Abstract

IN DEBATES CONCERNING the relationship between basic principles of Whiteheadian process philosophy and the classical doctrine of substance, one can distinguish at least three types of essentially different approaches to the discussed issue: Process metaphysics implies definitive rejection of substantialist categories of traditional philosophy, and introduces a radically new perspective in which notions of flux and change replace the former categories of enduring substances and relative immutability of individual subjects. Whitehead's approach to the traditional doctrine of substance results in a strong critique of it but not in total rejection. Certain elements of the Aristotelian and Cartesian legacy must be critically revised, but they cannot be eliminated from a rational interpretation of nature. Their implicit presence in Whiteheadian interpretative schemes substantiates the opinion that process metaphysics introduces a reformed version of the doctrine of substance. In spite of explicit critique of the concept of substance found in Whitehead's texts, the same texts implicitly presuppose the necessity of reference to certain substantialist categories. Whitehead himself did not always formally recognize such a necessity; his metaphysical assertions, however, provide an objective basis for developing a modified theory of substance.