Abstract

The final chapter attacks Brentano's argument against subjectivism by indicating how his epistemology for ethics may refute a protagorean view but is compatible with other types of ontological subjectivism. He cannot, on the basis of his epistemology, propose any link between experiences and objective values. ;An account similar to Brentano's of how we acquire the data for our systems of ethical beliefs is required by most contemporary positions , which begin at the point of organizing our ethical beliefs into coherent theories. With some modifications, Brentano's position succeeds as an epistemology, though it fails as an argument for objectivist ontology; its ability to provide the epistemological foundation for both objectivist and subjectivist ethics should be considered a strength rather than a weakness. ;The fourth chapter discusses flaws in Brentano's analogy, in his analysis of value, and in his account of acts of emotion. Despite its need of improvements, Brentano's theory is correct in pointing out that there is an important analogy between value experience and other experience and also between the respective objects of those experiences. The criticisms do not undercut the postulation of acts of emotion as a fundamental kind of mental act distinct from judgment. ;The second and third chapters present Brentano's epistemology for ethics within the context of his positivistic descriptive psychology. The key feature of his account is the analogy Brentano draws between acts of judgment and acts of emotion. This analogy provides a reason for believing that there is an analogy between the ontological status of existence and the ontological status of good. Thus, Brentano concludes that value is no more subjective than is existence. ;The central thesis of Brentano's epistemology for ethics has been misinterpreted as an ontological thesis, most notably by G. E. Moore. This basic misinterpretation can lead to misreading Brentano's ontology for ethics as subjectivist. In fact, the main argument of his major work in ethics, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, is against subjectivism. ;To prepare for the criticism of the argument against subjectivism, the first chapter distinguishes ontological from epistemic subjectivism and shows that Brentano's argument is aimed at one among several versions of ontological subjectivism. His epistemic views are themselves subjectivist. ;This dissertation presents Franz Brentano's theory of how we achieve knowledge of value and criticizes his attempt to refute subjectivism on the basis of that theory