Abstract

The Principle of Double Effect is defended against Alan Donagan's two central objections. Those objections are, in essence, that the principle is superfluous, and that it depends on a distinction that is inconsistent with the theory of action that is accepted by Donagan. These objections occur in the context of, and are dependent upon, the theory of morality that Donagan presents in his The Theory of Morality. It is shown that the first objection is mistaken by showing that there is at least one true moral doctrine that can be defended through appeal to the Principle of Double Effect, and not through appeal to any of the moral principle included in Donagan's theory as he presents it. The second objection is shown to be mistaken by showing that there is a formulation of the principle that is consistent with the theory of action that is accepted by Donagan. In the presentation of this formulation of the principle the distinction between what an agent brings about intentionally and what he foresees that he will bring about but does not do so intentionally is explained. Finally it is shown that the Principle of Double Effect is consistent with, and helps to explain, what it is for an agent to respect others as rational creatures. This concept is central to Donagan's theory of morality. ;This discussion of the Principle of Double Effect and Donagan's theory of morality provides a better understanding of what Donagan's fundamental principle of morality comes to than is available in his book; it provides a formulation of the principle that is consistent with a plausible theory of action; and it provides an account of how the principle can be defended against certain objections