This paper maintains that at the heart of the post-Reformation debates over the extra Calvinisticum lies the question of what it means to name God’s presence in the world – that is, to say where God is. Because the Lutheran position insists that there can be no proper identification of God’s presence in the world that does not take its bearings from talk about Jesus’ presence, it serves as a means of preventing Christian God-talk from becoming detached from the (...) flesh-and-blood realities of human existence. In this way, the denial of the extra Calvinisticum is a corollary of a theology of the cross – that is, the principle that talk about God is normed by the concrete reality of Jesus. At the same time, the Lutheran genus maiestaticum is rejected as making just the sort of move to which Luther himself objected in the doctrine of transubstantiation: a metaphysical explanation of Jesus’ presence in the world rather than a simple appeal to miracle. (shrink)

What does God do with the “holes” or “troumatisms” that comprise the limits of our existence, that “original solitude” whereby we are confronted with the impending annihilation of all sense? Are we left enclosed in it or does God accompany us there? This essay considers to what extent Christ’s descent on Holy Saturday takes part in the extra-phenomenal “impossibility of possibility” of this original solitude. Such a consideration requires distinguishing between that “underworld” Christ descends to on the Second (...) Day from the sin that is the proper domain of “hell.” Christ descending to the underworld marks God entering our finitude so it may be transformed (Holy Saturday) rather than our faults so that we may be resurrected (Last Judgment). Philosophically, Holy Saturday, as the ab-sense and non-sense residing between Crucifixion (Good Friday) and Resurrection (Easter Sunday), exemplifies the extra-phenomenal in which nothing is manifested (phenomenology) nor signified (hermeneutics). This intermediate realm is then one in which God comes to meet us at the limit of our own finitude. (shrink)

This article examines the question of the existence of non-Adamic persons-both terrestrial and extra-terrestrial-in early modern Europe. More particularly it looks at how the existence of non-Adamites seriously called into question the credibility of the central themes of the Christian story of the creation, fall and redemption in Jesus Christ in early modern Europe. It analyses the impact on the Christian view of history caused by the discovery of the inhabitants of the New World, speculations about the (...) polygenetic origins of the human race, and discussions about the plurality of worlds. It concludes with some reflections on the monogenetic and polygenetic accounts of the origin of humans in a post-Darwinian context. (shrink)

Perhaps all concrete phenomena obtain solely in virtue of physical phenomena. Even so, it seems that the world could have been otherwise. It seems that physicalism, if true, is contingently true. In fact, many believe that the actual truth of physicalism allows metaphysically possible worlds duplicating the actual world in all physical respects while containing immaterial extras, e.g. ghosts, spirits, or Cartesian souls, that no physicalist would believe actually exist. Here I focus on physicalism regarding mentality and argue that the (...) doctrine does not allow possible worlds that physically duplicate the actual world while differing mentally. By revealing what physicalism (regarding the mind) does not allow, this essay helps us get clear on what the view really amounts to and why it is contingent. (shrink)

From 1979 to 1999, a heated dispute over the science or pseudoscience of extraordinary power or extrasensory perception took place in China. During these two decades, many so-called “grandmasters” of ESP and Qigong emerged, and millions of people across the country studied with them; this was known as “Qigong Fever” or “ESP Fever.” The supporters of ESP argued that ESP existed, people could cultivate ESP through specific Qigong training, and ESP was a science; whereas the opponents of ESP denied all (...) of these. Both sides of the dispute had many supporters. With the onset of Qigong Fever in China, some Qigong and ESP masters developed their Qigong organizations into Chinese-style religions. Qigong Fever ended when the religions were banned by the Chinese government. The rise of Qigong Fever demonstrated that basic questions about the boundaries between science and pseudoscience were not easy to answer. Different theoretical and practical consequences resulted from different answers to these questions. (shrink)

One obstacle faced by proposals of retrocausal influences in quantum mechanics is the perceived high conceptual cost of making such a proposal. I assemble here a metaphysical picture consistent with the possibility of retrocausality and not precluded by the known physical structure of our reality. This picture employs two relatively well-established positions—the block universe model of time and the interventionist account of causation—and requires the dismantling of our ordinary asymmetric causal intuition and our ordinary intuition about epistemic access to the (...) past. The picture is then built upon an existing model of agent deliberation that permits us to strike a harmony between our causal intuitions and the fixity of the block universe view. I conclude that given the right mix of these reasonable metaphysical and epistemological ingredients there is no conceptual cost to such a retrocausal picture of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Abstract I develop the idea that there exists a special dimension of depth, or of scale. The depth dimension is physically real and extends from the bottom micro-level to the ultimate macro-level of the Universe. The depth dimension, or the scales axis, complements the standard three spatial dimensions. I discuss the tentative qualities of the depth dimension and the universal arrangement of matter along this dimension. I suggest that all matter in the Universe, at least in the present cosmological epoch, (...) is in joint downward motion along the depth dimension. The joint downward motion manifests itself in the universal contraction of matter. The opposite direction of motion, upward the dimension, would cause the expansion of matter. The contraction of matter is a primary factor, whereas the shrinking of space in the vicinity of matter is a derivative phenomenon. The observed expansion of the Universe is explained by the fact that celestial bodies become smaller due to matter contraction, while the overall space remains predominantly intact. Thus, relative to the contracting material bodies, the total span of cosmic space appears to be becoming vaster. I attempt to explain how the contraction of matter engenders the effect of universal gravity. I use over thirty animated and graphical color visualizations in the text to make the explanation of the proposed ideas more lucid. Content Type Journal Article Category Original Paper Pages 1-39 DOI 10.1007/s10516-011-9178-4 Authors A. Alyushin, Department of Philosophy, The Higher School of Economics, 20 Myasnitskaya Street, 101000 Moscow, Russia Journal Axiomathes Online ISSN 1572-8390 Print ISSN 1122-1151. (shrink)

Extra-mathematical explanations explain natural phenomena primarily by appeal to mathematical facts. Philosophers disagree about whether there are extra-mathematical explanations, the correct account of them if they exist, and their implications (e.g., for the philosophy of scientific explanation and for the metaphysics of mathematics) (Baker 2005, 2009; Bangu 2008; Colyvan 1998; Craver and Povich 2017; Lange 2013, 2016, 2018; Mancosu 2008; Povich 2019, 2020; Steiner 1978). In this discussion note, I present three desiderata for any account of extra-mathematical (...) explanation and argue that Baron’s (2020) U-Counterfactual Theory fails to meet each of them. I conclude with some reasons for pessimism that a successful account will be forthcoming. (shrink)

Predicate modal logics based on Kwith non-compact extra axioms are discussed and a sufficient condition for the model existence theorem is presented. We deal with various axioms in a general way by an algebraic method, instead of discussing concrete non-compact axioms one by one.

When proponents of Intelligent Design (ID) theory deny that their theory is religious, the minimalistic theory they have in mind (the mini-ID theory) is the claim that the irreducibly complex adaptations found in nature were made by one or more intelligent designers. The denial that this theory is religious rests on the fact that it does not specify the identity of the designer—a supernatural God or a team of extra-terrestrials could have done the work. The present paper attempts to (...) show that this reply underestimates the commitments of the mini-ID Theory. The mini-ID theory, when supplemented with four independently plausible further assumptions, entails the existence of a supernatural intelligent designer. It is further argued that scientific theories, such as the Darwinian theory of evolution, are neutral on the question of whether supernatural designers exist. (shrink)

The use of language models in Web applications and other areas of computing and business have grown significantly over the last five years. One reason for this growth is the improvement in performance of language models on a number of benchmarks — but a side effect of these advances has been the adoption of a “bigger is always better” paradigm when it comes to the size of training, testing, and challenge datasets. Drawing on previous criticisms of this paradigm as applied (...) to large training datasets crawled from pre-existing text on the Web, we extend the critique to challenge datasets custom-created by crowdworkers. We present several sets of criticisms, where ethical and scientific issues in language model research reinforce each other: labour injustices in crowdwork, dataset quality and inscrutability, inequities in the research community, and centralized corporate control of the technology. We also present a new type of tool for researchers to use in examining large datasets when evaluating them for quality. (shrink)

Bill Anglin has an ingenious argument in support of the classical utilitarian view that there is an obligation to create extra people if the people thus created will, on balance, be happy, and creating them will not reduce the happiness of others by a comparable amount. Ingenious as it is, I believe the argument is fallacious.Anglin's argument rests on a case in which a woman has a choice between having a child whose expected level of happiness is zero or (...) undergoing a minor operation, involving only a tiny amount of unhappiness for herself, and then having a child certain to be very happy. Anglin assumes that the woman ought to have the operation, and I do not think we should quarrel with this assumption.The remainder of the argument is swiftly stated. First Anglin claims that for a utilitarian it must be morally indifferent whether one brings into existence an extra person who would experience neither happiness nor unhappiness at any time in his life, or does not bring anyone into existence. (shrink)

The ontological argument fails because of an operator order switch between (1) “necessarily there is an perfect being” and (2) “there is a being which necessarily is perfect”. Here (1) is trivially true logically but (2) problematic. Since Kant's criticisms were directed at the notion of existence, not at the step from (1) to (2), they are misplaced. They are also wrong, because existence can be a predicate. Moreover, Kant did not anticipate Frege's claim that “is” is ambiguous (...) between existence, predication, identity, and class‐inclusion. To restore the ontological argument, an extra premise is needed to the effect that it is known who the existentially perfect being is. The question is raised whether Kant could have meant the failure of this extra premise by his thesis that existence is not a real predicate. (shrink)

Yagisawa (2005) considers two old arguments against the existence requirement. Both arguments are significantly less appealing than Yagisawa suggests. In particular, the second argument, first given by Kaplan (1989: 498), simply assumes that existence is contingent (§1). Yagisawa’s ‘new’ argument shares this weakness. It also faces a dilemma. Yagisawa must either treat ‘at @’ as a sentential operator occupying the same grammatical position as ‘∼’ or as supplying an extra argument place. In the former case, Yagisawa’s argument (...) faces precisely the problems he concedes that Kaplan’s argument does (§2). In the latter case, though the argument does not face these problems, it renders the sense in which things exist contingently no threat to (E) properly understood (§3). (shrink)

Scholars and policymakers continue to struggle over the meaning of the word “vulnerable” in the context of research ethics. One major reason for the stymied discussions regarding vulnerable populations is that there is no clear distinction between accounts of research vulnerabilities that exist for certain populations and discussions of research vulnerabilities that require special regulations in the context of research ethics policies. I suggest an analytic process by which to ascertain whether particular vulnerable populations should be contenders for additional regulatory (...) protections. I apply this process to two vulnerable populations: the cognitively vulnerable and the economically vulnerable. I conclude that a subset of the cognitively vulnerable require extra protections while the economically vulnerable should be protected by implementing existing regulations more appropriately and rigorously. Unless or until the informed consent process is more adequately implemented and the distributive justice requirement of the Belmont Report is emphasized and operationalized, the economically disadvantaged will remain particularly vulnerable to the harm of exploitation in research. (shrink)

Since Einstein’s failure to define a Grand Unified Theory, physicists have pursued a comprehensive theory explaining nature, a Theory of Everything. But because General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and Cosmology have little in common, defining one theory is an imposing task, having eluded the best scientists for ninety years. So are we close to defining a Theory of Everything? This analysis, after defining requirements, identifies four possible options for a Theory of Everything. Quotes from prominent physicists express divergent views on (...) each alternative.The leading proposal for a Theory of Everything is String Theory, which has possible issues. It requires supersymmetry, has extra compacted dimensions, and is background-dependent. A second less comprehensive theory is Loop Quantum Gravity, which emphases background-independence based on discrete quantum space. Explaining how theories define relationships between spacetime, quantum space, quantum time, and quantum gravity, positions the role of background-independence in proposed theories. If supersymmetry and extra dimensions are discovered, String Theory or a modified String Theory integrated with Loop Quantum Gravity, may be the option. Or, possibly a radically new theory might be developed. Or, as the last option considers, the answer to the question — Does a Theory of Everything exist? — may be no; if so, nature will always be a mystery. (shrink)

In paper [5] it was shown that a great part of model theory of logic with the generalized quantifier Q x = there exist uncountably many x is reducible to the model theory of first order logic with an extra binary relation symbol. In this paper we consider when the quantifier Q x can be syntactically defined in a first order theory T. That problem was raised by Kosta Doen when he asked if the quantifier Q x can be (...) eliminated in Peano arithmetic. We answer that question fully in this paper. (shrink)

Since Einstein’s failure to define a Grand Unified Theory, physicists have pursued a comprehensive theory explaining nature, a Theory of Everything. But because General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and Cosmology have little in common, defining one theory is an imposing task, having eluded the best scientists for ninety years. So are we close to defining a Theory of Everything? This analysis, after defining requirements, identifies four possible options for a Theory of Everything. Quotes from prominent physicists express divergent views on (...) each alternative.The leading proposal for a Theory of Everything is String Theory, which has possible issues. It requires supersymmetry, has extra compacted dimensions, and is background-dependent. A second less comprehensive theory is Loop Quantum Gravity, which emphases background-independence based on discrete quantum space. Explaining how theories define relationships between spacetime, quantum space, quantum time, and quantum gravity, positions the role of background-independence in proposed theories. If supersymmetry and extra dimensions are discovered, String Theory or a modified String Theory integrated with Loop Quantum Gravity, may be the option. Or, possibly a radically new theory might be developed. Or, as the last option considers, the answer to the question — Does a Theory of Everything exist? — may be no; if so, nature will always be a mystery. (shrink)

We discuss experimental support for the existence of a corollary discharge signal of attention movement control and its formulation in terms of the corollary discharge of attention model of attention movement . The data is from fMRI, MEG and EEG activity observed about 200 ms after stimulus onset in various attention paradigms and in which the activity is mainly sited in parietal and extra-striate visual areas. Moreover the data arises from neural activity observed before report of a subject’s (...) experience occurs. The overall experimental support for the existence of a copy of the attention movement control signal generates, it is suggested, a viable route to explore the relation between this signal and human consciousness, as concluded in the paper. (shrink)

It seems so clear that we're supposed to root for humanity and against each and every Xenomorph. Jean‐Paul Sartre's (French philosopher) works on existentialism and Marxism provide a number of insights on topics like secular morality, existence, resistance, and freedom, but Sartre may seem like a strange choice for defending Xenomorphs. Xenomorphs are often treated like animals despite their intelligence. For example, in Alien, the crew of the Nostromo hypothesizes about potential Xenomorph weaknesses. When the Xenomorphs cut the power (...) their behavior suggests tactics and planning, alongside an understanding of the humans' dependence on electricity. Alien: Resurrection and numerous examples from extra‐filmic Alien literature suggest the presence of a Xenomorph hive mind and even telepathy. Xenomorph Queens exhibit intelligence at least comparable to humans, while showing additional traits such as control of the hive‐like mental connection with others of her species and possibly having telepathy. (shrink)

Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant's ‘Only Possible Argument’ for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of Kant's proof, ‘real possibility must be grounded in actuality’, is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be ‘really harmonious’, i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell's reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present ‘real harmony’ as a general condition of real (...) possibility. Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the ‘Grounding Premise’ of the proof. Instead, this premise is sufficiently motivated by what Chignell labels the ‘content’ requirement. Finally, Kant's downgrading of the proof in his Critical period is not based on a concern regarding the real harmony of the predicates of God, but on his Critical restrictions on cognition in general and modal cognition in particular. (shrink)

There exist two methods for finding the magnetic moment of the electron. The first method employed in quantum electrodynamics consists in calculating the energy of the electron placed in a constant magnetic field, the extra energy due to the field being proportional to the magnetic moment. It is also possible to use the second method proceeding from the fact that the asymptotic form of the vector potential at infinity is proportional to the magnetic moment. If the electron were point-like, (...) both the methods would yield identical results. In the present paper is studied the magnetic field created by the electron in hydrogen-like ions, which enables one to find the electron magnetic moment by the second method. The electron magnetic moment in this case proves to be different in different states of the electron in the Coulomb field of the ions and, moreover, is distinct from the magnetic moment calculated by the first method. The results of the paper show that the electron is not small and is deformable under action of external fields. (shrink)

In addition to monocentric eukaryotes, which have a single localized centromere on each chromosome, there are holocentric species, with extended repeat‐based or repeat‐less centromeres distributed over the entire chromosome length. At least two types of repeat‐based holocentromeres exist, one composed of many small repeat‐based centromere units (small unit‐type), and another one characterized by a few large centromere units (large unit‐type). We hypothesize that the transposable element‐mediated dispersal of hundreds of short satellite arrays formed the small centromere unit‐type holocentromere in Rhynchospora (...) pubera. The large centromere unit‐type of the plant Chionographis japonica is likely a product of simultaneous DNA double‐strand breaks (DSBs), which initiated the de novo formation of repeat‐based holocentromeres via insertion of satellite DNA, derived from extra‐chromosomal circular DNAs (eccDNAs). The number of initial DSBs along the chromosomes must be higher than the number of centromere units since only a portion of the breaks will have incorporated eccDNA at an appropriate position to serve as future centromere unit sites. Subsequently, preferential incorporation of the centromeric histone H3 variant at these positions is assumed. The identification of repeat‐based holocentromeres across lineages will unveil the centromere plasticity and elucidate the mechanisms underlying the diverse formation of holocentromeres. (shrink)

I show how existing concepts of supervenience relate to two more fundamental ontological relations: determination and dependence. Determination says that the supervenient properties of a thing are a function of its base properties, while dependence says that having a supervenient property implies having a base property. I show that most varieties of supervenience are either determination relations or determination relations conjoined with dependence relations. In the process of unpacking these connections I identify limitations of existing concepts of supervenience and provide (...) ways of overcoming them. What results is a more precise, flexible, and powerful set of tools for relating sets of properties than current concepts of supervenience provide. I apply these tools to a recalcitrant problem in the physicalism literature – the problem of extras. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A complex problem exists about how to promote the best interests of children as a group through research while protecting the rights and welfare of individual research subjects. The Nuremberg Code forbids studies without consent, eliminating most children as subjects, and the Declaration of Helsinki disallows non-therapeutic research on non-consenting subjects. Both codes are unreasonably restrictive. Another approach is represented by the Council for the International Organizations of Medical Science, the U.S. Federal Research Guidelines, and many other national policies. (...) They allow research ethics committees or institutional review boards to authorize studies with acceptable balances of likely benefits and harms, but neither clarify how to balance them nor explain the meaning of pivotal concepts, like “minimal risk.” Paths to the improvement of balancing or consequentialist approaches include improving standardizing of risk assessment, rejecting crude utilitarianism, identifying and justifying normative or moral judg-ments, and acknowledging extra-regulatory thresholds and deontological or non-negotiable duties to children. (shrink)

We assume the existence of a specific G1 protein which is an initiator of DNA replication. This initiator is supposed to be synthesized according to Michaelis-Menten kinetics. In order to start DNA replication, it is assumed that this G1 specific protein must be produced in a required amount. Intra-cellular growth inhibitors and extra-cellular growth factors control the production of the initiator. This model allows to calculate the average G1 phase time as a function of the various chemical concentrations (...) of nutrients, enzymes, growth inhibitors and growth factors. This model is compared to cell kinetics experiments on a leukemic cell line responding to Interleukin 3 deprivation. The curves giving the experimental average G1 phase times with respect to Interleukin-3 concentrations are fitted by the mathematical model with a quite good agreement. (shrink)

Helmholtz’ electrically induced extra mass inside a charged hollow sphere, recently evidenced by Mikhailov, is analogous to Mach’s inertial mass. Existence of a corresponding magnetically induced extra mass in an electron flying around an “autistic magnet” is derived. The overall electro-magnetic effect can be covariantly expressed.

An ongoing tension exists within the Lockean tradition in political philosophy between the claim that each individual is the “Proprietor of his own Person” and the claim that nature is “that which God gave to Mankind in common.” The former claim points to a realm of discrete individual entitlements only formally equal in the sense of each individual having jurisdiction over his own person and not over any other person, while the latter points either to a collective entitlement to nature (...) or to individual entitlements to substantively equal shares of nature. Were the two realms, that of persons and that of extra-personal nature, separate and independent, no tension would arise from the union of these two claims. But the realms are manifestly interconnected. Individuals acquire, use, labor upon, invest their time and energy on, and transform, more or less in accordance with their purposes, elements of extra-personal nature. And Locke and his followers believe that at least certain of these interactions with segments of nature give rise to individual property rights to the segments thereby appropriated, labored upon, transformed, or whatever. The traditional bridging notion is each person's right to his own labor which is seen as part of each person's proprietorship over himself. According to this tradition, if the right of each individual over his own person is to be respected, individual titles to appropriated, labored upon, or transformed nature must also be respected. The task for anyone seeking to embrace all the strands within this Lockean heritage is to reconcile, a) this right to one's own labor and the system of private property rights tied to it plus the right of self-ownership which lies behind the right to one's own labor, with b) some distributionist ideal, at least with regard to natural resources. (shrink)

In declaring that «existence as existence corresponds to being as such, and pertains to its intrinsic significance», Suárez accords to existence a preeminence perhaps not ascribed to it by any Scholastic philosopher. Conceptually distinct, existence and essence are really identical, their identity indicated by the term essentia realis, or «existent essence.» Being is at once unitary in meaning and dyadic; it denotes existence that is both actual and aptitudinal . «Actual» existence is realized (...) class='Hi'>extra-mentally, while the «aptitudinal» is existence insofar it is intelligible to the mind, prescinding from but not denying any extra-mental realization. The terminology that Suárez employs is distinctly his own. Gilson, however, reads him Thomistically, and so interprets his essentia realis as a kind of Thomist reified concept affirming the preeminence of essence. More recent commentators, influenced by Heidegger, see in the Suarezian essentia realis no more than cogitabilitas. (shrink)

Some have objected to human enhancement on the grounds that it violates the autonomy of the enhanced. These objections, however, overlook the interesting possibility that autonomy itself could be enhanced. How, exactly, to enhance autonomy is a difficult problem due to the numerous and diverse accounts of autonomy in the literature. Existing accounts of autonomy enhancement rely on narrow and controversial conceptions of autonomy. However, we identify one feature of autonomy common to many mainstream accounts: reasoning ability. Autonomy can then (...) be enhanced by improving people’s reasoning ability, in particular through cognitive enhancement; given how valuable autonomy is usually taken to be, this gives us extra reason to pursue such cognitive enhancements. Moreover, autonomy-based objections will be especially weak against such enhancements. As we will argue, those who are worried that enhancements will inhibit people’s autonomy should actually embrace those enhancements that will improve autonomy. (shrink)

Quine said that the ontological question can be asked in three words, ‘What is there?’, and answered in one, ‘everything’. He was wrong. We need an extra word to ask the ontological question: it is ‘What is there, really?’; and it cannot be answered truthfully with ‘everything’ because there are some things that exist but which don’t really exist (and maybe even some things that really exist but which don’t exist).

We prove that there exists no sentence F of the language of rings with an extra binary predicat I2 satisfying the following property: for every definable set X ⊆ ℂ2, X is connected if and only if ⊧ F, where I2 is interpreted by X. We conjecture that the same result holds for closed subset of ℂ2. We prove some results motivated by this conjecture.

What is the ontological status of facts? Are facts linguistic or extra-linguistic entities? If facts are extra-linguistic entities, are they mind-independent or relative to languages, theories or conceptual schemes? Based on a minimal definition of facts, the author argues that what are specified by true statements are not identical to true propositions expressed, so facts are not linguistic entities. Furthermore, what are specified by true statements are not to which a true statement corresponds, so facts are not mind-independent, (...) either as concrete entities in the universe or as abstract entities in the world as it is. Last, the author presents an internal factual realist answer: although facts are neither in the world as it is, nor in a language, facts are real and exist in a world under consideration. A fact, as a non-linguistic correlate of a true statement of a language, exists in a world specified by the language. (shrink)

We describe a strategy for integration of data that is based on the idea of semantic enhancement. The strategy promises a number of benefits: it can be applied incrementally; it creates minimal barriers to the incorporation of new data into the semantically enhanced system; it preserves the existing data (including any existing data-semantics) in their original form (thus all provenance information is retained, and no heavy preprocessing is required); and it embraces the full spectrum of data sources, types, models, and (...) modalities (including text, images, audio, and signals). The result of applying this strategy to a given body of data is an evolving Dataspace that allows the application of a variety of integration and analytic processes to diverse data contents. We conceive semantic enhancement (SE) as a lightweight and flexible process that leverages the richness of the structured contents of the Dataspace without adding storage and processing burdens to what, in the intelligence domain, will be an already storage- and processing-heavy starting point. SE works not by changing the data to which it is applied, but rather by adding an extra semantic layer to this data. We sketch how the semantic enhancement approach can be applied consistently and in cumulative fashion to new data and data-models that enter the Dataspace. (shrink)

This article argues that large language models (LLMs) should be interpreted as a form of gods. In a theological sense, a god is an immortal being that exists beyond time and space. This is clearly nothing like LLMs. In an anthropological sense, however, a god is rather defined as the personified authority of a group through time—a conceptual tool that molds a collective of ancestors into a unified agent or voice. This is exactly what LLMs are. They are products of (...) vast volumes of data, literally traces of past human (speech) acts, synthesized into a single agency that is (falsely) experienced by users as extra-human. This reconceptualization, I argue, opens up new avenues of critique of LLMs by allowing the mobilization of theoretical resources from centuries of religious critique. For illustration, I draw on the Marxian religious philosophy of Martin Hägglund. From this perspective, the danger of LLMs emerge not only as bias or unpredictability, but as a temptation to abdicate our spiritual and ultimately democratic freedom in favor of what I call a tyranny of the past. (shrink)

The authors use empirical research into the environmental practices of 31 manufacturing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to show that ‚business performance’ and ‚regulation’ considerations drive behaviour. They suggest that this is inevitable, given the market-based decision-making frames that permeate and dominate the industry in which manufacturing SMEs operate. Since the environment is a pillar of corporate social responsibility (CSR), the findings have important implications for CSR policy, which promotes voluntary actions predicated on a business case. It is argued that (...) this approach will not alter the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs significantly because CSR practice will be regarded as an optional and costly ‚extra’ affecting core business activity. Consequently, the use and development of existing regulatory structures, providing minimum standards for many activities covered by CSR, remains the most effective means through which the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs will be changed in the short to medium-term. Another feature of the paper is the distinction made between ‚business performance’ and the ‚business case’ argument. Business performance emphasises cost reductions and efficiency whereas the business case accentuates the benefits to shareholders of good practices as their firms become more attractive to stakeholders and society. Manufacturing SMEs␣try to improve business performance because of the pressures placed on them by market-dominated decision-making frames. These frames do not encourage manufacturing SMEs to undertake voluntary actions for the benefit of wider stakeholders and society. (shrink)

Contemporary evolutionary biology comprises a plural landscape of multiple co-existent conceptual frameworks and strenuous voices that disagree on the nature and scope of evolutionary theory. Since the mid-eighties, some of these conceptual frameworks have denounced the ontologies of the Modern Synthesis and of the updated Standard Theory of Evolution as unfinished or even flawed. In this paper, we analyze and compare two of those conceptual frameworks, namely Niles Eldredge’s Hierarchy Theory of Evolution (with its extended ontology of evolutionary entities) and (...) the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (with its proposal of an extended ontology of evolutionary processes), in an attempt to map some epistemic bridges (e.g. compatible views of causation; niche construction) and some conceptual rifts (e.g. extra-genetic inheritance; different perspectives on macroevolution; contrasting standpoints held in the “externalism–internalism” debate) that exist between them. This paper seeks to encourage theoretical, philosophical and historiographical discussions about pluralism or the possible unification of contemporary evolutionary biology. (shrink)

Summary The object of this study is to analyse certain aspects of the debate between David Brewster and William Whewell concerning the probability of extra-terrestrial life, in order to illustrate the nature, constitution and condition of natural theology in the decades immediately preceding the publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin's Origin of species. The argument is directed against a stylised picture of natural theology which has been drawn from a backward projection of the Darwinian antithesis between natural selection and (...) certain forms of the design argument. Contrary to the popular image of natural theology as an essentially static, autonomous and monolithic set of presuppositions about the existence of design in nature, the paper underlines the existence of a fundamental divergence of strategies within natural theology, a divergence that, in the case of Brewster and Whewell, can be correlated with the religious cultures to which they most closely belonged. The fact that, in the plurality of worlds debate, their respective positions became mutually exclusive suggests that the fragmented and disordered state of natural theology, only too apparent before the Darwinian impact, was occasioned as much by the ulterior problem of rationalising the excessive space of the astronomers and the excessive time of the geologists as it was by any principle of the uniformity of nature in the biological sphere. The argument is substantiated with particular reference to the breakdown in communication as Brewster and Whewell developed conflicting strategies to expose the ?development hypothesis? that had appeared in Vestiges. Their altercation also reveals a certain conflict of status concerning the conclusions of astronomy and geology which, in turn, suggests that tensions between the physical and life sciences were not peculiar to the period following the publication of Darwin's theory. (shrink)

Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way to becoming a new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something flies off, and that one can do it with an egg as easily as with a man, namely the hommelette, or the lamella. The lamella is something extra-flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more complicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it is something - I will tell you (...) shortly why - that is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal - because it survives any division, and scissiparous intervention. And it can turn around. Well! This is not very reassuring. But suppose it comes and envelopes your face while you are quietly asleep... I can't see how we would not join battle with a being capable of these properties. But it would not be a very convenient battle. This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ - I can give you more details as to its zoological place - is the libido. It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. Every word has a weight here, in this deceivingly poetic description of the mythic creature called by Lacan "lamella". Lacan imagines lamella as a version of what Freud called "partial object": a weird organ which is magically autonomized, surviving without a body whose organ it should have been, like a hand that wonders around alone in early Surrealist films, or like the smile in Alice in Wonderland that persists alone, even when the Cheshire cat's body is no longer present: "'All right', said the Cat; and this time it vanished quite slowly, beginning with the end of the tail, and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of it had gone. 'Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin', thought Alice; 'but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in my life!'" The lamella is an entity of pure surface, without the density of a substance, an infinitely plastic object that can not only incessantly change its form, but can even transpose itself from one to another medium: imagine a "something" that is first heard as a shrilling sound, and then pops up as a monstrously distorted body. A lamella is indivisible, indestructible, and immortal - more precisely, undead in the sense this term has in horror fiction: not the sublime spiritual immortality, but the obscene immortality of the "living dead" which, after every annihilation, re-composes themselves and clumsily goes on. As Lacan puts it in his terms, lamella does not exist, it insists: it is unreal, an entity of pure semblance, a multiplicity of appearances which seem to envelop a central void - its status is purely fantasmatic. This blind indestructible insistence of the libido is what Freud called "death drive," and one should bear in mind that "death drive" is, paradoxically, the Freudian name for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears within psychoanalysis: for an uncanny excess of life, for an "undead" urge which persist beyond the cycle of life and death, of generation and corruption. This is why Freud equates death drive with the so-called "compulsion-to-repeat," an uncanny urge to repeat painful past experiences which seems to outgrow the natural limitations of the organism affected by it and to insist even beyond the organism's death - again, like the living dead in a horror film who just go on. This excess inscribes itself into the human body in the guise of a wound which makes the subject "undead," depriving him of the capacity to die : when this wound is healed, the hero can die in peace. (shrink)

Blindsight, the ability to blindly discriminate wavelength and other aspects of stimuli in a blind field, sometimes occurs in people with lesions to striate (V1) cortex. There is currently no consensus on whether qualitative color information of the sort that is normally computed by double opponent cells in striate cortex is indeed computed in blindsight but doesn’t reach awareness, perhaps owing to abnormal neuron responsiveness in striate or extra-striate cortical areas, or is not computed at all. The existence (...) of primesight, the experience of colored afterimages in blindsight, has been taken to suggest that qualitative color information is computed either in pre-striate or striate cortical areas but is not broadcast to working memory. I argue here that a recent study in which color phosphenes were induced in a blindsighter using bilateral transcranial magnetic stimulation indicates that computations necessary for conscious color vision are lost in blindsight. Owing to this loss, the neural responsiveness in extrastriate cortical areas is abnormal and hence is unable to give rise to color awareness. Blindsight is thus degraded vision in which the computations necessary for conscious color vision have been lost. (shrink)