In 2013, in accordance with a provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the U.S. government began fining hospitals with “excessive” patient readmission rates. Those working to respond to this issue have identified discharge communication with patients as a critical component. In response to this exigency and to contribute to the conversation in the medical humanities about the field’s purview and orientation, this article analyzes studies of and texts about communication in health and medicine, ultimately arguing that the (...) on-going circulation of compliance rhetoric and assumptions has limited efforts to improve patient communication. The article, furthermore, considers that humanist ideals of agentic action, the patient-centered care movement’s emphasis on the patient, and biomedicine’s tendency to treat evidence-based knowledge as fixed and given may have combined to support a rationale for using patient adherence to treatment guidelines as metrics in measurement studies designed to identify effective communication strategies. Finally, the article proposes that those working in the medical humanities consider the value of interdisciplinary posthumanist scholarship—specifically, its treatment of agency and knowledge as emergent, distributed, and contingent—and its potential to transform or extend in productive ways the conversation about what constitutes effective communication with patients. (shrink)

v. 1. A holy vision for family life -- v. 2. A holy vision for a happy marriage -- v. 3. A holy vision for raising children.

Is it morally acceptable for a couple to adopt a cryopreserved embryo by having it implanted in the wife’s uterus and, after birth, raising the child as their own? Is it morally acceptable for a single woman to do so? Advances in reproductive science have provided the technology to create and preserve embryos but not the means to evaluate the moral implications of the embryo’s status as a person. After examining Church teaching and specific ethical considerations, the author argues that (...) there may be cases in which embryo adoption is licit. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 12.3 : 439–445. (shrink)

Le texte de Hailey est une présentation didactique des 10 principes de justice handie du collectif Sins Invalid. Ceux-ci ont été rédigés en 2015, dans un contexte nord-américain où les milieux de justice sociale peinaient à considérer les effets combinés du racisme et du validisme systémique.

Une nouvelle écrite pour l’anthologie Octavia’s Brood: Science Fiction Stories from Social Justice Movements [enfants d’Octavia: des histoires SF tirées des mouvements de justice sociale], éditée par adrienne maree brown et Walidah Imarisha. L’histoire parle d’un futur dans lequel toutes les personnes handicapées (appelées I. P. ou ImParfait·es) ont été envoyées sur une autre planète où, débarrassées des soldats envoyés pour les surveiller, ielles se sont créé une vie faite d’entraide. Cette vie est menacée par les Parfait·es, qui s’apprêtent à (...) revenir prendre le contrôle et créer une nouvelle dystopie pour eux. (shrink)

Les personnes malades, handicapées et neurodivergentes ne sont pas censées rêver, surtout si elles sont queers et noires ou racisées − nous sommes simplement censé·es être reconnaissant·es que les « normaux » nous laissent vivre. Mais je suis le produit de nombreux rêves handirévolutionnaires queers noirs et racisés et je me consacre à rêver d’autres rêves de femmes racisées queers malades et handicapées.

À l’été 2014, les mouvements Black Lives Matter et Free Palestine convergent. C’est l’occasion pour la théoricienne transdisciplinaire Jasbir K. Puar de réfléchir à la dévalidation forcée des populations racialisées. S’appuyant sur les théories handies décoloniales et crip-of-color, Puar considère la manière dont les corps non-blancs sont exclus de la reconnaissance du handicap. Alors que les meurtres policiers de personnes noires aux États-Unis touchent une large majorité de personnes noires handicapées, et alors que la destruction systématique des hôpitaux palestiniens par (...) Israël apparaît comme une stratégie d’affaiblissement de la population, Puar développe les outils théoriques intersectionnels pour nommer « le droit de mutiler » exercés par les États modernes/coloniaux contre les populations qu’ils subjuguent. Appelant à ne pas se satisfaire des rhétoriques de l’empuissancement et de la fierté handie, ce texte (qui sert d’avant-propos au livre éponyme, Le droit de mutiler. Débilité, capacité, handicap ) jette les fondations théoriques d’une coalition antivalidiste/antiraciste contre les brutalités policières et néocoloniales. (shrink)

Le néologisme dévalider est formé sur le radical « valide » (compris au sens de : validé par le validisme) auquel s’ajoute le préfixe privatif « dé- » (compris au sens de : défaire, déconstruire, détruire). Il reprend et littéralise l’anglais disabled, qui se traduit habituellement en « personne handicapée ». À côté de cette signification ordinaire, les luttes handies se sont emparées du verbe dévalider pour signifier deux aspects contradictoires mais complémentaires. D’un côté, les mondes dévalidés sont les mondes (...) que prépare la lutte anti-validiste, c’est-à-dire une société sans validisme (dé-validé en ce sens qu’il n’est plus rapporté à la norme valide). De l’autre, les mondes dévalidés désignent les mondes que prépare le capitalisme extractiviste, c’est-à-dire des mondes où plus personne ne peut être dit valide (dévalidé en ce sens que tout le monde, bien qu’à des degrés différents, y voit ses capacités déplacées, par exemple en raison de la toxicité de l’atmosphère). Les mouvements pour la justice handie se situent au point de tension entre d’un côté une lutte pour une dévalidation libératrice (contre le validisme qui rend le handicap invivable) et de l’autre une lutte contre la dévalidation forcée (contre l’extractivisme qui exploite la débilitation des vies). Ce texte sert d’introduction à la majeure « Justice handie », qui rassemble des écrits universitaires, militants et poétiques écrits depuis et avec les luttes anti-validistes. (shrink)

Price gouging occurs when, in the wake of an emergency, sellers of a certain necessary goods sharply raise their prices beyond the level needed to cover increased costs. Most people think that price gouging is immoral, and most states have laws rendering the practice a civil or criminal offense. But the alleged wrongness of price gouging has been seriously under-theorized. This paper examines the argument that price gouging is morally objectionable and/or the proper subject of legal regulation because of the (...) context of market failure in which it occurs. It argues that even if claims of market failure or true, they do not generate these normative conclusions. (shrink)

This paper develops my position on the ethics of price gouging in response to Jeremy Snyder's article, "What's the Matter with Price Gouging." First, it explains how the "nonworseness claim" supports the moral permissibility of price gouging, even if it does not show that price gougers are morally virtuous agents. Second, it argues that questions about price gouging and distributive justice must be answered in light of the relevant possible institutional alternatives, and that Snyder's proposed alternatives to price gouging fare (...) worse on the dimension of justice than a system in which goods are allocated by a system of market prices. (shrink)

Price gouging occurs when, in the wake of an emergency, sellers of a certain necessary goods sharply raise their prices beyond the level needed to cover increased costs. Most people think that price gouging is immoral, and most states have laws rendering the practice a civil or criminal offense. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the philosophic issues surrounding price gouging, and to argue that the common moral condemnation of it is largely mistaken. I make this (...) argument in three steps, by rebutting three widely held beliefs about the ethics of price gouging: 1) that laws prohibiting price gouging are morally justified, 2) that price gouging is morally impermissible behavior, even if it ought not be illegal, and 3) that price gouging reflects poorly on the moral character of those who engage in it, even if the act itself is not morally impermissible. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges “Woman has the right to mount the scaffold; she must equally have the right to mount the rostrum” wrote Olympe de Gouges in 1791 in the best known of her writings The Rights of Woman, two years … Continue reading Gouges, Olympe de →.

What, if anything, is wrong with price gouging? Its defenders argue that it increases supply of scarce necessities; critics argue that it is exploitative, inequitable and vicious. In this paper, I argue for its moral wrongness and legal prohibition, without relying on charges of exploitation, inequity or poor character. What is fundamentally wrong with price gouging is that it violates a duty of easy rescue. While legal enforcement of such duties is controversial, a special case can be made for their (...) legal enforcement in this context. This account distinguishes, morally, price gouging by corporations from that of individual entrepreneurs. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In this response, I reiterate my argument that price gouging undercuts the goal of equity in access to essential goods whereas Zwolinski emphasizes the importance of the efficient provision of essential goods above all other goals. I agree that the efficient provision of essential goods is important as I argue for the goal of equitable access to sufficient of the goods essential to living a minimally flourishing human life. However, efficiency is a means to this goal rather than the end (...) itself. Finally, I offer additional arguments against the non-worseness claim. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This commentary develops my position on the ethics of price gouging in response to Jeremy Snyder's article, “What's the Matter with Price Gouging.” First, it explains how the “nonworseness claim” supports the moral permissibility of price gouging, even if it does not show that price gougers are morally virtuous agents. Second, it argues that questions about price gouging and distributive justice must be answered in light of the relevant possible institutional alternatives, and that Snyder's proposed alternatives to price gouging fare (...) worse on the dimension of justice than a system in which goods are allocated by a system of market prices. (shrink)

In this response, I reiterate my argument that price gouging undercuts the goal of equity in access to essential goods whereas Zwolinski emphasizes the importance of the efficient provision of essential goods above all other goals. I agree that the efficient provision of essential goods is important as I argue for the goal of equitable access to sufficient of the goods essential to living a minimally flourishing human life. However, efficiency is a means to this goal rather than the end (...) itself. Finally, I offer additional arguments against the non-worseness claim. (shrink)

An analysis of the contemporary moral debate over price gouging can advance multiple readings of the challenging biblical episode which depicts Jacob's purchase of the birthright. Ethical considerations, such as the maximization of welfare, preservation of choice, and promotion of virtue are evaluated and then applied to the biblical text recounting the sale of Esau's birthright. Did Jacob act ethically in his purchase of ravenous Esau's birthright, or did he seize a propitious opportunity to exploit Esau's predicament? Is Esau responsible (...) for spurning his birthright, or was he misled as he claims Jacob had “supplanted me these two times: he took away my birthright; and, behold, now he has taken away my blessing”? An ethical analysis of Jacob's and Esau's intentions and actions in the transaction uncovers the Bible's position on the sale and on the larger moral debate. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges, though a well-known historical figure, has not been investigated as a philosopher until quite recently. Yet, many of her writings have philosophical import, whether they are written in the genre of the philosophical treatise, drama or political pamphlets. In the three main sections, the author gives an overview of some of her arguments, showing their originality and their relevance to debates contemporary to her and to us. In the introduction, the author addresses the question of genre (...) and argue that Gouges should be read as a philosopher, as well as a playwright and political writer. In the conclusion, the author draws out the relevance of her work for contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

InLe Bonheur Primitif, Olympe de Gouges takes on Rousseau's account of the evolution of human society in his first twoDiscourses, and she argues that primitive human beings were not only happy, but also capable of virtue. I argue that in that text, Gouges offers a contribution to the eighteenth-century debate on human progress that is distinct from Rousseau's in that it takes seriously the contribution of women and families to human happiness and progress. I show how the concept (...) of emulation plays an important role in Gouges's analysis, both in her account of primitive societies and of the theater, and argue that she uses it to bridge the gap between primitive happiness and future progress. (shrink)

In addition to authoring the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of Citizen (1791), for which she is generally known today, Olympe de Gouges devoted several writings to denouncing slavery. In this article, I present the contents of these works by placing them in the context of both the Parisian debate and the situation in the colonies. Furthermore, I highlight the theoretical contribution of these writings with respect to the specific situation of slavery and, more generally, with respect (...) to the question of the universality of human rights. For this purpose, I analyse de Gouges’ reflection on women’s rights and compare her position with that of classical social contract theorists. I conclude by highlighting how de Gouges’ position still provides an effective critique of the pitfalls of a self-proclaimed objective and universal Reason. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic reveals a new phenomenon, unaddressed by the existing literature on “price gouging” in times of emergency. While merchants – getting large remuneration for providing desperately needed goods – evoke public moral outrage for assumed “price gouging”, employees – getting large remuneration for providing desperately needed services – do not cause such outrage but rather experience moral appraisal for their valuable commitment. To address this inherent inconsistency of moral judgment, we propose to embrace insights from research on folk (...) economics. By understanding the folk perception underlying public outrage at “price gougers,” business ethics might better enlighten the moral legitimacy of anti-“price gouging” measures. (shrink)

While many historians and philosophers have sought to understand the ‘failure’ of the French Revolution to thrive and to avoid senseless violence, very few have referred to the works of two women philosophers who diagnosed the problems as they were happening. This essay looks at how Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges theorised the new tyranny that grew out of the French Revolution, that of ‘petty tyrants’ who found themselves like ‘cocks on a dunghill’ able to wield a new (...) power over those less fortunate than themselves. Both offer diagnoses and prognoses that revolve around education. Wollstonecraft argues that a revolution that is not backed by a previous education of the people is bound to result in chaos and violence. Such education, however, must be slow, and it necessitates the reform of the institutions that most shape the public’s character. A revolution, perforce, is fast, and it often takes several years, or even generations before the spirit of the reforms finds itself implemented into new institutions. Olympe de Gouges shares Wollstonecraft’s worry and she observes that the men who were once dominated quickly become tyrants themselves unless their moral character is already virtuous. But the state of being dominated leaves little room for virtue; hence, newly minted citizens need to be educated in order not to replicate the reign of tyranny onto other. Gouges suggests that the answer to the difficulty she and Wollstonecraft highlighted was to educate the people where they could be found: on the streets, or, where they could easily and willingly be gathered: in theatres. By helping organise revolutionary festivals, highlighting the ways in which citizens could be virtuous, and writing plays to awaken their virtue, and proposing a reform of the theatre, so that the production of such plays would be possible, Gouges offered a plan for the civic education of French citizens in the immediate aftermaths of the Revolution. Unfortunately, the chaos she and Wollstonecraft had sought to remedy, led by the cocks or petty tyrants, ensured that they were unable to see through their plans, with Wollstonecraft having to leave Paris and Gouges being sent to the guillotine. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges (Montauban 1748 – Parigi 1793) è generalmente nota come autrice della Dichiarazione dei diritti della donna e della cittadina. Il documento, scritto nel 1791 in risposta alla Dichiarazione dei diritti dell’uomo e del cittadino, mette in luce la parzialità di quest’ultima, che, nonostante le rivendicazioni formalmente universalistiche, fu proclamata esclusivamente “da” e “per” esseri umani di sesso maschile. Nella sua dichiarazione, de Gouges rivendica il riconoscimento dei diritti civili e politici delle donne e anticipa così (...) alcune delle istanze centrali del femminismo. L’approccio di de Gouges, inoltre, pur aderendo al paradigma teorico del giusnaturalismo, si distingue all’interno di quest’ultimo per modernità e coerenza. L’impegno politico e intellettuale di de Gouges non rimase confinato alla rivendicazione dei diritti delle donne. Ella si espresse infatti su molti dei temi centrali del dibattito pubblico francese negli anni della Rivoluzione, tra cui la sanità pubblica e le politiche sociali, la questione del voto per testa o per ordine, l’esecuzione di Luigi Capeto, il divorzio, la schiavitù e la tratta degli schiavi. De Gouges denunciò inoltre le ingiustizie che caratterizzavano la situazione delle donne, degli schiavi, dei meno abbienti, dei malati, delle partorienti, dei figli illegittimi, mostrando le cause strutturali e sociali della loro vulnerabilità. Alcune delle sue proposte furono fatte proprie e realizzate dal governo rivoluzionario, come quella riguardante l’introduzione di una tassa volontaria per risanare le casse statali. La produzione intellettuale di de Gouges include romanzi e racconti, opere teatrali, saggi filosofici, pamphlet, lettere aperte e altri scritti brevi, e consta di circa 150 opere. Il suo impegno politico, che in lei si saldò sempre strettamente al lavoro intellettuale, le costò infine la vita. Nell’estate del 1793 fu arrestata mentre cercava di affiggere un manifesto dal titolo Le Tre Urne, in cui suggeriva di far decidere al popolo francese quale fosse la forma migliore di governo per la Francia. Dopo alcuni mesi di prigionia e un processo sommario, fu condannata a morte. La sentenza fu eseguita il 3 novembre del 1793. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines Olympe de Gouges’ demands for the rights of woman in her famous but still understudied work Les droits de la femme. A La Reine [1791]. Particular emphasis is put on analysing how she combines her demand for equality with her conception of sexual difference. The article consists of three parts. The first part gives a brief overview of the demands for the equality of the sexes as they were presented in seventeenth-century France and critically reacted (...) upon in eighteenth-century France, not least by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his defence of sexual difference. The second and third parts focus on Gouges’ argumentation. First, by analysing how she argues for women’s active citizenship by criticising the exclusion of women from the public sphere, but without questioning sexual difference as such; and second, by discussing how she redefines the famous slogan of the French Revolution; liberty, equality, fraternity. The conclusion argues that rather than being caught in a paradox of equality and difference, as has been claimed by Joan W. Scott, Gouges did successfully combine the two concepts, even if her interpretation of their relation was excluded from the canon of political theory. (shrink)

The importance of French revolutionary and philosopher Olympe de Gouges as a pioneer of the women’s rights movement is generally recognised today. In contrast, the significance of her thought for practical philosophy has not yet been fully appreciated. This article aims to bring out the relevance of de Gouges’ writings for practical philosophy both historically and systematically. Drawing on her 1791 text The Rights of Women, this article compares de Gouges’ depiction of gender relationships in the private (...) and public spheres with depictions by such classical social contract theorists as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. From a historical perspective, de Gouges’ key contribution consists in pointing to and overcoming the theoretical assumptions that hamper the universality of individual rights. From a systematic perspective, de Gouges provides an account of the relationship between abstract universalism and concrete experiences of inequality that is now more topical than ever. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges publica as Réflexions sur les hommes nègres no ano de 1788. Com ideias abolicionistas, a autora aborda a condição dos escravos negros no Século das Luzes, em um contexto de profusão do ideário dos progressos da razão em todos os campos do saber. Ela evidencia, porém, que os ideais de liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade ainda estavam bastante aquém de serem praticados ao pé da letra.

Paper prepared for the XVIII World Congress of Philosophy, Brighton, U.K.

L’ouvrage comprend une annexe qui présente un document inédit relatif à la fête du 23 mai 1792, en l’honneur du maire d’Étampes, rédigé par Olympe de Gouges et communiqué aux acteurs et actrices de la Comédie française afin d’ordonner le cortège des femmes. Il propose un panorama très complet des éditions des œuvres de madame de Gouges, à laquelle succède une bibliographie critique sur cette auteure ainsi que la liste de ses œuvres présentées par ordre chronologique, avec des (...) commentaires, un... (shrink)

In this article, I present the arguments of three republican women philosophers of eighteenth-century France, focusing especially on two themes: equality (of class, gender, and race) and the family. I argue that these philosophers, Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy, who are interesting and original in their own right, belong to the neo-republican tradition and that re-discovering their texts is an opportunity to reflect on women’s perspectives on the ideas that shaped our current political thought.

Recently there has been an outpouring of consumer frustration over rising food and energy prices. Many politicians railed against “speculators” who allegedly drove up the prices of key necessities. Is speculation unethical? This article reviews the traditional arguments against speculation. Many of the standard criticisms confuse speculation with gambling. In much the same way as ethicists now draw distinctions between usury and normal business interest, we draw a distinction between socially useful speculation and gambling. Gambling involves taking on risk with (...) no plausible expectation of making a profit. Gambling may provide entertainment value to some people, but like other addictive activities causes grave harm to a subset of users. Speculation involves taking on a business risk with a plausible expectation that a profit will result. Speculators provide an important risk bearing service by taking on risks that others do not want. They help markets to function better by helping to incorporate information into prices as well as providing liquidity. Speculators may actually reduce shortages by causing quicker price increases that motivate producers to increase production and consumers to conserve. But even socially useful speculation may have an ethical dark side. Does such speculation cause damage by adding excess volatility to prices? Speculators may contribute to price bubbles. At what point does legitimate speculation become odious “price gouging?” We also draw an ethical distinction between speculation, which seeks to benefit from changing prices, and manipulation, actions taken to push prices away from their economically appropriate levels. (shrink)

Telling the story of three overlooked revolutionary thinkers, Liberty in Their Names explores the lives and works of Olympe de Gouges, Sophie de Grouchy and Manon Roland. All three were thinking and writing about political philosophy, especially equality and social justice, before the French Revolution. As they became engaged in its efforts, their political writing became more urgent. At a time when women could neither vote nor speak at the Assembly, they became influential through their writings. Yet instead of (...) Gouges, Grouchy and Roland, we speak of Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot. -/- Sandrine Bergès examines the lives and writings of these trailblazing women philosophers, and their impact on philosophical thought during the French Revolution. Featuring pictures, a timeline and a bibliography of their works, this book offers exciting new insights into the history of political philosophy and of the French Revolution. (shrink)

SARS-CoV-2 has unleashed an unprecedented global crisis that has caused the demand for essential goods, such as medical and sanitation products, to soar while simultaneously disrupting the very supply chains that allow individuals and institutions to obtain those essential goods. This has resulted in stark price increases and accusations of price gouging. We survey the existing philosophical literature that examines price gouging and identify the key arguments for regulators permitting such behavior and for regulators restricting such behavior. We demonstrate how (...) the existing accounts are designed for localized emergencies rather than global persistent crises such as the coronavirus pandemic. In light of this, we highlight an understudied justification for price gouging that is much more salient during global crises: incentivizing increased production of essential goods. Furthermore, we pinpoint three conditions that help determine whether authorities should restrict price gouging during the coronavirus pandemic and similar global crises. (shrink)

T. A. Gouge has argued that certain explanations in evolutionary biology should be understood as conforming to the so-called ‘narrative’ model of explanation, where the chief distinguishing feature between this model and the well-known ‘covering-law’ model is that this narrative model, unlike the covering-law model, makes no appeal at all to laws. In support of his case Goudge offered an example of an evolutionary explanation which, he claimed, comes closer to the narrative model than the covering-law model. In a recent (...) paper in this Journal I offered a critique of Goudge's model of narrative explanation, and I suggested that there were good reasons for understanding Goudge's example of an evolutionary explanation as making some kind of appeal to laws. (shrink)

Discussions about the morality of slavery are a central part of the history of early modern philosophy. This book explores the philosophical ideas, theories, and arguments that occur in eighteenth-century debates about slavery, with a particular focus on the role that race plays in these debates. This exploration reveals how closely Blackness and slavery had come to be associated and how common it was to believe that Black people are natural slaves, or naturally destined for slavery. The book examines not (...) just well-known authors like David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, but also less widely studied philosophers like Quobna Ottobah Cugoano, Lemuel Haynes, and Olympe de Gouges. By presenting philosophically important aspects of debates about slavery in eighteenth-century North America and Europe, the book aims to be a valuable resource for scholars, instructors, and students who are curious about a topic that historians of philosophy have so far neglected. (shrink)

The arguments for redistribution of wealth, and for prohibiting certain transactions such as price-gouging, both are based in mistaken conceptions of exchange. This paper proposes a neologism, “euvoluntary” exchange, meaning both that the exchange is truly voluntary and that it benefits both parties to the transaction. The argument has two parts: First, all euvoluntary exchanges should be permitted, and there is no justification for redistribution of wealth if disparities result only from euvoluntary exchanges. Second, even exchanges that are not euvoluntary (...) should generally be permitted, because access to market exchange may be the only means by which people in desperate circumstances can improve their position. (shrink)

Olympe de Gouges is known primarily for La Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne (1791), which is her response to the Declaration of the Rights of Man, adopted in 1789 by the National Assembly. Carol Sherman's book, Reading Olympe de Gouges, turns our attention away from normative principles of La Déclaration and directs it toward the ways that de Gouges's other texts challenge the normativity of the dominant social imaginaries of the time. Sherman’s (...) book is required reading for anyone wanting to participate in the debates about whether de Gouges deserves a place the Panthéon, but also in broader discussions about the history of feminism and the French Revolution. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Re-viewed John 0. Nelson It is obviously important for Hume's purposes in the Treatise to maintain that simple ideas are always founded in precedent, resembling impressions;1 andhe explicitly, overandover, doesso, evensometimes being so carried away by this first principle ofhis science of man (T 7) or so careless as to say that not just all simple ideas but all ideas are founded in precedent, (...) resembling impressions. At the same time, as often noted, Hume explicitly maintains that it is possible for there to be a simple idea having no precedent, corresponding impression. He argues: There is however one contradictory phaenomenon, which may prove, that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions... Suppose... a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue... Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, beplac'd before him... Now Iask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himselfthe idea ofthat particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there arefew but will be ofopinion that he can; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions. (T 5) Nowjust prior to this concession (as Cummins calls it ), Hume has said that the full examination ofthis question [the causal relationship between ideas and impression] is the subject of the present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. (T 4) Volume XV Number 2 353 JOHN O. NELSON And just after the same concession, that a simple idea may be raised up which does not have a prior, correspondent impression, Hume says that it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions (T 7). Thus we have Hume explicitly asserting, it seems, both that all simple ideas have precedent correspondent impressions and that they do not. But this, on the face ofit, is an arrant contradiction! Can Hume have Homerically nodded? We have been quoting from the Treatise, but Hume makes the very same contradictory-seeming claims in the Enquiryl A thinker of Hume's acumen might nod for a page or two's quarter hour but not for all of nine years! Moreover, in both places Hume refers to the phenomenon of the impression-less idea ofblue as a contradictory phenomenon, indicating clearly enough that he was himself aware of there seeming to be an inconsistency here in his contentions. What can possibly be going on? Is Hume deliberately being paradoxical? Perhaps trying, for sensation's sake, to shock the reader and so increase sales of his work, as some commentators in the past might have wished to say? But this would be at the expense ofhis own contentions and principles and not the reader's, and not even Hume's bitterest foes and most malicious critics — so far as I know — have ever proposed that Hume would, figuratively speaking, like Oedipus, gouge out his own eyes, even in order to increase sales of the Treatise, nor does it make the slightest sense to think he would. The mystery deepens when we remember that Hume has said, in defining the program of the Treatise, that his intention is to establish the one general proposition that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspondentto them (T4). What astrange way, we want to exclaim, to show that all our simple ideas are derived from correspondent simple impressions by almost immediately afterwards arguing that it is possible to have an idea that has had no correspondent, precedent impression! Such an egregious nonsequitur mightbe expected ofan absolutely incompetent beginner in philosophy, but we are speaking of David Hume, generally recognized as the profoundest and most acute of... (shrink)

How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties? If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue’s borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this “problem of coinciding objects”, this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the (...) piece and the mass supposedly must have, to go on being, are not properties which anything can have necessarily or essentially. Not even having that origin can be essential. There is no object of which the statue is composed, though there are objects (viz., gold atoms) and a kind of stuff (viz., gold) of which it is composed. (shrink)

The renaissance of Aristotelian virtue ethics has produced an extensive philosophical literature that criticizes markets for a lack of virtues. Drawing on Michael Sandel’s virtue-ethical critique of price gouging during natural disasters, we (1) identify and clarify serious misunderstandings in recurring price-gouging debates between virtue-ethical critics and economists. Subsequently, (2) we respond to Sandel’s call for interdisciplinary dialogue. However, instead of solely calling on economics to embrace insights from virtue ethics, we prefer a two-sided version of interdisciplinary dialogue and argue (...) that virtue ethics should embrace economic insights. In particular, we argue that if virtue ethics is to preserve its social relevance under modern conditions, it should re-conceptualize its notion of virtue and re-evaluate the self-interested but effective—and in this sense solidary—help among strangers via markets as virtuous rather than devaluate it as greed, that is, as vicious price gouging. (shrink)