Epistemological aspects of delusional thinking

Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):125-136 (2021)
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Abstract

: The notion of a delusion occupies a central place in psychotherapy. The presence of delusional thinking in a patient is often regarded as indicative of psychosis. And yet, the nature of a delusion is still widely disputed. The difficulty of defining a delusion has proved so difficult that some prominent authors have declared the task impossible. The aim of this paper is to offer a characterisation of delusional systems of thought. In this paper is argued that delusions, unlike scientific explanations and the explanations generally offered by common sense, fail to minimise that which requires explanation. In the first part of the paper, difficulties with extant accounts will be discussed. In the following parts, the author’s own account of delusional thoughts will be developed and some difficult cases considered. It will be argued that delusions differ from more typical beliefs in the number of things that they leave unexplained. Delusions, unlike those beliefs we typically see as rational, bring about an increase in the number of things requiring explanation. Keywords: Delusions; Epistemology; Analysis; Explanation; Rationality Aspetti epistemologici del pensiero delirante Riassunto: La nozione di delirio occupa una posizione centrale nell’ambito della psicoterapia. La presenza del pensiero delirante in un paziente è considerata spesso come un indice di psicosi. E, tuttavia, la natura del delirio non è ancora oggetto di ampio accordo tra gli studiosi. La difficoltà nel definire il delirio si è mostrata talmente ostica che diversi importanti studiosi hanno dichiarato questo compito impossibile. Lo scopo di questo lavoro è quello di offrire una caratterizzazione dei sistemi di pensiero delirante. Si sosterrà che i deliri, diversamente dalle spiegazioni scientifiche e da quelle offerte generalmente dal senso comune, non riescono a ridurre quanto necessita di una spiegazione. Nella prima parte del lavoro, saranno discusse le difficoltà degli approcci correnti. Nelle parti seguenti verrà proposto l’approccio dell’autore ai pensieri deliranti e verranno presi in esame alcuni casi complessi. Si sosterrà che i deliri si distinguono dai casi più tipici di credenza per il numero di cose che lasciano senza spiegazione. I deliri, diversamente dalle credenze che tipicamente consideriamo irrazionali, determinano un incremento del numero di cose che richiedono una spiegazione. Parole chiave: Delirio; Epistemologia; Analisi; Spiegazione; Razionalità

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The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.

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