The Representation of Belief

Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):715-732 (2018)
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Abstract

I derive a sufficient condition for a belief set to be representable by a probability function: if at least one comparative confidence ordering of a certain type satisfies Scott’s axiom, then the belief set used to induce that ordering is representable. This provides support for Kenny Easwaran’s project of analyzing doxastic states in terms of belief sets rather than credences.

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10.1007/s10992-017-9448-8

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Isaac Wilhelm
National University of Singapore

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.

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