious approach in relation to the seemingly compelling argument that cohabitants will benefit from the extension of aspects of marriage law to cover property issues at the end of a relationship. (shrink)

Saudi Arabia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, it has made general reservations to the effect that where there is a conflict between a Convention article and Islamic Law principles, Islamic Law shall have precedence. The family law rights of women and children in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have been criticised for not reaching the standards set by CEDAW and CRC. This (...) article looks at the internationally set standards of these rights and compares them with the Family Law rules of Islamic Law as applied in Saudi Arabia. The applications in Saudi Arabia are then examined by looking at certain practices, case judgments and recent developments in the country in this field. Amongst these developments are the first case in which a Saudi judge annuls a child's marriage, the first death sentence declared on a father who abused his daughter causing her death, and the Saudi Divorce Initiative which aims to educate women and call for the protection of their rights during marriage and after its dissolution. The article stresses that despite the many improvements, there remains a need for codifying the Islamic Law of Personal Status in Saudi Arabia as this measure would be the basis that defines and protects the rights of women and children in Family Law. (shrink)