Ampliative Understanding

Abstract

The primary goal of this dissertation is to develop and defend an account of understanding, which I call ampliative understanding. I will begin by defending the claim that understanding has final value as a cognitive achievement. From there, I will explore the notion of cognitive success as it pertains to achievement through the notions of facticity, coherence, and grasping. Although an analysis of understanding based on these features is ultimately unsuccessful, I offer a different approach in developing an account of understanding. Instead of looking at what comprises an understanding, I look at what a successful understanding can produce – namely, true beliefs.

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