Rumfitt on truth-grounds, negation, and vagueness

Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2079-2089 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In The Boundary Stones of Thought, Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11098-018-1114-7

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

II—Hyperintensional Truth Conditions.Gary Kemp - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):57-68.
Some Comments on Ian Rumfitt’s Bilateralism.Nils Kürbis - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (6):623-644.
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Amounts of Vagueness, Degrees of Truth.Enrique Romerales - 1999 - Sorites 11:41-65.
On the very idea of degrees of truth.Timothy Cleveland - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):218 – 221.
Does Vagueness Exclude Knowledge?David Barnett - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):22 - 45.
Truth and The Ambiguity of Negation.Teresa Marques - 2010 - In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. pp. 2--235.
Vagueness, Truth and Permissive Consequence.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 409-430.
Price and Rumfitt on rejective negation and classical logic.Peter Gibbard - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):297-304.
Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay in the Logic of Truth. [REVIEW]Jamie Tappenden - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):142-144.
Paraconsistent vagueness: a positive argument.Pablo Cobreros - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):211-227.
Vagueness as closeness.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):157 – 183.
Paradoxes of Signification.Stephen Read - 2016 - Vivarium 54 (4):335-355.
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth.Paul Egré - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):177-180.
Paradoxes of Signification.Stephen Read - 2018 - New Content is Available for Vivarium.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-10

Downloads
955 (#14,570)

6 months
95 (#47,891)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Zach
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Mathematics and Metaphilosophy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2022 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford University Press.
Reply to Crispin Wright and Richard Zach.Ian Rumfitt - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2091-2103.

Add more citations

References found in this work

True, Truer, Truest.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):47-70.
Pretopologies and completeness proofs.Giovanni Sambin - 1995 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (3):861-878.

Add more references