Abstract

The analysis presented here covers a vast number of aspects, or sub-questions, of the maddeningly frustrating general question, How can I be sure that, every time I believe something, such as that there are rocks, I am not deceived into so believing by a modern version of Descartes’ evil demon, i.e., a mad scientist who, by means of electrodes implanted in my brain, manipulates my beliefs? Numerous aspects are also analyzed of the standard objections to scepticism, such as G. E. Moore’s common-sense affirmations of knowledge that he has two hands and the ad hominem question, If no beliefs are justified, then why do you, the sceptic, believe such propositions as the proposition that no beliefs are justified? The author not only concludes in favor of scepticism, but also erects strong arguments supporting the contention that, even apart from knowledge or supposed knowledge, truth itself is impossible. He concludes that, "to solve our problems [about the unwarranted use of terms such as ‘know', ‘believe', and ‘true'], either a new language should be developed and made available or at least an existing language should be radically changed in creative ways."—W.G.