Abstract

In “Disentangling Conscience Protections,” in this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Nadia Sawicki offers a taxonomy of conscience protection laws (conscience clauses) that highlights the expansive protections they can offer to health professionals who refuse to provide a medical service for reasons of conscience. Conscience clauses can protect health professionals from adverse actions by public actors (such as administrative agencies, prosecutors, and government funders) or private actors (such as employers, private professional associations, and injured patients), and they can also protect health professionals from being subject to adverse actions for their beliefs, their conduct, or harm that results from their conduct. This taxonomy provides an accurate description of the broad range of protections conscience clauses can offer and thereby is a valuable contribution to the scholarly literature on conscientious objection in health care. But it remains to consider whether the distinctions Sawicki identifies disentangle conscience protections beyond merely providing a taxonomy. In particular, does the taxonomy identify relevant distinctions in relation to determining whether a conscience clause is justified?