Abstract

Human dignity is commonly regarded as the fundamental moral, legal and political value. However, in philosophy and legal studies, the concept is nonetheless highly contested; in particular, it is criticised for being vague, empty, highly arbitrary, not rationally justifiable and therefore dispensable. Against this criticism, this paper defends a classical Kantian understanding of human dignity; this is done in five steps: Firstly, the concept of human dignity is clarified by distinguishing it from the concept of social dignity. Secondly, well-known attempts to justify human dignity are criticised for being insufficient, paving the way for a transcendental-philosophical justification. Thirdly, and this is the core of this paper, a transcendental-philosophical justification is presented: Starting with a broad understanding of the phenomenon of morality, the paper shows that morality has five necessary preconditions, namely the abilities of having a will, of being free, of being rational, of having a moral conscience and of being a self. As preconditions of morality, these five abilities lie beyond moral weighing and have thus to be regarded as absolute values, constituting human dignity. The paper ends - fourthly and fifthly - with a discussion of the ethical and legal consequences of this concept and with some of its difficulties.