Famously, Plato argues that the soul pre-exists the body, continues to exist after the body dies, and can come to exist afterwards in another body. Aristotle argues against the transmigration of souls in On Generation and Corruption and for the most part appears not to endorse these Platonic doctrines. But in De Anima III.5 Aristotle also seems to argue that a part of the soul, usually dubbed the nous poiētikos, is separable from the body and eternal. This has (...) presented interpreters of Aristotle with a problem: how can we reconcile Aristotle the naturalist philosopher with the apparently Platonist philosopher of De Anima III.5? Can we understand Aristotle’s position in De Anima III.5 in a way that does not conflict with the anti-Platonism he expresses in texts like On Generation and Corruption? I will argue that we can and offer an interpretation of De Anima III.5 that does not commit Aristotle to the position that the human soul is eternal. Even if Plato is right about the concept of the human soul, about what the human soul is in its own nature, he is wrong on ontological grounds. There are no eternal human souls. (shrink)

The physicist defines anger in terms of heart, blood, and heat; the dialectician says it is the desire to inflict pain in retaliation. Both give fairly sure signs for its recognition; but neither can show why these signs must go together and in what they can cohere. Aristotelian physics is presumably a way to avoid such a split, and whatever defects his account of perception or intellection suffers from cannot be traced to it. Phantasia, however, seems to be dialectically distinguished (...) from other faculties of soul and physically defined as a kind of motion; and even if Aristotle could say at what speed it moves, we do not discern in such a definition the ground for its being the link between perception and intellection. The soul is the source of both motion and awareness; and since it cannot be the efficient cause of motion without destroying the possibility of awareness, something in its cognitive capacity must be able to translate the nonmotivating acts of perception or of intellection into causes of motion. That something seems to be again phantasia, which thus comes to light as the soul’s double bond, linking the aesthetic with the noetic and awareness with motion. Phantasia is as inseparable from desire as it is from thought. It is the closest Aristotle comes to acknowledging that self-moving motion is soul. (shrink)

El presente artículo es una propuesta de una nueva lectura del capítulo quinto del libro tercero del De anima de Aristóteles. Por lectura se entiende no una interpretación, sino una cuidadosa atención al momento filológico: qué dice literalmente el texto, antes de las interpretaciones filosóficas. Para esto, se atiende minuciosamente a la semántica de los términos, al modo de adjetivación de la lengua griega, y al contexto general, gramatical y semántico de este capítulo quinto. El resultado de este análisis (...) filológico es una es una nueva comprensión del texto, que permite una nueva traducción, que se ofrece al final. (shrink)

This chapter argues that it is possible to identify, in the coming to be of knowledge, the three elements that Aristotle says are involved in any kind of coming to be whatsoever (viz., matter, form, and the generated composite object). Specifically, it is argued that in this schema the passive intellect (pathetikos nous) corresponds to the matter, the active intellect (poetikos nous) corresponds to the form, and the composite object corresponds to the mind as actually knowing.

This is a close scrutiny of De Anima II 5, led by two questions. First, what can be learned from so long and intricate a discussion about the neglected problem of how to read an Aristotelian chapter? Second, what can the chapter, properly read, teach us about some widely debated issues in Aristotle's theory of perception? I argue that it refutes two claims defended by Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Sorabji: that when Aristotle speaks of the perceiver becoming (...) like the object perceived, the assimilation he has in mind is ordinary alteration of the type exemplified when fire heats the surrounding air, that this alteration stands to perceptual awareness as matter to form. Claim is wrong because the assimilation that perceiving is is not ordinary alteration. Claim is wrong because the special type of alteration that perceiving is is not its underlying material realisation. Indeed, there is no mention in the text of any underlying material realisation for perceiving. The positive aim of II 5 is to introduce the distinction between first and second potentiality, each with their own type of actuality. In both cases the actuality is an alteration different from ordinary alteration. Perception exemplifies one of these new types of alteration, another is found in the acquisition of knowledge and in an embryo's first acquisition of the power of perception. The introduction of suitably refined meanings of 'alteration' allows Aristotle to explain perception and learning within the framework of his physics, which by definition is the study of things that change. He adapts his standard notion of alteration, familiar from Physics III 1-3 and De Generatione et Corruptione I, to the task of accounting for the cognitive accuracy of perception and second potentiality knowledge: both are achievements of a natural, inborn receptivity to objective truth. Throughout the paper I pay special attention to issues of text and translation, and to Aristotle's cross-referencing, and I emphasise what the chapter does not say as well as what it does. In particular, the last section argues that the textual absence of any underlying material realisation for perceiving supports a view I have defended elsewhere, that Aristotelian perception involves no material processes, only standing material conditions. This absence is as telling as others noted earlier. Our reading must respect the spirit of the text as Aristotle wrote it. (shrink)

This is a close scrutiny of "De Anima II 5", led by two questions. First, what can be learned from so long and intricate a discussion about the neglected problem of how to read an Aristotelian chapter? Second, what can the chapter, properly read, teach us about some widely debated issues in Aristotle's theory of perception? I argue that it refutes two claims defended by Martha Nussbaum, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Sorabji: (i) that when Aristotle speaks of the perceiver (...) becoming like the object perceived, the assimilation he has in mind is ordinary alteration of the type exemplified when fire heats the surrounding air, (ii) that this alteration stands to perceptual awareness as matter to form. Claim (i) is wrong because the assimilation that perceiving is is not ordinary alteration. Claim (ii) is wrong because the special type of alteration that perceiving is is not its underlying material realisation. Indeed, there is no mention in the text of any underlying material realisation for perceiving. The positive aim of II 5 is to introduce the distinction between first and second potentiality, each with their own type of actuality. In both cases the actuality is an alteration different from ordinary alteration. Perception exemplifies one of these new types of alteration, another is found in the acquisition of knowledge and in an embryo's first acquisition of the power of perception. The introduction of suitably refined meanings of 'alteration' allows Aristotle to explain perception and learning within the framework of his physics, which by definition is the study of things that change. He adapts his standard notion of alteration, familiar from "Physics" III 1-3 and "De Generatione et Corruptione" I, to the task of accounting for the cognitive accuracy of (proper object) perception and second potentiality knowledge: both are achievements of a natural, inborn receptivity to objective truth. Throughout the paper I pay special attention to issues of text and translation, and to Aristotle's cross-referencing, and I emphasise what the chapter does not say as well as what it does. In particular, the last section argues that the textual absence of any underlying material realisation for perceiving supports a view I have defended elsewhere, that Aristotelian perception involves no material processes, only standing material conditions. This absence is as telling as others noted earlier. Our reading must respect the spirit of the text as Aristotle wrote it. (shrink)

An important part of Aristotelianism has revolved around the different interpretations given to the famous fifth chapter of Aristotle’s De Anima lll. The brevity with which he spoke about an intellectual agent principle described as divine and everlasting has led to a lengthy debate between those who argue that this principle is part of the individual soul and those who think that it must be placed outside the individual intellectual powers. Among the latter, the interpretation of the Renaissance Aristotelian (...) Giacomo Zabarella, a great expert on classical Greek and Aristotle’s works, is still one of the most influential. (shrink)

In der gegenwärtigen Debatte um Aristoteles’ Wahrnehmungstheorie herrscht ein Dissens darüber, welche Relevanz dem Kapitel De Anima II 5 beizumessen ist. Während Burnyeat davon ausgeht, daß in diesem Kapitel eine für die Wahrnehmung spezifische und gegenüber physischen Vorgängen vollkommen andere Art von Veränderung eingeführt wird, sehen die Literalisten in diesem Kapitel lediglich eine Erweiterung des Bewegungsmodells der Physik, das für seelische wie nicht-seelische Tätigkeiten gleichermaßen gilt. Ich zeige, daß beide Interpretationsstrategien der Aussage und Relevanz von De an. II 5 (...) nicht gerechtwerden. Meine Interpretation konzentriert sich auf die Klärung zweier Punkte, die für den Status von De an. II 5 entscheidend sind: das Verhältnis von De an. II 5 zur Bewegungslehre von Phys. III 1-3 und die Funktion von De an. II 5 innerhalb der Argumentation des zweiten Buchs von De Anima. Die Klärung beider Punkte beantwortet die Frage, was der Sinn der umstrittenen Termini alloiôsis tis und sôteria ist und auf welche Klasse von Vermögen sie sich beziehen. (shrink)

Myles Burnyeat has argued that in De Anima II.5 Aristotle marks out a refined kind of alteration which is to be distinguished from ordinary alteration, change of quality as defined in Physics III.1-3. Aristotle's aim, he says, is to make it clear that perception is an alteration of this refined sort and not an ordinary alteration. Thus, it both supports his own interpretation of Aristotle's view of perception, and refutes the Sorabji interpretation according to which perception is a (...) composite of form and matter where the matter is a material alteration in the body. I argue that Burnyeat's interpretation of II.5 should be rejected for a number of reasons, and offer a new interpretation of the distinctions drawn in the chapter, and the relations between them. I conclude that the chapter provides no evidence against the Sorabji view or for Burnyeat's view. Aristotle's assertion that perception is a refined kind of alteration means that it is the kind of alteration that preserves and is good for the subject of that alteration. There is no inconsistency in the thought that perception is a refined alteration of this sort while it, or its matter, is an ordinary alteration. (shrink)

Myles Burnyeat has argued that in De Anima II.5 Aristotle marks out a refined kind of alteration which is to be distinguished from ordinary alteration, change of quality as defined in Physics III.1-3. Aristotle's aim, he says, is to make it clear that perception is an alteration of this refined sort and not an ordinary alteration. Thus, it both supports his own interpretation of Aristotle's view of perception, and refutes the Sorabji interpretation according to which perception is a (...) composite of form and matter where the matter is a material alteration in the body. I argue that Burnyeat's interpretation of II.5 should be rejected for a number of reasons, and offer a new interpretation of the distinctions drawn in the chapter, and the relations between them. I conclude that the chapter provides no evidence against the Sorabji view or for Burnyeat's view. Aristotle's assertion that perception is a refined kind of alteration means that it is the kind of alteration that preserves and is good for the subject of that alteration. There is no inconsistency in the thought that perception is a refined alteration of this sort while it, or its matter, is an ordinary alteration. (shrink)

Dans mon article, je vais essayer de développer une analyse de deux des plus importants chapitres du De anima d'Aristote : les chapitres 4 et 5 du livre III, où Aristote propose son traitement de la question de l'intellect (Nous). Sans entrer dans les détails de l'histoire de l'interprétation de ce texte, je propose d'identifier l'intellect dit ‘passif’ avec quelques traits distinctifs de la puissance de la phantasia ou imagination, et ce que l'on appelle ‘l'intelligence productive’ avec l'environnement cosmique, (...) qui, en vertu de ses régularités, produit les habitats qui vont agir sur la puissance sensorielle de l'être humain et qui, dans la production des expériences sensorielles de l'être humain, fera passer son esprit du statut d'intellect passif à celui d'intellectus in habitu. (shrink)

In the de Anima, Aristotle outlines a theory of perception. In de Anima II, 5-12, he considers the basic kinds of sensory perception — seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. He uses a few basic elements, viz., the five senses and their proper, common and incidental objects, and a few explanatory principles to explain sensory perception. In de Anima III, 1–2, Aristotle turns to apperception, viz. perceptual selfawareness. He considers several basic cases of apperception – the selfconscious (...) awareness of occurrent perceptions and the awareness that the objects of different senses are different. (shrink)

Para elaborar sua profetologia, Maimônides retoma conceitos relativos às teorias do intelecto de Al-Fārābī e de Avicena, que, por sua vez, se baseiam nas noções sobre a alma de Aristóteles. Dessa perspectiva, a Revelação divina deve ser considerada um fato natural inserido na totalidade da natureza criada por Deus. Compreender a Revelação significa, portanto, compreendê-la a partir do homem, uma vez que o profeta, apesar de se tratar de alguém que se destaca do conjunto da humanidade, é sempre um ser (...) humano, possuidor de uma natureza humana. Desse modo, a doutrina da profecia – central no "Guia dos Perplexos" ‒ é elaborada a partir da natureza humana à luz da filosofia racional greco-árabe. Os falāsifa – filósofos muçulmanos helenizantes – já ensinavam que a profecia é possível graças a certa perfeição da natureza humana . Esse ensinamento está fundamentado na teoria do intelecto apresentada por Aristóteles em "De Anima" III, 5, 430a 10 et seq. Contudo, para os filósofos de expressão árabe , a profecia é resultante de certas condições físicas e psíquicas determinadas pelo fluxo necessário das emanações, cuja teoria deriva da "Teologia Pseudo-Aristotélica", um tratado neoplatônico atribuído ao Estagirita que, durante a Idade Média, circulou amplamente nos ambientes filosóficos tanto dos judeus quanto dos muçulmanos. Na cosmovisão neoplatônica adotada por eles, o intelecto do profeta reflete a luz e o conhecimento divino derramado pelo fluxo emanatório do Ser primeiro no mundo celeste, composto pelas dez inteligências separadas, suas almas e esferas. No processo emanatório, a faculdade da imaginação do profeta recebe da última inteligência, o Intelecto Agente, as verdades dos preceitos positivos e culturais da religião, que a imaginação transforma em alegorias e símbolos a serem transmitidos para a humanidade. Maimônides faz da imaginação a pedra de toque de sua profetologia. To elaborate his prophetology, Maimonides uses concepts relating to Al-Fārābī and Avicenna's theories of the intellect which, in turn, are based on Aristotle's notions of the soul. Within this perspective, divine Revelation should be considered a natural fact within the totality of nature created by God. Understanding Revelation therefore means understanding it from a human standpoint, since the prophet ‒ despite being a figure who is set apart from the rest of humanity – is always a human being, with a human nature. Thus, the doctrine of prophecy ‒ central to "The Guide of the Perplexed" ‒ is elaborated based on human nature in light of the rational Greco-Arabic philosophy. The falāsifa – the Hellenizing Muslim philosophers – taught that prophecy is possible thanks to certain perfection of the human nature . This teaching is based on the theory of the intellect, as presented by Aristotle in "De Anima" III, 5, 430a 10 et seq. Therefore, for the philosophers of Arabic expression , prophecy is the result of certain physical and psychic conditions determined by the necessary flow of emanations, whose theory is derived from the "Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology", a Neoplatonic treatise attributed to the Stagyrite which, in the Middle Age, widely circulated in the philosophical milieu, among both Jewish and Muslim. In the Neoplatonic cosmic vision which they adopted, the prophet's intellect reflects the divine light and knowledge overflowing from the emanatory flow from the first Being in the celestial world, which is composed of the ten separate intelligences, their souls and their spheres. In the emanatory process, the prophet's faculty of imagination receives from the ultimate intelligence, the Active Intellect, the truths of the positive and cultural precepts of religion, which the imagination transforms into allegories and symbols to be transmitted to humanity. Maimonides makes the imagination the cornerstone of his prophetology. (shrink)

I.-III. 1. Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam. 2. Commentaria in universam Aristotelis logicam. 3. Commentaria in tres libros Aristotelis De anima -- IV, V. 4. Commentaria in octo libros Aristotelis De physica auscultatione. 5. Commentaria in libros Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione.

Aristotle’s chapter on productive mind (De Anima III.5) and its comparison of this mind to light are best understood as a careful revision to Plato’s Sun-Good analogy from Republic VI. Through a rigorous juxtaposed reading of De Anima II.7 on vision and III.5 on thinking, one can see how Aristotle is almost wholeheartedly taking up Plato’s analogy between vision and thought. When one accounts for all the detail of Aristotle’s explanation of light and vision in II.7 (...) by seeing that chapter as anticipating III.5, an interpretation of productive intellect emerges which reconciles the main opposing views on the question that have long divided interpreters: whether the productive intellect discussed in De Anima III.5 is human or divine. (shrink)

No single theoretician provoked a greater tradition of the reception of his thought throughout changing times and across diverse cultures than did Aristotle, and so Hegel, who calls him the 'teacher of the human race', well describes the man known for ages simply as 'the philosopher'. The present volume examines from a philosophical-historical standpoint the intellect-theory of De Anima III 4-5, which stands in the center of the Aristotelian system and composes one of the most provocative Aristotelian theories. It (...) concentrates on the critical engagement with Aristotle's conception of nous in Theophrastus and his colleagues (Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus) and students (Demetrius of Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratus) in the Peripatos as well as in the Academic, Socratic, Epicurean and Stoic schools. The analysis of the relevant texts leads to a new assessment of Theophrastus's philosophical-historical significance in the Aristotelian tradition and documents that in early Hellenism the Aristotelian theory itself played a surprisingly limited role, so that the loss of the original Aristotelian manuscripts as reported by Strabo and Plutarch — a matter hotly debated in recent studies — was of only marginal importance.Kein Theoretiker provozierte über eine ähnlich lange Zeitspanne eine so intensive, kontinuierliche und multikulturelle Rezeption wie Aristoteles. Die Geschichte der Philosophie verlangt es daher geradezu, unter der Perspektive der ebenso konstanten wie vielgestaltigen Auseinandersetzung mit “dem Philosophen” analysiert zu werden. Den geeignetsten Kristallisationspunkt hierfür stellt die in “De Anima” G 4-5 präsentierte Nous-Theorie dar, denn zum einen stand sie im Zentrum des aristotelischen “Systems”, zum anderen handelt es sich bei ihr um die mit gröîter Kontinuität, höchster Intensität und unterschiedlichsten Resultaten rezipierte philosophische Theorie überhaupt. Der vorliegende Band thematisiert, im Anschluî am die “Topographie” der aristotelischen Noetik, die frühhellenistische Resonanz. Den ersten Schwerpunkt bildet Theophrasts philosophisch-kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Nous-Konzeption seines Lehrers, den zweiten die “De Anima”-Rezeption in der damaligen Philosophie-Szene, die im wesentlichen durch drie Gruppen konstituiert wurde: Theophrasts Kollegen im “Peripatos” (Dikaiarch, Aristoxenos); Theophrasts eingene Hörerschaft (Demetrios v. Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratos); und die zahlreichte philosophische Konkurrenz: die “Akademiker”, “Sokratiker”, und die Schulen Epikurs bzw. Zenons. Die Analyse der relevanten Texte führt erstens zu einder grundsätzlichen Neubewertung der philosophiehistorischen Position Theophrasts. Zweitens dokumentiert sie, daî die aristotelische Theorie entgegen der heutigen opinio communis gerade im Frühhellenismus eine erstaunlich bescheidene Rolle spielte. Rezeptionsgeschichtlich kommt dem von Strabon/Plutarch berichteten und in der neueren Forschung heiîdiskutierten Verlust der aristotelischen Originalmanuscripte deshalb allenfalls eine sekondäre Bedeutung zu. (shrink)

Dans mon article, je vais essayer de développer une analyse de deux des plus importants chapitres du De anima d'Aristote : les chapitres 4 et 5 du livre III, où Aristote propose son traitement de la question de l'intellect. Sans entrer dans les détails de l'histoire de l'interprétation de ce texte, je propose d'identifier l'intellect dit ‘passif’ avec quelques traits distinctifs de la puissance de la phantasia ou imagination, et ce que l'on appelle ‘l'intelligence productive’ avec l'environnement cosmique, qui, (...) en vertu de ses régularités, produit les habitats qui vont agir sur la puissance sensorielle de l'être humain et qui, dans la production des expériences sensorielles de l'être humain, fera passer son esprit du statut d'intellect passif à celui d'intellectus in habitu. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation of Aristotle’s identification, in De Anima 2.5, of αἴσθησις with an ἀλλοίωσίς τις that is not ‘a kind of destruction of something by its contrary’. Drawing on a passage from Metaphysics Iota 5, it argues that when so described, what is referred to as an ἀλλοίωσίς τις is not a uniquely perceptual alteration.

Comparing the passage of Aristotle’s treatise De anima, III, 8, 431b.21-24 and Ecclesiastes 3: 10-11, the author reveals a similar epistemological image: the universe is in the soul of the cognizing subject, for it embraces all existing things in the process of perception and cognition of the world.

In one of the unpublished parts of his manuscript titled the Spicilegia, Arthur Schopenhauer presents an uncharacteristically sympathetic reading of an Aristotelian text. The text in question, De anima III. 5, happens to include the only occurrence of arguably the most controversial idea in Aristotle, namely the distinction between active and passive nous. Schopenhauer interprets these two notions as corresponding to his own notions of the ?will? and the ?intellect? or ?subject of knowledge?, respectively. The result is a unique (...) interpretation, according to which Aristotle's active nous is in fact non-intellectual: it is devoid of any interaction with intelligible objects, and hence lacks any intellectual activity. I show that this interpretation, though counterintuitive, is tenable, and that it may contribute to our understanding of Aristotle even if we do not adopt Schopenhauer's metaphysics. (shrink)

Cuando Alejandro examina De anima II 5 de Aristóteles, se enfrenta al problema de explicar qué tipo de alteración es la sensación. Su respuesta fue muy influyente, especialmente después de la Quaestio III 3 que había sido traducida al latín por Gerardo de Cremona basada en una versión árabe. De hecho, aún es muy influyente, pues en general es tomada en cuenta por los comentadores modernos del De anima. Pero un examen detallado de De anima II 5 (...) puede generar dudas acerca de las teorías que Alejandro adscribió a Aristóteles acerca de la relación entre ser afectado o alterado y senso-percepción. Zingano se propone mostrar que mostrar cómo la lectura que Alejandro hace de De anima II 5 de Aristóteles contiene un elemento crucial para la adopción de la tesis, según la cual el ser afectado tiene poca o ninguna relevancia en la explicación de la sensación como facultad discriminadora. (shrink)

Translation of passages of Aristotle's De Anima into Portuguese. The passages are these: I.1, I.4 (the 'Rylean passage'); II.1-6; III.1-8. The translation is preliminary.

In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief (...) among which is its characterization of transitions from first potentiality to first actuality, e.g., learning, not as `ordinary', but rather as acquisitions of natural dispositions or faculties. (shrink)

It has been strongly disputed that Philoponus is the author of the commentary on the third book of De Anima printed in vol. xv of CAG under his name, and Stephanus of Alexandria has been taken to be its real author. The evidence for the authorship of Stephanus is as follows: Codex Parisinus gr. 1914, written in the twelfth century, has an adscript by a later hand saying βιβλ⋯ον τρ⋯τον ⋯π⋯ ϕωνης στεϕ⋯νου, and the same appears in the fifteenth-century (...) Codex Estensis iii F 8. In 543.9 there is a clause saying ὡς ⋯ν τῷ περ⋯ ⋯ρμηνε⋯ας ⋯μ⋯θομεν, which was taken by M. Hayduck to be direct reference to Stephanus' commentary on the De Interpretatione, edited also by Hayduck in vol. xiii/3 of CAG. The third book, says Hayduck, is short and jejune, in contrast to the verbosity of the preceding two books. The commentary on the third book of De Anima is divided into lectures, but the first two books are not. Some locutions are used constantly in the third book and in Stephanus' in De Interpretatione as well. In the Codex Vaticanus gr. 241 fol. 6 we are told that Stephanus also wrote a commentary on the De Anima. (shrink)

The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex activity” of its (...) organic body. This paper explores the role of this “complex activity” model of soul in Aristotle’s study of soul in De Anima. I argue, first, that the model has its origins in De Anima II.4, where Aristotle argues that living things do all they do by nature for the sake of a single, teleologically primary end. I argue further that Aristotle uses this model to account for the psychological attributes naturally present in living things, including their capacities for vital activities like nutrition, reproduction, and perception, and that this is the task to which Aristotle devotes the obscure final chapters of De Anima III. (shrink)

This book is a reconsideration of spirituality as a lived experience in the lives of the contributors. The authors speak both as well-informed scholars and as individuals who experienced the lived spirituality they give voice to. The authors do not place themselves above and outside of what they are writing about but within that world. They speak of living psychospiritual traditions of healing both the self and the world; of traditions that have not disembedded the self from the wider world. (...) Those traditions are from indigenous North and South America (5 essays), a Buddhist/ Shakta from Bengal, an Indo-Persian Islamic psychoanalyst, a mystical Jewish feminist rabbi, and a historical essay about the extermination of the Renaissance worldview of Anima Mundi. (shrink)

En este paper ofrezco una lectura global de _De Anima _III 4 de Aristóteles, en la que pretendo develar la rigu­rosa estructura argumentativa del capítulo. Así, mues­tro que el capítulo exhibe el típico patrón aristotélico de investigación filosófica: el estableci­mien­to de los pro­blemas básicos que han de ser resueltos, el camino dia­léctico para la postulación de una hipótesis, la deri­va­ción, a partir de ella, de las características indivi­dua­li­zantes relevantes del objeto (algunas de las cuales son ya manifiestas y explicadas (...) _como_ derivables de la hipó­tesis), y la emergencia de _aporiai_ que _prima_ _facie_ pare­cen invalidar la hipótesis pero que finalmente po­si­bili­tan una comprensión más profunda de ella. Pro­curo cla­rificar la progresión especulativa del capí­tu­lo al consi­derar incialmente el _Principio de Actuali­dad_ como sub­yacente a su _Modelo de Asimilación_ de la cog­nición (S conoce F _si y solo si_ el principio cognitivo de S deviene F debido a un objeto conocido O que es F en acto). Aristóteles, además, deriva la no-mezcla a partir de la carencia de límites (_Asunción de Ilimita__­ción_), que es una carac­terística manifiesta del _nous_. De la no-mezcla deriva la _Separabilidad_ (estas im­plica­cio­nes se clarifican en la primera _aporia_), de la Se­pa­rabi­li­dad deriva la _Espontaneidad_ y de la Esponta­neidad la _Autointelección_ del _nous_ (clarificada en la segunda _aporia_). Aunque examino el capítulo completo, me en­foco específicamente en el valor teórico y meto­doló­gico de la introducción y discusión de las dos _aporiai_. (shrink)

At De Anima II 5, 417b17, Aristotle says, ‘The first transition (πρώτη μεταβολή) in that which can perceive is brought about by the parent, and when it is born it already has [the faculty of] sense-perception in the same way as it has knowledge. Actual sense-perception is so spoken of in the same way as contemplation.’ The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of first transitions.

Whereas scholars often look to De Anima 2.5 to support one or another understanding of the sense in which perception, for Aristotle, qualifies as an alteration and qualitative assimilation to the sense-object, I ask the more basic question of what the chapter is meant to establish or accomplish with respect to the question whether perception is an alteration. I argue that the chapter does not presuppose or legitimate the view that perception is an alteration where it is thought to, (...) and that it is meant rather to challenge that view, most importantly, by putting its argumentative weight behind a different model of perception, leading to a kind of antinomy. What stands in the way of understanding perception as an alteration (and assimilation to the sense-object), in this chapter, is ultimately the lack of an account of perceiving a quality as having that quality. (shrink)

In De anima, III, Aristotele studia tre operazioni sensibili : percezione dei sensibili comuni, appercezione, discriminazione, cui la critica si riferisce come alla teoria del ‘senso comune’, identificando la αἴσθησις κοινή del De anima con la κοινὴ δύναμις dei Parva naturalia. Ma le due espressioni denotano aspetti ben diversi : la prima indica una capacità posteriore alla divisione della percezione nei cinque sensi, mentre la seconda è una capacità anteriore e radicale della percezione.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also the (...) best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The "Thinking of Thinking" in MetaphysicsA.9 JOSEPH G. DE FILIPPO a+~6v &Qa voE[, e~eQ ~o~t ~6 XQ&~O~OV, xetl. I~o~tv ~1VdOloLgvo1]o~t0g v6"qotg. (A.9, 1o74b33-34) Therefore it thinks itself, if indeed it is most powerful, and its thinking is the thinking of thinking. Thus culminates Aristotle's treatment of God's activity in the twelfth book of the Metaphysics. The conclusion seems transparent. God is an intellect (vo~Sg); since he is also the (...) best thing, and it is absurd that he should think anything worse than himself, he therefore thinks himself. And since he is nothing other than a thinking (v6"qotg), what he thinks of is thinking (vo~loEe0g). "Thinking of thinking," however, is a notion that is as ambiguous in ancient Greek as it is in English. It is just not clear what sort of thing such a reflexively self-thinking mind would be, though it might seem natural to construe the activity of Aristotle's God as somehow an act of pure self-awareness, self-consciousness or self-knowledge. On such an understanding God would be a separately existing consciousness, with himself or his activity as the only object of that consciousness. In 196 9 R. Norman published a paper which disputed this sort of interpretation.' He argued that when one considers Aristotle's theory of, R. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," Phronesis 14 (1969): 63-74 (reprinted in Articles on Aristotle, vol. 4, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji [London, 1979], 93-1o2). While I a-m indebted to Norman's basic approach, my treatment of God's self-thought differs substantially from his in two respects. First, although it isessential to recognize that in Aristotle human thought too thinks itself, this does not justify the conclusion that God's thinking is "of the same kind as our own normal abstract thought" (73). As 1shall argue below in section 4, the characterization of the Prime Mover as v6"qoLgvo~o~t0g is meant specifically to differentiate its activity from the selfthinking of human volSg;human thought could never be characterized as v6"qotgvofioEt0g.Secondly, Norman does not isolate the real source of A.9's argument, which, as l shall argue, is the potential conflict between Aristotle's own physical and psychological theories. M. Wedin, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle (New Haven, 1988), 229-45, also argues against Norman's thesis that human and divine thought are the same in kind. [543] 544 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER 1995 volSg from De Anima III.4-8, it is clear that the conception of God as a selfthinking mind does not entail that he engages in self-contemplation in the normal sense of the term. On Norman's interpretation, God thinks himself because he thinks a definite content with which he is numerically identical, according to the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of vo~g with its object of thought (vo~lx6v). To describe this act simply as self-contemplation belies the fact that its object must have an intelligible content, which in the case of God is not adequately described as his "self," for this self would indeed be nothing more than an act of self-contemplation. While many commentators have followed Norman in recognizing that the description of God as "thinking himself" is drawn from the De Anima's characterization of self-thinking, there has persisted a tendency to interpret Aristotle 's God as engaged in an act of pure self-awareness or under some similar description.' The reason for this persistence is due, I believe, to a crucial difference between chapters 7 and 9 of book A. Whereas both chapters characterize the Prime Mover (PM) as a self-thinker, in chapter 9 he is also said to be ~1 v61]otg vo~loec0g V6tlOtg (the thinking of thinking), which understandably appears to be a much more specific delineation of his thought content. A. 7 tells us that the PM is a vofJg that thinks itself (to72b18-3o); according to De Anima III. 4 that simply is what voa)g does at the highest level of actuality, since it... (shrink)