Abstract

The dissertation is a response to Hume's contention expressed in the Treatise that in introspection one is not aware of oneself but only of perceptions of oneself, which is to be compared to his similar contention that we do not perceive external material objects but only our perceptions of those objects. By considering what is implicit in a correct representational account of perception, I argue that it is a mistake to consider the relation between a perceiver and the mental representations of the thing that he perceives to be a perceiving relation. But if such a relation is not a perceiving relation, then the perceptions in one's mind do not play a role of a "veil" which can block one's access to perceiving both external objects and oneself as Hume implicitly thought they would. ;The goal of this dissertation hence is to provide an account of the kind of awareness we have of ourselves that no one other than we can have of us, because this awareness is not based on observation. I attempt to show how one can be aware of oneself simply by being noninferentially aware of the state one is in. I call the kind of self-awareness "proprietary nonepistemic self-awareness" as opposed to epistemic awareness of facts regarding oneself. I argue it is not causally possible for anyone other than oneself to have this kind of awareness one has of oneself. The kind of causal possibility that establishes the concept of "proprietary nonepistemic self-awareness" is supported by facts of neuroscience. This causal impossibility of such second person awareness of a person must be distinguished from the logical or metaphysical impossibility of such awareness, and my claim stops short of the claim that it is logically or metaphysically impossible for a second person to have this kind of awareness of a first. In the end I suggest that there is nothing to explain about "proprietary nonepistemic self-awareness" except what is explained by the neurophysiological facts.