Abstrak: Dari pengamatan, tidak banyak tulisan teologis tentang sakramen tobat atau sakramen rekonsiliasi di lingkungan bahasa Indonesia selama ini. Begitu pula, ada kesan bahwa pemahaman umat Katolik mengenai sakramen tobat cukup terbatas. Dari sinilah artikel ini ingin memberi sumbangan pemikiran teologis melalui kekayaan dan kedalaman pandangan teologis Karl Rahner mengenai sakramen tobat. Dari penelitian penulis, sabda pengampunan Allah menjadi inti pemikiran Rahner tentang sakramen tobat. Dengan metode teologi transendental sebagaimana dikembangkan oleh Karl Rahner, penulis mengupas secara kritis pemahaman sabda pengampunan (...) Allah melalui alur pemikiran sakramental Rahner. Rahner berpendapat bahwa manusia memiliki pengalaman dasar akan dosa-kesalahan yang tak dapat dihapus oleh diri sendiri, dan justru karena itulah manusia senantiasa mendambakan sabda pengampunan Allah sebagai pemberian diri Allah (Selbstmitteilung Gottes) yang berpuncak pada wafat dan kebangkitan Kristus. Melalui Gereja, sabda pengampunan Allah itu dihadirkan melalui aneka macam bentuk, sedangkan yang khusus dan istimewa melalui sakramen tobat. Tulisan ini ditutup dengan penyampaian poin-poin relevansi pandangan Rahner tersebut bagi Gereja sekarang ini. Kata-kata kunci: Sabda pengampunan Allah, sakramen tobat, sakramen rekonsiliasi, teologi sakramental, teologi transendental, belas kasih Allah. Abstract: Theology of Sacrament of reconciliation has not been widely written and developed in Indonesia, and therefore the general understanding among the faithful. This article is to contribute, particularly by presenting Karl Rahner’s theology on the sacrament of reconciliation. Rahner focused on the forgiving word of God. Employing his transcendental method, this article is presenting a critical study on the understanding of Rahner’s forgiving word of God as well as his sacramental theology. Rahner showed that human beings themselves aware and know of their experience of sin or guilt and could not just get out of it, and because of that human beings themselves are longing for forgiveness and God’s forgiving word (Selbstmitteilung Gottes) revealed per exellentiam in the death and resurrection of Christ. Disciples of Christ gathered as people of God or church make present God’s forgiving word here and now in various forms, yet especially in the sacrament of reconciliation. The article shall conclude with points of relevance for the church today. Keywords: God’s forgiving word, sacrament of penance, sacrament of reconciliation, sacramental theology, transcendental theology, mercy of God. (shrink)

The whole of the premodern Indian world appears shot through with language. The analysis of language, first undertaken to preserve the sacred texts of the Brahmins, achieved such conceptual sophistication that it served as the model, directly or indirectly, for almost all traditions of systematic thought, regardless of religious affiliation. Language was implicated in all the most important philosophical debates, regarding the nature of reality and the foundations of knowledge, and became an object of philosophical debate itself. Given the enormous (...) tangle of sources that address these issues, spanning several traditions of thought, and given their complexity, if not abstruseness, it would be difficult for anyone to... (shrink)

Contributed articles on semantics philosophy of vedic literature and poetics presented earlier at a seminar honoring Kapil Kapoor, Indian Indologist.

The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, (...) but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita). (shrink)

The epistemology of śabda is one of the main themes in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the conceptual basis of Jayanta’s textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī contains a debate between Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas who, respectively, advocated an holistic or atomistic theory of language. Selected Jayanta’s re-uses from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya sources are here surveyed and analyzed, with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The method of (...) analysis is partially following Moravcsik’s scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small’s classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors’ tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy authority, and his statement with a status of śabdapramāṇa. (shrink)

본고는 인도 산스크리트 문법학 전통을 대표하는 철학자인 바르뜨르하리(Bhartṛhari, 450-510 CE)의 대표작 『문장과 단어에 관한 책』(Vākyapadīya)의 제 1장 「브라흐만에 관한 챕터」(Brahmakaṇḍa)에 나타난 ‘말’(śabda 혹은 vāc) 개념을 분석하고 해당 개념의 인식론적, 존재론적 함의를 세 가지 측면에서 살펴본다. 바르뜨르하리에게 있어 ‘말’이란 의식적･무의식적인 정신적 활동을 관통하는 원리이다. 그는 말이 가진 세 가지 층위를 구분한 후 그것이 단순히 물리적인 실체로서 구체화된 음성에 국한된 것이 아니라 인간 인식 전반을 꿰뚫고 있다고 주장한다. 하지만 그의 ‘말’ 개념은 인식 주체를 규율하는 기제를 넘어선다. 그는 ‘말’을 구체적으로 ‘베다’와 등치시키며 (...) 베다로부터 모든 사물이 창조되었다는 브라흐마나(Brāhmaṇa)군의 텍스트에 보이는 사고방식을 적용하여 모든 사물이 ‘말’의 힘에 의해 산출된 것이라 주장한다. 이와 같이 인식의 주체와 객체 모두를 ‘말’의 원리로 환원시킨 후, 바르뜨르하리는 인식 주체와 객체가 관계 맺는 방식인 인간의 지식체계 역시 태초의 ‘말’인 ‘베다’로부터 기인하기에 인도의 모든—비-베다 혹은 반-베다적 전통을 포함한—종교적 그리고 철학적 학문 전통은 베다로 구체화된 ‘말’이라는 공통의 기원을 가지고 있다는 세계관을 도출한다. (shrink)

Abstrak: Kitab Suci merupakan Sabda Allah yang menjadi tumpuan hidup dan sumber kebenaran bagi umat beriman. Posisinya begitu agung dan penting. Sayangnya, banyak umat Kristiani yang kesulitan untuk memahami isi Kitab Suci. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk memperkenalkan salah satu metode menafsirkan Kitab Suci yang relatif mudah untuk digunakan oleh semua kalangan, yakni metode Analisis Naratif. Dalam artikel ini, metode tersebut akan digunakan untuk menganalisis perikop tentang “Kelahiran Samuel” (1 Samuel 1:1-28). Melalui analisis atas teks ini pula, hendak dipaparkan beberapa pesan (...) teologis yang dapat meng- inspirasi kehidupan umat beriman. Secara praktis, artikel ini berikhtiar menunjukkan bahwa metode analisis naratif cukup berjasa dalam mem- permudah umat Kistiani menafsirkan atau menggali pesan-pesan teologis dari teks-teks alkitabiah. Kata-kata Kunci: Analisis Naratif, Kitab Suci, kelahiran Samuel, iman, doa, pesan teologis. Abstract: Holy Bible (Scripture) is the Word of God. It is the foundation of life and the source of truth for the faithful. Its position is very great and important, but unfortunately, many Christians find it difficult to understand the content of Scripture. This article would like to introduce one method of interpreting Scripture that is relatively easy to be used by all circles, the method of Narrative Analysis. In this article, the method will be used to analyze the passage about “Birth of Samuel” (1 Samuel 1:1-28). Through the analysis of this text, the writer also offers some theological messages that can inspire the life of faith. Practically, it can be argued that the method of narrative analysis is meritorious in facilitating Christian people to interpret or explore theological messages of biblical texts. Keywords: Narrative analysis, scripture (holy bible), Samuel’s birth, faith, prayer, theological messages. (shrink)

Ever since some traditional protagonists made the intriguing claim that the Vedas (canonical Brahmāṇical texts) are an inviolable resource of authority on significant matters, extensive debate has raged in Indian thought as to whether word can rightfully be accepted as pramāṇa or autonomous mode of knowing; in western epistemological terms, as testimony? At the mundane level the doctrine underscores the capacity of language, i.e., words and sentences (sabda), to disseminate knowledge from speaker/author to hearer/audience; at a transcendental level it adverts (...) to wisdom-texts delivering knowledge about supramundane matters. Unlike the former, the words of the latter may be literally authorless: truth is begot from what the sages of yore simply ‘heard’, somehow, and came to know. But J. N. Mohanty has rejected this doctrine, arguing that sentences can certainly generate linguistic meaning or intentionality – understanding that p. But since this does not come stamped with evidential warrant (‘fact’), it may not amount to knowledge that p; at best it may generate belief about injunctions and imperatives (‘ought’ but not indicatively ‘is’, nor objective moral knowledge). The chapter is a response to what I call the Mohanty-Gettier Paradox, and a case is argued for the viability of śabda-based testimony, drawing on phenomenology of language and hermeneutics. (shrink)

The paper discusses anumāna and its variety in general from the point of view of inferential cognition for the sake of oneself as well as for the sake of others; i.e. svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna as given in the Buddhist tradition of logic, especially with parārthānumāna, its nature and role. The paper argues that the Buddhist intent of division of anumāna into svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna was to bring Buddha-vacanas under the category of parārthānumāna and to save them from being classified under (...) śabda pramāṇa. It contends that such a division was not just an epistemological demand, but had a deeper philosophical significance in the Buddhist conceptual framework. Such a division is, therefore, intended to reject the role of śabda as an extra causal means or pramāṇa. The paper identifies the logical commitment in Buddhist tradition as hetu-centric commitment as it differs from the Nyāya tradition of vyāpti-centric one. (shrink)

This article explores the notion of meditation and devotionalism in the Radhasoami tradition of the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries, a tradition of reform that questions and transcends traditional Hinduism in many ways. In the following, we study several texts and ritual practices of the Radhasoami tradition, in the example of the elaborate meditation called surat śabda yoga (yoga of the sound of the inner current). Our goal is to explore the complex interactions between meditation and devotion. In addition, (...) we wish to address yogic, meditative and devotional embodied practices, such as the collective meditation during the satsaṅg. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diasporic Impulses:Sikh Philosophy as an AssemblageArvind-Pal S. Mandair (bio)Let me begin this response by thanking the editors of Philosophy East and West for generously allowing space for this review forum on my recent book, Sikh Philosophy: Exploring Gurmat Concepts in a Decolonizing World (Bloomsbury, 2022), and thanking the reviewers Monika-Kirloskar Steinbach, Ananda Abeysekara, and Jeffery Long for their careful readings of this work. "Sikh Philosophy" names the modern academic (...) discourse that crystallized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a result of the encounter between modern Western philosophy and gurmat, a mode of thought-praxis deriving from and associated with Sikhi (lit. "the path of learning"), a spiritual-philosophical tradition hailing from India, which most readers may only have encountered through the modern knowledge system's categorization of it as the religion known as Sikhism. To avoid complicating the discussion, I will be referring interchangeably to gurmat and Sikh philosophy, even though they represent quite different entities. Gurmat represents a tradition of thought-praxis that goes back to Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhi, whereas Sikh philosophy is a modern formation that emerged from the encounter between gurmat and European thought, which is why I prefer to regard it as an assemblage. The book examines some of the key concepts of Sikh philosophy and how they inform its vision of life, what they tell us about the nature of reality, and whether it is possible to discern a distinct logic, epistemology, and ontology based on the principles of gurmat. In their reviews, Kirloskar-Steinbach, Abeysekara, and Long have provided critical readings and insightful questions, which I address below.Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach asks about the relationship between Sikh philosophy and Indian philosophy, noting that my book does not explicitly engage Indian philosophy. Specifically, she raises two questions: (1) whether Sikh philosophy should or potentially could be part of the broader field of Indian philosophy, and (2) whether I would be inclined to contribute to that field, particularly in light of recent efforts to diversify philosophical practices within Indian philosophy by scholars like Jonardon Ganeri in his Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy (2017) and Purushottama Bilimoria and Amy Rayner in their History of Indian Philosophy (2018). My immediate response would be "yes," but with an important caveat. In that vein, I applaud Ganeri's and Bilimoria/Rayner's efforts to open up philosophical inquiry within Indian traditions and take them beyond darśanic framings that narrowly positioned different thought-practices of South Asia either within or [End Page 364] in relation to the Brahmanical/Vedic/Sanskritic paradigm. Ganeri's "multiperspectival" narrative about practices might well enable discussions about Sikh philosophy to flourish, given that the lexicon of gurmat (the teaching, logic, practice of the Guru) is replete with concepts that have cognate terms in the main Hindu philosophical schools including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta; the Jain and Buddhist traditions; and perhaps most importantly, within the Islamic, especially Sufi, traditions. It is the seeming parity between cognate terms such as the Punjabi dharam (Skt. dharma), karam (Skt. karma), yoga, śabad (Skt. śabda), guru, hukam, and many more, which has given rise to the misperception that Sikh philosophy is a purely syncretic thought system parasitic on earlier Indic systems. A similar misperception might be that Sikhi is more primarily a mode of lived praxis or dharam than it is a philosophy (Bhogal 2018) and therefore has less to do with thought than with spiritual attainment. But this approach is far too narrow in that it opposes "philosophy"/"thought" to spiritual praxis without asking whether there might be a broader definition of thinking at play within Sikhi or gurmat. Such an approach fails to extricate itself from the legacy of imperial categorizations of Indic traditions as essentially religious and therefore unrelated to what is called "thinking." By doing so, it falls prey to another misconception many have, that the closest Indians have come to philosophical thought are the darśanic schools, not realizing that most Indian philosophers and thinkers were at the same time devotees and spiritual adepts who developed rigorous modes of discipline and practice.Having said this, I would premise any... (shrink)

-- v. 5. Nyāya philosophy of language : analysis, text, translation, and interpretation of Upamāna and Śabda sections of Kārikāvalī, Muktāvalī, and Dinakarī.

The Bhagavad-Gita, as a multivalent text, has been a source of inspiration for all areas of Indian thought. This paper identifies elements in the Bhagavad-Gita which may have influenced the formation of Nyaya philosophy in the centuries after it was written. Part one of the paper reviews Nyaya epistemology as a whole, focusing on aspects that play an important role in the Bhagavad-Gita: perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), ‘syllogism’, verbal utterance (sabda) and the practical orientation of knowledge. The second part shows (...) how those aspects appear in the text of the Bhagavad-Gita. In praticular, Krishna relies on a number of techniques in convincing Arjuna of his obligation as a ksatria which would later be formalized in Nyaya philosophy as pramana or methods of knowing. As a whole, the Bhagavad-Gita also emphasizes the Nyaya view that knowledge is only useful insofar as it helps the knower achieve a particular goal. This paper does not, and has no pretention to prove the existence of a direct line of influence connection the Bhagavad-Gita and Nyaya philosophy; readers will instead gain an appreciation of the shared cultural context which gave rise to both of these forms of Indian thought. Abstrak Bhagavad-Gita, sebagai teks yang multitafsir, telah menjadi sumber inspirasi bagi segala pemikiran India. Makalah ini mengidentifikasikan unsur-unsur dalam Bhagavad-Gita yang mungkin memengaruhi pembentukan filsafat Nyaya selama beberapa abad setelah Bhagavad-Gita ditulis. Bagian pertama makalah meringkas epistemologi Nyaya secara keseluruhan dengan berfokus pada aspek-aspek yang memainkan peran penting dalam Bhagavad-Gita: persepsi (pratyaksa), penyimpulan (anumana), ‘silogisme’, saksi verbal (sabda), dan orientasi praktis pengetahuan. Bagian kedua memperlihatkan bagaimana aspek-aspek tersebut muncul dalam teks Bhagavad-Gita. Secara khusus, Krishna mengandalkan berbagai teknik dalam meyakinkan Arjuna akan kewajibannya sebagai ksatria yang kemudian diformalkan dalam filsafat Nyaya sebagai pramana atau sarana pengetahuan. Secara keseluruhan, Bhagavad-Gita juga menekankan pandangan Nyaya bahwa pengetahuan hanya berguna sejauh dapat membantu si penahu mencapai tujuan tertentu. Makalah ini tidak dapat membuktikan adanya garis pengaruh langsung yang menghubungkan Bhagavad-Gita dengan filsafat Nyaya; namun, kita tetap dapat mengapresiasi suatu ‘kemiripan keluarga’ di antara keduanya yang menunjukkan kekayaan konteks kebudayaan yang menghasilkan kedua buah pemikiran peradaban India ini. (shrink)

The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)

The Kingdom of God is central to the whole message of Jesus Christ. Through the kingdom of God, we can discover and understand the entire mission of Jesus. The Kingdom of God is the embodiment of God’s saving presence in human life. Compared with the Jewish religious movements of that era, especially the apocalyptic movement, which also awaited the coming of the Kingdom of God, Jesus’ preaching about the kingdom of God has a special feature, that the Kingdom of God (...) is an act of forgiveness and salvation from God, and not God’s judgment; moreover, the action is happening now in people’s life, rather than being something that is expected in the future. Through Jesus, through his word and his work, God is now present in the midst of the people. Through his parables and his words in the Sermon on the Mount and in the act of casting out demons, in healing the sick and in the forgiveness of sin, Jesus reveals the presence of a compassionate God, a God who frees people from the power of sin and leades them in the power of divine grace. Jesus not only preached the kingdom of God but gave himself so that people would experience God’s saving work. Through His death on the cross, Jesus freely poured God’s mercy and goodness upon human beings. Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom of God has important implications for the understanding of the Christological and ecclesiological renewal. Keywords: Kingdom of God, salvation, forgiveness, word of Jesus, work of Jesus, human life, Christological and ecclesiological renewal. Abstrak: Kerajaan Allah merupakan inti seluruh pewartaan Yesus Kristus. Melalui Kerajaan Allah kita dapat menemukan dan mengerti seluruh perutusan hidup Yesus. Kerajaan Allah berarti perwujudan kehadiran Allah yang menyelamatkan dalam hidup manusia. Dibandingkan dengan gerakan keagamaan yahudi pada zaman itu, khususnya apokaliptik yang juga menantikan kedatangan Kerajaan Allah, pewartaan Yesus tentang Kerajaan Allah memiliki ciri khusus bahwa Kerajaan Allah adalah tindakan pengampunan dan penyelamatan Allah, bukan penghakiman Allah dan tindakan itu kini terjadi nyata dalam hidup manusia, dan bukannya sesuatu yang dinantikan di masa depan. Melalui diri Yesus, dalam sabda dan karya-Nya, Allah kini hadir di tengah-tengah umat-Nya. Lewat perumpamaan dan sabda bahagia maupun dalam tindakan pengusiran setan, penyembuhan orang sakit dan pengampunan orang berdosa, Yesus menyatakan kehadiran Allah yang penuh belas kasih dalam hidup manusia, yang membebaskannya dari kuasa dosa dan menuntunnya dalam kuasa rahmat Ilahi. Yesus tidak hanya memberitakan Kerajaan Allah tetapi juga memberikan diri-Nya, sehingga orang sungguh mengalami karya penyelamatan Allah. Melalui kematian-Nya di salib, Yesus mencurahkan dengan cuma-cuma kerahiman dan kebaikan Allah dalam hidup manusia. Pewartaan Kerajaan Allah Yesus ini memiliki dampak penting bagi pembaruan pemahaman kristologis dan eklesiologis. Kata-kata Kunci: Kerajaan Allah, penyelamatan, pengampunan, sabda Yesus, karya Yesus, kehidupan manusia, pembaruan pemahaman kristologis dan eklesiologis. (shrink)

The Pauṣkara briefly discusses the meaning-expressing nature of śabda (constituted of phonemes, varṇa) and the means to the cognition of word and sentence meaning. According to this dualistic Śaiva Tantra, meaning is denoted by nāda, a capacity of varṇas. Varṇas also are the means to the cognition of meaning through a capacity (saṃskāra) manifested in them. Although the meaning-denoting capacity is natural to varṇas, the relation of words (which are nothing but groups of varṇas) with objects is fixed by (...) convention. This article translates and analyzes the relevant passages from the sixth and eighth chapters. Certain arguments of plagiarism levelled against the eighth chapter of the Pauṣkara are examined in the concluding part of the article. (shrink)

It is commonly taken for granted that in Vedānta, as also in Indian philosophy in general, yukti, anumāna, and tarka, translate into “reason” (of Western thought) while śruti is rendered as “revelation.” I reject this translation-interpretation; it is a good example of theway in which Sanskrit philosophical discourse is often misconstrued. The term śruti does not refer to revelation, nor do yukti, anumāna, or tarka to reason. Reason, I argue, comprehends all the pramānas; these are all means of legitimizing beliefs. (...) I distinguish between different levels of the application of “reason,” and I maintain that the mere reasoner (tārkika) has not grasped the true nature of “reason.” In effect, I maintain that śabda, both lauika and alukika, is a component of reason, and so is perception. There is no concept of “revelation” in Indian philosophy, and no opposition between reason and experience. (shrink)

The authors make an attempt to comparatively analyse some stances of the Old Indian philosophy of language, exemplified by the Medieval Indian author Jayanta, along with the Western tradition of the analytical philosophy of language, and to highlight the differences as well as the similarities. The main focus is on Jayanta's discussion of the meaning vs. reference problem.

Dalam Alkitab Kristen tersimpan empat kisah Injil yang dengan cara- nya masing-masing menceritakan hidup dan karya Yesus dari Nazaret. Riwayat-riwayat itu dapat sangat bermakna bagi pembaca yang satu, tetapi juga sulit dipahami oleh pembaca yang lain. Hal ini disebabkan, antara lain, karena manusia masa kini kurang akrab dengan latar belakang, zaman dan tempat kisah Injil tersebut ditulis. Bagaimana mengatasi kesulitan itu? Peter Walker, seorang dosen Alkitab di Universitas Oxford, yang pernah meneliti situs-situs di Tanah Suci, dan berpengalaman sebagai pemandu rombongan (...) peziarah, menemukan solusi yang menarik dan sangat berguna. Ia menyusun buku In the Steps of Jesus, untuk memperkenalkan kisah Injil terutama Injil Lukas sambil membawa pembaca buku ini ke tempat-tempat terjadinya adegan-adegan riwayat hidup dan karya Yesus. Tempat-tempat itu diperlihatkannya dengan foto dan gambar, disertai keterangan yang mampu membuka mata dan hati pembaca................................................ Tahun lalu kami sudah memperkenalkan kembaran buku ini: In the Steps of Saint Paul: Penabur Sabda Segala Bangsa, yang disusun oleh pengarang yang sama, Peter Walker, dan juga diterjemahkan oleh pener- jemah yang sama, pakar Alkitab V. Indra Sanjaya dan diterbitkan pula oleh Kanisius. Kedua buku ini bukan hanya enak dipandang dan dibaca, tetapi juga memberi informasi yang dapat diandalkan oleh pembaca dari kalangan mana pun yang ingin lebih mengenal sejarah awal agama Kristen dan warisannya di Palestina serta wilayah Laut Tengah. Buku In the Steps of Jesus ini merupakan suatu penziarahan tersendiri, semacam napak tilas perjalanan hidup Yesus. Selain dapat menjadi buku panduan bagi segelintir orang yang sempat berwisata ke Tanah Suci, buku ini juga membuka kesempatan “berziarah batin” bagi mereka yang tidak pernah akan dapat berangkat ke tanah itu; dan tentu tetap juga memberi banyak pencerahan bagi mereka yang telah pulang dari ziarah yang nyata. (Martin Harun, Program Studi Ilmu Teologi, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)