A response to G.A. Cohen's argument that a prevailing "ethos" of justice would prevent a Rawlsian just society from having any income inequalities. I suggest that Cohen's argument fails because a Rawlsian ethos would involve correlates of both of Rawls' principles of justice.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Peace; 3. Rule of law; 4. Human rights; 5. Democracy; 6. Liberty; 7. The institutional ethos of the EU; 8. Towards the EU as a just institution; 9. Concluding proposals.

Many contemporary political movements focus more on changing the values and principles that people act on in their daily lives rather than institutions and legal frameworks. Political-philosophical theories of justice, however, often focus more on the Rawlsian “basic structure” than the “ethos” of a just society, and rarely discuss how individuals may be encouraged to act in accordance with principles of justice. This article attempts to redress this, and draws on moral, social and political philosophy to argue (...) that an ethos exists in a group or society either i) when its members internalize and act from a particular principle, or ii) when its members uphold a decentralized system of informal social sanctions that increases their compliance with a particular principle. (shrink)

In The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen, Stephen K. White contends that Western democracies face novel challenges demanding our reexamination of the role of citizens. White argues that the intense focus in the past three decades on finding general principles of justice for diversity-rich societies needs to be complemented by an exploration of what sort of ethos would be needed to adequately sustain any such principles. Accessible, pithy, and erudite, The Ethos of a Late-Modern Citizen will (...) appeal to a wide audience. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis of (...) traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

:Some understand utopia as an ideal society in which everyone would be thoroughly informed by a moral ethos: all would always act on their pure conscientious judgments about justice, and so it would never be necessary to provide incentives for them to act as justice requires. In this essay I argue that such a society is impossible. A society of purely conscientiously just agents would be unable to achieve real justice. This is the Paradox of Pure (...) Conscientiousness. This paradox, I argue, can only be overcome when individuals are prepared to depart from their own pure, conscientious, judgments of justice. (shrink)

_Contexts of Justice,_ highly acclaimed when it was published in Germany, provides a significant new intervention into the important debate between communitarianism and liberalism. Rainer Forst argues for a theory of "contexts of justice" that leads beyond the narrow confines of this debate as it has been understood until now and posits the possibility of a new conception of social and political justice. This book brings refreshing clarity to a complex topic as it provides a synthesis of (...) traditions and theories that leads to a truly original approach. Forst makes a four-part distinction to decipher the debate between communitarianism and liberalism. These four parts concern the constitution of the self, the neutrality of law, the ethos of democracy, and the opposition between universalism and contextualism. He shows that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to take these different contexts adequately into account. He discusses recent debates about discursive democracy and feminist critiques of liberalism, and addresses such topics as multiculturalism and civil society. (shrink)

This paper explores the integration of John Rawls’s (1921–2002) theory of “justice as fairness” into corporate social responsibility (CSR). It accentuates the shift from solely focusing on profit maximization to a model that prioritizes ethical governance and sustainable development. The paper reinterprets Rawls’s theory for corporate ethics and governance, asserting that businesses have a moral obligation to uphold fairness and equity beyond mere compliance or public perception. It acknowledges the role of the government in this integration. It recognizes the (...) challenges in aligning Rawlsian principles with corporate objectives while balancing economic and societal obligations. The fusion of CSR with Rawlsian ideas can potentially bring transformative impacts to businesses, paving the way for a more equitable form of capitalism that combines economic goals with a strong commitment to social justice and ethical practices. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Site One: The Terms of Cooperation Site Two: Ontological “Sources” and Their Resistance to Full Articulacy Site Three: Recognizing Identity Conclusion Notes.

Summary In this paper I inquire by way of a phenomenological description whether the experience of an encounter with one's own mortality could not so transform a person's ethos that the virtues of justice, compassion and neighborly love could ensue. I will concentrate on such an encounter in and through the mood of dread. This paper, in opposition to Heidegger, is only concerned with it's effect regarding our ethical comportment. I claim that the mood of dread not only (...) destroys the mood of indifference, but also sends him on a pathway of self‐transforming moods. As to the “understanding” accompanying moods in the field of ethical comportment I try to show that it has the character of a direct non‐ratiocinative insight.RésuméJe voudrais dans cet article examiner, à l'aide d'une description phénoménologique, si l'expérience que constitue la rencontre avec la perspective de sa propre mort ne peut pas transformer l'éthique d'un homme de telle manière que les vertus de justice, de pitié et de reconnaissance de la dignité humaine puissent s'y développer. Je me limite ici à une telle rencontre avec un sentiment d'horreur. Cet article n'aborde — contrairement à la manière dont Heidegger conçoit l'angoisse — que l'effet sur le comportement éthique. Je suis d'avis que le sentiment d'horreur non seulement détruit celui d'indifférence, mais dispose l'homme à vouloir se changer lui‐me̊me. Quant à la »compréhension« des sentiments accompagnant le comportement éthique, je montre qu'elle a le caractère d'une intuition immédiate et non rationnelle.ZusammenfassungIn diesem Aufsatz möchte ich auf dem Wege einer phänomenologischen Beschreibung untersuchen, ob die Erfahrung einer Begegnung mit der eigenen Sterblichkeit das Ethos eines Menschen nicht so verwandeln kann, dass sich die Tugenden von Gerechtigkeit, Mitleid und mitmenschlicher Anerkennung entwickeln können. Ich beschränke mich dabei auf eine solche Begegnung in der und durch die Gestimmtheit des Entsetzens. Dieser Aufsatz erörtert — im Gegensatz zu Heideggers Auffassung der Angst — nur die Wirkung auf unser ethisches Verhalten. Ich bin der Auffassung, dass die Gestimmtheit des Entsetzens nicht nur die Stimmung der Gleichgültigkeit zerstört, sondern den Menschen auch auf einen Weg der selbstverändernden Gestimmtheiten sendet. Was das »Verstehen« begleitender Stimmungen im Bereich des ethischen Verhaltens betrifft, so versuche ich zu zeigen, dass dies den Charakter eines unmittelbaren, nicht‐rationalen Einsehens hat. (shrink)

L’un des objectifs centraux du livre de Kyle Johannsen,A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, consiste à défendre l’idée selon laquelle nous devrions concevoir la justice comme une valeur fondamentale pouvant entrer en conflit avec d’autres valeurs fondamentales. Ce type de pluralisme est principalement associé aux travaux de G.A. Cohen et à sa critique de la théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Dans le cadre ce commentaire, je propose une esquisse des implications du pluralisme de Cohen et de (...) ce à quoi pourrait ressembler un ethos de justice à la Cohen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Need for a New Ethos of White AntiracismShannon SullivanWhite people in this country will have quite enough to do in learning how to accept and love themselves and each other, and when they have achieved this—which will not be tomorrow and may very well be never—the Negro problem will no longer exist, for it will no longer be needed.—James Baldwin, The Fire Next TimeIn his classic (...) manifesto on race, The Fire Next Time, James Baldwin passionately urges black people not to retaliate against white people by attempting to debase or dominate them in return. The reason is that doing so would harm black people most of all. As Baldwin (1963, 113) assures his readers,I am very much concerned that American Negroes achieve their freedom here in the United States. But I am also concerned for their dignity, for the health of their souls, and must oppose any attempt that Negroes may make to do to others what has been done to them. I think I know—we see it around us every day—the spiritual wasteland to which that road leads.... I would not like to see Negroes ever arrive at so wretched a condition.Likewise, when Martin Luther King Jr., urged his black church members to love their white enemies rather than return their racial hate, he did so because he believed that “hate distorts the personality of the hater. We usually think of what hate does for the individual hated or the individuals hated or the groups hated. But it is even more tragic, it is even more ruinous and injurious to the [End Page 21] individual who hates” (King 1957). While Baldwin was an avowed atheist and King a Christian minister, both warned of the devastating effects of white racism on “the souls of white folk,” and they pleaded and preached that black people should not stoop to white people’s debased level.1 Out of all the damage that white racism has done to African Americans and other people of color, the most damaging of all would be for it to turn them into the debilitated, deplorable people that white folk generally are.We might say that on Baldwin’s (and perhaps also King’s) view, white people are the truly “wretched of the earth” (Fanon 1965). It has been argued that white racism has cost white people their capability for intimacy, their affective lives, their authenticity, their sense of connection to other people, and their spiritual selves (Segrest 2001, 65). These claims are not an attempt to trump or erase the enormous physical, psychological, economic, spiritual, and other types of pain that white people have caused people of color around the world. They instead are a recognition that white people’s attempts to gain material riches and political power through the domination of people of color have impoverished and depleted their own souls. White people qua white are ill in that their racial habits largely have been built out of greed, hatred, jealousy, fear, and cruelty. Their psychosomatic health has suffered and continues to suffer because of their toxic racial identities.So much the worse for white people, we might think. But although understandable, this response would be misguided since white people’s psychosomatic depletion has implications for the well-being of others. Put succinctly, white people’s unhealthiness helps fuel their abuse and domination of people of color. It thus matters to struggles for racial justice whether white people are psychosomatically healthy and strong. It matters which affects, emotions, and passions fund white people’s actions in general, and their work for racial justice in particular. In this paper, I will draw from Friedrich Nietzsche, Teresa Brennan, and other scholars to explain the ontological and power-full aspects of affect, touching briefly on the toxicity of white guilt and shame and focusing especially on the healthiness of what Nietzsche calls a bestowing self-love. I will argue that in the context of white people’s contributions to racial justice movements, a positive effect of their bestowing self-love is that white people will be more likely and better able to clean up their own house... (shrink)

The author discusses two questions, the relation between liberalism and democracy, and the relation between ethics, morality and law. As to the first question, she argues that neither liberalism nor democracy are merely formal. Roughly spoken, it can be said that liberalism stands for negative liberties, whereas democracy stands for positive ones. She observes a non-contingent tension between the ethos of liberalism (personal freedom) and the ethos of democracy (equality; majority rule). It is the task of morality to (...) maintain and restore the balance between these two kinds of ethos. As to the second question, she is worried about the balance between law (legal regulation), ethics, and morality. On the one hand, abolishing legal regulations would amount to abolishing the freedom of the moderns. On the other hand, the substitution of legal regulations for ethical regulations would lead to a similar result: the end of the freedom of the moderns through the homogenisation of life. In the former case, personal support, charity, magnanimity, and caring would get lost, while in the latter there would be no escape from community pressure towards uniformity. (shrink)

This thesis defends John Rawls’s constructivist theory of justice against three distinct challenges. -/- Part one addresses G. A. Cohen’s claim that Rawls’s constructivism is committed to a mistaken thesis about the relationship between facts and principles. It argues that Rawls’s constructivist procedure embodies substantial moral commitments, and offers an intra-normative reduction rather than a metaethical account. Rawls’s claims about the role of facts in moral theorizing in A Theory of Justice should be interpreted as suggesting that some (...) of our moral beliefs, which we are inclined to hold without reference to facts, are, in fact, true, because certain facts obtain. This thesis and the acknowledgement of the moral assumptions of Rawls’s constructivism help to show that Rawls does not, and does not need to, deny Cohen’s thesis. -/- Part two defends the characterization of the decision problem in Rawls’s original position as a decision problem under uncertainty. Rawls stipulates that the denizens of the original position lack information that they could use to arrive at estimates of the likelihood of ending up in any given social position. It has been argued that Rawls does not have good grounds for this stipulation. I argue that given the nature of the value function we should attribute to the denizens of the original position and our cognitive limitations, which also apply to the denizens of the original position, their decision problem can be characterized as one under uncertainty even if we stipulate that they know that they have an equal chance of being in any individual’s place. -/- Part three assesses the claim that a true commitment to Rawls’s difference principle requires a further commitment to an egalitarian ethos. This egalitarian ethos is offered as a means to bring about equality and Pareto-optimality. Accordingly, I try to undermine the case for an egalitarian ethos by challenging the desirability of the ends it is supposed to further or by showing that it is redundant. I argue that if primary goods are the metric of justice, then Pareto optimality in the space of the metric of justice is undesirable. I then argue that if the metric of justice is welfare, depending on the theory of welfare we adopt, an egalitarian ethos will either be redundant or will have objectionably paternalistic consequences. (shrink)

Where institutions are well-ordered and governed according to principles identified as necessary for justice, the attitudes and behaviors of citizens are also likely to be affected: they will develop a specific ethos that is appropriate for sustaining that just order. However, the absence of a substantially just basic structure will also take effect on what is considered an appropriate sense of justice suited to dealing with nonideal situations characterized by potentially profound injustice. Where ideal theory can describe (...) an ethos necessary for supporting already just institutions and practices, we require a separate account of an ethos appropriate to nonideal conditions. (shrink)

"Case notes." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (199), pp. 34–35.

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a (...) Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a (...) Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a (...) Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice. (shrink)

Relational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches (...) of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice. (shrink)

Susan Okin criticizes John Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ because it does not apply principles of justice directly to gender relations within households. We explain how one can be a ‘political liberal feminist’ by distinguishing between two kinds of justice: the first we call ‘legitimacy justice’, conceptions of which apply to the ‘legally coercive structure’ of society; the second we call ‘ethos justice’, conceptions of which apply to citizens’ ‘non-coercive’ relations. We agree with Okin that a society (...) in which most persons act in accordance with ‘gender equal’ ethos justice is morally superior to one in which most persons do not. A shared commitment to a particular conception of ethos justice, however, cannot be required by a conception of legitimacy justice. A political liberal feminist is committed to promoting gender equality with respect to both legitimacy justice and ethos justice, but recognizes that different means are necessary to do so. (shrink)

I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political (...) significance in relation to non-domination, and so to freedom. While it is only the republican conception of political freedom that presents nondomination as constitutive of freedom, I shall argue that non-domination is best understood as a thoroughly generic liberal ideal of freedom to which even negative libertarians are implicitly committed, for non-domination is negative liberty as of right—secured non-interference. Crucially on this conception, non-domination requires that the citizen can contest interferences. Pettit specifies three conditions of contestation, each of which protects against a salient risk of the would-be contester not getting a ‘proper hearing’. But I shall argue that missing from this list is anything to protect against a fourth salient threat: the threat that either kind of epistemic injustice might disable contestation by way of an unjust deflation of either credibility or intelligibility. Thus we see that both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice can render a would-be contester dominated. Epistemic justice is thereby revealed as a constitutive condition of non-domination, and thus of a central liberal political ideal of freedom. (shrink)

This article offers both an incisive and exhaustive critique of the present degenerate state of values in society. The author asserts that while the capitalist system may solve the production problem, it can never usher in distributive justice through its reliance on market economy. The biblical sins and shada ripus will ensure that the values domain of distribution will remain uncharted. The article disabuses the reader of some of the misapprehensions regarding concepts like 'pure mind' and processes like 'mind-stilling (...) exercise. (shrink)

A free society requires a citizenry that is capable of taking personal responsibility for bettering their lot, and voluntarily promoting and protecting public goods such as education, health, public order, peace, and justice. Although the law backed by force can have some success at compelling people to make contributions to the public exchequer, refrain from criminal activity, honor legal contracts, and so on, an economically and politically free society cannot rely exclusively on the threat of coercion to induce in (...) citizens a sense of social responsibility. On the contrary, a free society depends on a well‐entrenched sense of responsibility that is internalized and actualized by citizens in their everyday lives. But any realistic attempt to frame an ideal of social responsibility must confront two serious challenges presented by the complexity and scale of modern societies, namely the challenge of knowing the content of our responsibilities and the challenge of finding the motivation to discharge them. With these challenges in view, this essay assesses the power of prevailing accounts of citizenship to generate an effective sense of social responsibility, and proposes some guiding principles to inform a broader theory of responsibility that might synthesize the strengths of political accounts while transcending some of their limitations. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to discuss the general idea of a Central-European ethos in comparison with the values that shaped the contemporary form of Western societies. My argument is threefold. First, I briefly discuss the emergent character of Western modernization. Second, I pinpoint those historical and material conditions that have shaped the general situation of Central Europe in the last two hundred years in order to indicate their influence on what Charles Taylor calls "social imaginaries", shared by (...) the peoples of the region. And in part three, I attempt to point out some consequences of the otherness of the Central-European mode of modernization for regional ethos and its perspectives. My general thesis is that the countries of Central Europe, members of what-is-now the Visegrad Group, that is to say, for the last two hundred years (and some of them, like Poland for instance, for last three or even four centuries) are in the process of some kind semi-modernization, This semi-modernization concerns not only their economies and social relations, but also certain moral and world views (Weltsschauungen), whose basic outlines are derived from inferiority complex about the modernized West. But at the same time they are mostly unable, for the reason I shall refer to below, to propose their own way of modernization. Hence, claims to equality and justice made within Central-European are are of a special kind, which involves a strong recognition of history as the source and basis for them. (shrink)

This paper deals with the connection between law and morality. Such a connection is relevant for political theory, since demonstrating that law necessarily implies a claim to justice would require fundamental rights to be considered the horizon of any legal system, instead of being considered as dependent on the axiological context of liberal democracies. The paper approaches the controversy starting from an overview of the work of the German philosopher Robert Alexy, in particular his attempt to establish an analytical (...) link between law and morality, and to this end considers law as a speech act with a claim to correctness. It then examines the critique put forward by Joseph Raz, that points out the lack of objectivity of this claim to correctness. In order to establish a moral foundation for law, the paper argues that it is necessary to take account of Karl-Otto Apel's attempt to establish the transcendental foundation of language, as well as of Habermas' critique of that attempt. In conclusion, it is argued that the debate about a possible link between law and morality sheds new light on contemporary debates on liberal justification in political theory. (shrink)

In The Idea of Justice (2009), Amartya Sen advocates democracy defined as ‘public reasoning’ and ‘government by discussion’. Sen’s discursive approach facilitates the exercise of political freedom and development of one’s public capacities, and enables victims of injustice to give public voice and discussion to specific injustice. It also responds to the contested nature of ‘universal human rights’ and the need to clarify and defend them via public reasoning. However, Sen’s approach leaves intact the hegemony of a liberal form (...) of democracy that prioritizes political and civil rights over social and economic rights and thus precludes alternative democratic forms, most notably a form of cooperative democracy that politicizes social and economic activities in the pursuit of local and global justice. Sen’s ‘government by discus- sion’ must combine with cooperative democracy and a global ethos emphasizing cooperation (and action) over privatization in order to address our most serious global injustices, including exploitation, inequality and poverty in the Global South, accelerating destruction of the environment and biodiversity, and global warming and climate change. (shrink)

The contributors to this special issue of _Tikkun_ seek to redefine the boundaries of political and ethical responsibility by crediting a worldview in which we are held to account for the well-being of everyone who has “passed through our city,” if only momentarily. Their conclusions challenge the ethos of materialism that _Tikkun_ believes is at the root of globalized capitalism and, alternatively, articulate a social justice ethos derived from the Jewish tradition of “accompaniment,” the call to take (...) care of those who enter our common space. Contributors from Christian, Muslim, and Jewish traditions bring an interfaith perspective to the foundations of social responsibility, laying the groundwork for a new global notion of justice. Drawing on a model from Rabbinic Judaism, one contributor discusses homelessness in Los Angeles, calling us to adopt a new, radical sense of obligation in relation to our neighbors. Another offers challenging insights from the point of view of one who grew up homeless. An essay from the Christian tradition expands this model by comparing our mutual relationships to body parts that all belong to the same whole. Another essay extracts from medieval Islamic texts a vision of the state as a caregiver and then compares this vision to life in Vancouver, where citizens’ taxes underwrite robust social services for those in need. Contributors:_ _Rumee Ahmed, Aryeh Cohen, Estelle Frankel, Jill Goldberg, Lisa “Tiny” Gray-Garcia, Peter Laarman, Ana Levy-Lyons, Alexia Salvatierra Michael Lerner is editor of _Tikkun_ and rabbi of Beyt Tikkun; his writings have appeared in many national publications. Alana Yu-lan Price is managing editor of _Tikkun_. Aryeh Cohen is a contributing editor to _Tikkun_. (shrink)

I argue that a theory of distributive justice is sensitive to desert if and only if it does not require an institutional scheme that prevents individuals from treating one another as they deserve, and requires a desert ethos. A desert ethos is a set of principles that, though not embodied in a society’s basic coercive structure, nevertheless governs interpersonal relations between citizens. These two necessary conditions are jointly sufficient for ‘giving desert its due’ in a theory of (...) justice. I therefore reject the received view that a desert-sensitive theory must endeavor to guarantee distributions patterned according to desert. (shrink)

The author examines the character of the changes taking place in contemporary Serbian society. He emphasizes at the same time that contemporary Serbian philosophy is facing these crucial questions as well, which without it cannot be even addressed, let alone solved. The key difference between modern West European and contemporary Serbian societies, seen from the perspective of philosophy, is demonstrated most clearly in the manner of constituting institutions and transforming the modern Serbian society. In the process of building modern institutions (...) philosophy, not just in our country but throughout the Slavic East, has not had the role it played in Europe. Here lies the explanation why natural consciousness and an original ethos, though considerably modified, still remain unadapted and today represent a major obstacle to the establishment of the rule of European law. Without a change in the sense of justice and respect for the law it is impossible to accomplish the transformation of the society in which the law recognized by a democratic state could not be super ordinate to any reason. The crucial role of philosophy in this process is seen by the author not only in establishing modern European institutions and acceptance of the principle of European legislation, but above all in its influence on the transformation of the original ethos and establishment of new criteria on which the reflection, decision making and action of any individual would be based.. Autor u ovom radu nastoji da pokaze u cemu se sastoji sustinski karakter promenama koje se danas ostvaruju u savremenom srpskom drustvu, ukazujuci istovremeno, da i savremena srpska filozofija stoji pred tim sustinskim pitanjima, koja se bez njenog sudelovanja ne mogu na valjan nacin ni predociti, a kamo li da se mogu uvideti putevi njihovog razresenja. Kljucna razlika izmedju modernog zapadnoevropskog i savremenog srpskog drustva, sagledanog iz perspektive filozofije, najjasnije se pokazuje u nacinu konstituisanju institucija i nacina preobrazaja modernog srpskog drustva. U izgradnji modernih institucija filozofija, ne samo u nas, vec i na celom slovenskom istoku nije imala onu ulogu koju je imala u Evropi. U toj cinjenici nalazi se objasnjenje zasto su prirodna svest i izvorna obicajnost, iako znatno izmenjeni, ostali ipak neprilagodjeni i danas predstavljaju jednu od glavnih prepreka u uspostavljanju vladavine evropskog prava. Bez promene osecanja pravednosti i postovanja zakona nije moguce izvrsiti preobrazaj drustva u kojem pravo priznato od demokratske drzave ne bi moglo biti nadredjeno nikakvom umu. Kljucnu ulogu filozofije, autor ne vidi samo u uspostavljanju modernih evropskih institucija i prihvatanju nacela evropskog zakonodavstva, vec pre svega u njenom uticaju na preobrazaj izvornog etosa i uspostavljanje novih merila na kojima ce biti zasnovano promisljanje, odlucivanje i delanje svakog pojedinca.. (shrink)

Sheldon S. Wolin’s ‘fugitive democracy’ is arguably his most provocative contribution to political theory. Breaking with the understanding of democracy as a constitutional form whose origins he locates in the work of Aristotle, Wolin claims democracy is better understood not as a constitution, but as a ‘rebellious moment,’ making democracy dependent on cultural rather than institutional characteristics. This formulation poses a problem for democracy as a political phenomenon, as political power today tends to be concentrated within institutions. Without institutional expression, (...) democracy is alienated from political power and hence a contradiction in terms. I reconstruct an understanding of Wolin’s fugitive democracy that can avoid such problems, while also being adequate to the current political juncture. I argue that Aristotle’s conception of the practice of justice, read through the lens of Wolin’s ‘fugitive democracy,’ becomes ‘fugitive justice,’ the cultivation of a democratic ethos that might support and sustain fortuitous democratic moments, connecting democratic culture to political institutions. In this way, Aristotle’s work is split: not simply the founder of constitutionalism, through ‘fugitive justice’ Aristotle becomes a resource for radical democrats, and a complement to Wolin’s concept of democracy. (shrink)

The Soul of Jewish Social Justice offers a novel intellectual and spiritual approach for how Jewish wisdom must be relevant and transformational in its application to the most pressing moral problems of our time. The book explores how spirituality, ritual, narratives, holidays, and tradition can enhance one's commitment to creating a more just society. Readers will discover how the Jewish social justice ethos can help address issues of education reform, ethical consumption, the future of Israel, immigration, prison (...) reform, violence, and business ethics. (shrink)

Can the need for incentives justify inequality? Starting from this question, Frank Vandenbroucke examines a conception of justice in which both equality and responsibility are involved. In the first part of the inquiry, which explores the implementation of that conception of justice, the justification of incentives assumes that agents make personal choices based only upon their own interests. The second part of the book challenges the idea that a normative conception of distributive justice can be based on (...) that traditional assumption, i.e. that personal choices are not the subject matter of justice. Thus, Vandenbroucke questions the Rawlsian idea that the primary subject of a theory of justice is the basic structure of society, and not the individual conduct of its citizens. For a society to be really just, the ethos of individual conduct has to serve justice. Non-mathematical readers can skip the formal model proposed in Chapter 3 and understand the rest of the book. (shrink)

Being a Christian involves metaphysical, epistemological, and social commitments that set Christians at variance with the dominant secular culture. Because Christianity is not syncretical, but proclaims the unique truth of its revelation, Christians will inevitably be placed in some degree of conflict with secular health care institutions. Because being Christian involves a life of holiness, not merely living justly or morally, Christians will also be in conflict with the ethos of many contemporary Christian health care institutions which have abandoned (...) a commitment to Christian spirituality. In this regard, managed care raises the special question of how Christian institutions can act morally under financial constraints and maintain their character while under the control of secular managers. This question itself raises the further question as to why health care institutions need even pose this query when there are Christian physicians and nurses who could work for less, or Christian men and women who could become sisters and brothers and work for nothing. Contemporary challenges to Christians to maintain their integrity in a post-Christian world have much of their force because Christians have failed to maintain traditional Christian spirituality. In the face of that failure, Christian physicians and nurses will find themselves in greater conflict with health care institutions, because few will any longer understand the requirements of traditional Christianity. In its place, they will have put a generic spirituality, a value-neutral understanding of the role of the health professional, and an anonymous commitment to social justice. (shrink)

Although the effectiveness of some tobacco programs and policies has been clearly demonstrated in reducing the overall population smoking prevalence, the health benefits are not equally distributed across all socio-economic classes; a situation that clearly runs against the equalitarian ethos of most modern states. In this article, we evaluate the benefits of using Sen’s Capability Approach as a theory of social justice to guide public health program and policy development in a way that would prevent the further increase (...) of inequalities in health outcomes. Starting from four consensual goals of tobacco control practice (i.e. that individuals live a smoke-free life, that smokers quit smoking, that non-smokers are protected from exposure to second-hand smoke and that smoking cessation support is accessible) we found that besides the standard interventions (e.g. education on the harms of smoking, policies to reduce exposure to SHS) an iniquity-proof tobacco control program needs also to address the lack of options of underprivileged people in affordable smoke-free settings and in leisure activities. We conclude that an ethical tobacco prevention program needs to address the broader social determinants of health such as the socio-economic policies that put a strain on people’s capacity to shun or quit smoking. (shrink)

This essay reviews G.A. Cohen’s final major work, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In the book, Cohen challenges the Rawlsian account of the content and the concept of justice. This essay offers a summary of Cohen’s main arguments, and develops objections to several of those arguments, particularly Cohen’s claim that his proposed egalitarian ethos is not vulnerable to a well-known trilemma (liberty, equality, efficiency) that might be pressed against it. The essay’s final section offers critical reflections on the (...) important differences between Cohen’s and Rawls’s views about the nature of justice, and suggests that Cohen’s view may not be helpful if we believe justice is a complex value that includes considerations other than distributive equality. (shrink)

Sophocles' Antigone, written around 441-440 B.C. is the most studied and interpreted tragedy in the history of classical theater. There are diverse interpretive angles and analysis that at 2500 BCE challenge exegetes and scholars from the various fields of human knowledge. The way the play is, interpretatively, received varies according to the interests of the time in which it is studied and staged. The objective of this work, by means of a hermeneutic-dialectic analysis of literature review, is to present possible (...) impacts that the non-compliance with the civil law that prevented the young princess Antigone from giving a dignified burial to her brother, Polynices, has on the formation of an educational and emancipating ethos of citizens who seek, in their praxis, full social justice in the face of laws woven by the excluding logic of a state power that aims only to perpetuate itself in power. The main characters are analyzed and contextualized in the light of the understanding of a formative ethos that prioritizes the logic of justice over the cold logic of legal law. We conclude that Creon's interdict is still alive in our times, and education is one of the main instruments to transform the status quo that unjustly victimizes many people in the name of a state reason divorced from ethical and moral principles. (shrink)

In Cohen’s vision of the just society, there would be no need for unequalizing incentives so as to benefit the least well-off; instead, people would be motivated by an egalitarian ethos to work hard and in the most socially productive jobs. As such, Cohen appears to offer a way to mitigate the trade-off of equality for efficiency that often characterizes theorizing about distributive justice. This article presents an egalitarian challenge to Cohen’s vision of the just society. I argue (...) that a society where all internalized the egalitarian ethos would be one lacking equal respect among its members, in which certain groups lacked the grounds of self-respect. Section 1 defends equal respect and a form of equality of self-respect as values with broad-based appeal to egalitarians, and argues that a particular form of hierarchy would undermine both equal respect and the grounds of self-respect. Sections 2 and 3 reveal that just such a hierarchy would emerge in a society in which all had internalized the egalitarian ethos, in the case of both carers and the untalented. Thus, Cohen’s proposed society is shown to fail to unite equality and efficiency. Instead, Cohen’s society would be characterized by a lack of equality. (shrink)

This paper offers a critical phenomenological view of the concept of access intimacy, a term coined by disability justice advocate Mia Mingus. Access intimacy refers to a mode of relation between disabled people or between disabled and non-disabled people that can be born of concerted cultivation or instantly intimated and centrally concerns the feeling of someone genuinely understanding and anticipating another’s access needs. Putting in conversation this notion of intimacy with Kym Maclaren’s critical phenomenological account of intimacy, I show (...) how accessibility is not about what one person or institution can do for another but involves an ongoing, interpersonal process of relating and taking responsibility for our inevitable encroachment on one another in ways that enhance one another’s freedom. (shrink)

As a fascinating study of global justice in Asia, this book presents a series of contributions reflecting upon the conditions of a greater involvement of East Asian traditions of thought in the debate on global justice. Including chapters on diverse issues such as global social inequalities, human rights practice and the functioning of international institutions, this book examines the political cultures of East Asia in order to help political theorists better appraise the distinctiveness of non‐Western ideas of (...) class='Hi'>justice. Confirming the persistence of a strong social ethos, the contributions also demonstrate the long-lasting influence of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in shaping East Asian public conceptions of justice. Bringing much needed non-Western voices to the global justice debate, this book will appeal to students and scholars of politics, law and philosophy, as well as activists involved in the global justice movement. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: From Liberalism to Republican Liberalism Cohen's Critique of Rawls A Liberal Republican Political Economy Liberal and Republican Approaches to Effective Political Agency The Republican Alternative Conclusion References.